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Abbreviations. 
The following abbreviations have been used in the 
foot -notes with reference to Rashdall's own books, which 
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are here listed chronologically: 
DD - -- Doctrine and Development. (1898) 
CE - -- Christus in Ecclesia. (1904) 
GE - -- The Theory of Good and Evil. (1907) 
(Volume numbers are represented by large Roman 
numerals; this work is in two volumes,but it 
is divided into three "Booksx ". Where the 
Book, instead of the Volume, is referred to, 
this has been indicated). 
PR - -- Philosophy and Religion. 
ICE --- Is Conscience an Emotion? 




Atonement - -- The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theolo . 
1919 
JHD - -- Jesus, Human and Divine. 
PP - -- Principles and Precepts. 
ID - -- Ideas and Ideals. 





The titles of three symposia to which Rashdall contributed 
have likewise been abbreviated thus: 
CV - -- Contentio Veritatis. ( "The Ultimate Basis of Theism "). 
(1902). 
PI - -- Personal Idealism. ( "Personality, Human and Divine "). 
(1902) . 
FW - -- The Faith and the War.( "The Problem of Evil "). 
(1915). 
The titles of periodicals have sometimes been abbreviated, 
but in such a way as to be unmistakablè 
1. See the Bibliography for full data. 
Single inverted commas, throughout, indicate direct 
quotation; double commas indicate that the expression is 
a quotation within the book quoted, or a quotation within 
a quotation, or that it has some special significance. 
"There two or more succeding quotations are from the same 
page in the work followed, that page is indicated with 
reference to the last quotation. In order to avoid 
confusion, it has sometimes been necessary to capitalize 
the possessive pronoun when referring to the Deity or to 
Christ, hence this has been done throughout. Cross - 
references to pages in this thesis have been uniformly 
indicated by the symbol #. 
Virtually all persons of high academic rank in 
the Jnited States are "Professors % I have applied 
the title incorrectly to several British scholars 
mentioned in the followingg pages, but this was not 
pointed out to me until it was too late to make the 
necessary corrections. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Hastings Rashdall will be remembered primarily for the 
versatility which enabled him to produce three such works as The 
Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, The Theory of Good and 
Evil, and The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology. Against the 
background of a widely diversified learning, he consciously emulated 
Aquinas in his desire to compass the whole area of knowledge within 
1 
a consistent theological system. Doubtless he was aware of how 
far short he fell of this ideal; the magnitude of his enterprise 
inevitably laid his writings open to defects, although he was more 
successful in avoiding superficiality than are most thinkers who 
have the temerity to undertake huge tasks of research in a number 
of different fields. Scholars have frequently questioned his 
originality within their respective spheres, but they have hastily 
coupled this with admiration for his ability otherwise. The 
Biblical scholar, for example, is not favourably impressed by him 
as an exegete, and suggests that his strength lay, say, in 
metaphysics. The philosopher esteems him more as a courageous 
theologian than as a philosopher. The theologian is convinced 
that here was a really great historian whose mind proved to be a 
bit too unyielding when he turned to constructive theology. This, 
of course, is the price of versatility, and his critics are 
1. 'Thomas Aquinas did a great work for his time by putting 
Christianity into a shape in which it satisfied, on the whole, 
the intellect of his day - by combining the truth about God 
which the world had learned from Christ with all the truth 
about man and the Universe which it had learned from other 
sources... But knowledge and thought go on growing, and the 
work which St. Thomas did for his age wants doing again for ours; 
for knowledge increases and thought advances, and Theology, 
if it is to be a living science, must advance too'. 
(GM., p. 198). 
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justified in emphasizing those shortcomings which their 
training has prepared them to discern most readily. Never- 
theless a review of Rashdall's writings should be challenging 
precisely because he attempted with at least a boldness which few 
English thinkers of his generation can rival, to bind ethics, 
metaphysics and theology into one consistent system. This fact 
in itself seems to furnish sufficient excuse for a survey which 
is designed to present the essence of his thought in a single, 
coherent argument. 
At the same time the variety and scope of the problems he 
discusses, the wealth of historical detail which be brings to 
bear upon them, the pains with which he scrutinizes opposing 
points of view, and the concreteness with which he habitually 
relates theoretical issues to practical affairs, often by means of 
humourous illustrations, - all these considerations set definite 
limits to what a monograph of this kind can accomplish. 
Historical and exegetical material has been dealt with in an 
extremely summary manner; so far as criticism of his scholarship 
is concerned, I have not mentioned even all the most dubious points. 
Controversial matter has also been reduced to a minimum, though any- 
one familiar with Rashdall's career will know that it would be 
misleading to separate his thought from replies to opponents. As 
Dr. W. R. Matthews has put it: 
'Dr. Rashdall is one of those who never build so well 
as when they have a sword in one hand and a trowel in the 
other; he is never so vivacious as when he is slaying either 
a high churchman or a denier of the objectivity of moral 
judgments'.1 
Of Rashdall's influence as a preacher the following pages can give 
but little hint, b.ecatzse practical applications and discussion of 
detailed theological questions have had to give way before issues 
1. Hibbert Journal. Vol. XIII, p. 926. 
of principle ; his purely historical writings, and virtually all 
of his articles on social, economic and educational problems, have 
been passed over for the same reason. The bibliography, in which 
I have sought to include everything he has published, indicates 
where these neglected items can be found. In the chapter on 
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metaphysics, and in one portion of the chapter on doctrine, i 
have felt justified in giving a rather full outline of his opinions, 
in an effort to compensate in some small way for deficiencies which 
Rashdall's death prevented him from supplying as he intended. All 
else, including much that could have been discussed with great profit, 
has been sacrificed in an attempt to show the relationship in which 
each main aspect of his thought stands to the others. So large a 
proportion of his work is contained in isolated articles, lectures 
and small books, that if the expository section of this thesis 
succeeds in leaving a clear impression of the singleness of purpose 
which he brought to his variegated intellectual activities, it will 
be of more value than the critical reflections offered in the latter 
half. 
The task of setting forth Rashdall's religious philosophy in a 
unified, orderly statement is facilitated by the fact that his 
writings, from the earliest to the latest, manifest a remarkable 
consistency. Apparently he did not begin contributing to 
philosophical journals until he had thought out the rudimentary 
outlines of a working philosophy; for it is possible in the case 
of every important aspect of his thought to point to some essay or 
sermon written pries' to 1900 which contains the basic principles of 
his later books. Perhaps this will be taken as indicating either 
hat he was too stubborn to change his point of view, or that his 
thought crystallized into an unyielding system. He was nearly 
1. Chapter I1S 
2. Chapter IV, 2. - concerning the Incarnation. 
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thirty years of age, however, before his first philosophical 
articles began to appear; and in the succeeding ten years, while he 
was engaged primarily in his work on the medieval universities, he 
unhurriedly developed his own speculative outlook. Hence one of the 
reasons why he did not change the first principles of his 
philosophy as his thought progressed, was that he had not expressed 
them prematurely. That took place, then, in the period between 
1900 and his death, when all his philosophical and theological books 
(except for the first volume of sermons) were written, was the 
gradual elaboration and deepening of a single world -view, as his 
mind confronted fresh problems and fortified itself with an 
increasingly wide study of the history of Christian thought. 
Still another consideration helps to explain the consistency 
of his work as a whole. He habitually reached theoretical 
conclusions as the result of reflection upon practical issues, and 
he had no interest in building up an architectonic system for its own 
sake. Therefore his philosophy bears to a striking degree the 
impress of his own temperament, and his temperament can hardly be 
characterized except as one of rugged common sense. Perhaps he 
appealed too frequently to "the plain, self- evident facts" in 
seeking to substantiate really questionable points in his own 
position; certainly he had no hesitation in waving aside dialectical 
brilliance whenever he felt that it led ultimately to nonsense. 
In any case, familiarity with his characteristic reactions and methods 
frequently makes it possible for one to conjecture in advance how 
he will treat a new problem and what his conclusions will be. One 
can even reconstruct what in all probability would be the essence 
of his attitude toward the Oxford Group Movement or toward 
Barthianism, if he were alive today. 
- viii - 
This desire to make every aspect of his thinking cohere 
found expression in an unwavering confidence in reason; yet he 
always looked upon the functioning of reason as integral to the 
unified consciousness of the self. Hence on the one hand he 
broke away from absolute idealism because of its hypostatization 
of abstract thought. But on the other hand he was an avowed 
opponent of the voluntaristic tendencies which came into 
philosophical prominence during his life -time; for example, he 
was convinced that pragmatism ignores the distinction between 
objective truth and falsity. His rationalism continually 
involved him in disputes with conservative churchmen when he turned 
to theology; because he regarded the moral consciousness as 
included within the sphere of reason, and then built his theology 
largely upon that foundation, he left little room for the mystical, 
the mysterious and the miraculous in religion. He did, indeed, 
recognize that reason has its limits, but he felt that those limits 
mark the boundary of what the human mind can know at all; once 
reason had been pressed to the utmost, he regarded it as 
illegitimate to look for illumination from some region beyond. 
If some aspects of reality are literally supra -rational, he 
contended, we cannot even be aware of them, let alone understand 
them; hence it is better to assume an attitude of reverent 
agnosticism in such matters than to introduce contradictory or 
unintelligible elements into theology. This intellectual 
disposition in its6lf would have been sufficient to make his 
career in the Church a stormy one; but other personal 
characteristics intensified the inevitable conflicts. In the 
first place, he did not permit his very real desire for 
conciliation so to soften his statements as to blur their meaning. 
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Rather than foster harmony through silence or vague language, 
he preferred to serve the cause of truth within the Church by 
actively attacking doctrines or beliefs which he regarded as 
unsound. Popular approval seemed to him a poor substitute 
for intellectual integrity. Dean Inge has written of him: 
'My friend Rashdall...ws impelled by his combative 
disposition always to sieze a poker by the hot end, and 
in consequence had a reputation for heresy which he 
certainly did not deserve'.1 
That must have given even greater pain to conservative 
opponents than his aggressive liberalism was the fact that Rashdall 
was convinced of his own fundamental orthodoxy. He recognized 
that he was at odds with the general opinion of the Church on 
questions involving miracles, especially with regard to the Virgin 
Birth and the physical Resurrection; but he did not look upon these: 
as essential. :ith regard to doctrines like the Incarnation, the 
Trinity, and the Atonement, however, he was ready to defend his 
orthodoxy with an acuteness and a wealth of historical learning 
which must have made him troublesome as an opponent. Moreover, 
when he felt sufficiently justified, he did not limit his remarks 
to an apologetic for his own position; he boldly charged 
notoriously conservative theologians with holding views which were 
really heretical. 
Unmitigating confidence in reason is not an unmixed blessing 
in a theologian; and if many err on the side of being too ready to 
evade difficulties by relegating them to a realm of divine mystery, 
Rashdall perhaps erred in the opposite manner; he followed out the 
logical implications of his thought so rigorously that he sometimes 
reached conclusions too clear -cut to be true. Some of his own 
1. Cf. Vale, p. 54. Rashdall himself one said of Bernard 
Bosanquet that the latter had 'exceeded the limits of 
courtesy that were customary between scholars'(Oxford 
Magazine. Vol. XLII. p. 276). 
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friends felt this to be especially the case with his solution 
to the problem of evil; Dean Inge once said with regard to his 
1 
conception of a limited Deity: "I have no use for godlets ". Again, 
the consistency of Rashdall's own mind often led him astray when he 
studied exegetical and historical questions; to Biblical writers, to 
the framers of the creeds, or to great theologians of the past, he 
tended to attribute a uniformity in the use of terms and a logical 
coherence which in many instances they did not possess. Moreover, 
in his studies of historical theology he usually had some polemical 
purpose uppermost in his mind, and this inevitably biased his 
researches in favour of whatever would support his own thesis; as 
a result, what he méant to be an impartial survey of a writer's 
thought at times turned into special pleading. 
A11 these considerations fall within the perspective of a 
wider purpose which will lie continually in the background of this 
thesis, and concerning which a word must now be said. Rashdall's 
religious philosophy repays study not only because of features 
already mentioned, but because the type of thinking which it 
represents is undergoing such widespread criticism to -day. 
Undeniably his conception of theology is the sort which Barth cannot 
abide. To be sure, Rashdall did not fall into all the heresies of 
liberalism which the Barthians have catalogued. His distrust of 
arguments based on immediate religious experience put him poles 
asunder from the subjectivism and the mysticism which Schleiermacher 
is usually blamed for insinuating into Christian theology. Again, 
acceptance of the evolutionary view of history did not lead Rashdall 
into the superficial optimism which, it is alleged, tainted European 
and American theology before the war; he conceived of salvation and 
the Kingdom - to take specific examples - as beginning in a 
terrestrial process which reaches fruition only in the future, in a 
'1. Dr. Major recounted this to me; so far as I know it has not 
appeared in print_ 
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supra- mundane order. Most noteworthy of all, he was not an 
indeterminist. But the alternatives which he adopted must seem 
to the Barthian equally bad. for if Rashdall reacted against 
subjectivism, he at the same time repudiated the distinction between 
natural and revealed theology. And if he reacted against a shallow 
optimism, he at the same time refused to acknowledge any radical 
separation between God and man, between the supernatural and the 
natural - any "infinite qualitative difference between the eternal and 
1 
the temporal" - such as Barthianism involves. 
Naturally recent theological tendencies cannot be discussed in 
this thesis; but if a period of reaction is apt to swing too far in 
the opposite direction, overlooking the merits and exaggerating the 
defects of the previous period, then the study of a powerful representa- 
tive of liberalism should help to suggest which elements in it may right- 
ly be discarded and which should not be allowed to perish in the rising 
tide of the Theology of Crisis. I have already admitted that in a few 
respects Rashdall does not fit into the Barthian description of what 
constitutes a liberal; perhaps his writing may be taken as indicating 
that this description sometimes borders on mere caricature. Yet if a 
steadfast belief in the reasonableness of Christianity, and a firm 
conviction that theology should be built upon an ethical foundation, 
2 
be the two most important features of liberalism, Rashdall assuredly 
epitomizes them. In so far as Barthianism places man's reason, 
including conscience., within the sphere of the flesh, it strikes at the 
foundation upon which post -Kantian Protestant theology has largely 
rested. This fact should make our present enterprise all the more 
relevant to current problems; for every difficulty which Rashdall 
1. The expression is Kierkegaard's, but I cannot recall exactly 
where I have read it. 
2. Cf. C.J. Shebbea's remarks in The Atonement in History and 
in Life,p. 309. 
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encounters in defending the independent validity of moral judgments 
(on which he primarily bases his theology), in defending theism by 
other speculative arguments, and in employing this theistic system 
as an apologetic for Christian doctrine, attests to the danger of 
resting the validity of Christian revelation upon purely rational 
grounds. At the same time, wherever the strength of his own 
position becomes apparent, then we may take that as an admonition 
against lightly relinquishing whatever benefits a rational theology 
has to offer. 
Admittedly we cannot generalize concerning such momentous questions 
on the basis of one man's thought. Yet there are certain advantages 
to be derived from the study of one representative of a movement, which 
would remain even if an understanding of liberalism were our primary 
concern. In one man's mind, if it be penetrating enough, the essence 
of a movement may be distilled away from extraneous elements. This 
gives rise to a danger if it blinds one to the fact that the movement 
is more diffuse than the man; but on the other hand, it may enable 
one to discern certain cardinal features which otherwise would not have 
been distinguishable admidst the confusing welter of a generation's 
thought. Rashdall took such pains to show the organic relationship 
between his own ideas and the traditional doctrines of Christianity, 
that in his case we find an especially good opportunity for forming some 
sort of a judgment concerning what place belongs to liberalism in the 
sweep of dogmatic history. Because he was awake to the various influ- 
ences which were moulding European thought, especially prior to the war, 
we can study in him the perennial problem of the relationship between 
Christian theology and secular thought as it pertains to the development 
of liberalism. In this connexion his acquaintance with current 
philosophical disputes, as well as the close attention which he gave to 
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the findings of higher criticism and to specific theological 
tendencies like Ritschlianism and Catholic modernism, make his 
religious philosophy a meeting ground for most of the forces which 
fashioned Christian thought in the first quarter of the twentieth 
century. 
A further word should be said here concerning the sources from 
which he drew; in so far as possible I have indicated, at the 
appropriate point in the exposition, those writers who influenced.him 
most. In some instances,however, it has been necessary to do more 
than this. Because in many respects he reached his own conclusions 
primarily in response to or in reaction against the writingsof others, 
it has been undesirable to abstract those conclusions entirely from the 
setting in which they developed. These references to other thinkers 
have been confined to that bare minimum which is indispensable to an 
understanding of Rashdall's own position. In order to avoid 
confusion, the ideas of others have been stated in the sense in which 
they influenced him; frequently his interpretation is by no means the 
only one possible, and, in some instances it may seem to be positively 
unfair or misleading. Where this latter has been the case, I have 
sometimes sought to indicate the fact in so far as my own acquaintance 
with the writers concerned made that possible; but the main purpose 
throughout has been first to unfold Rashdall's thought as it stands, 
and then to criticize it in terms of itself. While supplementary 
reading has been employed in criticizing the various aspects of his 
system, all else has been made subordinate to a consideration of 
difficulties which are inherent to that system. Hence, to the extent 
that conscious effort enables one to do so, I have usually suppressed 
my own prejudices and predilections, with the intention of making such 
criticisms as are offered those which would occur most inevitably to 
anyone who studied his thought as a whole. 
The thesis thus divides itself into two main sections; the first 
is expository and the second critical. In the former, while following 
the inner logic of Rashdall's own thought, I have nevertheless attempted 
to bring out tLe chief points of weakness in such a manner that the way 
is prepared for a critical examination of them in the latter half. 
Naturally this latter half is largely destructive in tone because those 
aspects of his thought which rest on a firm foundation need little 
further comment; this will not be taken, I trust, as indicating a lack 
of respect on my part for the work of a very earnest and able Christian 
theologian. 
An admirable biography of Rashdall has been written by Percy E. 
1 ' 
Matheson of New College; in it the various influences which entered 
into his intellectual life may be traced in detail. Because this 
volume is readily available I have refrained from mentioning many 
personal incidents and characteristics which throw much light on 
Rashdall's writings. It also contains a masterly comment, contributed 
2 
by Dr. Webb, upon Rashdall as a philosopher and theologian. Articles 
3 4 
by Dr. Major and Dr. Kirkby in The Modern Churchman, the preface to 
5 6 
God and Man, and Prof. Joseph's brief tribute in The Oxford Magazine, 
also provide illuminating insight into his character and work. 
1. Percy E. Matheson: The Life of Hastings Rashdall. Oxford 1928. 
2. Ibid. Ch. XIII, by C.C.J. Webb. 
3. Op. cit. Vol. XIII. pp. 634 -42. 
4. Ibid. Vol. XVII, pp. 481 -88. 
5. Q. cit. ( s s airs by Rashdall, edited by H.D.A. Major and 
F.L.Cross). Cf. pp. 7 -12. 
6. Op. cit. Vol. XLII, pp. 275 ff. 
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AN EXPOSITION OF RASHDALLtS RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY. 
CHAPTER I - MORAL THEORY 
The epithet once applied to John Dewey serves equally well to 
indicate the primary characteristic of Dean Rashdall's thinking: 
"He is incurably ethical ". The fruits of Rashdall's reflection 
during the years when he taught moral philosophy at Oxford are 
contained in his longest philosophical book, The Theory of Good and 
Evil. Undoubtedly his two other chief works are more original in 
their respective fields. Neverthelass, his contribution to ethics 
was one of the most significant made by any Oxford writer between 
1 
th+ime of Green and the controversy of the last few years. 
Because the moral consciousness is the focal point of Rashdall's 
thinking, his entire system must suffer greatly if his ethical theory 
is found to be defective in any fundamental respect. Future discussion 
will reveal the fact that his defence of theism rests primarily upon the 
objectivity of and that he regards the moral consciousness 
as affording the most important - if not the only - insight into the 
character of God. His reinterpretation of Christian doctrine is 
founded upon the belief that in morality human nature and the nature of 
God are the expression of a common principle; it is not unfair to say 
that he uniformly uses his conception of what constitutes moral truth 
as a criterion for discovering the eternal truth embedded in 
Christianity. Certainly he fee's bound to reject whatever seems 
immoral in traditional formulations of a doctrine like the Atonement. 
Therefore no intelligible survey of his religious philosophy can be 
undertaken except by first scrutinizing his conception of the nature 
of morality. 
1. A profitable discussion could be devoted to a consideration of 
Rashdall's ethical position in the light of these later writings 
by Prichard: Ross, Carritt and Joseph in Oxford, by Moore, Broad 
and Osborne in Cambridge, by Muirhead in Birmingham, Stocks in 
Manchester, Laird in Aberdeen,and many others. This is a topic 
which will receive some attention in the critical sectionC# 24g *f%); 
but our theme does not permit a thorough treatment of purely 
ethical questions. 
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The predominant affinities of The Theory of Good and Evil 
are indicated by the fact that it is dedicated to the memory of 
1 
T. H. Green and Henry Sidgwick. Rashdall was a pupil of Green, 
but he gradually found himself compelled to combat the followers 
of his master at Oxford, both in ethics andAmetaphysics. A 
cursory glance reveals the pervasiveness of Sidgwick's influence 
upon him; the real starting point of almost every chapter in the 
first volume of Rashdall's work is the painstaking analysis which 
the question at issue received in The Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick's 
influence also accounts for the striking parallel which at times 
exists between Rashdall's point of view and that of G.E. Moore. 
At first glance it might seem that the agreement between the two 
writers was due to direct borrowing on Rashdall's part, since Moore's 
Principia'Ethica was published four years before The Theory of Good 
and Evil. An early article by Rashdall, however, entitled "The 
2 
Principle of Authority in Its Relation to Morals", gives evidence 
that he had at that time thought out, in an imperfect form, the 
fundamental position which appeared sixteen years later in his 
3 
book; in fact many articles which were included almost unaltered 
as chapters in that work had appeared before the publication of 
Moore's treatise. 
The manner in which these and other writers affect Rashdall's own 
thinking is revealed in the opening chapters of The Theory of Good 
1. Prof. Broad once remarked: 'Even a thoroughly second -rate thinker 
like ''.H. Green, by diffusing a grateful and comforting aroma of 
ethical "uplift ", has probably made far more undergraduates into 
prigs than Sidgwick will ever make into philosophers' (Five Types 
of Ethical Theory, p. 144). Rashdall constitutes an exception to 
this pleasantry on both counts: for Green failed to make him a 
prig, and Sidgwick undeniably helped to make him a philosopher. 
This fact, of course, need not affect Prof. Broad's mordant 
fidelity to Cambridge. 
2. Cf. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.(1891). Vol.I,pp.96 -110. 
3. Cf. GE.I,pp. viii.ff. for a list of such articles. 
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and Evil, wherein he undertakes a survey of several contrasting types 
of ethical theory. His own position, which he calls "ideal 
utilitarianism ", gradually emerges in the course of the argument; and 
though it is constructed largely by means of a process of selection 
and rejection, the conclusions reached by no means form an 
artificially welded or merely eclectic system. For the sake of 
clarity it will be best to state at the outset the positive conclusions 
at which he finally arrives; then we may proceed to examine the various 
considerations which lead Rashdall to assume such a position. 
He accepts Sidgwick's contention that ethics must be teleological, 
- that it must determine the rightness of an action in terms of the 
extent to which that action will promote an intrinsically good end; 
the two writers differ sharply, however, concerning what constitutes 
this end. Both describe it as "universal well -being "; but for 
Rashdall this ideal, while it includes pleasure, incorporates other 
and more important elements such as virtue and cultural interests. 
Only an immediate judgment of value, he declares, can disclose that 
these various states of consciousness are good, and only comparative 
judgments of value can determine their relative positions in a 
conception of the summum bonum. 
His defence of this position encounters several problems; (1) The 
hedonistic identification of value with pleasure must be refuted. 
(2) The teleological relationship between the right and the good, which 
provides Rashdall with his view of the moral criterion, must be 
defended against that form of intuitionism which holds that the rightness 
of an act is known irrespective of its consequences. (3) Kant's 
formalistic attempt to give meaning to the idea of duty without appealing 
1. Q. cit. Bk. I. Chs. II-VII. 
to the concrete goods presented by experience, likewise conflicts with 
Rashdall's conception of the moral criterion; naturally he accepts, 
however, the Kantian thesis that virtue possesses intrinsic value. 
(4) The validity of judgiments of value must be established against 
theories which seek to enslave them to feeling, emotion or 
satisfaction. (5) The possibility of comparing heterogeneous goods 
must be demonstrated if it is true that such a comparison alone can 
reveal wherein duty lies. Rashdall's treatment of these topics will 
1 
now be examined in this order. 
1. Pleasure and Moral Goodness. 
(i) - Psychological Hedonism. 
The theory of psychological hedonism, whose foremost protagonist 
was Jeremy Bentham, elicits Rashdall's initial attention; for if its 
assertion can be substantiated that in fact only pleasure is ever desired, 
then theories like Sidgwick's which attempt to defend the rationality 
of hedonism, are rendered superfluous. Sidgwick may accord an 
independent meaning to the term "duty ", while contending that it is 
1. The composite character of The Theory of Good and Evil - several 
of its chapters being articles which were separately published - 
no doubt accounts for certain defects in its,arrangement. The 
first point supra corresponds to Book I, Chapters II and III, the 
second point to Chapter IV, the third to Ohapter V. But surely 
the chapter entitled "Morality and Evolution "(Book III, Chapter IV) 
belongs with Book I, Chapter VI, in a discussion of the moral 
consciousness, rather than in the metaphysical section. These two 
chapters, together with a book entitled Is Conscience an Emotion ?, 
and articles mentioned later, provide material for the treatment 
of the fourth point. Finally, the chapters on the hedonistic 
calculus, the commensurability of values, and the limits of casuistry 
(respectively Book II, Chapters I and II; Book III, Chapter V) have 
been joined here in a unified discussion of the fifth point. For 
all but the last point a little volume entitled Ethics (Published 
in 1913), which Rashdall wrote for "The People's Books "Series, 
furnishes a useful condensation of the argument. in The Theory of 
Good and Evil. Three chapters in this latter workTBook I, 
Chapter VIII; Book,II Chapters III and IV) deal with specific moral 
problems; for this reason they have not been brought into the 
course of the succeeding argument. 
always one's duty to promote the greatest possible pleasure. But 
Bentham's view, by resolving; the idea of goodnêss into that of the 
pleasant, denies the former notion's sui generis character altogether; 
it likewise robs the idea of duty of all distinctive meaning, since if 
in fact only pleasure is ever desired, it is idle to ask whether anything 
1 
else ought to be desired. 
Rashdall is concerned to disprove Bentham's view, not only because 
he regards it as destructive of genuine morality, but because he 
himself cannotollow ultra -rationalists in an unqualified deprecation 
of pleasure. Precisely because he is willing to acknowledge its 
legitimate place in the scale of values, he appreciates the importance 
of leaving no ambiguity as to his attitude toward any theory which 
seeks to make pleasure the sole value. 
He begins by contending that whether the hedonist define the pleasure 
in question as present, future, or "the greatest on the whole ", he 
cannot establish the thesis that men never desire anything else, - 
though a certain plausibility may be gained for the hedonistic 
argument by vacillating between these three possible interpretations. 
Certainly even very selfish people, as Rashdall points out, deliberately 
1. Professor Broad thinks that though psychological hedonism would 
render "duty" and "obligation" meaningless, it would not 
necessarily destroy the meaning of "right ". 'It might be the 
case that the only end which I can desire is also the end which 
it is right or appropriate or fíTtting for me to desire'. (Five 
Types of Ethical Theory, p. 182). If, however, "right" is 
definable íßñ terms of conduciveness to the greatest possible 
good, and goodness is definable in terms of pleasure, then the 
judgment "right action is conducive to the greatest possible 
pleasure" would be tautologous. But it is possible to hold, as 
Sidgwick does, that right action is always conducive to the 
greatest possible good, without holding that the one concept is 
definable in terms of the other. This point will prove to be 
of considerable importance. (Cf. # 249 ff . )', 
- 6 - 
elect to endure pairifül experiences in the present for the sake of some 
future end; but he is able in turn to dispose of the case for future 
pleasure by showing that, if the hedonistic psychology be valid, 
remoteness should not affect the intensity of desires for two equally 
great and equally certain pleasures, while in actual experience men 
invariably prefer the nearer. Similarly, the theory that the 
greatest pleasure on the whole is always the object of desire is at 
variance with the fact that the immediate proximity of some tempting 
object, like good food, frequently awakens a desire which proves too 
strong-for what one knows to be conducive to his own maximum pleasure 
in the long run. 
This patent inadequacy of the hedonistic psychology is traceable, 
Rashdall contends, to two fundamental defects. In the first place it 
attempts to reduce the human soul to an 'impartial calculating 
1 
machine', and thus it overlooks the presence of passion, the strength 
of which cannot be explained in terms of the proximity and intensity of 
the pleasure. In other words, a man under the influence of a passion 
like anger often chooses a lesser pleasure because he desires it more 
strongly; that is, he desires not pleasure qua pleasure, but a 
particular kind of pleasure which is selected, not because of its greater 
intensity or duration, but because it satisfies some supervening 
2 
interest. 
Secondly, hedonism falls into the fallacy of hysteron- proteron. 
Rashdall willingly admits that some pleasure attends the 
satisfaction of any desire; but this fact, he believes, leads hedonists 
into the false assumption that the anticipation of this pleasure explains 
the genesis of the corresponding desire. Frequently the reverse situation, 
1. GE. I, p. 12. 
2. Cf. Ibid. pp. 13 ff. 
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wherein the desire itself gives rise to the anticipation of pleasure 
at its fulfilment, is the only true explanation. The attractiveness 
of moral and intellectual pleasures, for example, is usually 
dependent in this manner upon a previously existing desire. Above 
all, benevolent impulses arise, not because the particular sort of 
pleasure they yield is more intense than others, but because the 
benevolent man in the first instance desires the good of others. 
The reverse case of the malevolent man is equally incompatible with 
hedonistic psychology, - and for the same reason. In a word, when 
hedonism denies the existence of any desire directed toward ends other 
than pleasure,- and these so- called "disinterested" desires may be bad, 
as well as good - it leaves out of account virtually all human interests 
1 
'except those of a purely sensual character'. It is incapable of 
2. 
explaining not only altruism, but 'hate, anger, revenge, ambition.' 
Rashdall maintains further that the findings of anthropology run 
directly counter to hedonistic theory as applied to the life of 
primitive man by a writer like John Stuart Lill. Mill's assumption 
that altruism has evolved out of egoism cannot be reconciled with the 
data of subsequent research, which have disclosed the presence of 
disinterested impulses of a self -preserving and race- preserving char- 
acter at very early stages of human evolution. In accordance with the 
principle that questions of present psychological fact should be 
distinguished from questions of genesis, however, Rashdall adds that 
even if the instinctive equipment of mankind (most clearly observable 
in the life of infants and savages) conformed to the hedonistic 
description of human nature, that fact would not serve to demonstrate 
the non -existence of genuine altruism among mature, civilized men. 
{'inally, he demonstrates that various attempts to harmonize hedonism 
with the dictates of conscience always end by implicitly abandoning the 
1. GE. I, p.15. 
2. ÿthics, p. 19. 
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hedonistic psychology. This is true of Mill's admission that the 
ethical quality of pleasures may constitute one of the determining 
factors in choosing between them. Pleasures vary only in intensity 
and duration; but Mill acknowledged that certain pleasures are preferred 
for qualitative instead of quantitative reasons. Similarly, the claim 
that the pleasure of obeying conscience is the greatest in intensity or 
duration is either patently false, or it refers to an extremely low 
moral standard. In any case, this form of pleasure presupposes a 
prior desire to perform one's duty; and this desire is quite distinct 
from desire for any sort of pleasure per se. When the hedonist seeks 
to deny this distinction he falls inevitably into a circular argument, 
explaining 'the pleasantness of an act...by its morality, and its 
1 
morality...by its pleasantness'. 
Despite this outspoken rejection of hedonism, Rashdall attempts to 
keep his criticism within due proportions, and he is not blind to certain 
elements of truth contained in the theory. He recognizes not only that 
some pleasure attends the gratification of all desire, but also that it 
may strengthen or weaken a desire according to whether its magnitude does 
or does not fulfil expectations. Nor in his insistence upon the 
existence of disinterested desires does he seek to suggest that the 
desire for pleasure as such does not exist. Indeed, in a later chapter 
dis 
he earns the /approval of idealists like Muirhead by so far deserting 
9 
Green's teaching as to defend, with qualifications, the possibility of 
a hedonistic calculus. He does not even regard Sidgwick's remarks about 
the "paradox of hedonism" as being invariably true; with his gift for apt 
illustration, Rashdall points out that the pleasure of a vacation tour 
is not necessarily diminished because it is carefully planned for in 
advance. 
1. GE. I, p. 30. 
2. Cf. Muirhead's review of GE: The International Journal of Ethics. 
Vol. XVIII, pp. 382 ff. 
(ii) - Hedonistic Utilitarianism: Sidgwick. 
After disposing of psychological hedonism, he still has to deal 
with that form of hedonism known as utilitarianism, which admits the 
existence of desires for objects other than pleasure, but maintains 
1 
that pleasure alone is the 'rational object of desire'. He 
attaches great importance to the fact that utilitarianism, although 
it asserts that ultimately pleasure alone is good, does distinguish 
between the two notions, so that such an assertion is intended to 
convey more than a mere tautology. The utilitarian thereby appeals 
to goodness as an objective and universal standard, just as truly as 
does the moral philosopher of a different school when he declares that 
virtue is good. It follows, if this assertion be true, that 
utilitarianism cannot be defended in an egoistic form. Ceteris paribus, 
equal pleasures in different individuals are equally worth promoting, 
if the promotion of pleasure is a rational end; but egoism cannot 
partake of that impartiality which must characterize universal judgments. 
It implies that it is right for each man to pursue his own good, and yet, 
because these goods conflict, it asserts a contradiction; for if one man's 
good is the rational end of action, that which conflicts with it cannot 
be. This refutation, in which Rashdall is following a well -known 
2 
passage from Moore's Principia Ethica, applies to all forms of egoism, 
however goodness. be conceived. 
3 
1. GE. I, p. 44. 
2. Cf. óp. cit., pp. 99 -103; and Rashdall's Ethics, p. 63d. 
3. In an essay on "Egoism, Personal and National ", which he contributed 
to a symposium entitled The International Crisis: The Theory of the 
State, Rashdall applies this refutation of egoism to the conduct of 
nations. Despite the fact that it was written during the war, and 
was directed against the theories of Nietzsche and Bernhardi, which 
Rashdall takes to be the motivating forces underlying Prussianism, 
the article is free from bitterness. It shows that a national- 
istic self interest which refuses to subordinate itself to the wider 
good of humanity falls into the egoistic contradiction. The force 
of its main conclusion is somewhat weakened, however, when Rashdall 
suggests that the individual may almost always serve humanity best 
by being obedient to his country, even when its policies and laws 
are wrong. (cf. pp. 129 ff.) This, of course, subordinates the 
(contd. on next page). 
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Recognition of the fact that if pleasure be a rational end then 
the pleasure of the many is of more importance than that of the 
individual, leads to the "universal" form of utilitarianism advocated 
1 
by Sidgwick. In his chapter on this very able thinker, Rashdall's 
2 
critical gifts are exhibited at their best: he leaves a clear 
impression of his debt to Sidgwick, and at the same time he explains 
why he cannot follow him completely. 
Rashdall holds that Sidgwick really writes as a rationalist when 
he declares that it is obligatory to prefer the pleasure of the many 
to that of the individual, and when he regards this "dictate of reason" 
as supported, not only by spontaneous benevolence, but by "a desire to 
3 
do what is right and reasonable as such ". To introduce the notion of 
obligation, as Sidgwick does, is to admit that ' the difference between 
4 
right and wrong is perceived...a priori'; for while experience may 
reveal what is pleasant, only an immediate moral judgment could reveal 
that it is right or obligatory to desire pleasure alone. Logically., 
such a position has substituted the notion of moral obligation for that 
of pleasure, as the ultimate ground for doing what is ascertained to be 
right. 
3. (Contd., from page 9) 
individual conscience to the state just as does the view against 
which he is protesting. This difficulty arises from a desire to 
bring home the necessity for patriotism to the minds of his English 
readers; his assumption that England is fighting for the wider 
good of humanity, while Germany is fighting primarily for selfish 
_purposes1 saves him from logical inconsistency. 
1. Strictly, the opposite of egoism is altruism. Egoism counsels 
sacrifice of others for self, altruism counsels sacrifice of self 
for others; while the "universal" theory counsels sacrifice of self 
or of others for the greatest good of the whole. 
2. Sidgwick himself acknowledged the acuteness of Rashdall's comments 
upon The Methods of Ethics; see the sixth edition, p.xii. n. 
3. GE. I, p. 51. 
4. Ibid., p. 48. 
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The real point of divergence between the two writers arises over 
the nature of goodness, which Sidgwick identifies with pleasure (or 
1 
happiness). Because he takes a hedonistic view of the end towards which 
right conduct is directed, his system encounters a "dualism of the 
practical reason "; that is, he holds that while reason regards the 
greatest happiness of society as of more importance than one's own, it 
at the same time supports the individual's right to pursue his own 
happiness as an end. Hence he maintains that public good may always 
be regarded as the more reasonable end, but that it cannot be shown 
to be the sole reasonable end without the aid of an empirically 
unverifiable hypothesis to the effect that the world is rationally 
ordered. He is torn between the duty of promoting the welfare of 
others - which Sidgwick, as a hedonist, defines as serving their 
desire for happiness, - and the knowledge that it may not be 
conducive to his own good to do so. 
Rashdall regards this dualism as the presentation of a false 
dilemma. He thinks that because of his hedonistic conception of 
good -ness, Sidgwick has been betrayed into unwarrantably assigning 
2 
' a different end to the individual and to the race'. Sidgwick's 
position requires that one treat himself as morally rational, - as 
ready to serve the collective good from a sense of duty - while treating 
others as irrationally desiring their own pleasure only. If service 
of the general good is rational for the individual agent, it must be 
1. Sidgwick's treatment of the question as to whether "good" is 
definable is extremely complicated. Apparently he concludes that 
individual " good on the whole" involves reference not only to the 
state of affairs which the individual most desires to bring about 
for hi elf (assuming that he can foresee how the various alter- 
natives, which he might initiate, will affect him, and how his 
desires and feelings will alter), but also to the ethical notion 
"ought ". (Cf. The Methods of Ethics,p. 112, sixth edition.) 
It is important to note that while Sidgwick regards happiness as 
good, and alone as good, he does not hold that "good" can be 
analyzed or defined in terms of happiness. Rashdall accepts 
Moore's contention that Sidgwick held " good" to be indefinable. 
(Cf. GE. I, p. 135 n.) 
2. GE. I, p. 55. 
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rational for each of those whom he serves. By refusing to admit that 
Soed 
the promotion of public4is also the individual's good, Sidgwick under- 
mines the chief impulse to moral action, and his trust in the bare 
desire to act rationally is insufficient to recuperate this loss so 
long as his antinomy between self -interest and desire for universal 
good remains unresolved. In Rashdall's estimation that difficulty can 
be surmounted only by abandoning hedonism and incorporating virtue into 
the conception of the social, as well as of the individual, end. 
The gulf which Sidgwick sets between duty and interest, between 
virtuous conduct and a hedonistic conception of goodness, is one 
which, by his own admission, cannot be bridged except by postulating 
the existence of God and the fact of immortality. Rashdall proceeds 
to argue, however, that hedonism undermines the grounds on which these 
beliefs rest. If pleasure be the true end of human life, the problem 
of evil is well -nigh insoluble.. Moreover, the individual sacrifices 
which duty prompts one to make in the name of reason, run directly 
counter to that attainment of pleasure which the universe is (ex 
hypothesi) rationally ordered to achieve as its true purpose. This 
criticism of Rashdall's, it must be confessed, neglects the fact that 
according to Sidgwick the voice of duty, though it does impose 
individual sacrifice, in the end serves the hedonistic conception of 
the general good; hence the incompatibility between what reason 
prescribes and what a hedonistically ordered universe would have as its 
1 
purpose, is not as insurmountable as Rashdall's comments imply. 
Nevertheless he is able to point out that Sidgwick's attempt to justify 
individual sacrifice in this life by holding out the hope of a 
recompense in the next, ends in a paradox: in such terms, the man who 
serves his true good least in this life will achieve it most completely 
hereafter. Moreover, once the antinomy between individual duty and 
1. Cf. GE. I, pp. 60 ff. 
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individual pleasure is rejected, once it is admitted that pursuit of 
duty is more rational than pursuit of pleasure, then indeed there is 
much force in Rashdall's contention that what reason prescribes can 
hardly be good merely as a means to the future attainment of what 
it rejects. 
In putting forth virtue as an essential element in his 
conception of goodness, Rashdall is forced to meet Sidgwick's direct 
objections to that view. He holds that Sidgwick's refusal to regard 
character - or, for that matter, truth and beauty - as possessing 
intrinsic value, is ultimately founded upon the indefensible 
assumption that no aspect of consciousness except feeling can possess 
value; having made the assumption he writes as though 'to assign value 
to...ends irrespective of their pleasantness is to assign value to them 
1 
as things outside consciousness altogether'. 
Sidgwick's view serves to bring out Rashdall's own by contrast; 
for the latter contends that just as virtuous character cannot be 
divorced from a rightly directed will, neither can it be divorced from 
the feelings and emotions which accompany volition. In claiming that 
such character possesses value, Rashdall thinks of that value as resident 
in consciousness. Moreover, he denies that the value thus ascribed 
to virtue can be explained as a preference for the particular sort of 
pleasure which accompanies virtuous action; for this sort of pleasure 
is not superior in duration and intensity to others which the pursuit 
of virtue makes it necessary to forgo. In a word, Rashdall holds that 
value may be attached to aspects of consciousness other than pleasure, 
or irrespective of the pleasure which attends them, - while Sidgwick 
in effect denies this. It also follows that if value is resident in 
consciousness, ' acts can only be called right or wrong in so far as 
they represent some state of a conscious agent which has value ig 
1. GE. I, p..67. 
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itself, or in so far as they lead to some conscious state in the agent 
1 
himself or in another being'. 
At this point Rashdall's position is nearer to Kant's than is that 
of Sidgwick, since in seeking to bring virtue and happiness within the 
2 
scope of a single harmonious conception of the good, it likewise 
subordinates happiness, and assigns it intrinsic value 'only in so far 
3 
as it is consistent with the predominence of Virtue'. This position 
is at variance with Sidgwick's, not only because it assigns intrinsic 
value to virtue, but because it refuses to assign value to pleasures in 
terms of their intensity or duration. 
Rashdall completes his conception of the summum bonum by giving 
intellectual and aesthetic interests their due place in his scale of 
values; and again that place is not determined solely by the 
magnitude of the pleasure they yield. The relationship between these 
4 
three factors will soon be discussed more extensively; here it is 
enough to say that virtue or the goo4ill is of supreme value, while 
(in the abstract) intellectual and aesthetic activities are superior 
to pleasure as such. Within the realm of feeling itself, those 
pleasures which are associated with virtue are the highest, those 
associated with cultural interests are next in value, and those of a 
more purelysensual nature are last. 
5 
It must be admitted that a schematic artificiality characterizes 
1. Ethics p. 29. 
2. Rashdall is here referring to an aspect of Kant's thought which 
is incompatible with the doctrine that the good will alone is 
good. Cf. i 23. 
3. GE. I, p. 71. Rashdall himseifnmakes a distinction,of course, 
between pleasure and happiness; the latter involves wider and more 
enduring satisfactions, though it includes pleasure. He refuses 
to regard happiness as the sole ethical end because it is not 
invariably the good to which all others should be sacrificed. 
Although moral goodness in general conduces to happiness far more 
than it does to mere pleasure, devotion to the moral ideal may some- 
times require a genuine sacrifice of happiness. Cf. GE. II pp. 57 -60. 
4. Virtue, cultural interests and pleasure. 
5. Cf. it 269 -71. 
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Rashdall's argument as he goes on to represent the constituents of 
this conception of the summum bonum as corresponding to 'Thought, 
Feeling and Volition ... each of which is unintelligible in entire 
abstraction or separation from the rests'. He contends that because of 
the essential indivisibility of consciousness, it is impossible to 
follow hedonism in according value to pleasure by itself; for 
rational creatures never experience feeling apart from a content 
which is 'dependent upon the other two aspects of consciousness.' 
'There is a good state and a bad state of intellect, of feeling, and 
1 
of will. The good consists in a certain state of all three of them'. 
While in the abstract value may be assigned to feeling as regards its 
pleasantness, thought its truthfulness, and the will its moral goodness, 
- in reality the value of a given state of consciousness cannot be 
identified with any one factor in isolation from the others. This 
explains why Rashdall admits that pleasure forms an element in all 
good states of consciousness. 
This dictum of the unity of consciousness is of paramount 
importance, not only here, but in Rashdall's metaphysical arguments, 
wherein it has a decisive effect upon the manner in which he formulates 
his conception of God; and it recurs again in his discussion of the 
doctrine of the Trinity. Perhaps it is necessary to add that in 
ascribing value to such seemingly heterogeneous ideas as pleasantness, 
truthfulness and moral goodness, he does not mean to imply that value 
itself is susceptible of analysis into component parts. With Professor 
Moore, he regards it as an indefinable notion which may enter into 
consciousness in all its aspects, but which cannot be identified with 
anything other than itself. Thus he writes: 
'The ideal life or the good is an ultimate conception which does 
not admit of further definition, and the content of which we can only 
express by enumerating the various elements or aspects of it, and then 
explaining in what way they are to be combined'. 2 
1. GE. I, p.75. 
2. GE. II, p. 60. Cf. #f 25. 
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2. The Moral Criterion. 
Rashdall's fundamentally practical temperament is nowhere 
exhibited more clearly than by the fact that he regards casuistry as 
the ultimate task of ethics. Hence he attaches great importance to 
questions relating to the nature of the moral criterion, and he is 
unduly sanguine concerning its effectiveness in guiding men to a 
knowledge of what particular actions are right and wrong. His own view, 
as we have just seen, adopts the utilitarian principle of estimating 
the rightness of acts in terms of the extent to which they promote good 
ends, while it rejects the hedonistic conception of what constitutes the 
good; this view must now be tested against the opposing claims of 
intuitionism. 
He defines intuitionism as the theory that conscience pronounces 
actions 'right or wrong a priori without reference to their 
1 
consequences'. Many intuitionists make concessions to the 
necessity for consulting consequences in certain cases; but in his 
opinion they have never succeeded in disclosing the principle which 
explains when consequences should or should not be considered. The 
form of intuitionism which holds that the moral faculty constantly 
issues guidance concerning particular acts, he dismisses as one which 
reduces morality to mere caprice, and makes moral instruction impossible. 
A more cogent defence of intuitionism holds that conscience is the 
Pource of general rules of conduct, in terms of which the morality of 
particular acts must be judged. In his consideration of this view he 
follows at many points the searching critique to which Sidgwick had 
already subjected it. It is fair to note that Rashdall regards one 
quite frequent objection to intuitionism as invalid. The variations 
in moral judgOment between different ages, races and individuals, really 
do not injure the theory'/ although most intuitionists seek to 
minimize these differences. Intuitionism may consistently recognize 
1. GE. I, p. 80. 
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the fact that men differ in their capacity to apprehend moral truth, 
just as they differ in mathematical ability. Because moral ideas, 
like mathematical concepts, have undergone a gradual development, and 
because these ideas are not grasped in either case with uniform 
completeness, even by civilized adults, one is not thereby justified 
in doubting their objectivity; certainly it is gratuitous to believe 
in the truth of mathematics and then urge against morality 
considerations which, if valid, would undermine the former also. The 
intuitionist need not claim that his self- evident moral rules or 
judgments have been assented to by everyone. In defence of his own 
utilitarian position Rashdall urges, however, that the traditional 
moral rules of mankind are usually founded upon the social benefits 
which they safeguard, and for that (utilitarian) reason present 
themselves to conscience as binding. His chief objection to 
intuitionism is simply that action which is not directed towards 
some end is irrational. When confronted by special circumstances, 
intuitively attested rules always seem to admit of exceptions, which 
are sustained not by fresh intuitions, but by reason of a consideration 
of foreseen consequences. Or again, when intuitions seem to conflict 
with each other, - when, for example, benevolence seems to be 
incompatible with strict veracity - the superiority of the one principle 
over the other cannot be satisfactorily decided except by appealing to 
consequences. If intuition pronounces veracity to be invariably 
superior, it is too rigorous; if it asserts that veracity must be 
relinquished whenever it conflicts with benevolence, it is too lax. 
Another important objection turns upon the fact that consequences enter 
into and determine the moral quality of action in such a manner that 
it is meaningless to speak of the one apart from the other. 
At first glance Rashdall's refutation bf intuitionism may seem 
somewhat puzzling. Though he does indeed espouse the utilitarian 
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principle, - freed from its hedonistic associations - that 'it is 
irrational to judge of the morality of an action without tracing its 
1 
bearing upon human Well -being as a whole', he has nevertheless 
asserted earlier that moral judgments are a priori or immediate. 
Such judgéments would appear to be precisely what one means by 
deliverances of intuition. However, whereas intuitionism hold that 
the moral judgment relates to the rightness of acts, Rashdall holds 
that it reveals the value of ends. And, as he proceeds to argue in a 
chapter which will be discussed in a moment, experience must furnish 
knowledge of what the End is, before one can judge it to be good or 
bad. This judgment remains a priori, however, because 'experience 
2 
can tell us nothing (concerning) intrinsic...value'. 
He goes on to maintain that once moral judgment is Owen to imply 
a calculation of consequences, ethical principles lose the 
inflexibility which intuitionism ascribes to them. When moral 
judg4ment takes the form "this end is good" instead of "this action is 
right ", it will prove adaptable to the exigencies of special 
circumstances. For example, the judgment that veracity is good remains 
valid, even though speaking the truth may in certain cases be 
sacrificed because it leads to consequences which constitute a greater 
evil than those of telling a lie. Intuitionists have rightly 
contended that action cannot normally be delayed until one has 
calculated its effects in terms of universal well- being; but that is 
because in practice the consequences of excessive deliberation are 
often harmful. Usually it is possible to decide whether an action 
is right or wrong in terms of its obvious effects. Nevertheless, unless 
all the circumstances and possible consequences are known, wider 
knowledge may reveal that some previously undiscovered end is superior 
1. GE. I, p. 91. 
2. Ethics p. 75. 
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to the one originally espoused as the best; more complete foresight 
concerning consequences may result in a redirection of duty. 
As a result of these reflections, Rashdall conceives of an 
ethical system as progressively built up through the comparison and 
correlation of particular judgments of value. How heterogeneous 
goods are brought into an ordered system under the aegis of a 
gradually developing moral idea, how they are assigned their places of 
relative importance, how one's duty in particular cases is discovered 
amidst competing ends, - these are questions which must be reserved 
for discussion in the last portion of this chapter. 
3. Duty: Kant. 
In his little book entitled Rule and End in Morals, Prof. J.H. 
Muirhead writes: 
...'the Kantian theory...finds in acting from a sense of obligation 
something in itself good with a goodness that depends on its rightness; 
...theories...like Rashdall's and Moore's resolvç rightness into 
conduciveness to a good which is not an action'. 
I cannot help but think that this statement seriously misrepresents 
2 
Rashdall's position; he makes a definite effort in his chapter on 
Kant to show that, although he cannot agree in making goodness entirely 
contingent upon rightness, he can accept from Kant the important truth 
that right action itself possesses the highest intrinsic value. Perhaps 
a direct quotation from the remarks by which Rashdall leads up to the 
subject will serve best to establish this point. 
'By expressing moral judgaent as a jud rent of value...we emphasize 
the fact...that acts are the objects of moral jud4nentsas well as 
consequences. Recause no act can be good or bad without reference to 
consequences, it does not follow that its morality depends wholly upon 
those consequences... -;Then once it is admitted that the end includes a 
certain ideal of human character,...we can no longer recognize an 
absolute distinction between means and ends... ost of the acts which 
do conduce to further ends have a value (positive or negative) of their 
own; and this value must be taken into account in estimating the rightness 
ar, wrongness of the acts' 
1. a. cit., p. 16. 
2. Muirhead is merely reproducing a similar grouping suggested by Prof. 
Prichard. 
3. GE. I, pp. 96 f. Italics mine. Only illustrative data have been 
omitted. 
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He even goes on to argue that certain pleasures are intrinsically 
bad because of the character of the acts from which they are derived, 
and from which they cannot be separated except for purposes of 
abstraction. 
In a brief reference to his conception of the summum bonum, we 
have seen already that he regards right action as the greatest of 
all goods, and therefore as one which takes precedence over both 
1 
culture and happiness when a conflict arises. In a long chapter on 
Kant, Rashdall seeks to defend this conception, together with what 
it implies concerning the nature of duty. Whether the language 
employed in this defence can be reconciled with his theory that the 
right is instrumental to the good, is another question; but in 
according supreme value to the good will, Rashdall definitely parts 
2 
company with both Sidgwick and Moore. In so doing he contends 
that the intrinsic value of right conduct is as self- evident as is the 
3 
intrinsic value of any other form of goodness. 
In so far as the idea of a categorical imperative implies that 
reason immediately recognizes the rightness of an action, however, 
Rashdall does not assent to it without reservation. At this stage 
4 
in his thinking he recognizes an element of truth in the 
contention that moral obligation is an ultimate notion, not 
susceptible of analytical definition. For example, he is inclined 
to agree with Sidgwick that its validity cannot be proved to any 
sceptic, because, like the categories of causality or quantity, it 
can be substantiated only by an appeal to the fact that men do 
1. The exact sense in which this is the case is made clear infra; 
cf. Ñ 23 f and If 50. 
. 2. The references to Moore in this part of the thesis reflect the 
opinions expressed in Principia Ethica; they do not take into 
account later modifications, notably those suggested in 
Philosophical Studies, Chs. VIII and X. 
3. The exact sense in which Rashdall supports this contention will 
be examined in the critical section, # 253 ¡f'o 
4. In the critical section I argue that he later adopts a position 
which is really incompatible with what he says in GE concerning 
"right' and moral obligation. Cf. 1 249 -ff 
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actually pronounce judgments, which they regard as genuinely true or 
false, concerning the rightness of conduct. And, as he sees it, only 
a metaphysical argument can demonstrate that a denial of the validity 
of what reason pronounces in the sphere of morals leads logically to 
complete scepticism; the results even of this demonstration are purely 
negative. Yet, for reasons which will appear presently, he cannot admit 
that judgments concerning obligation or "right" are immediate in the 
same sense as are those concerning "good ". 
Nevertheless, he does agree unreservedly that recognition of one's 
duty may itself supply a motive to the will, although that motive may 
not always be strong enough to dominate other desires over which it has 
a superior claim. He holds that Kant's doctrine of the autonomy of the 
will really embodies this truth, despite the fact that because of his 
false identification of desire with pleasure he 'refused to speak of a 
1 
desire to do one's duty'. 
The point at which Rashdall finds Kant's system to be radically 
unsatisfactory can be revealed without entering into the details of his 
criticisms. Rashdall is willing to assent to the proposition that 
the form of morality is a priori; but this is the case because moral 
judgment, as he conceives of it, refers to the value of ends. 
Accordingly, knowledge of value, which for him is identical with 
2 
knowledge of what ought to be, is accessible solely through immediate 
judgments, and can never be supplied from experience. What Rashdall 
objects to is Kant's assertion that the detailed content of morality 
can be furnished from the notion of duty alone, without reference to 
1. 
2. 
GE I, p. 106 n. 
This is true of Rashdall's views in GE; but see my comments in the 
critical section, # 249 ff. . 
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1 
experience. In an examination of the three maxims which Kant derived from 
the categorical imperative, Rashdall attempts to show that none of them 
can be applied until some information - which they themselves are 
powerless to supply - is obtained concerning 'what particular things 
2 
are good'. 
The first maxim, relating to the universalization of personal 
conduct, rightly implies that duty is in principle the same for all 
rational creatures; but it is at best a negative test, which informs 
one as to whether an action, when universalized, conduces to the 
general good; it says nothing about what constitutes that good. 
Indeed, in applying the principle Kant tacitly appealed to consequences 
( resulting from conduct like promise- breaking) which only 
experience and observation of human nature could give one any ground for 
anticipating. Even if he haé succeeded in avoiding all reference to 
empirical data, the freedom from internal contradiction which the 
maxim requires remains an insufficient test of conduct. T"lith the sly 
raillery which often animates his writing, Rashdall points out that 
Kant's own practice of celibacy is self- contradictory, since if it were 
made a universal rule it would soon extinguish celibates along with 
the rest of the race. Rashdall concludes from these observations 
that for moral rules to be valid without exception, either they must 
be so stated as to indicate the particular circumstances to which they 
apply, or they must be made general and internal, relating to motives 
1. Professor Laird (in The Idea of Value, p. 282) has suggested that 
it is wrong to hold that the essence of Kant's ethic is a formal 
consistency with which his conception of reason as an end is 
really incompatible. Kant's ethics, he argues, referred from the 
outset to an end; his real concern was with the question as to 
whether the purpoe which underlies every volition (a fact which 
Kant did not deny) is within the rational will, or external to it; 
for in the latter case the will is enslaved to animal inclinations, 
an empty idea of perfection or an arbitrary theology. 
2. GE. I, p. 112. 
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1 
and dispositions rather than to types of action. 
He is unconvinced, not only by this attempt on Kant's part to 
derive guidance for action from the bare notion of duty, but also by 
his view of the motives supporting morality, Kant's assumption that 
2 
'respect for the Moral Law' alone can possess moral value, he condemns 
as the product of a false psychology. Kant fell into the error of 
regarding all desire as directed towards pleasure; therefore he looked 
upon desire as morally worthless, irrespective of the nature of its 
object. Rashdall, following Aristotle and Butler, maintains that 
motives other than that of respect for duty may support virtuous 
action; benevolent action is not rendered less valuable because it is 
founded upon love, and a person moved by such an impulse is not on the 
same moral level as a crude pleasure- seeker. Moreover, Kant's 
arguments at this point are incompatible with his admission that 
happiness, in so far as it does not conflict with virtue, may be a 
rational end of action. 
Rashdall does not mean to imply that action springing solely from 
the sense of duty is necessarily indicative of a cold and defective 
moral life. Yet because he acknowledges other valuable ends, he 
maintains that virtue must take its due place within a supreme ideal 
which elicits devotion to each of 'the various kinds of good...in 
3 
proportion to their relative value and importance'. 
1. Kant's other two maxims prove inadequate for similar reasons. 
Treating humanity as a means is most wrong when the end thins served 
is bad, and yet, once again, the precept fails to provide any 
illumination concerning the nature of ends. The third formula, 
which enjoins treating all human beings as possessing equal 
intrinsic value - or, in Kant's language, as members of a kingdom 
of ends - may be accepted in principle; but, when divorced from all 
empirical data, it likewise remains silent as to what constitutes 
that good of humanity which deserves to be promoted equally in each 
member, Cf. GE. I, pp. 131 -5. 
2. Ibid., p. 118. 
3. GE. I, pp. 125 f. 
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In other words the sense of duty, instead of expelling all other good 
impulses, should act in a regulative capacity. In so far as natural 
. 
inclinations issue in good conduct they should be allowed full sway, 
and their moral value should be recognized. It is the function of the 
sense of duty to augment or inhibit these various impulses only in so 
far as is demanded by the due proportions of the universal ideal. 
Although according to this principle other goods must be considered, 
such consideration can never result in a sacrifice of moral value for 
the sake of lower goods; so long as the approval of lower goods is 
commensurate with their relative importance, the agent is at the same 
time fulfilling his duty. 
Rashdall's conception of duty thus stands in contrast with Kant's 
in several respects. According to the former, right action is the 
most important, but not the sole good; it must be weighed along with 
the other goods which participate in the summum bonum before duty, 
in any given instance, can be determined. Since value is resident 
only in conscious states, the sense of duty - far from being apposed 
to all natural impulses - is 'at its highest...identical with the 
rational love of persons (including in due measure self- love), and 
the things which constitute their true good'. Finally, when Rashdall's 
conception of the sense of duty is taken in connexion with his 
theistic belief, it becomes identified with the love of God and 'the 
1 
conscious direction of the will towards the end which He wills'. 
Thus it loses the impersonal and abstract character which has made Kant's 
imperative repellent to so many moralists. 
The immediately preceeding discussion raises the question as to 
whether Rashdall's own view of the relation between the right and the 
good is consistent. In order that the later task of criticizing his 
1. GE. I, p. 128. 
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system may be facilitated, the fundamental nature of his difficulties 
must be suggested here. Repeatedly, in the chapter just reviewed, 
he refers to the fact that to recognize the imperative demands of 
duty affords no guidance as to what good end it is one's duty to 
promote. Now this criticism can be valid only on the basis of the 
assumption that it is impossible to know that an act is virtuous 
unless one first knows that the end which it promotes is good. 
To be sure, he contends that virtue itself may be an end of action; 
that is, rightness of motive may confer intrinsic value upon the 
action; but this value - while it may be additional to the goodness 
of the action's consequences - cannot be known apart from it. It 
would even seem that the intrinsic goodness of an action cannot be 
known until after its consequences have already been seen to be good. 
For this reason Rashdall maintains that the idea of "good" is 
logically prior to that of "right ". He holds that 'the good is 
that which "oughtîito be', and yet he adds in a foot -note: 'Such a 
statement is in noway inconsistent with the doctrine...which I 
fully accept, that the word "good"is indefinable'. This is the 
case because he regard "'Good ", "Ought" (when applied to ends), 
"Value ", "the End "... as synonymous terms`. Thus it remains true 
that 'we can only bring out the real meaning of the idea (i.e. of 
"good ") by the use of words which equally imply the notion'. 
Therefore Kant's difficulties may be summarily expressed by saying 
that he attempted 'to give meaning to, and...find a content for, (the) 
1 
idea of "right" without appealing to the idea of "good "'. 
Now Rashdall 's utilitarian view of the relationship between the 
right and the good may or may not be defensible; but irrespective 
of that question, can the theory that the sense of obligation is 
1. GE. I, p. 135, and foot -note. 
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contingent upon and logically posterior to immediate judgments 
of value be reconciled with the view that obligation or "right" (as 
well as goodness) is an ultimate and indefinable notion? To be sure, 
he has not unreservedly accepted from Kant and Sidgwick the contention 
that reason immediately recognizes the rightness of actions; for if 
he had done so, he would have been forced to admit that no ground, 
other than this fact of immediate recognition, can be given for 
holding that a given course of action is indeed right. And then he 
could not have said that Kant, in making the rightness of action the 
sole moral criterion, failed to provide any detailed information as 
to what constitutes right action; for in that case no information 
could be provided, no reason could be cited for performing it, other 
1 
than the fact that the agent perceives its rightness. 
Five years after the publication of The Theory of Good and Evil 
a famous essay by Professor H. A. Prichard, entitled "Does Moral 
2 
Philosophy Rest on a Mistake ? ", appeared in Mind. A fundamental 
thesis of this article, and of several subsequent books by writers 
whom it has influenced, is that to seek the ground of moral obliga- 
tion in the value of the action itself or in the value of its 
consequences, is to fall into the fallacy of giving a reason, other 
than the rightness of the act itself, for holding that what is 
regarded as obligatory is really so. Because this essay criticizes 
The Theory of Good and Evil directly, it may be taken as reasonably 
1. ]professor Prichard would protest that, in so far as Kant stressesthe 
value of the good will as a reason for an action's being obligatory, 
his theory is in fact incompatible with the doctrine that 
obligation is known immediately and unconditionally. 
2. a. cit. Vol. XXI, pp. 21 -37. (Professor Prichard was for some 
years a co- editor with Rashdall of TheEconomic Review.) 
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certain that the difficulties it raises caused Rashdall to revise his 
1 
position. In any event, his little book entitled Ethics (published 
in 1913) acknowledges the sui generis character of "right ". 
Nevertheless, he seeks to reconcile this with the theory that "right" 
is instrumentally related to "good ": 
'There arises the further question whether this idea (i.e. of 
"right ") is intelligible by itself, or whether it does not involve 
the further notion of good. This will depend upon what answer we 
give to the question how we ascertain what particular actions are 
right - whether particular acts can be seen to be right apart 
altogether from their consequences, or whether the only acts which 
we can regard as right are acts which conduce to the good. To hold 
this last view does not at all involve giving up the distinctive or 
sui generis character of the idea of right or duty. For both notions 
really involve the fundamental conception of an "ought ". If we 
accept this view, we shall say that the notion of good is the notion 
of something which ought to be or which possesses intrinsic value; 
the notion "right" will then imply a voluntary act which ought to 
be done as a means to this ultimate good, whatever that may be. The 
two terms will be correlative terms which mutually imply one another 
(just as the convex implies the concave, or as the term "father" 
is only intelligible if we know the meaning of "son ")....'2 
Then in a foot -note he adds the qualification, which received so much 
stress in the chapter on Kant just reviewed, that certain types of 
action, because they possess intrinsic value, may themselves 'be part 
3 
of the good'. 
In the critical section we shall find that this revision of his 
opinion concerning "right" has very far -reaching implications, which 
Rashdall himself never elaborated. 
4. Moral Judgment. 
The prominence which he accords to the judgment of value 
makes him an avowed opponent of all theories which declare that 
ultimately morality is founded upon feeling or emotion. During 
his tour in the United States in 1913, he took the opportunity to 
supplement what he had said concerning this subject in The 
1. I have been unable to confirm this suggestion directly. 
2. Ethics. pp. 13 f. 
3. Ibid. , p. 14 n. 
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Theory of Good and Evil; 
1 
for in the interim he had become more 
thoroughly acquainted with the writings of anthropologists and 
psychologists who defended the view which he deplored. He was 
especially anxious to meet the criticisms of Professor McDougall, 
as contained in the latter's 1.n Introduction to Social Psychology. 
Hence he chose the theme Is Conscience an Emotion? for the West 
Memorial Lectures which he delivered at Stanford University. 
2 
The discussion of value- theory as a specialized Problem had 
begun to take on the dimensions of a major philosophical contro- 
:versy in England and America some years before Rashdall delivered 
these lectures; and at that time the problem of the value -judgment 
seemed central for many other writers, as it did for him. Later 
discussion, such as Professor Perry's General Theory of Value, has 
tended to show that to establish the "rationality" of the judgment 
of value does not settle the question as to the nature and constitu- 
:tion of value itself. Moreover, Professor Moore, in a review of 
The Theory of Good and Evil published in The Hibbert Journal3 directly 
after the appearance of the work itself, had called attention to 
substantially this same point. 
Rashdall's argument assumes at the outset that men possess a 
capacity for pronouncing genuine judgments concerning morality; his 
task is to show that this capacity belongs to the intellectual or 
rational part of human nature. All that the first part of his dis- 
:cussion purports to prove, then, is this: emotion and feeling are not 
sufficient to account for judgments of any sort whatever; therefore 
the pronouncement of ethical judgments must be assigned to "reason ". 
1. Op. cit., 3k. I., Ch. VI. 
2. Published in 1914. Some years later McDougall wrote a reply to 
this volume, which Rashdall in turn defended; both articles appeared 
in The Hibbert Journal, Vol. XIX. Cf. # -39 f. 
3. Q . cit. Vol. VI, p. 451. 
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He writes as though the ouestion at issue relates primarily to how 
moral knowledge is possible, - while really he wishes to defend the 
additional thesis that the object of cognition in moral judgment 
cannot be identified solely with feeling or emotion. This latter 
topic receives little attention until he turns to some rather unwise 
remarks of William James in The Will to Believe; fortunately this 
does demand a discussion of the nature of value itself; but this was 
not, even at the time, a fair sample of pragmatist doctrine, despite 
the fact that Professor Ferry's theory is really a development of it, 
with many weaknesses removed. 
Rashdall takes account of three possible views as to the source 
of moral approbation: (a) in feeling, emotion or satisfaction; (b) in 
the intellect; (c) in a sui generis capacity which falls under neither 
1 
of the two preceding categories. He dismisses the last alternative as 
unintelligible, maintaining that what a writer like Martineau2, who 
ostensibly defends it, really means to emphasize is that moral judg- 
ments are distinct from judgments of fact. However true this may be, 
Rashdall replies, it affords no justification for inventing a sui 
generis "faculty". This leaves only some form of the first theory in 
the field against rationalism. 
(i) - The Moral Sense Theory. 
He freely admits that the exaggerations of rationalists have 
ofteh been responsible for the impetus given to views which profess 
to find the basis of moral approbation in feeling or emotion, instead 
of in the intellect. Frecf,ently the fact has been overlooked that the 
1. In Ethics, p. 31, Rashdall misleadingly refers to these as theories 
of the origin of moral judgment. 
2. Cf, his Types of Ethical Theory, especially Vol. II, pp. 468 and 
743. 
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mere rationality of action - taken apart from the desire to do what 
is right, and the other spontaneous impulses which support virtuous 
conduct - is insufficient to account for its ever being performed. 
But he proceeds to show that because the moral judgment is presupposed 
by and gives rise to the feelings or emotions which accompany it, it 
does more than merely record their occurrence. 
Historically the most influential philosophical theory to be 
formulated in reaction against a misguided rationalism has been that 
of the "Moral Sense" school. Rashdall's illuminating account of the 
various thinkers who contributed to the development of the theory can 
be indicated here only in outline. He suggests that in the writings 
of Locke, although the language of rationalism was still used, reason 
was degraded to the function of calculating pain and pleasure; in 
accordance with his theological utilitarianism Locke held that reason, 
perceiving the future results of conduct, approved of virtue primarily 
as a path of escape from Hell. The inadequacy of Locke's theory - 
arising especially from its failure to refute Hobbes - prompted 
writers like Shaftesbury and Hutcheson to find the basis of morality 
in a particular kind of feeling rather than in the intellect. Never- 
theless, these two writers retained Locke's doctrine that all know - 
:ledge has its origin in "experience", which for them virtually meant 
"sensation ". To avoid the hedonism implied in including moral know- 
:ledge under such theory, they postulated a special sense, which gives 
rise to feelings of a specifically moral and sui generis character. 
Rashdall points out that this moral sense theory is radically 
defective because it cannot account for the origin and operation of 
moral ideas. Feelings vary only in intensity and duration, and moral 
feelings cannot claim superiority in these respects; until a judgment 
is pronounced, which assigns value to these feelings, nothing has 
31. 
entered consciousness which demands obedience. If morality is 
restricted to feelings, one can never claim validity for it; for 
feelings are neither true nor false. Furthermore, because feelings 
vary from one individual to another, the judgments which merely record 
their occurrence may contain contradictory assertions, and yet both 
may be true. He assents to the undeniable fact that ethical judg- 
ments do contradict one another; but he points out that if the moral 
sense theory be correct, the judgments in question can never express 
real disagreement because they refer to different data; that is, they 
refer to the feelings of different individuals. The significant 
fact about disagreement concerning moral questions, however, is not 
that different individuals possess different feelings with regard to 
the same course of action, but that if one individual is right in 
approving the action, then anyone who mEintains the opposite must be 
wrong. As has been maintained in the discussion of intuitionism, the 
fact that men may fall into error in pronouncing moral judgments no 
more undermines objectivity in this sphere of knowledge than in any 
other. If moral approbation were constituted entirely by feeling, 
judgments could err only concerning whether or not a given sentiment 
were actually felt by an individual with regard to a certain type of 
conduct; they could never err as to whether the action were right or 
its end intrinsically good, because the moral sense theory renders 
questions of objective truth (in such matters) meaningless1. 
1. Rashdall goes on to show that Shaftesbury and Hutcheson intended 
their theory to vindicate ethics, and did not realize that ultimately 
it destroyed the meaning of ethical distinctions; the former wished 
'to defend the disinterestedness of the moral motive' (ICE, p. I1.); 
the latter even regarded the moral faculty as that by which human 
actions could come into accordance with the will of God (Cf.ibid,p.14), 
Hume, however, saw that qua emotion, moral approbation cannot pro- 
:vide its own ground for claiming ethical superiority over other 
motives; he therefore made pleasure the sole basis for choosing 
between different emotions. Contemplation of certain qualities, 
whose social utility is apparent, he held to cause sympathetic 
pleasure in the spectator; he listed the benevolent affections, but 
(Contd. on Page 32) 
32. 
The reaction which led to the appearance of the moral sense 
theory was partially due to rationalism's claim that ethical truths 
are aPprehended in the same way as mathematical truths - that is, 
as axioms which present themselves to the intellect as self -evident. 
At first sight Rashdall's acceptance of Sidgwick's axioms of prudence, 
benevolence and equity1, may seem to partake of this extreme ration- 
: alisen; but he points out that these three principles are really 
formal representations of quantitative relations. The first asserts 
that one should promote his own greater good rather than his lesser 
good, in so far as the good of others remains unaffected; the second, 
that a larger public good is preferable to a smaller; the third, that 
the good of one man should be regarded as of equal intrinsic value 
with the like good of every other. It is correct to say, therefore, 
that these Principles resemble those of mathematics, because they 
embrace no empirical content whatever; but for that very reason 
they can solve no ethical problem by themselves. Their sole ethical 
feature is the fact that they refer to the good; and not until after 
its nature has been determined by judgments relating to concrete 
objects of experience, can they furnish guidance concerning its 
distribution. Hence although they are self -evident, intuitive truths, 
a utilitarian like Sidgwick could consistently espouse them because 
they possess no content until supplemented with judgments of value 
which relate to consequences. For the same reason, they do not 
constitute an independent or self-sufficient type of moral judgment. 
(Contd. from Page 31) 
also personal possessions, as exciting this approbation. Thus Hume 
joined love of virtue with admiration for the prosperous. Moreover, 
on his view virtue varies directly with the actual approbation which 
it elicits in the spectator; actions are not approved because they 
are moral; they are moral because approved. Hence virtue is not pro- 
portionate to actual social usefulness, since a man who is really a 
benefactor, but who is hated by society, is, in terms of Hume's theory, 
really a bad man. Therefore this theory undermines utilitarianism along 
with all other objective theories of ethics. Finally, it implies, like 
the moral sense theory, that'if an act excites approbation in some 
minds1and disapprobation in others, it is right and wrong at the same 
time (.L p . 271 
1. Cf. GE. I. p. 147. 
33. 
The plausibility of the moral sense theory, Rashdall contends, 
arose from the fact that the moral judgment resembles aesthetic 
appreciation more closely than it does mathematical knowledge; and 
the moral sense writers assumed that aesthetic appreciation is 
wholly subjective. Moreover, concrete ethical judgments - as dis- 
:tinguished from formal principles - cannot be 'expressed with the 
same Precision as mathematical judg nents'1. Finally, because in 
both aesthetic and ethical questions no reason, apart from the 
immediate percerition of value, can be cited in support of a given 
judgment, the metonymical expression, "I feel it to be good or 
beautiful ", is frequently used in ordinary speech. In reality, 
2 
'propositions cannot be felt'. 
Rashdall's detailed discussion of the complicated problem of 
aesthetic judgment cannot be treated here3. In general he holds 
that in the case of aesthetic, no less than ethical, judgment, one 
man's opinion may be "better" than another's, - and that such an 
assertion would be meaningless in both cases if the judgments were 
founded solely upon feeling. Once the objective character of both 
is asserted, it is advantageous to stress the analogy between them; 
for though they involve a priori factors, both can be delivered only 
with reference to concrete objects which are given in experience. 
The most potent objection to the moral sense theory and its 
modern descendants really arises) however, from the nature of value 
itself. In the foregoing discussion we have seen that Rashdall 
regards states of consciousness alone as possessing value; value 
itself, he has held, is indefinable, but it does characterize every 
aspect of consciousness, and therefore it cannot be identified with 
any single aspect in isolation from the others. Hence feeling 
1. GE. I, 
2, GE. I, 
3. Cf. GE. 
p. 149. 
p. 148, 
I, pp. 177-183. 
35. 
of ma ̂  matics in that non -rational creatures could not pronounce 
either; but they differ from those of mathematics because non- sen- 
tient or non -emotional creatures could, apparently, pronounce the 
latter, while they could not pronounce the former. 
Nevertheless, judgment and emotion may vary independently; an 
act may be judged wrong, even though it awakens no repugnance in the 
one who judges. It is even possible to pronounce a moral judgment 
without exciting any emotion concerning it, although in practice 
emotional deficiency usually leads to a state of indifference in which 
the tendency is to form no judgments at all; on the other hand, excessive 
emotion concerning a judgment may distort one's insight into its truth 
or falsity. Again, the same type of moral judgment may be attended 
under different circumstances by different emotions within the same 
person. And finally, emotions themselves - as is also the case with 
pleasures - may be judged to possess positive or negative value over 
and above the value attached to their satisfaction; the degree of in- 
:trinsic value assigned to them is dependent upon the relative impor- 
:tance or excellence of the interest they support; thus emotions assoc- 
:iated with virtue or benevolence are the highest. 
So far as terminology is concerned, Rashdall recognizes that in 
popular usage it is natural to speak of "conscience" as including feel- 
ings and emotions which are deemed intrinsically valuable, or which 
support the performance of right action. As long as reason's unique 
capacity to furnish knowledge of moral value is remembered, this con - 
:ception of conscience rightly takes account of the presence of feeling 
and emotion in every conscious state, and hence in the ground of every 
moral judgment.1 
1. Once moral judgments take the actual emotional constitution of 
humanity into account, Rashdall believes, many schemes of social 
reorganization, which might be defended consistently on purely 
rational grounds, will be seen to be 'inappropriate or injurious; 
he cites Plato's plan to collectivize the family as an example. 
Cf. _48 n. 2. 
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(ii) - The Emotionalist Theory:1 
McDougall and Westermarck. 
What Rashdall has to say in criticism of the writings of 
Professors Westermarck and McDougall2 is really but a special 
application of the general theory just outlined. The vital issue, 
which must be filtered out from a mass of ambiguities, is whether 
or not the idea of duty can be completely analyzed into emotional 
constituents. Rashdall holds that by giving an affirmative answer 
to this question his opponents fall into the fundamental error of 
the moral sense writers, despite the fact that as modern scientists 
they do not believe in the existence of a 'specific moral feeling'.3 
Professor McDougall, for example, although he is far too well informed 
to echo the naïve eighteenth century belief that primitive man was 
a deliberate utilitarian, does seek the foundations of morality in 
various instincts and their accompanying emotions. 
Rashdall is willing to go a considerable distance with these 
writers in purely historical matters. He thinks them undoubtedly 
correct in holding that some modes of conduct came to be approved 
or disapproved because of emotional reactions which they inspired 
in primitive men; he even admits that, if at an early period of human 
history the notion of duty was wholly absent, then the mores of that 
Period can be explained in terms of emotion. What he wishes to main- 
:tain is that once the notion of duty has appeared, reflective morality 
has begun, and conduct can no longer be accounted for entirely by 
an emotionalist theory. The date of this transformation ra;isss a 
1. The term "Emotionalism" is Rashdall's own; Cf. ICE., p. 54. 
2. Cf. Westermarck's Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, 
and McDougall's Social Psychology. Westermarek's Ethical 
Relativity, published in 1932, contains various replies to 
Rashdall. 
3. ICE, p. 55. 
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purely historical question; and the answer does not affect the 
question of validity any more than the validity of mathematics is 
affected by the fact that at one stage savages may have been unable 
to count. Even on historical grounds, however, he is inclined to 
think that McDougall fails to emphasize sufficiently the alteration 
effected in human emotions by the growth of intelligence.1 
If McDougall and =òestermarck are inclined to doubt the validity 
of the notion of duty among civilized adults to -day, Rashdall can 
make no fresh reply. The distinction which he sets between moral 
judgments and judgments recording personal desire or feeling is one 
which can be verified, in the last analysis, solely through intro - 
:spection. He has urged, however, that the moral category is as 
inexpugnable as those of cause, substance or quantity. Refusal to 
acknowledge any fundamental category renders the world unintelli- 
:gible; it entl.s a repudiation of reason as such, and this, Rashdall 
reminds his opponents, leads to a scepticism which is fatal to their 
own sciences of anthropology and psychology. He is able to show, 
however, that they do not fall into this scepticism even with regard 
to morality; for both betray an implicit belief in the objectivity 
of moral judgments. 
2 
Nevertheless, their historical studies of morality fail to 
recognize the full significance of the transition from a purely 
emotional to a rational foundation. The transition from a stage 
when no notion of duty is present, through periods of confused 
savage beliefs, to the emergence of distinct moral ideas, is no more 
1. Rashdall finds in Hobhouse's writings (especially Morals in 
Evolution) a more adequate recognition of this transformation. 
Cf. ICE, p. 66 n. 
2. Vestermarck refers to his own moral ideas as based on reflection, 
end as "higher" than those of the savage. Cf. ICE, pp. 121 ff. . 
Similar presupposition of moral objectivity may be found in 
McDougall's Social Psychology, pp. 257 f. (6th Edition). 
38. 
difficult to understand, than a similar transition in the case of 
any other intellectual category. Rashdall believes, however, that 
even at relatively primitive levels of culture, men are able to 
distinguish between the customary and the right;1 for example, they 
are able to formulate a conception of justice which is regarded as 
valid for all persons who belong to their own tribal group; this 
requires a capacity to grasp conceptions which aim at impartiality 
in mediating between the conflicting claims of tribal members. It 
is the awakening claims of reason which account in large measure for 
moral progress; for through this awakening, inconsistencies inherent 
in merely customary systems are gradually refined away. If the 
emotionalist hypothesis were true, no justifiable reason could ever 
have arisen for demanding that conduct be consistent from one day 
to the next. Needless to say, Rashdall does not bring forward these 
considerations in order to disparage the important influence of 
desire and emotion upon conduct. He wishes merely to defend his 
belief that the idea of duty operates through reason in a regulative 
capacity, - selecting, subordinating and comparing within the welter 
of the emotional life, with a view to ordering it in conformity with 
an harmonious and inclusive ideal.2 
1. Cf. ICE, pp. 90 ff. 
2. This view has many affinities with that presented in 
Professor Hobhouse's The Rational Good (Published in 1921). 
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A Note on the Controversy with McDougall, 
and on the Ethics of Herbert Spencer. 
The dispute between Rashdall and McDougall can be followed in 
detail in the latter's comments in Af Introduction t9 Social Psychology, 
and the reply to these in Is Conscience an Emotion ?, - and then 
again in the articles in The Hibbert Journal. Rashdall is able 
to demonstrate that because McDougall persists in assigning a purely 
deductive function to reason, he does not at all appreciate the sig- 
:nificance of a priori notions as furnishing the only possible first 
premises for science as well as for morals; yet even this limited 
function which McDougall does recognize, - that of deducing 'new pro - 
:positions from propositions already accepted- 'implies certain 
principles of inference which cannot themselves be deduced from 
anything else' "k. Rashdall suggests, in reply to repeated demands 
from his opponent, that McDougall can no more "prove" the validity of 
the principles on which his own science of psychology is founded, 
than he can "prove" the validity of moral categories. 
Several other equally elementary and in some cases absurd 
points of confusion are clarified by Rashdall; for example, McDougall 
takes the assertion that the idea of duty can give rise to an impulse, 
as identical with the proposition that the idea of duty 'is an 
impulse' One point deserves special attention, however, McDougall 
intimates that Rashdall has f alen into a circular argument because 
in The Theory of Good and Evil he makes the objective validity of 
moral judgments the ground for asserting that they are the work of 
reason, while in Is Conscience an Emotion? he argues that because 
these judgments are the work of reason they must be regarded as 
objectively valid?. Rashdall replies that McDougall should 
familiarize himself with the notion of mutual implication. 'From 
my point of view', he writes, 'to say that a judnent is objectively 
true implies that we ascribe it to Reason; neither proposition is 
deducible from the other, but each implies the other. There is 
therefore no difference between the two modes of statement on this head'8. 
1. Og. cit. pp. 127 ff. 
2. Op. cit. Vol. XIX (1920 -21). McDougall's article: pp. 279 -95, 
Rashdall's: pp. 449 -65. 
3, An Introduction to Social Psychology, pp. 378 ff. 
4. Hibbert Journal. Vol. XIX, p. 453. 
5. Ibid., p. 455. 
6. Op. cit., I, p. 166. 
7. Hibbert Journal. Vol. XIX, cf. p. 291. 
8. Ibid., p. 462. 
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In fairness to McDougall it should be added that Rashdall 
recognizes both the originality and the soundness of his work 
as a psychologist. Moreover, Rashdall tends to disregard the 
measure of acknowledgement, however inadequate, which McDougall 
does accord to the intellect in the shaping of the moral life. 
It is not correct to leave the impression, if Rashdall's remarks 
do so, that McDougall espouses a purely emotional theory.1 
In a long chapter in The Theory of Good and Evil (Book III, 
Chapter IV), Rashdall defends his view of the relationship between 
the development and the validity of moral ideas against the 
evolutionary ethics of Herbert Spencer; there he convincingly 
exposes the latter's philosophical incompetence. The chapter deals 
primarily with confusions inherent in Spencer's system; it throws 
light on Rashdall's own views only by adding testimony to the 
fact that nothing in his theory is incompatible with an evolutionary 
account of all rational capacities, including those exercised in 
moral judgment. Rashdall follows Professor Cook Wilson in adding 
the rejoinder, however, that 'no accumulation of experiences, 
personal or ancestral, could ever generate the idea pf "good" or 
"value" in a consciousness which did not possess it' , any more 
than it could generate the logical axiom of non- contradiction. 
(iii) - The Satisfaction Theory: 
James. 
The pragmatism of William James4 offers yet another theory 
which, from Rashdall's point of view, ultimately denies the validity 
of ethical distinctions. Although James acknowledges that men 
desire other things besides pleasure, Rashdall finds his attempt 
to define value as "the satisfaction of desire" quite as objection- 
:able as hedonism. 
Because James realizes that all desires cannot be fulfilled 
at once, and that they often conflict with one another within society 
1. Cf. W.K. Wright's article: "Conscience as Reason and as Emotion "; 
Philosophical Review. Vol. XXV (1916), pp. 676 -91. 
2. Cf. his "Mr. Spencer's Theory of Axioms ". An Inaugural Lecture. 
3. GE. II, p. 372. 
4. Cf. his The Will to Believe, especially pp. 201 ff. 
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and within the same individual, he seeks to furnish a regulative 
criterion for mediating between them; he suggests that the 
desire (or desires) whose realization destroys or obstructs the 
least possible number of other desires, should be satisfied. 
This, Rashdall argues, is tantamount to an abandonment of James' 
own definition of value; for the individual may not in fact 
desire to follow the course of action which he knows will lead 
to the most inclusive satisfaction, as strongly as he desires 
some very selfish end. To accede to James' criterion the agent 
must be impartial enough to sacrifice the stronger desire to the 
more inclusive end, and this impartiality is dependent not upon 
emotion, but upon the intellect. In short, James' criterion 
presupposes an a priori judgment: "More satisfaction is always 
better than less satisfaction "1. No doubt this self- evidently 
rational principle cannot be put into practice unless it is 
supported by 'the desire to be rational'2. But the desire presupposes 
the antecedent presence of the principle and the judgment upon 
which it is founded. 
If the inclusiveness of one satisfaction can constitute a 
reason for regarding it as "better" than others, and for promoting 
it apart from consideration of personal preference, then value can 
no longer be defined merely in terms of desire. For the superior 
value of the wider satisfaction is not contingent upon whether one 
desires it; it 'presents itself to my rational nature as that which 
ought to be desired, whether in point of fact I do desire it or not'3. 
Moreover, this notion of obligation must arise in the individual 
1. ICE., pp. 162 f. 
2. Ibid., p. 162. 
3. Ibid., D. 165. 
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mind before the highest good can be so strongly desired that it 
takes precedence over competing and narrower ends in the direction 
of actual conduct. Thus James' own argument implies that value 
is an ideally apprehended notion, which commends itself to reason, 
and remains - independent of the vicissitudes of individual impulse - 
the norm of what ought to be desired. 
Therefore Rashdall cannot understand how James can go on to 
assert that 'being desired stamps ... a thing ... as 222 tanto good'1. 
In terms of James' own argument it has already been shown that 
the measure in which a thing is actually desired by an agent is 
no measure of its goodness. But, Rashdall adds, neither is the 
satisfaction of the desires of others a principle which alone can 
determine the goodness of conduct2. 
Nevertheless, his whole commentary on James really falls short 
of its purpose. It establishes that any given individual may fail 
to desire the highest good; it further proves that this highest 
good, defined in James' sense of the widest possible satisfaction, 
can be apprehended only through a judgment which is undistorted 
by personal desire; it thus demonstrates the fact that James' 
criterion for determining the value of each specific desire in its 
relation to the widest possible satisfaction, is a principle which 
1. ICE., P. 166. 
2. Rashdall supports this latter statement with a rather dubious 
example; he attempts to show that when a "good" man tries to 
prevent a fellow creature from getting drunk, the source of 
his motive is an idea of duty, which can be explained neither 
in terms of his own or the drunkard's desires. Rashdall admits, 
of course, that this idea calls forth in the good man a desire 
to perform his duty which yields satisfaction when fulfilled. 
The example fails to prove Rashdall's case, however, since 
James might reply that the real objection to drunkenness is that 
it interferes with wider satisfactions either in the drunkard 
himself, or in other men whom his drunkenness adversely affects. 
Cf. ICE., pp. 167 ff. .
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can be recognized only by the intellect. But Rashdall falsely 
assumes that when he has demonstrated the rational character of 
judgments of value, he has likewise destroyed James' definition 
of value itself. To show, for example, that only the intellect 
can acknowledge the superiority of an end which is predominantly 
desired by society, does not disprove that the end is superior 
simply because it is thus predominantly desired. James might 
admit that the individual will not desire this ultimately best 
end until after he has acknowledged its excellence through a 
judgment; but this admission would not require him to change his 
definition of value1. 
Rashdall's real intention can be grasped only by carrying 
out a process of inference further than he hes done in his own 
writings. His acceptance of Ivioore's dictum that the good is in- 
:definable, 
2 
supplies a key to the riddle. Clearly Rashdall does 
not mean to contend merely that value can be apprehended through 
judgments which "claim" objectivity. For if this were the case, 
he could offer no objection to the moral sense writers, McDougall, 
or James, so long as they acknowledged the self- evident fact that 
moral judgments involve reasoning. But Rashdall goes on to argue 
that because desires and satisfactions vary from one man to the 
next, James cannot provide an "objective standard" for moral 
approval: 'The identification of the good with the satisfactory 
reduces diversities of moral jud rent to differences of taste 
quite as much as the theory of the "moral sense" school'3. To 
1. This is not to say that other aspects of Rashdall's theory may 
not be cogent enough to require such a change; it is merely to 
say that the argument which Rashdall here advances does not meet 
the case. Cf. infra. 
2. Cf. ICE., pp. 143 ff. . Cf. also #-25. 
3. Ibid., p. 171. 
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nut Rashdall's objection in its simplest terms: according to 
James, if one person desires X and judges that it is good, while 
another desires to avoid X and judges that it is bad, then X 
is both good and bad at the same time. Rashdall contends, on 
the contrary, that if one person judges correctly that X is 
good, then anyone who contradicts him judges falsely. Therefore 
merely to distinguish, as Rashdall doesl, between the experience 
that a thing is satisfying, and the judgment that this experience 
of a thing is satisfying, fails to bring out the point at issue. 
For James, to judge that X satisfies desire is identical with 
judging that X is good. Because of this identification each 
judgment "claims objectivity" in the sense that if it is true, 
anyone who denies it judges falsely; but likewise in each case, 
according to James, what the judgment predicates of X has its 
origin in the fact that someone does actually desire X. Rashdall 
wishes to contend that the two judgments are not identical, and 
that whereas the former indeed claims objectivity only in the 
sense that it purports to assert a truth about the actual state 
of someone's emotional or impulsive life, the latter claims 
objectivity in the sense that what is predicates of X - if the 
judgment is valid - is not dependent upon what any human being 
actually feels or desires. According to Rashdall, the statement 
"that which is desired is good" is not a mere tautology; for the 
introduction of the idea of value asserts something not contained 
in the idea of desire or satisfaction; it asserts, in short, that 
1. Cf. ICE., p. 173. He uses the terms "satisfactory" and 
"satisf actoriness ". 
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what is desired ought to bel. In his opinion this notion of value 
is a priori; hence it cannot be reduced to any factors of subjective 
experience. Thus, although he holds that value resides in or 
aualifies states of consciousness, he escapes what he holds to be 
James' error of identifying value itself with a state of conscious- 
ness, or an aspect of such states2. Rashdall would agree with 
Moore that judgments of value are synthetic, not analytic3. His 
exposition of this position is defective because he assumes that 
the "objectivity" of a judgment of value necessarily implies that 
value itself is "objective" in the sense of not being constituted 
by emotional or affective factors. Obviously this is not the case. 
Propositions which are true or false - and this is what Rashdall 
means by "objectivity" - can be pronounced concerning emotions or 
feelings. 
This distinction is of the utmost importance, because Rashdall 
has E.lready acknowledged the closeness of the relationship between 
moral judgment and satisfactoriness. The notion of duty, as has 
been observed, may give rise to a desire to perform it, and the 
fulfilment of the desire yields satisfaction; moreover, one of 
the grounds upon which a low form of satisfaction may be condemned 
is that it causes the non- satisfaction of the impulses which 
support morality. But, although realization of the "good" is thus 
satisfying, James is not justified in assuming that the latter 
is exhaustive of the former's meaning. This attempt to identify 
1. Cf. Ethics, p. 25. 
2. In the critical section I show why this is Rashdall's position; 
cf. # 310 ff. 
3. Cf. Principia Ethica, pp. 6 f. But Rashdall agrees for a very differ- 
ent reason. In his theory, judgments of value are synthetic because 
they relate empirical data ( "states of consciousness ") with an a 
priori notion (value). In roore's theory they are synthetic because 
they relate one simple notion of an empirical quality (value), with 
other notions, simple or complex. 
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the "higher" goods with "higher" satisfactions Rashdall regards 
as a tacit acknowledgement of the validity of a notion wherein 
the intrinsic value of an end is not dependent upon whether or 
not it is in fact desired, or would prove satisfying, to anyone. 
5. Casuistry. 
Rashdall's assertion that it is possible to discriminate 
between various types of good as to their degree of value, in 
order that the greatest accessible quantity of good may be made 
the end of action, raises a special problem. It implies that 
each of these various goods is susceptible of being compared in 
quantitative terms. He seeks first of all to establish, against 
widespread objections, the possibility of a calculus of pleasure; 
for if comparison of different instances of this single type of 
good is impossible, the more, complex notion of the commensurability 
of all values can hardly be defended. 
The most radical criticism of the hedonistic calculus with 
which he has to reckon is that of Edward Caird1, who asserts that 
pleasure cannot be experienced apart from an object desired on some 
other ground; this implies that pleasure per se cannot be desired 
at all. Rashdall answers this objection bluntly; it seems self - 
evident to him that if two objects are equally desirable on other 
- grounds, the more pleasant one will be preferred. To deny this 
involves defending the (to his mind absurd) converse notion that, 
e eteris paribus, it is impossible to have an aversion to the more 
painful of two experiences for no other reason than that it is the 
more painful. 
1. Cf. his The Critical Philosophy of Kant. Vol. II, p. 229. 
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Once this objection is set aside, that of Mackenzie) must 
be considered; he criticizes the idea that pleasures can be 
summed, primarily on the ground that different pleasures cannot 
co -exist at the same moment. If this argument were valid, Rashdall 
maintains, it would also prove that a single pleasure cannot be 
desired; for the briefest pleasure must occupy a duration -span 
which is infinitely divisible. All pleasure must be experienced 
in a series, and all that the idea of a sum of pleasures involves 
is that this series should possess as great a magnitude as possible 
when both duration and intensity are taken into account. Obviously 
the intensity of one series may be so much greater than another 
that the former is preferable, even though of shorter duration; 
and vice versa. Where two pleasures are equal in either duration 
or intensity, their difference as regards the other factor will 
determine which is more pleasant on the whole. 
Green2 objected to the idea of a sum of pleasures, not because 
he found it unintelligible, but on the quite different ground that 
because capacity for pleasure has no definable limits it cannot 
provide a determinate conception of the highest good. Rashdall 
of course does not wish to defend the hedonistic ideal; but he 
believes that Green's refutation will be seen to be invalid when 
it is applied, as consistency demands, to all goods realizable in 
time. The greatest possible virtue, for example, is not untenable 
as an ideal; yet any e °;°«ab * attainment of virtue could always 
conceivably be exceeded. 
The only point which Rashdall deems indispensable to his posi- 
tion, apart from the obvious fact that pleasure occupies duration, 
1. Cf. his Manual of Ethics, pp. 229 f. Fourth Edition. 
2. Cf. his Prolegomena to Ethics, pD. 401 f. Second Edition. 
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is that duration can be weighed against intensity. This can be 
denied only by maintaining that duration cannot increase the 
value of a pleasure at all1, - or, conversely, that the duration 
of pain is a matter of indifference; and the same reasoning would 
have to be applicable to other goods, implying, for example, that 
a long period of virtue (its nuality remaining constant) would not 
be better than a short one. On the special question as to whether 
the comparative magnitude of pleasures can be expressed numerically, 
Rashdall admits that in practice such estimates are not feasible; 
yet he asserts that both intensity and duration are roughly con- 
ceivable in terms of portions, and that there is nothing theoretic- 
ally unintelligible about maintaining that if one minute of a 
pleasure seems as desirable as two minutes of another, then the 
former is twice as intense. 
Finally, he holds that even pleasures which differ in quality 
may be compared; for it is possible to distinguish between the pleas- 
antness of an experience, and the other valuable elements it contains. 
It is possible, for example, to prefer the contemplation of beauty to 
some alternative experience on the ground that, while the other 
experience would yield a greater quantity of pleasure of a cruder 
kind, the aesthetic experience is more valuable as a whole2. 
1. Cf. Ivlackenzie: Social Philosophy, pp. 231 f. 
2. For a detailed defence of the distinction between the value 
of the pleasure which an experience yields, and its value ón 
other grounds, see GE. II, pp. 50 -57. In pursuance of this 
distinction Rashdall devotes the balance of a chapter (GE. 
Book I, Ch. VII) to contrasting his own view concerning various 
specific virtues like humaneness, veracity, purity and humility, 
with that of hedonistic utilitarianism. This chapter also rests 
on the assumption that actions, and the feelings and emotions 
which accompany them, may possess positive or negative value 
over and above their value as means to some external good. Nhen 
what he calls 'the actual constitution of human nature' (GE.I. 
p. 108) is thus taken into account, certain actions are con- 
demned which might be defended on purely utilitarian grounds; 
for example, cruelty to animals, infanticide, and the extinc- 
tion of social dependents. 
49. 
Rashdall's sole purpose in discussing the hedonistic calculus 
is to show that varying amounts of one type of good (viz: pleasure) 
can be compared; having done this, he passes on to the more diffi- 
cult question of whether all kinds of good can be compared with one 
another. He has asserted that "value" is applicable in the same 
sense to virtue, cultural interests and pleasure; he has also 
asserted that right conduct consists in the promotion of the 
greatest possible quantity of value. If either statement is to have 
any meaning, these three types of experience must be commensurable 
as regards their value. This does not imply, however, that a 
certain quantity of one good can be satisfactorily substituted 
for that of another, Since all elements are indispensable to the 
suzmnutri bonum, no amount oz one can compensate for the total absence 
of the other; indeed, no single type of value (positive or negative) 
can exist alone, because each attaches to an aspect of consciousness 
which is inseparable from the others. What Rashdall wishes to demon- 
strate is that when an ideal state of all three aspects of con- 
sciousness is not feasible, - when, in fact, the enhancement of 
one good involves the diminution of another - it is possible to 
determine which should be preferred. 
Assuming that the necessity for quantitative comparison can 
be escaped only by contending that it is always right to choose 
the highest type, no matter how small an amount of it is thereby made 
available, Rashdall appeals again to the fact that if virtue is 
regarded as the sole value, it cannot of itself furnish content 
for moral action. Of course, virtue could be treated as invariably 
preferable, without being regarded as the sole value; but to this 
he replies that such supremacy can be known only by comparing it 
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(i.e. the value of virtue) with lower forms of value. In individual 
conduct it is clear that virtue cannot come into competition with 
other goods, since it is always virtuous in the highest degree to 
promote the greatest quantity of value, whatever be its constituents1. 
But when one must choose between contributing to a very slight 
increase in the moral character of another, at the cost of great 
sacrifice of cultural enjoyment, or at the cost of great physical 
suffering, Rashdall holds that a greater amount of the lower goods 
may suffice to compensate for the qualitative superiority of the 
higher. When intellectual or aesthetic goods are weighed against 
pleasure and material comfort, it is still more apparent that the 
enjoyment of the latter - beyond the minimum limits of physical 
necessity - is often justifiable, even when it entails the loss of 
a small amount of these higher benefits. 
A brief statement of the basic principles which Rashdall lays 
down in defence of the idea of commensurability cannot do justice 
to his argument, because that argument is greatly strengthened by 
an appeal to concrete examples in an attempt to demonstrate that 
men actually do indulge in a quantitative comparison of different 
goods. He admits, of course, that these comparisons can never be 
exact, and his own language remains vague when questions of prin- 
ciple arise. In the abstract he can speak only of "large" amounts 
of a lower good off- setting "small" amounts of a higher; but when 
the bribery of a Mandarin, involving slight deterioration in a 
character which is already none too pure, could save a score of 
Europeans from torture, Rashdall has no doubt about which course 
the moral consciousness affirms. 
1. Cf. # 24ó ". 
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In the first instance his whole discussion of casuistry 
issues from a theoretical necessity; he has argued that the pri- 
mary purpose of ethics is to determine what acts are right, and 
according to his position this involves a knowledge of what 
accessible end possesses the largest amount of value for society 
as a whole. The question remains as to what extent this goal of 
casuistry can be realized in practice. 
He recognizes that moral philosophy is primarily speculative, 
and therefore sufficiently justifies itself if it contributes to 
knowledge; but he believes that speculative enquiries cannot be 
devoid of influence upon conduct so long as they are intimately 
connected,with vital human interests. In the case of moral 
philosophy, while a defence of its practical usefulness is by 
no means necessary, it may be put forward as an additional reason 
for its importance. Moreover, because ethical enquiry does per- 
tain to issues which have practical importance, it is undesirable 
to be indifferent to them; earnest devotion to the truth is not 
diminished because knowledge of it is sought, not only for its 
own sake, but also because of the value which it has for life and 
conduct. 
The feasibility of casuistry is seriously limited by the fact 
that the ultimate data of ethics are immediate judgments; but 
Rashdall denies that this renders casuistry altogether impossible. 
He is willing to admit that training in moral philosophy does not 
necessarily lead one to judge more correctly than others concern- 
ing moral value, any more than the formal correctness of the 
Í` 
logician's thought is guaranteed by training in his discipline; 
but in each case reflective study does increase the likelihood of 
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correct judgment. Bradley had contended, in his diatribe against 
casuistry, that ethical thought cannot be discursive at all; but 
if this were true, Rashdall replies, all ethical judgments would 
be isolated and incoherent, and reflection upon them could only 
increase the likelihood of their being erroneous1. He holds that 
Bradley has overlooked the fact that immediate judgments can be 
criticized and moulded into a consistent system, through modifica- 
tion and subordination of their contradictory elements; this is a 
Process which reflective reasoning alone can perform; it yields 
general principles for the guidance of conduct, and moral progress 
is dependent upon it. 
Another invalid objection to casuistry arises from the fact 
that it is popularly associated with the vices of the Jesuit system, 
which arose in a period when the Church was seeking to gain favour 
by making its demands upon conduct as light as possible. Casuistry 
can be carried on apart from tan immoral system of probabilism'2, 
apart from confessionals and priestly authority, apart from the 
distinction between mortal and venial sins which stresses the 
external character of the act rather than its motive. In short 
the whole purpose of casuistry, as Rashdall conceives it, is to 
facilitate the discovery of how men may best serve the highest 
possible ends; the Jesuit system, in general, was constructed to 
point out the degree of immorality which can be practised without 
incurring the censure of the Church. 
Nevertheless, very real limitations are set upon the extent to 
which moral philosophy can enhance right conduct. Because the moral 
1. Cf. GE. II, p. 424. 
2. Ibid., p. xv. 
L 
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judgment is in the first instance immediate, its adequacy is 
dependent more upon insight than upon intellectual acumen. For 
this reason the best moral teacher is primarily a man of exceptional 
moral character. Speculation cannot greatly affect the moral sen- 
sitiveness of the individual in a positive way; but, given a native 
insight, it can stimulate the exercise of this capacity with regard 
to problems that might otherwise be neglected; especially it may 
provide a safeguard against fanaticism. The fact remains, however, 
that moral philosophy can contribute to goodness only in the small 
measure to which goodness is dependent upon knowledge and reflection; 
it can rectify those mistakes in conduct which are due to prejudice 
or confused thinking rather than to ill -will. 
One further limitation arises from the fact that knowledge of 
the best means to the ideal end requires specialized information. 
The moral philosopher may contribute to progress by criticizing 
traditional standards which govern the conduct of mankind; but in 
order to discern and promote the best course amidst concrete cir- 
cumstances, specialized knowledge is necessary. It is the expert 
who, in a given field, like law, medicine or commerce, is best fitted 
to know the most suitable means for bringing about a specific reform; 
but experts seldom concern themselves with ethical questions. Clearly 
the task of relating and comparing these various complicated aspects 
of life is too vast for any one man or class of men to perform 
adequately. Thus the ideal of a casuistry universal in scope cannot 
be fully realized in practice because it involves universal knowledge. 
CHAPTER II - CHRISTIAN ETHICS 
1, Authority. 
Rashdall's ethical position, which is now completely before us, 
can be reduced to comparatively simple terms. Conscience he defines 
as a rational capacity whereby the rightness of an action is judged 
(not irrespectively of its consequences, but rather) in terms of the 
extent to which it promotes a universal good; and the universal good 
he regards (not as synonymous with maximum pleasure, but rather) as 
an ideal which includes virtue,cultural interests and pleasure, each 
in proportion to its relative importance. Is this, then, the end of 
the matter? Because he contends that judgment on the part of the 
individual agent is the ultimate arbiter concerning moral questions, 
does his system culminate in an individualism which leaves no function 
for external authority? This question is most pressing, of course, 
when taken in connexion with the moral teaching of Christianity; for 
Rashdall's procedure seems diametrically opposed to the practice of 
deciding matters of conduct by appealing to scriptural teaching. 
The same tour in the United States which produced the little 
volume entitled Is Conscience an Emotion? included an engagement at 
Oberlin College, where he delivered the Haskell Lectures. This latter 
series, for which he chose Christian ethics as his theme, was published 
three years later (in 1916) under the title Conscience and Christ. 
The primary purpose of this volume is to clarify the relationship between 
the authority of individual conscience and the authority (so far as it 
concerns moral questions) of Christ's life and teaching. Rashdall had 
long been troubled by the fact that the prima facie inconsistency 
involved in espousing the authority of both had received so little 
1 
attention. 
1. Rashdall's discussion of this problem is to be found 
opening chapter of Conscience and Christ. See also 
of Good and Evils Book II, Chapter V, and his early 
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As early as 1893, in a review of Newman Smyth's Christian Ethics) 
he had raised such questions as these: To what extent does Christian 
moral teaching reveal truths which the practical reason,operating 
independently, could not discover? How far are reason and revelation 
harmonious in the sphere of morality? What are the grounds and limits 
of the moral authority ascribable to Christ, the Bible and the Church; 
and in what relation do these authorities stand to individual conscience 
and the state? To these questions Conscience and Christ furnishes a 
partial answer, and on the basis of this book we shall now proceed to 
consider most of them; the relationship between reason and revelation, 
2 
however, must be reserved for another chapter. 
Yet the importance of Conscience and Christ can be indicated only 
by anticipating this later topic. Briefly, Rashdall's conception of 
the significance of the Incarnation turns upon the belief that humanity 
at its highest, especially in its pursuit of a perfect moral ideal, 
provides the most adequate possible revelation of the character of God. 
1. Cf. The Economic Review. Vol. III, pp. 136 -145. 
2. The claims of the individual,the state, and the Church, are 
considered in three thoughtful articles which he wrote for 
The Economic Review in 1896. See Vol. VI, pp. 59- 75,166 -182 
-333; these were later reprinted in Ideas and Ideals, 
Chapters II - IV. Cf also Appendix F. 
In the review of Smyth's book Rashdall mentioned two additional 
subjects which should be included in any complete treatise on 
uhristian ethics: (a) A discussion of ' the relation between 
Christian doctrine and Christian practice' (02. Cit., p. 138). 
(b) A detailed treatment of the content and app1T tion of the 
moral law as it is conceived in Christian teaching; this would 
entail a system of casuistry which would show men how to do 
right instead of merely how to escape from sin. Rashdall's 
own sermons, which abundantly emphasize the moral advantages to 
be derived from belief in Christian doctrine, provide an ample, 
though scattered, treatment of the former topic. (See Doctrine 
and Development, Christus in Ecclesia, and Principles and 
Precepts). His views on casuist try and nowhere more fully 
delineated than in the chapters just reviewed, though he applied 
the method there outlined in virtually all of his writings on 
practical topics, whether religious or secular. 
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To maintain that Christ uniquely revealed the nature of God, it is 
necessary to show that He did indeed uniquely fulfil this moral 
ideal in His life and teaching. Therefore the book as a whole con - 
:stitutes an apologetic on behalf of the ethical supremacy of our Lord; 
and although Rashdall does not regard this truth, once established, 
as comprehending the whole meaning of the doctrine of the Incarnation, 
it is correct to say that he regards it as the most important aspect 
1 
of that doctrine.t the end of the volume he intimates that Christ's 
supremacy over other religious teachers could be shown in other respects; 
yet he nowhere attempts such a demonstration with a fullness comparable 
to this discussion of His ethical significance. Hence his treatment 
of Christ's teaching is more than an essay in comparative ethics; for 
Rashdall himself, at least, the conclusions reached are of the utmost 
doctrinal importance. 
His view of the relationship between individual conscience and 
external authority follows from the limitations inherent in each. 
The limitations connected with the former have just been mentioned 
in our account of his discussion of casuistry, where it was observed 
that knowledge of the proper means to the attainment of good ends 
2 
demands 'an experience much wider than that of the average individual' . 
More important still, all men are not equally competent to judge the 
value of an end, even when they possess sufficient factual knowledge 
to achieve that end. In reality, therefore, the morality of a large 
proportion of one's actions cannot be decided solely through individ- 
:ual judgment. The child begins life in dependence upon external 
influences for his moral education, just as the race began in sub- 
servience to tribal custom. Even the more autonomous civilized 
adult remains tremendously influenced by tradition and the social 
environment; even he can be independent only with reference to 
1. Cf. CC., p. 280. 
2. CC., p. 15. 
isolated issues. Indeed, complete autonomy would be synonymous 
with anarchy. 
Historically, the discovery that moral ideas are necessarily 
transmitted through tradition and education has been the source of 
ethical scepticism; reflection upon differences in national customs 
led the Sophists, for example, to regard all morality as founded upon 
arbitrary conventions. Rashdall has already sought to show that the 
self- evidence of moral truth, like that of any other body of such 
truth, is not undermined because it has been gradually discovered 
and must be learned afresh by every child; yet he has admitted that 
ethics, because it is related to concrete human affairs, cannot claim 
the Precision which characterizes the abstract sciences. Questions 
concerning the means to a given end turn upon factual information, 
and therefore differences of opinion about them arise largely from 
variations in intellectual acumen and powers of observation'. But 
differences of insight into the value of ends 'by no means correspond 
with differences of general intellectual capacity'2; for velue, as 
has been Pointed out already, is related to affective and volitional 
dispositions, which enter into the ground of moral judgments, and 
thereby qualify the operation of the practical reason. For example, 
when the emotional capacity of an individual is defective, his 
experience lacks one part of the data on which these judgments should 
be based. Thus -my aspect of character may give rise to 'inequality 
in men's power of discerning between right and wrong'3. Conflicting 
opinion does not justify the conclusion that objective truth in ethics 
is undiscoverable or non -existent; but it does indicate the insuffic- 
:iency of isolated individual judgment and the necessity for moral 
education, which make the operation of some measure of authority 
indispensable. 
1. Cf. GE. II, p. 151, 
2. GE. II, p. 152. 
3. Ibid., p. 154. 
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On the other hand the influence of authority must also be 
subject to limitations. A primary purpose of moral education is 
the training of individuals to accept or reject independently 
principles which were originally received on authority. Unquestion- 
:ing assent to traditional standards, or complete submission on the 
part of the individual to the consensus of social opinion (as the 
Hegelian ethic commends), would signalize the atrophy of moral 
development. For most great ethical advances have been due to the 
insights of a few individuals - pre -eminently to the originators 
and reformers of the great religions. Undeniably, even the most 
original moral teachers are largely moulded by the ideas of their 
own social heritage; but this does not gainsay the fact that they 
have freely exercised their critical faculties upon accepted beliefs 
and institutions - repudiating, refashioning or transcending them. 
The inequality of individual moral insight thus attests to the 
necessity for some measure of both authority and autonomy; it makes 
autonomy necessary for those individuals capable of perceiving and 
accepting a high ideal on its own merits; it makes authority necessary 
if that ideal is to be effective in the lives of those who cannot 
independently appreciate its worth1. In this connexion it is impor- 
:tant to remember that 'the power of recognizing a moral truth when 
1. Rashdall recognizes that the harmonious and fruitful interaction 
of these two forces constitutes one of the most difficult prob- 
lems of applied ethics. The transition from unreflective child- 
hood to moral self -reliance is an especially delicate one because 
the consequences of general disrespect for moral restrictions 
are disastrous, even though that disrespect be aroused by some 
justifiable departure from convention. Hence the evil results 
of compliance with an otiose moral rule may in certain circumstances 
be less than those of rebellion; but ideally it should be an in- 
dependent recognition of this fact, rather than unquestioning con - 
:formity, which prompts one to submit to authority in such a case. 
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'it is once pointed out is much more widely diffused than the power 
of independently discovering it'l. Thus when authority is acknow- 
ledged at all, it should be that of the best men, rather than that 
of "public opinion "; it should issue from someone whose moral insights 
have proved superior to one's own already, so that it is reasonable 
to accept his authority where verification is impossible. 
These general considerations Rashdall applies to the specific 
problem of how the life and teaching of Christ can make authorita- 
tive claims upon individual conscience. His principle would base 
acceptance of Christ's teaching upon its appeal to an unfettered 
conscience, rather than upon 'blind obedience'2; it also implies 
that if His teaching proves supreme within regions where personal 
judgment is capable of furnishing guidance, then it may reasonably 
be followed where one's own powers are inadequate. Negatively the 
principle affects religious authoritarianism as an attitude rather 
than any essential teaching of Christ Himself. Slavish submission 
to the letter of Scripture has been a cause of most of the religious 
outrages of history; some Christians have even seemed 'prepared to 
obey a dictum of Christ, no matter what they themselves thought of 
its morality' 
3 
. y But the spirit in which Christ put forth His own 
message was one which assumed that His hearers could recognize its 
truth for themselves. He indeed spoke as one having authority; 
but even His most revolutionary and paradoxical sayings do not take 
the form of arbitrary rules which must be accepted without being 
understood; they appeal in a direct and startling way to the con - 
4 
:science individual With regard to He laid of every . miracles, 
1. GE. II, p. 167. 
2. CC., p. 29. 
3. CC., p. 32. 
4. Cf. a sermon entitled "Principles or Precepts ", PP., Chapter I. 
the stress not upon the supernatural power they manifested, but upon 
their mercifulness, as illustrating the unique moral purpose of His 
ministry. 
In the preceding chapter we have seen that no body of ethical 
teaching can furnish authoritative guidance concerning the details 
of conduct; the most that it can accomplish is to put forward general 
principles which are universally valid for human society. In whet 
follows it will be shown that Christ's ethical teaching takes the 
latter form; but full recognition of the originality and the absolute - 
:ness of the principles which He revealed is not in the least incom- 
:patible with the exercise of autonomous moral judgment. His teach - 
:ing cannot even be understood unless it commends itself to a capacity 
possessed by each individual; and the character of that teaching is 
such that it leaves men free to discover its significance for them - 
:selves, as they seek to meet the detailed needs of their own times. 
Naturally Rashdall has little sympathy with attempts to defend 
the supremacy of Christ's ethical teaching on grounds other than its 
intrinsic worth. He does not believe that Christ's power to work 
miracles can constitute a proof as to the truth of His ethical utter - 
:ances; a similar power recorded of others like Moses and Elijah has 
not led to belief in their ethical infallibility. A more important 
claim frequently made by the Church is that belief in Christ's 
divinity implies belief in the truth of His ethical teaching. For 
reasons which will be explained in another chpter 1 , Rashdall regards 
this as a reversal of the proper order in thinking; in his opinion, 
recognition of the moral supremacy of Christ's teaching and practice 
must constitute a fundamental ground for believing in His divinity. 
1. Cf. Chapter IV. 
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He even writes : 
'If we once allow the self -evidencing truth of His moral teach - 
:ing to occupy a prominent place in the argument for His Divinity, 
we are trusting to the validity of our own moral consciousness; and 
when we have done this, we can no longer profess ourselves willing 
to accept any and every moral precept of Christ, without any criticism 
of its contents, on the strength of the historical evidence that he 
uttered the words"-. 
2. Christ's Ethical Teaching 
Therefore Rashdall undertakes a study of Christ's ethical 
teaching with the sole purpose of discovering to what extent it 
may claim to appeal to the conscience of mankind as eternally true. 
Like most great moral teachers, Christ was not a systematic phile- 
:Osopher; His sayings, often couched in parable, take the form of 
intuitive insights into the significance of specific questions. 
Yet Rashdall holds that this does not make it impossible to dis- 
:cover certain fundamental principles which underlie all His 
injunctions. Indeed, he believes that the non -speculative char- 
acter of Christ's teaching has concealed from many His undeniable 
intellectual gifts; the gifts which enabled Him to study the Old 
Testament with rare discernment and to meet skilfully the questions 
3 
of learned friends and foes. 
Rashdall also takes account of the fact that our Lord drew 
upon an extremely advanced moral tradition, with which all His 
hearers were familiar. Portions of the prophetic and wisdom books 
of the Old Testament, he declares, surpass the highest ethical 
teachings of the Hellenic world. Undoubtedly the virtues connected 
with political and intellectual activity were better understood in 
Greece than in Palestine; but in 'those matters of personal morality 
1. cc., p. 28, 
2. The succeeding discussion is based on CC., Ch. III; PP., Chs. 
I and XXVI; DD., Ch. XIV. 
3. Cf. DD., pp. 231 -234. 
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1 
'which are apt to be most affected by the state... of religious belief', 
the Jewish teaching is vastly superior; this is especially true 
with regard to sexual purity and charity, 
Other influences altered the form in which the prophetic 
tradition entered into the Judaism of Christ's own time. One of 
these was a definitely retrogressive emphasis upon ritualism and 
legalism; it frequently thrust great moral issues into the background, 
fettering conduct to the minutiae of petty observances prescribed in 
the Pentateuch and the elaborate commentaries of the legalists. But 
the period subsequent to the great prophets contained progressive 
developments as well. The Exile brought with it a recognition of 
the importance of individual moral responsibility (viz: Ezekiel); and, 
because worship in the Temple was no longer possible, other less 
rigid forms of devotion gained a new importance which was not lost 
after the Return. Moreover, several Apocryphal books, though they 
embody no fresh ethical inspiration, do attest to a detailed and 
2 
exacting application of the prophetic teaching. 
Rashdall has no patience with the assertion that Jesus 
contributed nothing to morality which cannot be paralleled in Jewish 
writings of His own period; but he does recognize that one of His 
greatest contributions consisted in the fact that He discriminated 
between the elements of permanent moral value in the Jewish tradition, 
and the body of legalistic accretions which weighed down the religion 
of His day. Even if this were His only claim to originality, it 
would be a considerable one. While acknowledging the authority of 
the Pentateuch, He attached little importance to the vast accumulation 
3 
of "Pharisaic glosses" which laid irksome and even inhumane 
1. CC., p. 80. 
2. In "The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs" especially, many 
religious and moral ideas closely resembling those of Jesus are 
to be found, and it is probable that He read the book Himself. 
(CF. CC. p. 92), 
3. CC. p.95. 
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restrictions upon the people. 'Within the Law itself He practically, 
if not avowedly, distinguished between the ethical parts of it and 
merely ritual or ceremonial regulations'l. Therefore He did not 
hesitate to depart from accepted practices when ethical purposes 
seemed to demand it; for example, He deprecated the 'system of clean 
and unclean meats which was the main foundation of (the) social 
barrier between Jew and Gentile'2, and thus in principle anticipated, 
or even exceeded, the teaching of St. Paul in such matters. 
Christ went beyond Judaism, not only in subordinating ritual 
to ethical requirements, but in emphasizing to a degree hitherto 
unequalled the importance of motive within the strictly moral 
sphere of the Law. He condemned evil desire in matters like anger, 
murder, and lasciviousness, as uncompromisingly as He condemned the 
overt deed; and on the positive side He taught that love for God 
and neighbour is the primary source of good actions. Rashdall 
points out, moreover, that this principle of love was extended 
universally, to include not only men belonging to other classes 
and races, but even enemies; this in itself constituted a 
transformation of the whole moral code. The highest teaching of 
Judaism had long counselled civility to strangers, but it had never 
sanctioned the equality of treatment which Christ's words imply. 
1. CC., p. 96. Rashdall holds that the "fulfilment of the Law" 
referred to in Luke 16:17 is altogether concerned with a 
development and application of ethical teaching in the Law 
and the prophets. He is inclined to question the authenticity 
of Mt. 5:17 f. (about "not one jot or tittle, etc. "), but 
suggests that 'if Jesus said it, He must have done so at a 
period when His antagonism to Jewish legalism was not fully 
developed' (CC. p. 96 n). In fact he implies that the few 
sayings which specifically make concessions to legalism - 
virtually all of which are found in the first gospel - either 
spring from the Judaizing interest of the evangelist, or, 
if genuine, are inconsistent with our Lord's 'actual teaching 
and practice on other occasions' (Ibid., p. 98). In any 
event, he claims, no 'insistence upon ceremonial rules' can be 
found in the gospels at all. 
2. CC., pp. 100 f. 
- 64 - 
That Jesus regarded His mission as primarily devoted to His own 
people cannot be doubted; but the studies of critics have not 
1 
qualified the commandment to love one's enemies, and this commandment, 
even apart from anything else, atteststo the universal application 
which Christ desired for His teaching concerning brotherhood; for 
the term "enemies" surely cannot be restricted to the confines of the 
Jewish race. 
Christ enjoined love not merely because of the external benefits 
which it brings, but primarily because of the supreme value of the 
loving character itself; He taught men that in promoting the 
spiritual well -being of their fellows and themselves they were 
following the will of God, who desires the true good of all His 
2 
creatures. It is this union of divine and human love in a single 
teaching, Rashdall contends, which constitutes Christianity's 
strongest claim to finality, and evokes the highest religious and 
moral aspirations of which the human heart is capable. Hence it 
is impossible to regard Christ's moral teaching as separable from 
the religion out of which it issues; it is impossible to hold that 
a system embodying the same ethical principles could replace those 
of the gospels. For when robbed of the religious motives which 
support it, when dissociated from fidelity to the Person whose 
spiritual insight and purity it expresses, the ethical content 
of the gospels is deprived of its compelling power. 
1. Rashdall admits that some of the universalistic statements in 
the gospels may be questioned on critical grounds; but, he 
argues, the very fact that Jesus based morality upon inward 
righteousness instead of upon 'descent from Abraham,... 
circumcision...(or) the observance of the distinction between 
clean and unclean meats' (CC. p. 111), indicates clearly that a 
Gentile who fulfilled the requisite conditions would not be 
excluded from the Kingdom. Concerning the authenticity of the 
parable of the Good Samaritan, see Ibid., p.112. 
2. Cf. PP., pp. 253 f. 
65. 
Appendix A. - Ethics and Eschatology. 
At the time when Conscience and Christ was written, the 
eschatological theory of Christ's teaching had come into great 
prominence, largely through the influence of Albert Schweitzer. 
Rashdall devotes the entire second chapter of his book to a 
consideration of this theory, since he feels that it erroneously 
subordinates the ethical aspects in Christ's message to His 
annunciation of a catastrophic Day of Judgment; he also desires to 
refute the suggestion that Christ's ethical conceptions are so 
inextricably bound up with this fore -shortened view of history as 
to be largely inapplicable to modern problems. 
He begins by contending that Schweitzer's theory has exaggerated 
the importance and the trustworthiness of the eschatological passages. 
In the Synoptics, predictions of how soon the Kingdom would come 
contradict each other, and tket all are inconsistent with the passage - 
one of the best attested in the gospels - in which Christ professes 
His own ignorance of the date (i) ; Rashdall is therefore inclined to 
regard the passages which do mention a date as attempts by the 
evangelists 'to adjourn the date of the Coming' (2), in order to 
restore waning hope in the Parousia. He also regards passages which 
deal with Christ's own róle in the Judgment as not much less doubtful 
than those which fix its date in the immediate future (3). 
Rashdall does not attempt to deny. that Jesus may have looked 
forward to the sudden coming of the Kingdom in the near future. 
What he does wish to protest against is the tendency to overlook 
other elements in an exclusive emphasis upon eschatology; for it is 
this, he believes, which has led writers like Schweitzer to hold that 
Christ's 'ethical precepts (were) ... not much in advance of the higher 
rabbinic teaching of His time'(4), and were intended merely for the 
guidance of His followers in the brief interval before the Judgment. 
The eschatological position, Rashdall renlies, neglects the fact that 
the gospels also contain a conception of the Kingdom as present, - 
that is, as being gradually established in the hearts of believers. 
These latter passages attest to the fact that Christ's ethical 
teaching was at least partially directed to the purpose of gradually 
winning men over in the present to a quality of life which would 
characterize all life in the perfect Kingdom. Thus, although no 
doubt the full establishment of the Kingdom was associated with a 
future Judgment, the essence of the conception was ethical. Only 
when it is acknowledged that in Christ's teaching the Kingdom is 
represented as the establishment of a perfect relationship between 
God and man, can any connexion be found between the sayings in which 
its coming is gradual and those in which it is sudden and catastrophic. 
The earliest utterance of Jesus about the Kingdom was joined with a 
call to repentance; and throughout His teaching the conditions for 
admission to it were described as moral and spiritual. The fact that 
He also regarded the Kingdom as a state of reward and punishment 
1. Cf. Mt. 26; 36; Mk. 13:32. 
2. CC. p. 46. Rashdall does not seem to realize that his 
interpretation here would well support the thesis that eschatology 
is primitive in the gospel tradition. He suggests that none of 
these predictions 'certainly belongs to ... . (Ibid; p. 44). 
3. Cf. Ibid., pp . 48 f. 
4. Ibid., p. 44. 
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enhances rather than diminishes the ethical worth of the conception; 
hence it is gratuitous to contend, as some have done, that this 
aspect of Christ's teaching causes a conflict between bcetween His ethics 
and His eschatology. (1) When the gospels are compared with apocalyptic 
literature, the attention which they accord to details of catastrophe 
and reward is immediately seen to be moderate; from the prophetic and 
apocalyptic teaching concerning the Kingdom and the Messianic ideal, 
Tesus so unremittingly chose the most spiritual elements that, except 
for the "little Apocalypse ",(2) the gospels contain virtually no 
mention of the Kingdom which is not closely connected with His preaching 
of righteousness. 
What Rashdall is most concerned to prove is that even if Jesus 
expected the Kingdom to come suddenly in the immediate future, the 
value of His ethical teaching is not thereby destroyed; (3) for His 
teaching dealt almost exclusively with principles whose validity even 
a swiftly approaching cataclysm would not alter. Anticipation of 
an imminent termination of the race would transform the details of 
duty; for example, good works requiring long periods of time would 
have to be abandoned. But it would not affect the value of 
repentance, right motive, and love of God and man. Whether the 
Kingdom is seen in the perspective of a world which will long continue 
in time, or whether it is seen as a sudden supernatural intervention 
in history, the necessity for seeking it through righteousness is not 
diminished; and this latter was the essence of Christ's teaching. 
In his own preaching and writing Rashdall usually lays most stress 
on Christ's teaching of a Kingdom already begun in the hearts of men, 
which he takes to be the Christian ideal for society; the idea of a 
full fruition of the Kingdom in the future, he associates with belief 
in immortality. Therefore he refuses to follow a writer like Father 
Tyrrell (4) in radically separating the "present" and "future" 
conceptions of the Kingdom. Tyrrell's view of the present social 
order is so pessimistic that he conceives of a future Kingdom, beyond 
history, in which God will redeem the evil of this world, as the only 
basis for Christian hope. Though Rashdall's own position is one which 
resolutely confronts the reality of evil, he is not ready to go so far. 
He holds that belief in a loving God, which justifies the hope of 
immortality, is drawn from the evidence of earthly experience; (5) 
such belief, he maintains, affords hope for improvement - though not 
for perfection - in this life. Precisely because he believes 
righteousness to be the primary condition for bringing in the Kingdom, 
he refuses to divorce the effort to realize it in this life from the hope 
that it will be perfectly realized in the future. 
1. For more detailed defence of this statement, see Appendix D. 
2. Cf. CC. p. 59. 
3. Rashdall seeks to show elsewhere that the validity of Christ's 
ethical teaching is not affected by the fact that He may have 
mistakenly believed in the imminence of a world catastrophe. 
And he does not believe that the doctrine of Christ's divinity 
implies omniscience in the human Tesus. Cf. # 194 ff. 
4. Cf. his Christianity at the Cross -Roads. 
5. Cf. W 149 ff. 
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3. Objections to Christ's Ethical Teaching. 
Rashdall claims universal validity only for 'the general 
principle of impartial love towards all mankind', which he finds 
at the core of Christ's ethical teaching. Since this is substantially 
identical with the ideal which he has already espoused in a purely 
theoretical discussion of ethics, acceptance of it here needs no 
further elaboration or defence. To those who deny the validity 
of Christ's ethical teaching because they uphold egoism or refuse to 
acknowledge the reality of moral obligation, Rashdall's reply has 
already been sufficiently indicated. Yet Christ's teaching 
embodied concrete details as well as general principles; indeed, 
it 'would have been very cold and unpersuasive apart from the 
2 
particular applications and interpretations which He gave to it'. 
When Rashdall turns to a consideration of the objections which have 
been urged against Christian ethics, he discovers that most of them 
refer to these concrete details; it is frequently claimed, for 
example, that His teaching is too closely bound up with a particular 
period of history and a limited racial mentality to be universally 
applicable to -day. 
Rashdall sympathizes to a certain extent with such criticisms. 
He himself emphasizes the fact that the gospels do not contain a 
set of rigid precepts which can exhaustively determine the details 
of conduct. Concerning a question like that of divorce, he 
maintains that conscience immediately assents to Christ's defence of 
the general principle of monogamy; but whether or not divorce is 
justified in a given case cannot be contingent, he arges, upon 
1. The succeeding discussion is based on CC., Chapter 1V. 
2. CC., p. 135. 
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the literal application of some isolated saying of Jesus. For 
apparently the only cause which He acknowledged as sufficient 
was that of sexual infidelity, and even the verses which contain 
1. 
this exception may not be genuine. Here, Rashdall argues, the 
rightness of conduct cannot be made to depend upon critical conjecture; 
for it is impossible to be certain in the case of any saying that it 
was rightly remembered and recorded by the evangelist or his 
informant, that it was correctly copied by scribes for centuries, 
or that it was accurately translated from Aramaic into Greek and 
then into English. On the contrary, only a free conscience, 
operating in the light of modern experience, can decide whether 
divorce in any given case is not - where all else has failed - the 
lesser of two evils, and therefore more compatible with maintenance 
2 
of respect for the very institution which Jesus sought to defend. 
He also believes that many objections brought against detailed aspects 
of Christ's teaching are the fruit of a misguided literalism, and 
that they may be removed merely by considering each saying in its 
relationship to the principle of love, which permeated His teaching 
as a whole. His answers to only the most important of these 
3 
objections may be considered here. 
1. Cf. r..CE:. pp. 104 f. 
2. It is interesting to note that while he was a witness before the 
Royal Commission on Divorce Rashdall was severely criticized, 
especially by high churchmen, for claiming that conscience rather 
than the literal application of gospel sayings, should be the 
guide in such a question. Cf. The Daily Telegraph, Nov. 24, 1910, 
for his testimony, and The Nunes, March 1911,for his controversy 
with Prof. Goudy on the subject. Cf. also Rashdall's article, 
"Divorce: The,uestion of Principle ", The Modern Churchman, 
Vol. VI, pp. 566 -75, - and a joint letter, which he signed,on 
"tThe Grounds of Divorce ", Ibid., Vol. XIII, pp. 162 f. 
3. Chapters III IV and V, in Conscience and Christ, are followed in 
each case by'a lengthy appendix. The first treats of detailed 
teachings of Jesus, the second of detailed objections to them, while 
the third discusses the manner in which apostolic writers, especially 
St. Paul, elaborated or fell short of them. These supplementary 
notes contain much valuable material, largely of an exegetical 
character. 
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To the charge that Christ's teaching counsels an exaggerated 
sacrifice of self, Rashdall replies that the saying, "Love thy 
neighbour as thyself ", in principle asserts belief in the intrinsic 
value of every human soul, and therefore requires that one take 
account of his own needs as well as those of his neighbour. Because 
men usually err on the side of selfishness alone, it is frequently 
forgotten that the saying is also applicable against a destructive 
self- sacrifice, which fails to contribute to a good more important 
than one's own. No doubt Jesus stated the duty of giving to the 
needy in an unqualified form; pre -occupation with exceptional 
circumstances would have confused His hearers and diminished the 
force of His appeal. Nevertheless, there is nothing in His teaching 
which counsels charity in cases where it is contrary to the wisdom 
of a love which seeks the highest well -being of all men impartially. 
He was primarily concerned with promoting that inward unselfishness 
which usually expresses itself in giving; so long as one is motivated 
by generosity, it is entirely in keeping with His main purpose to 
consider how a gift may be most beneficial; thus good -will itself 
may restrain one from giving where it will instill laziness in the 
recipient, where other needs or responsibilities are more pressing, 
or where some means more effective than private charity should be 
employed to combat the evil of poverty. 
Christ's statements concerning meekness, non -resistance and 
forgiveness afford another instance, Rashdall claims, of a teaching 
which is inapplicable to modern life only so long as it is interpreted 
in a deadly literal way. It should be remembered that these sayings 
were delivered to a people who had no political power; they apply 
primarily to personal relationships, and their chief object is to 
denounce revenge. Rashdall does not mean to suggest that the 
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fundamental principles of Christian morality do not apply to 
every sphere of human action, social as well as personal. But if, 
as he contends, punishment and resentment may be joined with the 
purpose of promoting the malefactor's true good along with that 
of all other men, then indeed it is a mere abuse of Christ's 
teaching to claim that it permits all offences to go unpunished and 
meets evil solely with indiscriminate forgiveness. If Christ's own 
sayings and actions be examined as a whole, many circumstances can 
be found in which He thought it proper to bring indignation and 
resentment to bear against corrupt or hypocritical individuals 
who were undermining the spiritual life of a whole community. 
Moreover, He taught that even forgiveness should be contingent upon 
1 
repentance on the part of the offender. 
When he comes to consider Christ's attitude toward property, 
Rashdall is willing to admit that eschatological expectations 
partially explain the special obligations which He imposed upon His 
immediate disciples; and he stresses the fact that many of the 
most uncompromising demands for the renunciation of personal goods 
2. 
and worldly ties were addressed to this small band alone. In 
Rashdall's opinion, therefore, Jesus did not intend to make complete 
3 
poverty a general condition for entrance into the Kingdom. Thus in 
seeking to apply the spirit of Christ's teaching to modern life, he 
does not feel compelled to sanction a universal renunciation of 
wealth. No doubt he reaches this conclusion partially under the 
1. Cf. # 214 ff .. 
2. Rashdall suggests that this fact may explain the passage about 
hating father and mother (Lk. 14:25 f. Cf. Mt. 10:37). He 
also believes that the demands made upon the Rich Young Ruler 
were exacting, not only because Jesus perceived that his wealth 
was a spiritual stumbling -block to him, but also because He was 
inviting him to become a disciple (Cf. Mt. 19:21). 
3. In support of this statement he cites Christ's commendation of 
Zaccheus, who 'resolved to restore fourfold to the particular 
persons whom he had wronged and to give half of his remaining 
goods to the poor' (CC. p. 152. Italics mine). 
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influence of a conviction, often expressed elsewhere, that economic 
equalitarianism would prove more injurious than beneficial if put 
into practice in modern society. He does recognize, however, that 
Christianity demands a readiness for any sacrifice which love requires; 
for some men wealth may be such a taint that only complete renunciation 
1. 
of it can bring about moral perfection. He also affirms without 
reservation that Jesus desired property, along with everything else 
material, to be subjugated to the service of human welfare, - and 
that in so far as our social order fails to make wealth the servant, 
instead of the task -master, of all mankind, it undeniably falls short 
of the Christian ideal. 
Finally, Rashdall regards the charge of morbid asceticism as 
entirely unjustifiable; for Christ never made suffering, or the 
avoidance of harmless pleasure, ends in themselves; what He endured 
was indispensable to the fulfilment of His mission. In fact, the 
gospels are full of evidence that He was censured for not rigidly 
2. 3 
following such practices as fasting. Moreover, only one passage, 
which has all the appearance of being a characteristic Matthean 
addition, could be interpreted as placing celibacy above marriage, 
1. Cf. GE. Bk. II, 
fitted to serve 
Ch. 
God 
IV, on "Vocation ". Some are especially 
through great sacrifice. 
2. Rashdall claims that since both Jews and early Christians tended 
to be ascetic, it is reasonable to suppose that traditional sayings 
of Jesus sanctioning their practices would have been preserved; 
yet modern criticism has cast doubt upon even the few references 
to fasting which do occur in the gospels. Of the two undoubtedly 
genuine allusions (Mt. 6:16 ff., and Mk. 2:19-22 with parallels), 
the former neither commands nor opposes fasting, while the latter 
contains a saying (about the new wine and the old wine -skins) 
which renounces the old ritual system, side by side with what is 
probably (as Loisy holds) 'an addition...reflecting the growing 
asceticism of the later Church' (CC., p. 162). For Rashdall's 
whole discussion, see ibid., pp. 156 -62. 
3. Mt.. 19:12. 
- 72 - 
and it does not purport to be the enunciation of a universal principie. 
Elsewhere the gospel evidence unequivocally indicates that Christ 
attached great importance to the sanctity and permanence of monogamy. 
1. 
4. Development in Christian Ethics. 
Thus far our review of Conscience and Christ has shown how 
Rashdall seeks to strike a balance between the legitimate claims 
of authority and autonomy. Christ's teaching of impartial love 
toward all mankind, together with its implications for specific aspects 
of conduct, presents a principle for which he claims universal validity. 
But he further claims that allegiance to Christ does not fetter the 
conscience because His teaching does not put forth a rigid, detailed 
code; the practice of Christianity thus requires the exercise of 
individual judgement in applying the law of love to the changing 
needs and conditions of each succeeding generation. A literalism 
which regards each gospel saying as a precept to be followed without 
qualification, conceals entirely the true relevance of Christian ethics 
to modern problems. It engenders a slavish legalism like that which 
Christ Himself denounced in the Judaism of His own times; it plays 
havoc with the sometimes subtle and metaphorical significance of our 
Lord's expressions; it fails to interpret each isolated saying in 
2. 
the light of His teaching as a whole. 
The fact that the fundamental principles of Christian ethics 
are susceptible of development and expansion therefore attests, not 
1. The succeeding discussion is based largely upon CC., Chapter V. 
For other sources, see foot -notes. 
2. Rashdall cites several instances of how Christ's own actions 
contradicted some of His sayings if only the bare content of the 
latter, instead of their underlying intention, be taken into account. 
For example, He strongly condemned the use of the word "fool", 
and yet He is recorded to have employed it Himself on a few 
occasions. (For further examples, see PP. p. 9). A thoroughgoing 
literalism would imply that one should forgive exactly four hundred 
and ninety times, hate father and mother, and indulge in 
self- mutilation. 
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to their insufficiency, but to their abiding fruitfulness. Because 
Christ did not claim to expound a system which would exhaustively 
cover all aspects of conduct, Rashdall feels free to undertake an 
enquiry into the forms of development needed. The apostolic writers 
themselves, he declares, began the task of adapting the Christian 
message to changing circumstances, and the Church has regarded this 
as one of its appropriate tasks ever since. Indeed, if the doctrine 
of the Holy Spirit in the Fourth Gospel may be regarded as having 
some actual foundation in the later discourses of Jesus, this activity 
1. 
of perpetuating His influence was one which He foresaw and sanctioned. 
This development may of course take the form of increasing insight 
into the means for promoting the good of mankind; for obviously the 
use of new knowledge or the solution of complex modern problems cannot 
be held within the confines of modes of action which were best suited 
to enhance the general good in the first century. But Rashdall 
is willing to maintain also that the ethical teaching of Jesus can 
be supplemented legitimately with regard to its conception of the 
moral end itself. 'alien Conscience and Christ is compared with the 
central principles of The Theory of Good and Evil, this becomes apparent. 
For though our Lord's teaching embodies an exalted conception of moral 
goodness, and does not fall into an ascetic condemnation of pleasure, 
it lays very little stress upon the value of intellectual and cultural 
activities. To be sure, He did not indulge in the anti -intellectualism 
which has sometimes characterized great religious teachers; 
nevertheless, Rashdall desires to provide a definite place for this 
1. Cf. PP. p. 250. The idea of development, as implicit in the 
doctrine of the Holy Spirit, is one which permeates Rashdall's 
whole attitude toward Christian thought. Cf., e.g., 177 and 
if 210ó 
. Also note the title of his first volume of sermons: 
Doctrine and Development. Cardinal Newman he regards as the 
writer primarily responsible for introducing the conception of 
development, in its modern form, into English theology. 
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additional type of value within the teaching of the Church. In so 
doing, he does not wish to detract in the least from the authority 
of the positive principles contained in the gospels. That is, in 
contending that the Christian conception of the moral end should 
inculcate elements which are compatible with our Lord's primary purpose 
of enhancing human welfare, but which are not made explicit in His 
recorded teaching, Rashdall is giving no colour to the assumption - 
often induced in modern writerson ethics by their obsession with the 
idea of moral evolution - that an ideal taught two thousand years ago 
can be in no sense final for life to -day. It is frequently contended, 
for example, 'that the ethics of Jesus were "world- renouncing" and 
1. 
that ours are "world- affirming" '; in fact it is chiefly in reply 
to this charge that Rashdall seeks to answer the problem of Christianity's 
relationship to cultural interests, and to consider fairly what that 
2 
relationship implies concerning the finality of its moral ideal. 
At the outset he wishes to establish the fact that, no matter 
how widely human needs and values may have expanded in some respects 
since the time of Christ, His teaching of love for one's neighbour 
remains valid; for that teaching prescribes the promotion of human 
welfare, however it be conceived; therefore it is capable of 
3 
incorporating new goods into the moral end as they arise. If it be 
contended that the Christian conception of human well -being is itself 
"world- renouncing ", the sense in which the epithet is used must be 
carefully examined. It is justifiable if it means that selfishness 
and lust are to be renounced, and even harmless pleasure subordinated 
1. CC., p. 199. 
2. To the extent that this charge is based on the assumption that 
Christ's teaching was largely eschatological, it has been dealt 
with in Appendix A. 
3. Cf. PP. p. 252. 
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to the ideal of universal love; it is wholly unjustifiable, as 
Rashdall has already argued, if it means that Jesus condemned pleasure 
as such, or sought sacrifice and pain for their own sakes. What he 
is chiefly concerned to maintain is that our Lord's teaching was not 
"world -renouncing" in the sense that intellectual and cultural 
activities cannot be reconciled with His conception of the moral end; 
no breach of fidelity to His ideal is entailed by an inclusion of 
these aspects, which He did not stress, in a modern conception of 
what love bids us promote for ourselves and others. Rashdall does 
hold, however, that because these pursuits are good, Christian teaching 
requires that they be cultivated for the benefit of humanity as a 
whole; thus it is opposed to barren intellectualism, and 'dilettante, 
1 
anti -social Aestheticism'. 
The contention that Christianity is unduly "other -worldly" derives 
more plausibility from certain periods of the Church's history than 
from the teachings of its Founder, yet even this former ground for 
the charge is meagre. As hope in the Parousia waned, early Christians 
gradually turned to practical pursuits which the followers of Christ 
had largely set aside during His ministry and immediately after His 
crucifixion. 
'All the industrial virtues to which Christianity has sometimes 
been supposed to be indifferent are enjoined by implication in St. Paul's 
precepts to the idle busybodies of Thessalonica'. (2) 
The best aspects of Hellenistic culture and literature came to be 
held in high esteem by the more philosophical of the Fathers. As 
soon as the Empire was Christianized, believers were allowed to engage 
in public activities. And since the Renaissance, especially in the 
1. CC. p. 207. 
2. Ibid., p. 209. 
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Protestant Churches, recognition of the value of secular culture 
has been almost unreserved. Moreover, monasticism was the product 
of a particular epoch, in which all civilized life - not only the 
activity of the Church - was profoundly affected by a mystical movement 
which issued largely from Neo- Platonism; it never became the accepted 
ideal of the Church as a whole. After all these reservations have 
been made, however, Rashdall is willing to admit 'that the ideal of 
other -worldliness...does represent the predominant tone both of the 
1. 
later patristic and of the medieval Church'. Even Protestantism, 
though it has not sanctioned extreme asceticism, or denied the 
compatibility of righteousness with a secular calling, has in many of 
its phases imposed on men an austere mode of living from which many 
cultural values are almost wholly excluded. 
He emphatically asserts that the modern Church is not departing 
from the spirit of Christ's teaching when it refuses to follow the 
medieval ideal, as represented in a work like Imitatio Christi, in 
disparaging secular culture, harmless pleasure, and extra -ecclesiastical 
callings. For religious devotion which issues in practical works of 
love is more in keeping with His life of tireless service, than is a 
life of pre -occupation with salvation and fear of Hell, or a 'life of 
2 
solitary meditation'. Though modern Christianity may owe a great deal 
to secular movements like the Renaissance, - 'in the attempt to remould 
3. 
all social life in accordance with the ideal of human brotherhood', 
it is really returning to the spirit of its Founder. This does not 
mean that the morality practised by the modern world at all fulfils the 
demands of Christianity; many products of the modern spirit - 
1. CC., p. 214. 
2. Ibid., p. 220. 
3. id.,pp . 221 f. 
Nietzschean egoism, ruthless industrialism, and new forms of condoning 
laxity in personal morals - are utterly opposed to the Christian ideal. 
Indeed, if the implications of its ideal are to be fully developed, 
the Church must undertake a much more searching and uncompromising 
criticism of modern society than it has hitherto attempted; too 
frequently it has been content to relieve suffering, poverty and 
injustice wherever possible, without confronting the necessity for so 
reorganizing society as to prevent these evils at their source. 
Christians may differ as to the best method for carrying out this 
reorganization, but that it will demand sacrifice on the part of 
privileged individuals for the welfare of the lower classes and of 
society as a whole, and that it must be founded upon subordination of 
individual self -interest to a collective good, cannot be doubted, if 
Christ's own teaching is the ideal toward which it is to be directed. 
1. 
5. Christian Ethics and Other Systems. 
One final task remains in setting forth the grounds upon which 
Rashdall ascribes unique significance to the Christian ethic. Since 
it may be contended that equally exalted ideals have been put forward 
by other teachers, and that these ideals are likewise susceptible of 
development, he turns to a comparison of Christian ethics with other 
systems. He has already suggested that the prophetic teaching which 
Jesus presupposed and transcended, renders His ethical system superior 
to that of the greatest Greek philosophers. This is especially evident 
when Christ's teaching of humility is compared with Aristotle's 
1. The succeeding discussion is based primarily upon CC., Chapter 
VI, and PP., Chapter XIX. 
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conception of the "high- souled" man1. In the latter case the 
individual could view his own virtues with self -complacency because 
they related to civic duties, owed primarily to his own class, which 
were comparatively easy to fulfil; the Christian, with a more 
exacting and universal conception of duty, is acutely conscious of 
his own moral inadequacies, and realizes that such goodness as he can 
embody is due, not to personal achievement, but to the grace of God. 
Because he is dominated by love, the Christian can find no satisfaction 
in the moral inferiority of others; but just as he is free from 
contempt for others, he is free, too, from self -contempt. In him pride 
is swallowed up in respect for the potential worth of every human soul. 
A more searching test of the originality of Jesus can be made, 
Rashdall believes, by comparing His teaching with that of the Stoics. 
In the writings of Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius may be found 
the same fundamental precepts which underlie Christianethics: the 
inwardness and pre -eminent importance of all moral goodness, especially 
of benevolence. Often even their phraseology is strikingly similar 
to sayings in the New Testament. But when Stoic morality is considered 
as a whole, a great deal may be found, both in its principles and in 
the way they were practised, which puts it on a lower plane. The 
restriction of the Stoic ideal of goodness to virtue resulted in the 
doctrine of "apathy ", which disregarded the true importance of pleasure 
and pain in contributing to or detracting from human well- being; hence 
Stoics sought to cultivate indifference, not only to their own pleasures 
1. See a sermon entitled "Christ and Aristotle ", PP., Chapter II, 
and the remarks on humility in GE. I, pp. 204 ff. Prof. A. E. 
Taylor has suggested (in a lecture at Edinburgh University) 
that the passage in the Nichomachean Ethics (IV, 3. p. 1123 b) 
is Aristotle's description, not of his own, but of the contemporary 
Athenian's image of the ideal man, - and that it may therefore 
be intended (at least in part) satirically. This was also thr 
opinion of Professor Taylor's late colleague at St. Andrew - 
John Burnet. 
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and pains, but to those of others. As a consequence, their altruism 
was seriously defective because it contained no place for pity, and 
even fostered a measure of high- minded contempt. Their suppression 
of all emotion, though instigated in a laudable attempt to become 
impartial, at the same time weakened the impulses which support 
benevolence itself. They viewed virtue and wisdom as prerogatives 
of the highly cultivated and gifted classes alone; this resulted on 
the one hand in pride, and on the other in an absence of humanitarian 
warmth. Indeed, the primary intention of Stoic ethics was to enable 
the individual to transcend external cares, rather than to stimulate 
him in the service of mankind. In its later development, chiefly in 
the thought of Marcus Aurelius, this individualism was modified by 
an increasing emphasis upon another great Stoic tenet - that of living 
in accordance with nature. Under the influence of this teaching the 
unity of humanity received due recognition, and the Stoic temperament 
turned from a renunciation of social and political interests to a 
devotion to altruistic activities; yet underlying both individualistic 
and altruistic tendencies was a mood of disenchantment, and the wisdom 
of conforming to nature was conceived of in terms which were essentially 
prudential and negative. Hence nothing in the teaching even of a Marcus 
Aurelius can approach the warmth of Christ's faith in a loving Father; 
nothing in his practice can approach the Master's positive and forth - 
going unselfishness. 
Even if the actual content of Christian and Stoic ethics were 
more ftearly equal in worth, an extremely important difference would 
remain; the one is founded upon a faith in a loving God which quickens 
the will and instills hope, while the other can make no corresponding 
claims. Christianity erpetuates and nourishes this religious 
aspiration within an ecclesiastical community; and thus it always had 
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a great advantage over Stoicism in the effectiveness with which it 
could carry out its doctrines in practice. Indeed, the Christian 
tradition, through the work of the apologists, inculcated the highest 
asrects of Stoic teaching. 
When he turns to a comparison of Christian ethics with that of 
other historical religions, Rashdall stresses from the first the very 
real differences which do exist; he is an unremitting opponent of the 
superficial view that at bottom all religions espouse the same world - 
view, or the same system of ethics. His discussion is restricted to 
a brief survey of those higher religions which 'identify the will of 
the supernatural being ... with the morally good'1, since more primitive 
types of belief can hardly be considered seriously as possible 
alternatives to Christianity in the sphere of ethical teaching. His 
remarks concerning Judaism 
2 
have sought to show that Christ included 
its best elements in His own teaching and put forward principles 
which transcend anything to be found in the Old Testament. In short, 
he holds that traditional Judaism, with its racial exclusiveness, 
cannot vie with the Christian principle of universal brotherhood and 
the equality of all men as children of God. The ethical importance 
attached by Judaism to external rites also makes it inferior to 
Christian practice, in which the essence of true morality is regarded 
as inard and spiritual. 
Mohammedanism repudiates distinctions of race and nation, but it 
also fails to fulfil,X the principle of universal brotherhood because 
it affirms the intrinsic superiority of the Mussulman, and even 
1. CC., r. 258. 
2. Cf. # 61 f. 
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'requires idolaters to be slain'l. It further violates this same 
principle by proclaiming the inferiority of women. Over against 
Christ's affirmation of monogamy it sets 'a limited polygamy and an 
unlimited concubinage'. It 'bases morality upon the arbitrary will 
of God'2, while Christianity affirms the responsibility of the 
individual moral agent3. 
Zoroastrianism, which in its modern form of Parseeism has become 
largely monotheistic, Rashdall regards as an ethically vigorous 
religion, in which much may be commended. But he points out that in 
the Zend- Avesta 'ceremonial transgressions'4 are to be punished more 
severely than moral ones; burial of a corpse, for example, merits 
eleven times as many stripes as murder. 'Like the Koran', the Zend- 
Avesta 'recognizes a fundamental distinction between a man's duty 
towards fellow-believers and his duty towards others!. In beauty of 
1. CC., r. 259. Rashdall's own principle of equality of consideration 
requires that individuals be treated in the light of their unequal 
intrinsic worth. (Cf. GE. I, pp. 223 -41). Thus when two men are 
drowning, and only one can be saved, the more valuable life should 
be given the preference. (Cf. Hibbert Journal, Vol. XIX, pp. 457 f., 
where Rashdall shows that McDougall overlooks this point in his 
criticisms) . The Mohammedan might therefore reply that, in so far 
as he is simply treating fellow-believers as intrinsically superior, 
he is doing nothing which violates this principle. 
2. Ibid., p. 260. Several of Rashdall's criticisms would not be true 
of Islam to -day. 
3. In a monograph entitled "Christianity and the Legalistic Religions" 
(in Pan -Anglican Papers, published by the S.P.C.K.), Rashdall 
contrasts Christianity as a religion of the spirit, with religions 
of the letter, especially Mohammedanism and Judaism. Here again, 
he finds the authority of spiritual religion to reside in the fact 
that it appeals not to sumernaturally promulgated rules and precepts, 
but to the individual reason and conscience. What he regards as 
the distinctive meaning of Christian revelation is therefore 
destroyed by any theory of plenary inspiration concerning the Old 
or New Testament. But his argument rests upon the presupposition 
that any view which regards human reason as incapable of apprehending 
the full truth concerning God's nature and incarnation, necessarily 
looks to an infallible scripture which must be followed literally 
and blindly. 
4. CC., p. 261. 
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expression, in clarity and forcefulness, in practical insight, he 
declares, 'its ethical precepts never rise above the level of the 
Pentateuch'1. 
Rashdall regards Buddhism, next to Judaism, as most worthy of 
comparison with Christianity2 He finds in Buddhism many ethical 
oreceDts similar to those of Christianity; it is universalistic, and 
it subordinates the ceremonial to the ethical. Yet there are several 
fundamental points of conflict between the two religions. Originally 
Buddhism was atheistic, while in its popular form it is virtually 
polytheistic, for it worships a multitude of "'Buddhas ", or incarnations 
of Deity'.3 In the sphere of ethics its similarity with Christianity 
ceases as soon as one compares the ultimate ends which each religion 
serves. In Christianity charity and self-sacrifice are enjoined for 
the sake of serving others and bringing in the Kingdom. In Buddhism 
this position is reversed; self-denial is regarded as an end in itself; 
while others whom the agent may serve are treated merely as a means 
for attaining his own good. In Christianity the worth of personality 
is coupled with the law of love; in Buddhism the ideal of self - 
renunciation is a corollary of the belief that individual personal 
existence is an evil. Buddhism therefore ends in the paradoxical 
assertion that escape from desire is the sole end worthy of being 
desired, extinction of the self the sole good of the self. Unlike 
that of Christianity, this ultimate ideal is incompatible with ordinary 
human pursuits, and it cannot be sought in practice by the great mass 
1. CC., p. 262. 
2. Rashdall also mentions Hindooism, of which Buddhism is really 
a great reform movement; he dismisses it, however, with the 
remark that the caste system alone is sufficient evidence of 
its ethical inferiority. A long essay on Buddhism among his 
unpublished papers contains the fruit of a study more thorough 
and appreciative than the brief sketch in Conscience and Christ. 
3. Ibid., p. 265 n. 
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of mankind. Christianity, in extremes of asceticism, has sometimes 
included "other- worldy" orders; but even so, the fundamental 
distinction has always remained that for such Christians renunciation 
of this world has been an expression of hope and confidence in a better 
world hereafter. Buddhism's future hope consists entirely in a negative 
release from evil; for it, world -renunciation is an end in itself1. 
Most of the religions here reviewed have undergone development 
in which the influence of Christian ideas has lessened some of the 
divergences just noted. This is especially true in the case of Buddhism, 
which in certain sects has become theistic, and has adopted doctrines 
resembling those of Christianity concerning salvation and immortality; 
in ethics, Buddhism has also become more positive quite independently, 
and these tendencies have been enhanced by its subsequent contact with 
Christianity. Similar reforms have taken place in IIindooism and 
Parseeism; while Judaism has been modified by Christianity ever since 
the latter's appearance. These transformations within other religious. 
traditions should be welcomed by Christians in so far as they bring 
their believers into closer proximity to the ideals taught by Christ. 
It should be noted in passing, however, that Rashdall fails to see in 
these developments any justification for the lessening of missionary 
activity. Iie believes that their initiation was largely due to missions 
in the first place, and that so long as they fall short of full 
Christianity missions will be necessary. Because Christianity owes the 
great appeal of its message not only to the sublimity of its ideals, 
but primarily to the fact that they were fulfilled in the life of one 
historical Person, no mere acceptance of its ethical principles on the 
part of other religions can ever supply 
to the Person of Christ is absent. 
what is lost so long as devotion 
1. Cf. GE. II, pp. 254 f., and CC., pp. 263-71. 
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Rashdall is convinced, as has been suggested already, that God 
may best be conceived 'in the light of the highest moral ideal known 
to Humanity'1. The argument of Conscience and Christ has sought to 
show that because the character and teaching of Christ fully disclose 
this highest moral ideal, He uniquely reveals the nature of God. The 
sense in which this argument justifies adherence to orthodox language 
concerning the doctrine of the Incarnation will be discussed in a later 
chapter.; before turning to such topics, however, it is necessary to 
examine his metaphysical defence of theism, wherein he attempts to 
vindicate the relationship between ethics and religious belief which this 
view of revelation presupposes. 
1. CC., p. 281. 
85. 
CHAPTER 111 - I II TAPHYS ICS . 
One indispensable presupposition has underlain Rashdall's thought 
thus far in our survey; all that he has said is based upon an 
unwavering belief in the independent validity of moral judgments. 
Upon this foundation he has constructed his ethical system, and in 
the light of the conclusionsthus reached he has examined Christ's 
ethical teaching. Instead of taking his stand within a body of what 
would ordinarily be called "revealed" religious truth, in terms of 
which all man -made systems stand adjudged, he has postulated a moral 
ideal as "independently" true; then he has gone on to maintain that 
the finality of a religious tradition is largely dependent upon the 
extent to which it teaches this ideal. The chapter just completed 
has outlined his reasons for contending that Christianity fulfils 
this condition as no other religion can. 
Judgment as to the defensibility of this procedure must be 
reserved until his apologetic for Christian belief has been completed, 
but it is worth noting here that his metaphysical thinking, which is 
now to be surveyed, rests upon the same foundation as the two 
preceding chapters. In pursuance of his firm conviction that 'ethical 
judgments are not in any sense deductions or inferences from some 
1 
previously accepted view of the Universe', he makes ethics the point 
of departure in what he has to say concerning metaphysical questions. 
Certain metaphysical implications or postulates may be drawn from a 
basic belief in the objectivity of moral judgments, and metaphysical 
systems may themselves be judged in terms of whether or not their 
conclusions are compatible with a recognition of the full significance 
of ethics. Only a meqaphysical argument can serve to refute an 
2 
attack on the validity of ethical distinctions; because ethical 
1. Ethics. p.78 
2. ...'If the reality of Morals or the validity of ethical truth be 
once brought into question, the attack can only be met by a 
thorough -going enquiry into the nature of Knowledge and of Reality;' 
(GE.Ì1, pp. 192 f.). 
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truth is immediate, however, such an argument is offered, not to 
provide ulterior vindication of it, but to reveal the inadequacy of 
systems which tend to undermine it. Thus he arrives at a series of 
postulates, which form the essence of his metaphysical thinking, in 
the very act of defending the validity of ethics against inimical 
1 
theories. 
The first of these postulates is the reality of a continuous 
self which is the cause of its own actions; this he believes to be 
indispensable to the meaning of ethics. The second postulate, belief 
in the existence of God, he regards as essential to a full appreciation 
of the objectivity of moral values; but the denial of it, unlike 
denial of the first, does not deprive morality of all meaning. In 
other words, he believes that when the fact of moral obligation is 
1. Therefore most of what follows has a polemic, rather than a purely 
speculative, purpose. In 1909 Rashdall wrote: 'I am quite aware 
that all that I have written does not amount to a fully developed 
and articulated metaphysical system'. (Mind, Vol. XVIII, p.116). 
And he would have been the first to admit that the slender volume 
entitled Philosophy and Religion (published later in the same 
year), together with the occasional philosophical essays which 
issued from his pen in the years that followed,did not remedy 
this deficiency. Had his health permitted him to accept the 
invitation to deliver the Gifford Lectures for 1922 -24 at St. 
Andrew Of . Matheson's Biography, p.212) , a volume on natural 
theology, fit to take its place beside his three other major 
works, would now be in our possession. The opinions which will 
constitute the substance of this chapter would have been perfected 
and elaborated; yet they would have formed the basis of what he 
had to say, for very little change can be detected in his writings 
on these subjects. Whether this be a virtue or a vice, it makes 
possible the construction of a coherent statement of his 
metaphysical views, even though they must be woven together from 
a multitude of sources. 
The most useful of these is Philosophy and Religion. In 1902 
Rashdall published his first metaphysical essays as contributions 
to two Oxford symposia: "The Ultimate Basis of Theism" in 
Contentio Veritatis, and "Personality: Human and Divine" in 
Personal Idealism (edited by Henry Sturt). Other important 
sources which should be mentioned here are The Theory of Good 
and Evil, Book III, Chs. I - III; his Deansgate Lecture on 
"The Problem of Evil "; and his King's College Lecture, "The 
Moral Argument for Personal Immortality". Complete data 
concerning these, and other metaphysical writings, will be 
found in the bibliography. 
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fully thought out, it logically implies theism, though in practice 
many men believe in the reality of duty without believing in God. 
That a thoroughgoing belief in moral objectivity naturally leads to 
an acceptance of the theistic position, he regards as one of the 
strongest arguments in favour of the latter. In an unguarded 
moment he even goes so far as to write: 
'The very fact that (an) assumption is a postulate of Ethics 
is by itself sufficient reason for declaring that it possesses 
metaphysical truth. It is implied in the idea of Morality, and 
the idea of Morality is a datum of the moral consciousness; and 
the data of consciousness are the only ground which we have for 
believing anything at all'.l. 
Two other postulates, the negation of optimism and the reality 
of personal immortality, follow from the terms in which he builds 
his argument in defence of ethical theism. 
1. Freedom. 
Rashdall's view of the relationship between ethics and theism 
may be held in abeyance until the first postulate is discussed on 
its own merits. Philosophical theories which deny the reality of 
the continuous self may be refuted in the first instance, he claims, 
on an epistemological basis. 
'...The existence of a continuous self', he writes, 'is implied 
in all knowledge. Knowledge comes to us piece by piece; and if we 
cannot treat the successive moments of our conscious life as 
successive moments of a continuously existing self, these successive 
experiences can never be built up into a single world. Deny the 
reality of the self, and you have no ground for believing in the 
existence of a world which is only known on the assumption of that 
reality'. 2 
In other words, an object can never be known except by a cognizing 
subject; therefore any theory which wishes to avoid self- contradiction 
must admit that the latter is as real as the former, even if it does 
not assent to the idealistic proposition that the object cannot exist 
1. GE. II, p. 203. 
2. GE. II, p. 199. 
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1 
in any sense apart from some subject. 
Morality demands the existence of the self, not only as knower, 
2 
but as 'the cause of its own actions'; for morality is meaningless 
unless the self is capable of being treated as possessing a spiritual 
character which is the product of its own activities and of its own 
susceptibility to spiritual influences. Materialism, which is 
opposed to this view of the self, will soon be dealt with at some 
length; but here another type of theory hostile to the idea of 
moral responsibility, which appears in the garb of absolute idealism, 
must be considered. This theory, which is usually associated in 
European philosophy with the influence of Hegel and which is a 
justifiable interpretation of at least one dominant aspect of his 
thought, so merges the individual self in a "universal reason" that 
it makes the former incapable of causing its own actions, just as 
it is incapable of causing events in nature. To be sure, in the 
writings of this school much is said with reference to the ego,and 
3 
the manner in which it 'makes "Nature "'; but this language, when 
examined, is intended merely to convey that the self records natural 
events in consciousness. For the absolute idealist, nature could 
1. Another mode of thought which Rashdall regards as incompatible 
with morality is sensationalism. Although it has no necessarily 
direct bearing upon the reality of the self, it is best mentioned 
here because his refutation of it is likewise epistemological. 
Because he holds (as Sorley later contends in Moral Values and 
the Idea of God, p. 182) that 'from "is" to "ought ", from 
Tin-7776e to value, from the actual to the good, there is no 
way by the road of experience' (GF+II, p.196), Rashdall argues 
that sensationalism, or empiricism in any rigid form, in effect 
denies that cognition of moral value is possible. Theories 
which make sensation the sole ground of knowledge usually leave 
only pleasure as a possible standard of value, and thus they form 
a facile alliance with hedonism. But even when this is not the 
case, the empiricist is obviously incapable of passing from 
sensory experience, which he regards as exhaustive for knowledge, 
to an a priori notion of intrinsic value. 
2. Ibid., p. 200. 
3. np. 201. 
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not exist apart from knowledge; but it must be noted that this 
relationship is purely cognitive, - not causal in the sense of 
implying volition on the part of the subject. It places events of 
consciousness upon precisely the same level as events in nature in 
the sense that the connexion between events in each case is for this 
theory one of purely logical necessity. Therefore ultimately it 
makes the self quite as impotent to affect its oti°vn actions as does 
materialistic mechanism. This charge justly applies, Rashdall 
believes, to the implications, at least, of Green's metaphysics. 
Green was an earnest moralist, and did not intend to construct a 
system with such consequences; nevertheless his conception of a 
"timeless " self, which he identified with a rational, but not 
cau wally active, "universal self-consciousness", is utterly 
incompatible with his affirmation of individual moral responsibility. 
This is the first intimation to appear thus far of a strain in 
Rashdall's thinking which will run through the whole body of this 
chapter. As a pupil of Green, he began as a convinced idealist, 
and he remained such to the end of his life. Early in his teaching 
career, however, he discovered that the centrality which he accorded 
to personality in his system removed him increasingly further from 
the positions of Green, and later of Bradley and Bosanquet. He 
early renounced, in defence of theism, a monism which seemed to him 
to nullify moral distinctions; and because at the time absolutism 
was exerting a pervasive influence on English philosophy, he was 
forced to combat it as fervently as he did naturalism. 
Yet Rashdall's assertion that the permanent spiritual self is 
the cause of its own actions by no means stamps him as an indeter- 
minist. Although his metaphysical position, as may be conjectured 
from what has been said already, manifests the influence of Lotze in 
1. Cf. Appendix C. 
1 
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many respects, he differed from Lotze fundamentally in his attitude 
toward the problem of freedom. In this matter Rashdall was,in fact, 
a conformist rather than a rebel at Oxford, he accepted the dictum 
then current that each particular act of the self must stand in a 
1 
necessary (i.e. a causal) relation to the character as a whole. 
His treatment of the problem of freedom begins by clearly setting 
out the two traditionally opposed positions. The essence of the 
determinist position, as he conceives it, is the contention that 
2 
'actions are the necessary result' of the original character at 
birth, plus the influences of the environment; because undeveloped 
capacities may be resident within character, however, the 
determinist need not argue that future conduct can be completely 
predicted on the basis of past actions. Therefore the determinist 
may even admit that outward conduct and internal motives may be 
3 
altered by the assertion of a 'hitherto latent capacity, without 
the interposition of new stimuli in the environment. The essence 
of the indeterminist position is the claim that the individual has 
the power to perform each successive act without being impelled to 
do so, either in response to external attractions, or by reason of 
the character he has built up through previous experience. Rashdall 
is willing to grant that the indeterminist has made out his case if 
he can show that such 'undetermined choice constitute(s) one of the 
factors'4 which direct deliberate human action. He regards it as 
unfair to claim that indeterminism must apply to all deliberate acts 
1. Cf. Hibbert Journal Vol.! pp.403 ff. Rashdall's chapter on 
freedom (GE. Bk.Tii, Chilli, Cf. PP. Ch.XXiii) also reflects a 
very considerable dependence upon Sidgwick, except where the 
latter admits that he finds intuitive evidence, at the moment of 
action, which supports indeterminism. (Cf. The Methods of Ethics, 
Bk.T., Ch.V. as a whole, and especially pp.65 ff., in the sixth 
edition). 
2. GE. ii., p.303. 
3. Ibid., p.305. 
4. Ibid., p.307; italics mine. 
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in order to be valid, - and especially unfair to interpret it as 
implying that volition can be carried on without motivation. The 
indeterminist may recognize, with the determinist, that deliberate 
action issues from desire, and that in the event of a conflict, the 
strongest desire prevails. On the other hand, the determinist need 
not regard the strength of desire as wholly dependent upon the nature 
of its object; he can give full weight to the internal control which 
the individual's own character may exert over motivation. In addition 
to false interpretations of the nature of the controversy, the 
ambiguous use of the word "freedom" itself has given rise to much 
confusion. The sense in which Rashdall uses the term whèn he refers 
to freedom as a fundamental postulate of ethics, implies merely that 
both good and bad acts are caused by 'a permanent spiritual self'1, 
instead of mechanically, by a material organism. 
In a glance at the history of the controversy over free -will, he 
observes that an interesting transposition has taken place. From 
patristic times through the Reformation, thinkers of a critical or 
humanistic bent defended the idea of human freedom against the 
-nrotagonists of religious authority, in whose thinking the human will 
was completely subject to God's omnipotence. In the modern epoch, 
however, philosophers have tended to sïpport determinism,, and 
theologians indeterminism, because the problem has come to turn upon 
freedom as over against the reign of natural law2. 
Empirical considerations, though they are not decisive, have 
tended to put modern scientific and philosophical theory largely on 
the side of determinism. One of these considerations is the close 
relationship between mind and body, especially the effect of cerebral 
1. OD. cit., p. 309. 
2. Cf. Ibid., pp. 310 f. 
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and neural conditions upon moral, as well as intellectual, capacities. 
Rashdall does not believe that these mental and spiritual capacities 
can be entirely explained in terms of physical causes, but he does 
hold that the latter should be 'included among the antecedents of 
human action'1. He also looks upon the scientific study of heredity, 
although its results are not complete, as indicating that some 
connexion exists between progeny and forbears in moral, as well as in 
physical, tendencies. Finally, he maintains that the applicability 
of statistical methods in predicting certain moral actions on the 
part of large numbers (for example, in computing crime rates) is 
inexplicable except in terms of regular causation; differences in 
rate between countries, or sudden fluctuations in such statistics, he 
claims, are almost always traceable to causes in the environment. 
These three empirical considerations leave untouched the assertion 
that the moral and religious consciousness demands indeterminism, and 
if this assertion be true, it constitutes a powerful objection to 
determinism. But Rashdall is unwilling to assent to the contention 
that only undertermined actions, or the undetermined part of a man's 
character, can possess moral value. For this would imply that, though 
the indeterminist might recognize the influence of heredity and 
environment, he could attach no value to any virtues which are 
attributable to education or good family; nor could he attach moral 
worth to, say, a religious conversion which was due to the influence 
of a book or another person. Kant's assertion 'that no man can really 
be made better by the influence of another'2, is the logical outcome 
of such a position. To this extent, Rashdall believes, indeterminism 
is actually opposed to ordinary moral judgments, instead of demanded 
1. pa. cit., p. 313. As will be seen presently, he does not believe 
in 'physical causes" in the usual sense at all. 
2. 22. cit., p. 322. 
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by them; for in practice, men do attribute moral value to aspects of 
character which have been determined. This being the case, either 
such moral judgments are erroneous, or determinism is compatible 
with the existence of at least some aspects of moral value. 
In order to avoid misunderstanding it is necessary to say a 
word more in distinguishing the form of determinism which he defends, 
from mechanistic theories. Although he has recognized that "physical" 
causes play a part in conditioning mental events, he asserts that 
the determination of human actions is quite different from that of 
events in nature, because 'the influence of mind upon body is at least 
as obvious ... as the influence of body upon mind'1. His view of the 
relationship between mind and body is not, however, that of 
interactionism, as the last statement might seem to suggest; for 
according to his idealistic view of causation, which will be discussed 
presently, even purely physical events are ultimately caused by 'the 
Will of God which within the region of Mechanics works invariably 
(we have every reason to suppose) according to this law of uniform 
succession'2. To put the point more simply, he conceives of only one 
ultimate order of causality, vested in the will of God; but this 
causality manifests itself in two different aspects - as the final 
cause of human volition, and as the efficient cause of physical events. 
'The way in which a self causes is quite different from the 
way in which mechanical events cause one another ... The self is 
not an event or a series of events. The ... psychical influences 
which are said to move the self have no existence of their own 
apart from the self. The self is present in each of them, and makes 
them what they are. Moreover, even if we regard the desires or 
inclinations which successively enter into the consciousness of the 
self as causes which determine its successive volitions, these are 
not mere events which act on succeeding events as it were a tergo, 
but presented objects which influence the self after the manner of 
final causes. In Mechanics the present in determined by the past: 
in the region of human action it is in a sense the future which 
determines the present'(3). 
1. Op. cit., p. 325. 
2. Ibid., p. 326. 
3. Ibid., pp. 326 f. 
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It is necessary to say an anticipatory word concerning the 
whole view of causality which underlies the distinction Rashdall 
is here making. He regards it as one of the major confusions of 
post -Kantian thought that the principle of mechanical uniformity 
in nature has come to be identified, by many writers, with the 
idea of causality. From Kant's contradictory accounts of causality, 
the noumenal cause gradually came to be rejected by later thinkers, 
while they accepted the phenomenal cause, manifest in the mechanical 
uniformity of nature, as an a priori principle. Thus arose the 
confusion against which Rashdall protests. 
Subsequently it will appear that he does regard causality as 
an a priori category; but he holds that the principle of uniformity 
is merely an empirical generalization. Mechanical sequence does, 
of course, presuppose the law of universal causality, and within 
certain regions, such asphysics and chemistry, experience teaches 
the reasonableness of arguing that the mode of occurrence of an 
event in the past is good ground for predicting a similar mode of 
occurrence as the result of similar conditions in the future. But 
the principle of uniformity does not exhaust the idea of causality. 
For, as he has just contended, another aspect of causality, namely, 
purposeful action on the part of rational beings, is strikingly 
different from mechanical uniformity. A given mode of action on the 
part of a human being in the past gives no ground whatever for 
contending that it will necessarily be the same in thé futurel, 
The distinctive feature of the principle of uniformity is that it 
applies to regions where purpose can be ignored. Hence the primary 
1. 'If (like Kant) I had got up at five every morning without a 
single failure for forty years, that would not prevent my 
getting up late on one particular morning if it seemed to me 
that the purposes of my life would be better served by some 
modification of my usual habits'. (Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society. Vol. VI, p. 12). 
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reason for denying that the principle is a priori is that every 
voluntary action constitutes a violation of it in accordance with 
higher laws; this very definitely does not imply, therefore, that 
voluntary action, because it differs from mechanical succession, 
lies outside the law of universal causality. 
The principle of uniformity is operatives only in the sphere of 
purely inorganic phenomena. Its limits, like the principle itself, 
are fixed empirically, because experience indicates in what regions 
psychical states or the voluntary actions of rational beings may 
alter the sequence of physical events, and in what regions they may 
not; and it also teaches that to some extent biological organisms, 
because they demand a teleological explanation, fall outside the 
mechanistic region. 
The essential reason why the principle of mechanical uniformity 
must be distinguished from the idea of causality lies in the very 
fact that volitions fall under the latter but not under the former. 
One volition does not follow as the mechanical effect of the psychical 
state or series of psychical states preceding it; it follows from 
the whole character, which is neither a psychical state nor a series 
of them1 . 
The teleological attraction by which Rashdall conceives of the 
self as determined through the presentation of ideal ends stands 
opposed, then, to a mechanical explanation which would make human 
behaviour merely the result of antecedent physical conditions. 
Nor does the theory of self -determinations as he conceives it, make 
the human self 'simply the (passive) theatre upon which a certain 
action and reaction between ideas takes place'2. 
1. This parenthetic passage concerning the principle of uniformity 
is based upon Rashdall's paper: "Causality and the Principles 
of Historical Evidence ". Cf. 1. cit. pp. 1 -34. Cf. also 
Appendix E. 
2. GE. II, p. 328. Italics mine. 
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It makes the present self the seat of causation; for though the 
character of the ideals which this self finds attractive is dependent 
upon its constitution, as moulded by heredity and environment, it is 
through striving, willed by the self in response to these ideals, 
that contemplation of them issues in effective action. 
Hence Rashdall concludes that a theory of self- determination 
such as he espouses does not in the, least undermine the meaning of 
judgments of value. For one thing, conditions which are entirely 
unrelated to human volition may be pronounced good or bad (in a 
non -moral sense)1; this is true, for example, of suffering resulting 
from disasters in nature and of ignorance due to lack of innate 
capacity. But even in the case of moral value, though such value 
attaches only to voluntary action, it is not destroyed by a 
deterministic theory of how the action came to be willed; for what 
is judged morally good or bad is the quality of the volition itself, 
or the state of character which i represents. Hence 'the difference 
between a crime and a disease is exactly the same for the Determinist 
as it is for the Indeterminist. The difference lies just in the fact 
that a better will would have prevented the one, while it could not 
have prevented the other2. If the judgment which pronounces a given 
voluntary action morally good or bad is valid, it 'cannot be upset 
by any theory as to how the ... act came to be done'3. 
In its practical effects, he believes, a theory of self - 
determination does not undermine moral effort as fatalism does; for 
while the latter assumes that events will occur in a fixed and 
fore -ordained order, the former clearly takes account of the influence 
1. This statement reflects a position assumed in The Theory of Good 
and Evil (concetrr! rtg judgments of value) which, as I argue in the 
critical section (# 250 f), is really incompatible with his 
metaphysical system. 
2. Ibid., p. 329. 
3. Tbid., p. 330. 
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which desire for moral improvement may exert upon conduct. Moreover 
determinism of this type, despite a widespread assumption to the 
contrary, does not undermine remorse or the sense of moral responsibility. 
Remorse arises primarily from the fact that the present self regrets 
some act performed in the past; but this is a state of mind which can 
arise in connexion with acts which were determined by a previous 
condition of character. A deterministic explanation of how the past 
act came to be done does not in the least lessen the abhorrence which 
the repentant self feels regarding the state of his character which 
prompted him to commit the bad action. New respect for goodness, or 
the re- assertion of good impulses which are part of his permanent 
character, have intervened since the offence; otherwise the man would 
not be repentant; and if that remorse be genuine, there is nothing 
in a deterministic view of it to undermine the recognition that certain 
impulses are bad, or to weaken the desire for ridding one's character 
of them. 
In his discussion punishment is intimately related to moral 
responsibility. He admits that determinism is incompatible with 
retributive theories1. If, however, punishment be intended to reform 
the evil -doer and to protect society, then a theory which explains 
the offence as an 'inevitable consequence of a bad character'2 does 
not in the least lessen the justifiability of imposing pain for the 
sake of improving that character, or of proscribing the offender's 
individual freedom for the sake of society. On the other hand, if 
a given action has no connexion with the previous self, no previous 
goodness of character could have prevented it. Indeed the indeterminist 
might protest on this ground that punishment for a "free" action is 
1. But he regards retributive punishment as indefensible; cf. # 213 fC. 
2. GE. II, p. 334. 
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unjust; and he might urge the futility of punishing in order to 
prevent future repetitions of the crime, since influences brought 
to bear upon the present self cannot determine future "free acts ". 
Finally, Rashdall asserts, to believe with the indeterminist in 
uncaused events, is to entertain what is virtually an unthinkable 
notion; at the very least such a belief, because it ascribes acts 
to "pure chance "1, is patently fatal to any idea of responsibility2. 
2. Theism. 
The manner in which Rashdall has taken moral truth as his point 
of departure in investigating metaphysical questions might lead one 
to suppose that his treatment of theism will follow Kantian lines. 
Does he look upon ethical data as providing a sufficient foundation 
for theology? His own statement, previously quoted3, to the effect 
that if a notion is a postulate of ethics, that is sufficient reason 
for according metaphysical truth to it, might easily be so understood 
as to lend colour to an affirmative answer. As a matter of fact he 
does not entirely adopt the Kantian procedure. In the passage quoted 
he really means to convey merely that metaphysical postulates demanded 
by the moral consciousness have a claim equal in importance to those 
derived from any other area of knowledge. This is revealed by his 
repeated assertions elsewhere that any single aspect of knowledge 
must be tested by and brought into harmony with the rest. Accordingly 
he bases his refutation of naturalistic ethics on the contention that 
whatever validity naturalism may attach to moral truth is really 
irreconcilable with its general theory of reality4. But he likewise 
1. GE. II. p. 337. 
2. The problem of freedom receives further consideration in connexion 
with its bearing upon the problem of evil. Cf. # 122 ff. 
3. Cf. # 87. 
4. Cf. it 111 ff. 
1 
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regards Kant's attempt to ground theology solely upon ethics as 
unsatisfactory, because the dichotomy between the theoretical and 
the practical reason in which it results leaves the postulates of 
ethics out of harmony with other aspects of knowledge and experience; 
and this, to Rashdall's mind, is almost as fatal as naturalism's 
failure to follow out the metaphysical and theological implications 
of ethics. Hence before turning to a consideration of the sense in 
which he looks upon belief in God as a postulate of moral objectivity, 
it is desirable to review the arguments by which he seeks to show that 
1 
theism is metaphysically defensible on other grounds as well . 
He attaches an especial importance to these arguments because 
at the turn of the century Ritschlianism, which deprecated all attempts 
to base theology on metaphysics, was exerting great influence upon 
English religious thought. He heartily agrees with the Ritchiian 
thesis that Christianity is based upon the immediate appeal which 
Christ makes to the individual conscience, but he denies that for 
most men contemplation of the character of Christ is sufficient by 
itself to instill belief in God. Belief in a revelation of God in 
Christ, he maintains, 'presupposes belief in the existence of a God 
2 
to be revealed' . Therefore the very first task of the theologian 
is to show that the theism which Christianity presupposes, is rational. 
Most significantly, he goes on to say that though Ritchlianism 
rightly accords a central place to the deliverances of the practical 
reason as a source of our knowledge of God's nature, 'value- judgments 
will not... assure us of the existence of God when taken apart from 
all the other rational considerations which lead up to the belief 
3 
that the origin of the world must be found in a Spirit and a Will' . 
1. Cf. GE. II, pp. 220 -223. 
2. Liberal Churchman. Vol. I, p. 35. The article is entitled 
"RT chlianism ". For additional material on Ritchilenism, see GE. II, 
pp. 183 ff. and 252 f.; PR., pp. 161 ff.; PP. Ch. XXIV: 'Harnack 
and Loisy ". 
3. Liberal Churchman. Vol. I, pp. 35 f. 
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Hence there can be no doubt that these "other rational considerations ", 
to which we now turn, occupy what Rashdall regards as an indispensable 
place, alongside ethical grounds, in the foundation upon which his 
theistic system rests. For that reason they likewise possess an 
apologetic, and not merely a theoretical importance, since he repeatedly 
voices the conviction that an inability to find belief in God 
reasonable, is the chief obstacle for modern minds in the way of 
accepting full Christianity1. 
(i) - The Idealistic Argument. 
In an influential essay entitled "The Ultimate Basis of Theism" 
(in Contentio Veritatis), in his Cambridge lectures on Philosophy 
and Religion, and i lmost every writing where he discusses theism 
by itself, Rashdall takes an idealistic ontology as his point of 
departure. Indeed, in the course of the aforementioned essay he 
rather rashly writes that idealism is 'the necessary basis of Theism'2,- 
'the one absolutely convincing and logically irrefragable argument 
for establishing the existence of God'3. But in this case, as in . 
the case of the ethical grounds for theism4, he softens the extreme 
claims which he makes at the outset by admitting that the argument 
is insufficient to fulfil his purpose unless it is supplemented by 
other lines of reasoning. Characteristically, he appeals to idealism 
in the first instance with a practical end in view; it is, he claims, 
the most effective weapon against a materialism which frequently 
seems plausible to the "plain man ". Rashdall believes that scientific 
research itself has rendered the older type of materialism untenable, 
1. Cf. e.g. Modern Churchman. Vol. IV, pp.-204 ff.; an artidle 
entitled "The Creeds ". 
2. CV., p. 8. 
3. Ibid.,p. 21. 
4. Cf. # 96 f. 
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but he sees in modern naturalism an ominous successor; for this type 
of thought still finds the basis of reality in physical events, of 
which it makes consciousness merely a by- product. 
He begins by criticizing the assumption, so easily made by the 
philosophically untrained, that matter is the one reality 'of which 
we are most certain, and 'with which we are in immediate contact'2. 
In the course of his reasoning he draws, at many points, upon the 
argument of Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge.3 With Berkeley 
he urges that even if matter does exist apart from mind, this fact 
obviously cannot be experienced or known immediately4. The widespread 
assumption that it does exist independently is therefore based on an 
inference. Now is this inference, on the basis of which it is asserted 
that matter possesses independently the qualities apprehended in 
perception, a justifiable one? Rashdall holds that it is not, and 
seeks to show that both secondary and primary qualities are mind - 
dependent. 
Ever since Locke's analysis of human knowledge English philosophers 
have for the most part recognized the unintelligibility of contending 
that secondary qualities are the possession of matter apart from an 
experiencing mind; no notion of these qualities can be formed at all 
except as 'effects produced by bodies upon mindr5. Accordingly, all 
that Rashdall is willing to attribute to matter itself is the power 
to produce these effects, and apparently he agrees with Locke that this 
power is 'something ... totally unlike the sensation itself°. To the 
1. PR., p. 6. 
2. Ibid., p. 7. 
3. Rashdall's Berkeleian argument is partially mediated through 
James Ward's Naturalism and Agnosticism. 
4. Rashdall's article on "Nicholas de Ultricuria, A Medieval Hume ", 
in the Proc. Arist. Soc., Vol. VII, pp. 1-27, suggests that this 
unconventional scholastic thinker anticipated several features 
of Berkeley's philosophy, including this one. 
5. CV., p. 9. 
6. PR., p. 9 
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suggestion that what the material thing possesses is really like 
what the mind knows in sensation, he retorts (with Berkeley) that 
a quality1 which ex hypothesi exists apart from mind cannot possibly 
be like a sensation or an idea. 
On the other hand, however, Locke did not go on to assert that 
primary qualities are also mind -dependent, as Berkeley did; this 
defect in Locke's analysis Rashdall attributes to the fact that 
primary qualities do indeed involve something other than sensation. 
In so far as solidity, shape and magnitude involve sensations like 
touch and muscular tension, he maintains that they clearly are to 
that extent as dependent upon mind as are secondary qualities. 
However, primary qualities also imply spatial relations; and 
it is true that the idea of space cannot be built up through sensation. 
Yet the act of relating objects in space (or the parts of one object 
with each other) likewise implies mind: 
'Relatedness only has a meaning when thought of in connection 
with a mind which is capable of grasping or holding together both 
terms of the relation ... Apart from mind there can be no relatedness; 
apart from relatedness no space: apart from space no matter. It 
follows that apart from mind there can be no matter'(2). 
Rashdall is willing to admit that Berkeley's argument is defective 
when it 'tends to explain space away into mere subjective feelings'3. 
For this reason he has acknowledged that things present themselves 
through thought, not through sensation, as externally related and as 
possessing structure; but this correction of Berkeley only strengthens 
the idealistic hypothesis. Again, Berkeley often treated knowledge 
as a mere succession of feelings, not realizing that this succession 
ltaelf involves a category which sensation cannot furnish; but, Rashdall 
1. The word "quality" is question -begging here, if it means "as sensed". 
2. PR., p. 11. This argument from the nature of relations is partially 
derived from Green's Prolegomena, pp. 31 f. (Second Edition). It 
must be carefully distinguished from the argument from qualities, 
for reasons which will appear in the critical section. 
3. PR., p. 15. 
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adds, temporal relations, like spatial, imply the presence of a 
relating mind. 
For the rest, he takes over bodily Berkeley's familiar arguments: 
(a) since some sensations can be produced - as in "dreams or 
frenzies" - without the presence of physical objects, it is impossible 
to argue from ordinary sensations to the necessary existence of 
1 
external bodies ; (b) even objects which are not present to 
perception are nevertheless present to the mind in thought at the 
very moment when one seeks to conceive of them as existing 
independently; they are thought of, indeed, in terms of the 
sensations which they would excite if perceived. 
The argument from qualities may be reduced to the proposition 
that since we cannot perceive matter apart from mind (i.e., apart 
from perceiving), we have no foundation for asserting that it 
exists apart from our minds; the materialist must arbitrarily 
2 
assert that matter possesses in itself attributes which differ from 
the sensations by means of which we do experience the "external" 
world. The argument based upon conceptual knowledge is similar in 
structure, merely substituting "thought" where "sensation" stands 
in the argument from qualities. The argument from relations, how- 
ever, has a wider significance. 
3 
All three will be discussed in 
the critical section. 
Rashdall does not mean any part of his argument to imply that 
mind can be abstracted from 'all relation to the objects of its 
4 
thought'; he recognizes, in other words, that the conscious life of 
the self involves a relationship in which both terms are indispensable, 
and he maintains that such a position, although it affirms their 
1. The critic would of course retort thet the presence of independent 
physical objects is precisely what distinguishes ordinary 
sensations from "dreams or frenzies". 
2. I use this vague word because it is advisable to avoid the term 
"qualities ". 
3. Cf. ti` Z72 f i . 
4. CV., p.15. 
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inseparability, does not destroy the distinction between subject and 
objectl. When his language is examined, however, it becomes evident 
that the only reality which he is willing to accord an object (or a 
physical thing) consists in what some mind thinks and perceives. 
Thus the distinction between (a) experiencing, and (b) what is 
experienced, falls wholly within the sphere of mind itself; the reality 
of things is regarded as mental in character. The question remains, 
however, as to whether his "proof" that matter can be neither perceived 
norconceived apart from mind really contributes anything towards 
establishing the further proposition that material things cannot exist 
apart from mind. 
Nevertheless the next step in his pursuit of the Berkeleian 
argument assumes that this proposition is well -founded. Although 
his contention, that because we cannot perceive or conceive matter as 
existing apart from mind we have no right to believe that it can exist 
apart from mind, is based entirely on the evidence of human experience, 
he clearly regards his argument as one which reveals a universal and 
necessary connexion between mind and matter. What he really desires 
to establish is the proposition that matter is intrinsically unintelligible 
unless it be regarded as dependent upon some mind. That this is the 
case is obvious from the fact that he goes on to admit that no single 
1. In Contentio Veritatis, pp. 15 -19, Rashdall also argues that his 
idealism does not destroy epistemological and logical distinctions 
between "subjective" and "objective ". In the case of a single 
self alone in the universe, he declares, the distinction between 
subjective feelings and judgments of objective fact would still 
hold, for only the latter are capable of being true or false. But 
because men live in a society of conscious selves, it should be 
recognized that the world of space and extended objects exists 
publicly as feelings do not; they possess the "objectivity" which 
belongs to data which can be apprehended only through thought. 
Moreover, private perceptions may be corrected more effectively 
when comparison with what others perceive is possible, than when 
one must discover his own errors in isolation. He discusses how 
this comparison can be made, in connexion with the problem of how 
one may know other selves. Cf. # 136 ff. and k 163. 
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human mind, nor all human minds together, can perceive (or in any gray 
apprehend) all reality; he admits that human thought does not create 
the external world, but gradually discovers itl. This admission 
arises, of course, from the difficulty occasioned by the data of 
scienceslike geology and astronomy; they record events in terrestrial 
and stellar history which occurred long before any human mind existed 
to perceive them. Rashdall can reconcile the reality of these events 
with idealism only by asserting that they existed in the mind of God. 
Undeniably the aspect of Berkeley's thought which this argument revives 
appears to be little more than an introduction of God as a deus ex 
machina, in order to bolster up the idealistic edifice at the very 
moment when it seems to be crumbling to bits. But perhaps it is more 
just to describe this affirmation of God's existence as a necessary 
conclusion, once it be assumed (a) that matter is unintelligible apart, 
from some mind, and (b) that matter exists independently of human 
minds. At the same time, our examination of this reasoning in the 
latter portion of this thesis will expose several difficulties which 
stand in the way of regarding it strictly as a theistic proof at all. 
(ii) - The Argument from Causality. 
Rashdall's argument has sought to reveal a natural rapprochement 
between idealism and theism. He qualifies this by recognizing that 
absolutism, in its exclusive emphasis upon the cognitive aspect of the 
Absolute's relation to the world, is in most forms uncongenial to 
theism. The sense in which Hegelianism seems to deny causality to the 
individual self has been mentioned already; now he seeks to show that 
1. Cf. PR., p. 17. 
2. Cf. A.C. Ewing: Idealism, D. 389. The writer points out that 
proofs of the existence of God are merely like proofs of anything 
else in so far as they introduce the notion in question in order 
to meet an intellectual difficulty. 
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in effect it denies causality to God or the Absolute. According to 
this view the Absolute, being related to nature only in thought, can 
"make" it only in the sense that if nature were not present in thought 
it would not be real. Human minds, the theory implies, "make" nature 
in the same sense except for the fact that their sphere of knowledge 
is limited, while the Absolute's embraces the whole. Green's statement: 
"the world is as necessary to God as God is to the world "1, envisages 
God merely as an eternal Contemplator who has no power actively to 
create or control the world. Yet, Rashdall urges, even human beings 
'can produce limited changes in the world'2; whereas a God who thinks 
but does not will is 'annexed as by some inevitable, eternal, 
unintelligible fate'3 to a universe of whose imperfections He is 
constantly aware, but which He is powerless to alleviate. Hence he 
sets himself against (what Dr. Webb has called) "the tendency toward 
immanence" in English philosophical and religious thought, because 
when he speaks of God as an eternal Mind he means to imply that He is 
capable of volition as well as of thought. The line of argument by 
which he Peeks to defend this notion is doubly important, because 
without such a capacity, Rashdall holds, God cannot be conceived as 
a moral Being at all. 
He begins once again with a scrutiny of the ordinary materialistic 
conception - in this case not of the existence of matter itself, but 
of physical causation. Because it is possible to distinguish in 
introspection between the experience of events which are caused by 
the self and "external" events which happen without the exercise of 
personal volition, the materialist assumes that the latter are due:: 
to a cause operative in space or the "external" world. But Rashdall 
1. PR., p. 30. 
2. Ibid., P. 31. 
3. DD., D. 274. 
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insists that 'space is part of the experience for which he (the 
materialist) seeks an explanation'1. This experience cannot be 
'due to the impact of an external thing upon his mind'2; for the 
mind is not in space, and therefore it is not externally related to 
events in the way that one physical object is external to another. 
That an object is apprehended as occupying space, is merely one 
factor in the experience of perception; and this factor - far from 
affording an explanation of causality - is an integral part of the 
cognitive experience which as a whole requires causal explanation. 
He once again follows Berkeley's argument, as expanded in this 
instance by Hume, when he maintains that the materialistic view of 
the universe can never genuinely account for causality. For all 
that observation of events in nature can yield is a notion of 
invariable sequence, and though this uniform succession may be 
accepted empirically as a fact, it cannot give rise to the notion of 
necessary connexion such as characterizes the self-evident truths of 
mathematics. In short, the phenomenon of uniform succession itself 
requires explanation, inasmuch as mere observation can never reveal 
why one event should give rise to another. 
Yet the fact is undeniable that the mind does possess a notion 
of causality, as distinct from that of mere succession. Whence then 
arises this notion? Whence comes the belief that every event has a 
cause? Some may be inclined to reach the hasty conclusion that it 
represents a category for which no content can be found in actual 
experience. Rashdall, in reply, contends that one aspect of experience, 
and only one, has given rise to the idea of causality - and that is 
man's consciousness of his own volition, of his own Dower as a cause. 
This consciousness is seen at its purest in the form of a capacity to 
1. CV., pp. 26 f. 
2. Ibid., p. 27. 
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direct the succession of one's own thoughts; but thought may in turn 
influence bodily movement and other events in nature, even though 
physical conditions may not lie wholly within the control of the self. 
In conscious volition can be discerned the real distinction between 
mere succession and causality, because the latter concept alone implies 
that'union of power with purpose (which) can only be found in 
consciousness ti. 
Primitive man, being aware, of himself as a cause, accounted for 
changes in nature as the result of the activity of unknown spiritual 
beings like himself. The progress of scientific knowledge has altered 
this inference in but one respect; to -day men realize that the parts 
and processes.. of nature are so interdependent as to be intelligible 
1. CV., p. 30. This aspect of Rashdallts theory of course departs 
radically from Hume. The latter maintained that it is no more 
intelligible to seek the origin of a category of causation in the 
awareness of volitional power than in the recognition of relations 
between events in the physical world. (Cf. An Enquiry concerning, 
Human Understanding. pp. 64 ff. Second Oxford edition, edited by 
L.A. Selby -Bigge, impression of 1927). Rashdall replies to Hume's 
argument by citing the distinction between experiences which the 
self does cause, and those which it does not cause: One is conscious, 
for example, of a connexion, due to his own volition, between the 
formulating of a thought and the dipping of his pen in ink to write 
it down; but one is aware of not having caused, by some preceding 
thoughts a twinge of pain which suddenly enters his consciousness. 
This distinction could not arise if the self could cause none of its 
states, as Hume's theory implies. 
Rashdall also criticizes Kant's identification of the idea of 
causality with that of logical connexion, since the latter does not 
imply time-at all, while causality, being essentially related to 
activity, does imply it. He cites, however, a passage in Ward's 
Naturalism and Agnosticism (Vol. II, pp. 191 f.) wherein Kant's 
posthumously published treatise on "The Connexion of Physics and 
Metaphysics" is shown to admit - as Kant's most mature Opinion - 
that the experience of volition is the source of the idea of 
causality. Rashdall also cites Stout's Analytical Psychology, 
Vol. I, Bk. II, Ch. I, in support of the contention that the self 
is immediately aware of his own power as a cause. Dr. Stout's 
Gifford Lectures (Mind and Matter) contain his most recent defence 
of what he calls the "animistic" view of causality. 
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only in terms of the activity of one mind, rather than many. The 
regularity of natural law demands that this one mind be conceived 
as rational and teleological rather than as capricious. How God 
causes the order and design manifest in nature is best comprehended, 
then, on the basis of an analogy from human volition which is actively 
directed toward rational ends. A scrutiny of the problem of causation 
has thus brought Rashdall to a conclusion which supplements the 
idealistic argument and protects theism from the incursions of 
absolutism. 
At this point the question naturally arises as to whether any 
Philosophical view other than idealism is at all compatible with theism. 
Rashdall acknowledges that some realists have found it possible to be 
theists by holding that God created matter, which, once created, 
constitutes a type of reality distinct from mind. In his opinion, 
however, realistic theism implies a dualism which it is difficult to 
reconcile with the interconnexion and unity characteristic of the laws 
regulating the relations of mind and matter; philosophy and science 
alike presuppose that all mental and physical events taken together 
form 'a single inter -related, intelligible whole'l; thus they point 
to some one reality as underlying both types of events. Nevertheless, 
he finds realism far more intelligible than any attempt to conceive of 
ultimate reality as a tertium quid, wholly different from either mind 
or matter; for this conception there is no sufficient justification, 
speculative or empirical2. 
The argument from causality, he recognizes, has also been used 
by realists like Martineau and Reid, in a form which asserts that 
matter exists independently, though only mind can cause change. 
1. PR., p. 21. 
2. For a detailed refutation of this theory, as manifest in the 
thought of Spinoza, see Rashdall's essay: "The Alleged Immanence 
of God" (ID. Ch. XI). 
íi 
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He holds, however, that such an employment of the argument rests 
upon an artificial separation of the concepts of matter and force 
which modern physics is making increasingly questionable. If 
ultimately matter is shown to be composed of centres of force, it 
will be extremely difficult for the realist to contend on the one 
hand that matter can exist apart from mind, and yet on the other 
hand that it cannot move 'without being influenced by an extraneous 
Mind'1. In the idealistic interpretation, of course, the existence 
of matter and the cause of its motion both have their seat in a single, 
universal Mind. 
Even the moral argument for theism, to which we now turn, may 
be presented apart from the question of the independent existence of 
matter. As Rashdall points out, even though it be assumed that 
matter exists independently, it may still be held 'that matter possesses 
2 
no value or worth apart from mind . The ultimate effect of such an 
argument, however, is to lead almost irresistibly to idealism, since 
it clearly implies that 'mind will explain matter, while matter will 
not explain mind'3. In short, if the human mind be recognized as the 
highest - that is, the most valuable, - type of reality, it is more 
intelligible to interpret ultimate reality in terms of it than in 
terms of anything lower; for 'the Reality from which all being is 
derived must possess at least as much worth or value as the derived 
being'4. The grounds and implications of such a line of reasoning 
must now be examined more fully. 
1. PR., p. 49. 
2. Ibid., p. 26. 
3. Ibid., p. 25. 
4. Ibid., p. 26. 
argument (from 
reality of its 
(Cf. Haldane - 
Rashdall does not 
the reality of an 
cause) in Descarte 
Ross ed. I. p. 162 
cite it, but there is a parallel 
effect to the at least equal 
s' Meditationj) III. 
). 
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(iii) - God and the Moral Consciousness: 
The Problem of Evil. 
In taking up a consideration of the ethical grounds for belief 
in theism, we are returning to the main theme of the chapter; the 
arguments based onidealism and causality are really digressions 
called forth by Rashdall's desire to show that, though theism is in 
the first instance a postulate of ethics, it is a postulate which 
can be harmonized with other metaphysical considerations. Naturalistic 
ethics commits the blunder of espousing a metaphysical system which 
in effect is hostile to adequate recognition of the validity of moral 
judgments. Psychologically it is possible to affirm the immediate 
self-evidence of our knowledge of what is intrinsically good or evil, 
while remaining agnostic concerning any metaphysical implications of 
this fact; but such an attitude arbitrarily stops the process of 
thought at a particular point, and makes no attempt to harmonize moral 
judgments with other aspects of knowledge. Rashdall, by pressing the 
enquiry further, seeks to show that such harmonization is indeed 
impossible in terms of a naturalistic system. 
Naturalism may affirm the usefulness of reason in the course of 
evolution, but this cannot provide a guarantee of the validity of 
knowledge, since in certain circumstances 'error and delusion'I may 
be similarly useful. Because naturalism identifies reality with 
material processes, and refuses to grant that mind underlies these 
processes, it makes all knowledge epiphenomenal; thus Rashdall maintains 
that complete scepticism is the logical outcome of a position which 
leaves room in this manner for an irremediable disparity between human 
ideas and cosmic processes, between thought and reality. To be sure, 
the practical utility of scientific knowledge may allay scepticism in 
that sphere; but the same does not obtain in the case of moral knowledge. 
1. GE. II, p. 209. 
- 112 - 
Ethical obligation tends to become meaningless as soon as its practical 
convenience is appealed to instead of its binding validity. 
This is not the only respect in which he believes a naturalistic 
world -view to be incompatible with an acknowledgement of the objective 
validity of moral judgments. That incompatibility is especially apparent, 
he suggests, as soon as one asks where the standard of moral truth and 
falsity is to be found. Naturalism, realism and idealism alike 
encounter comparatively little difficulty in acknowledging that the 
laws which govern physical nature are independent of the individual's 
thought or feeling; but this is the case solely because according to 
the first two theories physical laws are regarded as somehow resident 
in matterl. A moral law, however, cannot possibly be conceived as 
existing in material things, because it relates not to physical facts, 
but to obligations and ideal ends. 
Now naturalism may affirm that moral obligation is "objective" 
in the sense that it is the product of collective human opinion instead 
of an idea generated wholly within the individual experience; it may 
at least assent to the (undeniable) fact that an obligation can exist 
in and be valid only for minds. But it can never accord full "objectivity" 
to moral judgments in the sense of affirming that they have a foundation 
in ultimate reality, because it regards ultimate reality as mindless. 
Hence in practice it always tends to make public opinion, rather than 
intrinsic goodness, the standard of conduct. 
We have already examined what Rashdall invariably means when he 
speaks of the objective validity of moral judgments; it is merely that 
if one is correct in judging an end (toward which an action is directed) 
to be good, then anyone who affirms the opposite is in error. Hence 
1. With reference to realism this statement is subject to the 
qualification noted on # 109 f. 
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he believes that the moral law exists independently of what any human 
being or group of human beings may feel or think, just as do the 
physical laws of nature. And yet he affirms that a moral law 'can 
exist only in and for a mind'1. Consequently morality can have the 
objectivity which he claims for it only if the absolute moral ideal 
exists eternally in the mind of God. It has the same objectivity as 
physical laws, because it has its source in the same Mind which wills 
the existence and processes of nature. Thus, in so far as human moral 
judgments are true, they have their ultimate ground in God. While he 
therefore admits that it is psychologically possible to believe in the 
validity of moral distinctions without believing in God, he holds that 
when this position is thought out either (a) this validity is seen to 
be relative merely to human conventions, and thus not ultimate, or 
(b) if ultimate, it is seen logically to imply theism. In this sense 
belief in God is a necessary postulate of a full and consistent belief 
in moral objectivity. 
An especial importance attaches to this argument. Other 
metaphysical considerations may lead up to the idea that God exists, and 
works purposefully; but the moral consciousness alone can provide any 
insight into the benevolent nature of those purposes. The idea of 
causality itself must be supplemented by ethical data because its 
meaning cannot be complete unless it includes the notion of a final 
cause; and final causation implies the idea of intrinsic value towards 
the realization of which the whole process moves. In other words, the 
idea of universal purpose cannot be formulated apart from a capacity 
to pursue ends; and the benevolence of those ends cannot be judged 
except by the moral consciousness. 
1. PR., P. 74. 
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Herein Rashdall finds the great weakness which underlies purely 
speculative proofs of the existence of God, like the argument from 
design in the form advocated by Paley. He welcomes interpretations 
of evolution which establish the fact of teleology in nature>especially 
at the biological level; but even the data provided by these studies, 
he suggests, cannot in themselves demonstrate that the final purpose of 
the universe is benevolent. Indeed,he frequently asserts that purely 
empirical evidence taken from history and nature can be so interpreted 
as to provide as much ground for opposing the idea of a benevolent 
Guide, as for affirming it. He has sought to show, however, that the 
very meaning of the contention that goodness is a rational category 
ultimately implies that in so far as human moral judgments are valid, 
they are valid for all rational creatures; and this implies, therefore, 
that they characterize the purposes of God; or, conversely, they are 
valid in so far as they reflect the perfect goodness of God, which is 
the absolute norm of human moral judgment1. For this reason he looks 
to conscience as providing 'the only possible revelation of the 
character of God'2. 
The conviction that the purposes of God are revealed or apprehended 
(albeit only partially) in human moral judgments as benevolent, issues 
in a belief in the ultimate rationality of the universe. Yet this same 
conviction implies that evil cannot be resolved into mere appearance; 
it implies that if conscience rightly regards a thing as evil, then it 
must be evil in the sight of God also; and all experience attests to 
the present reality of things which conscience does judge to be 
inherently evil. Thus two seemingly contradictory conclusions, the 
1. Rashdall recognizes, of course, that many human rules of morality 
apply only to beings possessing bodily organisms. What he means 
to contend is 'that the ideal life for man must be such as commends 
itself to the supreme mind - that God pursues ends which possess 
absolute value, and that our ends, so far as they are right ends 
for us, must be in principle identical with the end or ends which 
have value for God'. (CV. p. 42). 
2. PR., p. 63. 
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goodness of God and the reality of evil, stem from the same premiss; 
this problem, which has in divers forms always constituted the greatest 
practical and speculative obstacle to theism, strikes with peculiar 
force at the very foundations of Rashdall's system, and he attempts to 
answer it with characteristic candour and directness, characteristic 
willingness to pay whatever price rational consistency may demand. 
xs might be expected, he is first concerned to refute any theory 
which suggests that moral distinctions are not valid for God as well 
as for men; the most pernicious example of such a theory he finds in 
the hypothesis of absolute idealism that God is supra -moral. This 
hypothesis rests upon the assumption that though the world, when judged 
in ethical terms, is seen to contain both good and evil, the religious 
point of view transcends morality; religion, it is asserted, views all 
that happens as ultimately good, because it is willed by God. This 
implies, he maintains, that actions and conditions which seem immoral to 
men 'are in God perfectly good'1; it presupposes that the ethical point 
of view is infected with man's inability to see events 'from the point 
of view of absolute knowledge' ; - that it is only a limitation of vision, 
restricting the scope of thought to human affairs, which brands pain 
and sin as evil; - that moral judgments do not reveal the nature of 
ultimate reality, in which things called evil, along with everything 
else, make a necessary contribution 'to the perfect beauty and harmony 
of the Universe'2. 
At the outset an ambiguity appears in this theory. Does it contend, 
Rashdall asks, merely that human moral ideas are incomplete and 
defective, and for that reason fail to afford adequate insight into 
the purpose of the universe? Or does it maintain that no moral 
1. GE. II, p. 269. 
2. FW., p. 89. 
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distinctions whatever can be regarded as valid for God (or the 
Absolute)? The former assertion would be admitted by almost every- 
one; the latter, however, implies not merely that human moral ideas 
are imperfect, but that they are 'false and delusive', affording no 
dependable insight at all into the nature of reality. He argues that 
failure to distinguish between these two implications has led Bradley 
to put forward a theory which inconsistently seeks to include both; 
Bradley himself declares that the Universe as a whole is perfectly 
good'1, but in so doing he must presuppose the validity of his own 
moral judgments, and, according to his own principles, such judgments 
cannot apprehend the Absolute because the latter by definition cannot 
enter into any sort of relation, even the cognitive. Furthermore, 
when Bradley claims that the Absolute may enjoy ends which seem cruel 
to men, but which are in reality better than the merciful ends of good 
men, he again posits an inescapable discrepancy between human moral 
judgments and absolute goodness. Such an Absolute obviously cannot 
be worshipped by men who desire to be moral. But on what grounds, 
Rashdall demands, can this discrepancy, and the superiority of the 
Absolute's ends over human ends, be asserted? Whatever the grounds, 
they are opposed to the moral consciousness, and he has repeatedly 
sought to show that if ethical knowledge is distrusted, it is gratuitous 
to accord validity to any other aspect of thought or experience. 
Bradley puts forward the conception of the Absolute ostensibly as 
fulfilling the demands of "harmony" and "coherence "; but clearly the 
notion fails to harmonize human moral ends with the "perfect" ends of 
the Absolute. 
In a word, Rashdall insists that 'either our moral consciousness 
is a guide to the ultimate nature of Reality or it is not'. If it is, 
1. GE. II, p. 270. 
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then Bradley is wrong in asserting that things which are evil in the 
sight of men are good for the Absolute. 'If it is not', then 'Bradley 
has no right to assert that the Absolute is goodtl. He virtually 
accepts the latter alternative, Rashdall holds, by suggesting that 
reality is the sole criterion of value2; this would of course make 
moral distinctions wholly inapplicable to the Absolute, would imply 
the unreality of evil, and would wholly repudiate the testimony of the 
moral consciousness. A few pages later, however, Bradley inconsistently 
reverts to the procedure of interpreting reality in terms of goodness: 
'That which is highest to us', he writes, 'is also in and to the 
Universe most realr3. 
Against the subversive optimism of absolute idealism Rashdall sets 
the view, which he believes to be affirmed by the moral consciousness, 
that pain and sin are unequivocally bad. He admits that on purely 
empirical grounds the problem thus presented, to one who believes in 
the rationality of the universe, remains inexplicable. The amount or 
evil in the world seems entirely in excess of what might legitimately 
be considered necessary for the development of high moral character; it 
is even quite possible to argue that, so far as immediate experience 
1. GE. II, p. 275. 
2. Cf. Appearance and Reality, p. 552. 
3. Ibid., p.560. (Quoted in GE. II, p. 275 n). 
Most of the foregoing discussion originally appeared in the 
Proc. Arist. Soc., Vol. V, pp. 1 -28, under the title: "Moral 
Objectivity and Its Postulates". 
For further discussion of Bradley, see Appendix C. Rashdall 
also presents a refutation of A.E. Taylor's The Problem of 
Conduct (Ch. VIII) in connexion with the present argument; see 
The Theory of Good and Evil, pp. 280 -85, and also Taylor's 
Element of Metaphysics and his review of McTaggart's Some 
Dogmas of Religion in The Philosophical Review (July, 1906), 
where he gives up some of the views criticized by Rashdall. 
Professor Taylor has subsequently altered his views, as is 
especially apparent, of course, in The Faith of a Moralist. 
Rashdall also discusses Von Hartmann's theory of a supra -moral 
sphere, as expounded in The Philosophy of the Unconscious, 
Das sittliche Bewusstsein, and especially Ethische Studien; 
but Von Hartmann denies neither the reality of evil nor the 
validity of moral judgments. Cf. GE. II, pp. 275 -80. 
ra 
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goes, the evil in the world outweighs the good. Hence he writes : 
'It is only the evidence of the moral consciousness, taken in 
connexion with the...theistic argument as a whole, that forces us 
to believe that the world must have an end, that that end is good, 
and that the good is in principle the same good of which we have a 
doubtless inadequate but not fundamentally misleading revelation'(1). 
Thus he is able to unite belief in the reality of evil with belief in 
the unqualified love of God only by regarding evil as a necessary means 
to the attainment of God's benevolent ends. 
Obviously, if God must attain His ends through unavoidably bad 
means, His power is in some sense limited. Rashdall believes such an 
assumption to be implicit in virtually all theological attempts to 
explain evil, once its reality is fully admitted. Although some 
pluralists claim to be theists, pluralism regards this limitation of 
power as external to God, and thereby virtually abandons the conception 
of God as the ultimate source of all reality. Rashdall refuses to adopt 
such an expedient, for several reasons. 
Pluralism can take either of two forms. On the one hand it may 
conceive of God as limited by a pre- existent, or eternally existing, 
matter, which is partly fashionable to His purpose, but also partly 
obstructive by reason of its being crude, imperfect and inert. Rashdall 
holds that such a view rests upon an antiquated theory; the doctrines of 
recent physics so identify "matter" with "force" as to make untenable 
any such dualism as is implied in the notion that mind seeks to impose 
form upon an independent, more or less resisting, material substratum. 
And of course all that he has said in defence of idealism is opposed to 
the ascription of an independent - let alone an eternal and uncaused - 
existence to matter. 
, On the other hand pluralism may contend that God is limited by 
1. GE. II, D. 236. 
[á 
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pre- existing souls, and this alternative at least has the merit of 
resting upon a spiritualistic view of reality. The theory, whose 
history extends from Plato through Origen down to modern pluralism, 
is postulated, in this instance, 'to avoid the admission that God 
originates souls with evil potentialities'l; for it holds that all 
evil is traceable to the eternal and uncreated souls which limit God. 
But this speculative advantage is in Rashdall's opinion far outweighed 
by practical difficulties. He writes : 
'The connexion between mind and body, between character andlorganism, 
between parental or racial character and individual character, is so 
close, that...(the pluralist) must suppose that every soul after each 
successive death is kept waiting in some extra -corporeal limbo till 
Evolution has developed parents to whom it can suitably be assigned, 
and an organism which will serve as a faithful expression of its present 
moral status no less than as an adequate discipline for its future moral 
advancement'. In short, this type of pluralism requires a mythology 
wholly 'unsupported by the...evidence of experience...and in the end... 
seems to give us no ethical advantage which we cannot have without it'(2). 
For if evil does not arise from the nature of these eternal souls, then 
the theory encounters 'all the difficulties of Indeterminism', along with 
those of pre -existence; while if it does arise from their nature, then 
the universe is held to contain 'an inherent element of evil'3, and this 
can be more reasonably explained as an uncaused limitation in God. 
Moreover, the close connexion between mind and body favours the 
inference that if God causes bodily processes, He also causes the 
accompanying mental processes4; for the life of the soul,- its beginning 
in time and its development, - is dependent upon a bodily organism. 
This fact is fatal to a theory which postulates uncaused souls as 
eternally existing apart from God. It need hardly be added that pluralism 
1. GE. II, p. 345. It is Rashdall (not I) who brings Plato's name in 
here; primarily Plato's God was limited by pre -existing OK. 
2. Ibid., pp. 346 f. 
3. Ibid., p. 347. 
4. Cf. FW., p. 93. 
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of any type is open to the further objection that it cannot account for 
the order and unity of the universe, which have already been found to 
indicate a single, universal Cause operative behind phenomena. 
Having attempted to dispose of the view that God's power is limited 
by something outside Himself, Rashdall proceeds to defend the thesis 
that this limitation is inherent in God's own nature. It is important 
to grasp the exact sense in which he accepts the notion of divine 
limitation, because despite careful and explicit definition on his part, 
references to his opinions have often coupled his name with the 
theological excursions of H. G. Wells and others, whose views really 
differ profoundly from Rashdall's own. The key to his whole conception 
is the fact that the words "infinite" and "omnipotent" have frequently 
been applied to God in a fashion which he finds meaningless. God's 
power is finite, he holds, only 'in the sense in which everything real 
is limited'1. 
'The idea of a being who is omnipotent, in the popular sense of 
the word, is the idea of a being who has no determinate character or 
nature whatever. A Universe in which everything might happen would be 
a Universe in which nothing was caused... Real being must be being of 
a definite amount'(2). 
Rashdall is willing to speak of God as "infinite ", in the sense that 
He is the ground of all reality and 'is not limited by anything outside 
Himself'3; - as "omnipotent" in the sense that He ultimately possesses 
all the power there is, though that power is of a finite amount; - as 
"infinitely good" in the sense that 'He wills the best that He has it 
in Him to produce'4. But to conceive of God as "omnipotent" in the 
sense of denying that there are any necessities inherent in His nature - 
so that He could change the past, or construct a triangle with the sum 
1. CV., p. 46. 
2. GE. II, pp . 344 f. 
3. This statement concerning God's freedom from external limitation 
refers only to His power. 
4. CV., p. 46. 
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of its angles not equal to two right angles, - is tantamount to denying 
that God is a rational Being. For such reasons even the most orthodox 
thinkers have not hesitated to reject the notion that "omnipotence" 
implies the power to do anything whatever, no matter how absurd. Aquinas, 
for example, defines the term 'as the power of doing all possible things'1 
and he regards anything which involves a contradiction as impossible. 
Therefore Rashdall concludes that if God's incapacity to do irrational 
things involves no breach in a proper and intelligible conception of 
omnipotence, neither does His inability to 'attain His ends without 
causing some evil'2. Rationality, in the sphere of moral purpose, 
involves willing the best ends attainable under the limiting conditions 
of the situation. 
Be it noted that he does not recoil from frankly regarding God as 
the author of sin and pain, though he adds the rejoinder that God causes 
evil only as a necessary means to the greatest possible good. He 
believes that it is impossible to attribute to God omnipotence in the 
unqualified sense and perfect goodness at the same time. Between these 
alternatives a choice must be made; and as a moralist, he is willing 
to sacrifice anything which unwavering belief in the goodness and love 
of God may require. This alternative could not be entirely circumvented, 
he holds, even if the world were to be regarded as wholly free from evil. 
For even on such a supposition the amount of good in the world would 
still be finite, and it might always be demanded why - if God is both 
omnipotent and perfectly good - there is not yet more good, and why there 
are not more spirits to enjoy it; if God could have caused more good, 
1. FW., D. 94. 
2 PR., p. 82. 
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and has not done so, surely He is 'deficient in goodness". 
The objection has been urged, by McTaggart for example, that if 
God's power is limited there is no assurance of His ultimate success, no 
assurance of immortality. Rashdall replies that if God is rational, and 
unhampered by forces beyond His control which cause evil, then 
'we have a right to suppose that the world must contain more good than 
evil, or it would not have been willed at all. A being who was obliged 
to create a world which did not seem to him good would be a blind force... 
not a rational Will'(2). 
Moreover, the belief that ultimately goodness must predominate over evil 
carries with it the conviction that in a rational universe beings capable 
of goodness would not be created unless in the long run the good were to 
predominate over the evil in their lives; such a faith cannot but regard 
the sufferings and evils endured by good men in this life as a preface to 
a better life3. 
An appeal to the fact of human freedom is perhaps the most frequent 
device of theologians in their attempt to account for evil without 
admitting limitation in God's power. According to the indeterminist 
statement of the argument, the gift of freedom is bestowed by God in 
order that men may achieve the highest good, namely, the development of 
moral character; yet because this freedom is real, it is always possible 
for men to choose evil. At the outset Rashdall throws suspicion on this 
line of reasoning by pointing out that it cannot apply to God; only 
theologians who make goodness contingent upon the arbitrary commands of 
the Deity, and therefore deny, in effect, that He is absolutely good, 
can contend that in His case the attainment of goodness involves the 
real possibility of evil. Here Rashdall is affirming the doctrine that 
1. FW., p. 97. For this reason Rashdall holds that Canon Peter Green, 
in his The Problem of Evil, does not go; far enough when he suggests 
that God is limited merely by the law of logical non -contradiction. 
There would be nothing logically contradictory in a world which 
incorporated more goodness or less evil than it contains at present. 
Cf. Modern Churchman, Vol. X, p. 440. 
2. PR., p. 84. 
3. Immortality is discussed infra, ff 149 ff. .
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God's will is determined by the necessities of His own nature - as 
opposed to the (Scotist and) Occamite doctrine that His will is free. 
This point will prove to be of considerable importance hereafter. 
At present all that concerns us is Rashdall's suggestion that since a 
deterministic conception of God safeguards rather than destroys belief 
in His moral goodness, a similar conception of the human self cannot 
1 
detract from the reality of human goodness . 
The view of causality already put forward implies that God is 
the ultimate cause of all reality, including the good and bad acts 
of souls. On the face of it, this seems incompatible with any 
affirmation of human freedom at all; but Rashdall tries to show that 
the power to direct our own actions, which we immediately experience, 
and which he is anxious to safeguard as a necessary postulate of 
ethics, is not affected by the fact that a more ultimate power - to 
put it plainly - causes the self which causes its own acts. In short, 
he desires to apply the distinction between first and second causes to 
human actions instead of to events in nature. God is the ultimate or 
first cause of human selves, bestowing upon them an original nature 
through heredity, and sustaining them in a world upon which they are 
continually dependent. Hence in one sense the character and the moral 
actions of every soul are willed by God. Yet this causal control 
is utterly different from a mechanistic ordering of events in nature, 
and it does not in the least conflict with the fact that each man is 
a being distinct from God, possessing a will distinct from God's. 
Every human action, then, is willed by the individual man and by God 
at the same time. Whether this notion of "double causality" can 
really be reconciled with belief in human freedom is one of the most 
.l. Cf. Modern Churchman, Vol. X, pp. 437 ff. 
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important questions which we shall have to examine in the critical 
section 
His argument is much more convincing when he turns to a 
criticism of the indeterminist answer to the problem of evil. 
Indeterminists, in an attempt to avoid making God the author of 
evil, attribute evil to human freedom, on the hypothesis that real 
freedom, which involves the possibility of choosing evil, is necessary 
to the development of high moral. character. Such a theory, Rashdall 
retorts, does not explain those sufferings of animals and men which 
do not arise from moral evil; nor does it account for at least the 
great preponderence of moral evil, which is due to hereditary and 
environmental influences over which the self does not have control. 
Thus all these evils have been caused by some force in the universe 
other than the "undetermined" wills of men; and for the theist, that 
force must be God. Apart from these considerations, God must be 
conceived by the indeterminist as "permitting" human freedom, in which 
case either He foreknows that freedom will result in evil, or He is 
not omniscient. If God is not omniscient, then He cannot with any 
certainty foresee that men will not choose a preponderantly evil 
course and thus defeat His purposes. Therefore the indeterminist 
must either acknowledge that God is the author of evil, or admit 
that His power is limited; for if God is not omniscient, that in 
itself constitutes a limitation. Either alternative leads to an 
admission that God cannot 'cause good without the possibility 
of evil'2; and this is precisely what Rashdall means when he speaks 
1. If it were not for this notion, I do not see how Rashdall could 
possibly have avoided pluralism; cf. # 135. 
2. GE. II, p. 344. 
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of divine limitation. 
Rashdall's own deterministic position admits that God is the 
'author of evil' in the sense that He wills it 'only as a means 
to the good'; but he asserts that man is 'the sole author of evil' 
in the sense that he 'alone wills the evil otherwise than as a 
means to the true good'. It may be difficult to understand how 
his system permits him to attribute this power to man; but at least 
it is clear that he is anxious to make his position compatible 
with the doctrine that God is perfectly good, and does not 'will 
evil as such'.1. Often determinism has been repudiated because 
of its association with an 'unethical Theology'2. One form of 
the doctrine of predestination not only makes God a wrathful and 
capricious Being to whose arbitrary will men must submit, no 
matter what may be the dictates of their own consciences; - it 
also conceives of God as creating bad men with deliberate 
foreknowledge, and with no other purrose but that they shall 
suffer an eternal torment which does not conduce 'to the moral 
improvement or future Well -being of themselves or others' 3. 
Needless to say, he is anxious to dissociate himself from this 
"appalling theology ". Indeterminism and determinism may 
alike represent the world as fashioned by God for the moral 
discipline and tutelage of souls., although it must be repeated 
that the former, because it admits that freedom may involve the 
1. GE. II, p. 345. 
2. Ibid., p. 350. 
3. Ibid., p. 350. 
Ì 
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defeat of this purpose in individual instances, equally implies 
divine limitation unless it is presumed that God does not desire the 
salvation of all men. No matter what solution to the problem of 
freedom be adopted, Christian theology, should conceive of any 
suffering which God imposes in the discipline of evil not as 'hopeless, 
useless, unending'1, but as a necessary means to moral improvement; 
it should conceive of evil as 'caused...by God only in order that 
it may be overcome'2. 
In his earlier discussion of freedom Rashdall has emphasized 
that determinism is not destructive of moral effort. The same holds 
true, he believes, when the idea of self-determination is brought 
into connexion with that of divine limitation. Both conceptions 
represent God as calling upon the human beings whom He has created 
to take part in a real struggle for the furthering of the good, 
instead of in a mock battle with an illusory evil. 
'The rapidity with which and the extent to which the evil will 
be diminished and the good attained really does depend in part upon 
human effort. It is true doubtless that God knows how much each of 
us is car able of aiding towards the process, and how much he will aid; 
but we do not know, and no human being can ever know until he has 
acted'(3). Thus the struggle is one 'in which we have the ultimate 
power of the Universe on our side, but (also) one in which the victory 
cannot be won without our help, a real struggle in which we are called 
upon to be literally fellow- workers with God'(4). 
Such a view, he argues, is surely more inspiring ethically than an 
unqualified belief in God's omnipotence, which implies that He can 
overcome all evil by a single fiat; for in the latter case the seriousness 
of evil as an obstruction to God's benevolent purposes is greatly 
diminished, and the moral goodness of mankind is no longer seen to be a 
necessary aid to the fulfilment of those purposes. 
1. PP., p. 226. 
2. Ibid., p. 225. 
3. GE. II, p. 355. 
4. PR., p. 86. 
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3. Personality: Human and Divine. 
Thus far this chapter has traced three metaphysical postulates 
which Rashdall bases primarily upon the moral consciousness, but which 
he has also sought to support through supplementary arguments. That the 
self is in some sense the cause of its own actions, he has held to be 
self -evidently indispensable to the meaning of ethics; belief in the ex- 
istence of God appears on reflection to be implied in the full acknow- 
ledgement of moral objectivity; the negation of optimism follows from a 
recognition that the moral consciousness rightly pronounces many acts 
and conditions to be really, and not merely apparently, evil. Before 
turning to the fourth postulate, that of personal immortality, it is 
desirable to bring these first three into more intimate connexion by 
means of a discussion of the relationship between God and man. In what 
follows, the idea of personality emerges as the key to Rashdall's whole 
metaphysical position. The independence of the human self takes on an 
importance hitherto only partially intimated in connexion with the first 
postulate; while all that has been said already concerning God - His ex- 
istence as an eternal Mind, as the Cause of all events, and as a moral 
Being willing benevolent ends - may be comprised, indeed, in the one term 
"personality ", so long as it is properly understood. The third postulate, 
which has led Rashdall to a theory of divine self -limitation, furnishes 
especially good grounds for conceiving of God as personal, because to his 
mind the view that God is literally infinite necessarily implies that 
nothing is excluded from His Being, and this in turn implies that He "in- 
:cludes" human selves; but the meaning of self -hood,he contends, includes 
as one of its essential characteristics the impossibility of one con- 
sciousness fusing or overlapping with another. Hence the conception of 
God as infinite is incompatible, not only with his solution to the problem 
1 
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of evil, but with the other two postulates as well: the independent 
reality of human selves, and the existence of a personal God. Adherence 
to these postulates therefore culminates in a conception of ultimate 
reality as a society of persons, consisting of God and created selves. 
The first and most obvious characteristic of Rashdall's conception 
of personality is the stress which he lays upon its indivisibility. His 
notion of the constituents of goodness has already been formulated on the 
assumption that none of the activities of personality - thinking, feeling, 
1 
willing, - is intelligible apart from the others. Because he views this 
assumption as applicable to divine, as well as to human, personality, his 
reasons for reaching such a conclusion may well receive further attention. 
He claims that feeling is inextricably bound up with thought be- 
cause it is impossible to experience an affective state without knowing 
what is felt, and it is likewise impossible to experience a succession of 
such states without joining them to one another by thought in a relation- 
ship of priority and posteriority. On the other hand, thought which con- 
templates anything actual refers to what is or could be felt; and even 
though thought may have to do with abstract relations, devoid of all 
feeling- content, the thinker's own consciousness is affected by many 
sensations, such as sight, touch and body -temperature, at the very moment 
in which he indulges in thought, no matter how abstract; indeed, some of 
these feelings invariably arise from bodily conditions, like nervous 
tension, caused by the activity of thinking itself. Accordingly, Rashdall 
- reasoning from the nature of human personality to that of God - finds 
strong objections to the Hegelian doctrine that divine knowledge 'is 
'simply the same as our knowledge of things when we think of them apart 
2 
'from present perception'. 
1. Cfe ft 15, 
2. CV., p. 23. See DD., pp. 270 ff. for an early statement of "Rashdall's 
views concerning the unity of consciousness. 
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He regards the attempt to isolate volition from thought or feeling 
as no less futile. Conscious volition implies direction of the will to- 
wards an end which must be contemplated in thought; moreover, this ideal 
object is desired, End though desire is more than feeling, it includes 
feeling. The consequences of attempting to conceive of God as capable 
of thought, but not of volition, have already been disclosed; it should 
also be noted, however, that Rashdall's position is equally antagonistic 
to the systems of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann, which go to the other 
extreme from Hegelianism in that they view ultimate reality solely as a 
manifestation of will. 
Thus the conclusions reached in the preceding pages on the basis 
of the idealistic, causal and moral arguments, may all be brought toget- 
her under a single conception whereby God's nature is thought of as ana- 
logous to human personality. Rashdall readily admits that feeling, 
thought and volition must be very different in the divine consciousness 
from what they are in us: we cannot conjecture what feeling would be 'for 
a Being who has no material organism', because human affective states 
are localizable in a body; again, 'we cannot suppose...that in God there 
is the same distinction between actual present experience and the univer- 
1 
sal concepts employed in thinking which there is in us'; and finally, 
God wills all the objects of His knowledge, while we can control only a 
fragment of the universe we know. Nevertheless he claims that the in- 
adequacy of the analogy from human personality cannot justify its con- 
demnation as a piece of "crude anthropomorphism". He argues that though 
knowledge of other human selves is likewise inadequate, and founded solely 
on inference or analogy from the nature of one's own experience, this 
does not lead one to conclude that no knowledge of other selves is poss- 
ible at all. In the case of God, as in that of a friend, imperfect 
1. PR., p. 46. 
- 130 - 
knowledge is yet sufficient to make possible communion and love. More- 
over, theologians have always rightly recognized the inadequacy of any 
categories of thought as applied to God's nature. They have contended 
that thought, will and feeling or love, must be 'applied to God sensu 
1 
eminentiori'. These terms, so used, are simply the highest in which 
men can think at all. To conceive of God as a personality is assuredly 
less inadequate than any alternative procedure; to think of Him as poss- 
essing one function of consciousness, like thinking, but not the others, 
is equally anthropomorphic, and (as Rashdall has contended elsewhere) less;' 
intelligible; to think of Him in terms lower than attributes of conscious- 
ness is to dispense altogether with the idea that God is a spiritual 
Being. 
In an essay entitled "Personality: Human and Divine" (in Personal 
Idealism), Rashdall adds several specific characteristics to his defin- 
ition of personality. Besides the unity of consciousness, personality 
implies a certain permanence, a capacity to bring into relation the ex- 
periences of diverse moments; moreover, a person distinguishes himself 
not only from the physical objects of his own thought, but also from 
other selves; each self exists not only as an object of another's 
thought, but as a being which exists for itself. Having so defined 
the term, he turns to a more detailed consideration of the objections 
which have been urged against ascribing personality. to God. 
The manner in which the argument develops is somewhat puzzling, 
because it passes by an almost imperceptible transition from the 
necessity of conceiving God's nature as analogous to what human 
personality is, to what formally, at least, is the precise reverse, 
namely, the necessity of conceiving it as analogous to what human 
personality strives to become, but never attains. In reality, however, 
there is no contradiction in his argument on this score; for it moves 
1. DD., p. 277. 
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from what is immediately known in experience, to something which that 
experience intimates, but which can be grasped only by inference and 
not immediately; logically, at least, this procedure is permissible. 
At the outset he points out the difficulty of drawing any clear 
line - in the course of natural evolution or in the development of 
the individual - between a stage where personality is absent and one 
where it is present. Awareness of the content of feeling, which 
implies thought, must be ascribed in a rudimentary form to animals 
far down the scale of evolution; and even forms of action which appear 
to be wholly instinctive imply some consciousness of an act - if not 
of an end - for which there is an impulse; between these two extremes 
of blind instinct and deliberate action, are all degrees of reflective - 
1 
ness. Certainly in the case of higher animals, all the various 
characteristics of personality must be attributed to them in a more or 
less rudimentary form. In the course of evolution, therefore, it is 
impossible to say that the phenomenon of personality emerges at any 
given point; 'personality...is a matter of degree'. 
Though an animal psychologist might wish to challenge many 
details in this reasoning, Rashdall's main intention is clear. He 
is correct, moreover, in maintaining that in the development of the 
human individual, no specific moment can be assigned when personality 
appears. Naturally, however, he does not wish to argue that because 
a transition is so gradual as to be imperceptible, no change is actually 
occurring at all. For this reason it is difficult to understand how 
he can add that 'the newly -born infant is no more of a person than a 
2 
worm, except dunamei'. one critic has put it, this statement 
'would work havoc with the principle that the only true definition 
3 
is dynamical and prophetic'. 
1. Cf. PI., D. 373. 
2. Ibid., p.-374. 
3. H. R. Mackintosh in The Critical Review, Vol. XII, p. 538. 
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It might be supposed that the presence or absence of a moral 
consciousness would provide Rashdall with a clear criterion for the 
applicability of the term "personality "; but the moral consciousness, 
it will be remembered, he regards as an integral aspect of personality, 
an aspect which partakes of the same gradual development. It is 
likewise impossible, therefore, to define at exactly what point 
choice between conflicting impulses becomes deliberate enough to be 
called "moral ". 
All this seems, no doubt, to be a needless complication of a 
simple problem. If the mature human individual be taken as constitutive 
of what is meant by personality in the full and complete sense,then 
there remains no difficulty in admitting that rudimentary characteristics 
of personality are discoverable in lower forms of life. But Rashdall 
does not believe that even the mature human self fulfils what is meant 
by "personality". One of the criteria already mentioned, for example, 
entails the capacity to relate successive moments of experience in 
thought ;human consciousness does this only imperfectly, forgetting 
much of its own past. Or when morality is considered, it is again 
apparent that even the noblest men fall short of an ideal of perfect 
personality. Hence Rashdall reaches the conclusion that human life 
stands at the peak of an evolutionary process whose very incompleteness 
points to a supervening goal which has not been concretely realized 
in earthly history. 
'Indeed, we may say (with Lotze) that the ideal of personality 
is one which is never fully attained in human consciousness, and that 
God is the only being who is in the fullest and completest sense a 
Person'.1 
Therefore the inadequacy of conceiving God's nature as analogous 
to human personality is now set in a clearer light. The term 
"personality" is imperfect as a description of God's nature so. long 
1. CV., p. 33. 
is 
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as it is associated with human limitations of power, knowledge and 
goodness; Rashdall removes this difficulty by contending, not that 
God transcends the notion of personality, but that men only imperfectly 
fulfil it. Nevertheless he insists that certain attributes which are 
found in human personality must be applicable to God: God must be 'an 
1 
actual consciousness...distinct from other centres of consciousness', 
capable of willing good ends, and thereby of perfectly fulfilling moral 
qualities which are the same in principle as those which human 
personality at its highest only approximates. 
Rashdall now turns to objections more serious than those which 
have to do merely with the definition or use of terms. He seeks to 
defend the conception of God as a Person against absolute idealism, 
which tends to undermine this conception both by refusing to 
distinguish between God and the world (thus violating the principle 
that a person must be distinguishable from the objects of his thought), 
and by positing an Absolute which includes human selves in its own 
Being (thus violating the principle that a self is distinct from other 
2 
selves). 
In maintaining that a person mutt be distinguishable from the 
objects of his thought, he might seem at first sight to be defending 
a thesis which is irreconcilable with the demands of his idealism; for 
his idealistic argument (though this may turn out to rest on a 
contradiction) asserts that objects exist independently of the 
individual's thought and will, only because they exist eternally in 
the thought of God and are willed by Him. Therefore Rashdall must 
1. DD., p. 10. 
2. In an article written in 1919, for a debate on the question "Can 
Individual Minds be Included in the Mind of God ?" (Proc. Arist. Soc., 
Supplementary Volume, No. 2, pp. 109 -23), Rashdall =era-37 
substantially without change, the position which he had defended 
seventeen years earlier in his essay in Personal Idealism. 
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find some way of harmonizing the contention that God is distinct from 
the world, which is the object of His thought, with the contention 
that the world cannot exist in independence from His thought and will. 
This he seeks to accomplish by differentiating between things and 
selves with regard to their ontological status. 
In the first place he claims that the material things which God 
knows do not exist apart from His thought and will; and looked at 
from this point of view, the distinction between subject and object 
as it applies to God is merely a distinction between the Divine Self 
1 
and 'its changing states'; the distinction, in other words, is 
between God's Self -hood and His knowledge of the physical world. This 
raises several questions which must be indicated here, but passed over 
for the present. Does Rashdall's conception really fulfil what is 
ordinarily meant by the distinction between subject and object? Is it 
legitimate to postulate a self as subject, which has an existence 
distinguishable from its own states? If the knowledge -relation, so 
far as material objects are concerned, falls wholly within the sphere 
of God's Mind or Being, how can the material world be "objective" or 
"public" in the sense that it may be directly apprehended by human 
minds? Does not the thesis that the reality of matter must fall within 
the sphere of some consciousness, either deprive knowledge of objective 
content (so far as material things are concerned), or imply that the 
states of God's consciousness can be directly known by human selves? 
In the second place he claims that the existence of human selves 
as independently real in a sense in which material things are not, 
2 
implies that God and His thoughts do not exhaust reality. Therefore 
what his reasoning comes to is that the world of things may be regarded 
1. PI., p. 377. 
2. Cf. Ibid., p. 377 n. 
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1 
'as included in the very being of God' (so long as this expression 
is not taken as a denial of the distinction between subject and object 
within the divine consciousness); human selves may not be regarded as 
so included. And perhaps it should be added once again that he strongly 
rejects the suggestion which he finds in Green's writings that God does 
not will the world; this suggestion, he believes, leads ultimately to 
2 
a 'pantheistic identification between God and the world'. 
It is this necessity for contending that God wills the world, as 
a universal Cause, which at the same time involves rejection, not only 
of a monism based exclusively on cognitive grounds, but of pluralism 
as well. Yet in defending his position against the monistic doctrine 
that human souls are included in the Being of God (or of the Absolute), 
he reacts so violently against his opponents that in the end he very 
nearly goes over to pluralism. 
He begins by asserting that if God "includes" other selves, then 
the bad as well as the good acts of individual men must be entirely 
3 
attributed to Him; the wilful sinfulness of men must be regarded as 
forming an element in the essential nature of God; the scoundrel must 
be held to be as much a "part" of God as the saint, since all beings 
capable of thought are, according to this hypothesis, incorporated in 
the universal Mind. This, of course, is a position which he finds 
intolerable. Within the limits of absolutism it can be escaped only 
by supporting the equally objectionable contention that God is 
supramoral. Rashdall has sought to steer a middle course between 
monism and pluralism by propounding a notion of double causality; he 
maintains that human volition is distinct from God's and yet he 
1. CV., p. 33. 
2. CV., p. 34. 
3. For the qualified sense in which Rashdall is willing to admit 
that God causes the bad acts of men, see # 125; 
1 
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conceives of God 'as co- operating in some sense with whatever causality 
1 
is exercised by human wills'. 
What further defence of his contention that the individual self 
is distinct from God can he offer? Absolutism, he declares, rests 
upon the fallacy of assuming that what constitutes existence for 
2 
things is the same as what constitutes existence for selves. Royce, 
for example, assumes that for a self to be in relation to another 
being it must be identical with that being, in the same sense that a 
mere thing really is constituted by its relations; this leads Royce 
to conclude that the individuality of the self lies in what it is for 
God. Rashdall claims, on the contrary, that while the esse of a thing 
is to be known by spirits, 'the esse of a person is to know himself, to 
3 
be for himself...' Royce's fallacy of assuming that the principium 
individuationis of a self is what can be known about it results from 
the error, which is a presupposition of the whole absolutist position, 
of regarding thouht - apart from feeling and volition - as the whole 
of reality. 
If it be acknowledged, Rashdall continues, that the esse of a 
self can be affected by its relation to things only through its own 
knowledge of them, then it follows that two persons might have 
experiences identical in content, and still remain two and not one. 
The absurdity of claiming that when two persons have exactly identical 
experiences (so far as content is concerned) they become one, is 
betrayed by Bradley when he 'contends that the Absolute may feel all 
4 
our pains and yet not feel them as pain'; the retort is obvious: we 
do feel them as pain. Rashdall's whole point can be summarized by 
1. PI., p. 380. 
2. In The World and the Individual, cf. especially pp. 426, 433 f. 
3. PI., p. 383. 
4. Ibid., p. 384 n. 
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saying that the mutual apprehension of a universal on the part of two 
selves is not tantamount to a fusion or identification of their 
personalities. 'The Reality of the world is not abstract content, but 
1 
living experience'. 
Bradley refuses to ascribe reality to the self because he fails 
adequately to distinguish between a self's knowledge of a physical 
thing and its knowledge of another self. It is true that both the 
6 
ting and the other self are "not - self" from the individual's point of 
view; but whereas the thing 'has no reality apart from what it is' for 
selves, the other self has a reality which is not dependent on any such 
contingency. Alen one self knows another, it must be repeated, the 
identity between them is that of mutual knowledge of a universal; the 
selves remain two independent realities. If Bradley is correct in 
maintaining that nothing can be real unless it is without 'relation 
2 
to anything outside itself', then obviously (as Bradley holds) only 
3 
the whole can be real. If, however, it be acknowledged with Rashdall 
that relations to other selves do not exhaust an individual's reality, 
then the word "real" may be applied - in a usage more legitimate than 
Bradley's - to that nucleus wherein the self exists for itself, rather 
than, like matter, "for other ". For this reason Rashdall claims that 
4 
the individual self is "real ", 'without being the whole of Reality'. 
Therefore he is able to conceive of God's relation to human 
spirits as similar to our own relation to other selves, although 
admittedly God knows far more concerning our past (since we forget) 
and our potentialities than we do ourselves. He has already recognized, 
moreover, that the functions of personality in God must be very 
different in their manner of operation from what they are in us. 
1. GE., II, p. 239. 
2. PI., p. 385. 
3. Cf. Appendix C. 
4. PI., p. 385. 
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Nevertheless, he believes that God's knowledge of human selves must 
rest upon a similarity of content between His experience and ours, - 
a likeness between our capacities for thinking, feeling and willing, 
and something corresponding to them in Him. This philosophical 
conclusion is one which he takes over bodily in interpreting the 
doctrine of the Trinity, for it is in essential agreement with the 
scholastic teaching that 'God must be known as Potentia, Sapientia, 
1 
Bonitas (or Voluntas)'. 
While so much is clear, an ambiguity nevertheless appears at 
this point. It can best be exposed by copying out two seemingly 
irreconcilable statements which occur on the same page (p. 387) in 
Personal Idealism: 
'Doubtless God cannot be thought of as attaining his knowledge 
of other selves by the clumsy process of inference and analogy by 
which we so imperfectly enter into the consciousness of others: ... 
'God must then, it would seem, know other selves by the 
analogy of what He is Himself; ... His knowledge of other selves 
may be perfect knowledge without his ever being or becoming the 
selves which He knows'. 
If analogy per se is a "clumsy process ", then it is difficult to 
understand how God can obtain His perfect knowledge of our minds 
through this means. Elsewhere, moreover, Rashdall admits that the 
distinction between immediate and inferential knowledge can hardly 
2 
apply to God's consciousness. 
Yet even this difficulty does not diminish the force of his 
main contention that to speak of one self as including another is 
an'instance of that all- fertile source of philosophical error - the 
misapplicatidn of spelcial (sic) metaphors. Minds are not Chinese 
3 
boxes which can be put "inside" one another'. Out of this 
1. PI., p.387. Rashdall would revise this formula to Sapientia, 
Voluntas, Bonitas, - including "power "under "will ", and 
"feeling" under "goodness ". 
2. Cf. # 161. 
3. PI., p. 388. 
1' 
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conviction grows Rashdall's antagonism towards mysticism; it likewise 
1 
makes him suspicious of the term "immanence". And the same view 
profoundly affects his conception of the Incarnation, because he cannot 
regard the indwelling of God in Christ as implying a personal identity 
2 
between them. 
The theory of ultimate reality at which he arrives thus ostensibly 
accounts for the unity of the world, while at the same time postulating 
the conception of a limited God. An important difference, however, 
characterizes the two considerations (his solution to the problem of 
evil, and his conception of personality) which give rise to this notion 
of a limited God. The idea of personality is foreign to that of an 
all- inclusive Deity, because 'God is...limited by other...selves, in 
so far as He is not those selves'. But this limitation cannot be 
conceived as imposing an external limitation upon God's power; therefore 
he adds: 'He is not limited...by anything which does not ultimately 
3 
proceed from his own Nature or Will...' From the point of view of 
power, the limitations which necessitate evil are internal to God's 
nature. This seems to neglect his own emphasis upon the "impenetrability" 
of consciousness, which implies that all the attributes of human 
personality, including powers of volition, must be external to God, if 
the personality is itself external to God. Whether real contradiction 
is involved depends upon the intelligibility of the account which he 
has given of how God and men co- operate in willing human action. 
4 
1. See an essay entitled "The Alleged Immanence of God" 
Contemporary Review, June 1907 (reprinted in ID, Ch. 
2. Cf. #2020 
3. PI., p. 390. 
4. This is my word; Rashdall usually avoids such terms 
are open to misconstruction, but in the light of the 
will not, I trust, be misunderstood here. No other 
seems better to suggest the important meaning which 
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If this point is held in abeyance, Rashdall's metaphysical 
thought is seen to culminate in the conception that 'the world is 
neither a single Being, nor many co- ordinate and independent Beings, 
but a One Mind (sic) who gives rise to many'. 'Reality...is a 
1 
community of Persons'. The notion of a Mind which knows and wills 
the whole is perfectly compatible, he believes, with its not being 
2 
the whole. In so far as God is distinct from created spirits, He 
is neither the whole, nor strictly infinite. In so far as other 
spirits are created as acts of His Will, and are wholly known to Him, 
ultimate reality forms a unified system, 'but that Unity is not the 
3 
unity Of self -consciousness'. The term "infinite ', it must be 
remembered,is one which Rashdall regards as inapplicable to real beings; 
the denial of the distinction between each individual consciousness and 
God, which the conception of a literally infinite God involves, 
inevitably leads, he believes, either to a refusal to regard the 
individual es real, or to a refusal to regard God as self -conscious. 
In a word, if the term "Absolute,' must be given a place in the 
philosophical vocabulary, he would make it synonymous, not with God, 
but with that society of persons which includes God and created 
spirits, and thus comprises all reality. 
1. PI. p. 391. 
2. His argument that identity of content does not entail identity 
of existence, proves this point only in the case of cognition; 
his notion of double causality is designed, of course, to show 
that G.A. can will all that men will without including them in 
His own Being. Cf. GE. II, p. 241. 
3. GE. II, p. 240. 
1!.1 
- 141 - 
1 
Appendix B. - The Problem of Time. 
The problem of time is one which may best be discussed separately 
because it intrudes at several different points into Rashdall's 
argument; yet, for a reason to be made clear, he accords it but the 
slightest treatment. First of all, his argument from causality, 
because it involves the idea of creation, - the idea that God wills 
the world, which consists of temporal events - raises the question 
as to whether or not this time -series is to be regarded as infinite. 
He perceives that the notion of an absolute beginning of existence 
must be rejected, because even if the creation of the world be 
conceived as having a beginning in time, God must have 'existed before 
that creation' (2). Therefore he leaves open the problem as to 
whether the material universe has resulted from an infinite or a finite 
series of physical changes, inasmuch as it belongs primarily to 
physicists and its solution would not remove the ultimate problem. 
TiVhen all existence, including God's, is considered, the problem 
of time presents to the human mind an irresolvable antinomy. Rashdall 
really leaves the matter there, except to say that neither ',rant nor 
any other thinker, has succeeded in surmounting the difficulty (3). 
It is impossible to conceive of time as having a beginning, to conceive 
of a moment which had no time preceding it; but it is likewise 
difficult to think of time as an infinite series'which no possible 
enumeration of its members will make any smaller' (4). Accordingly 
Rashdall contends that to conceive of God as supra -temporal is 
unavailing, since He must contemplate the time -series either as finite 
or as infinite, even though it be supposed that He contemplates 'the 
whole seriesat once'(5). 
He really inclines to the view that creation is "eternal ", 
because he recognizes that (quite apart from the question of a 
beginning in time) the idea of creation must be accompanied by that of 
a perpetual conservation or sustenance of existence. Another reason, 
to which we now turn, also underlies this preference: that is his 
antipathy to the notion of a (purely) supra -temporal God or Absolute. 
The problem of time has a second bearing upon his system, because 
the attribution of reality exclusively to a supra -temporal Absolute 
renders the temporal stream of consciousness, and the self whose life 
it constitutes, unreal. Thus for absolutism the distinctness of 
individual personality, which Rashdall makes normative for reality, 
is merely an appearance; time and the self it dismisses as an 
intertwined illusion. Here again, he claims, absolutism falls into 
1. This appendix is based upon the following sources: 
PI., pp.391 ff; GE.II,pp.244 -6,353 f; PR., pp. 87 -93; 
ID., pp. 90 ff; Proc. Arist. Soc., Vol. V., pp. 27 f; Ibid., 
Supplementary Volume No. 2., pp. 119 f. 
2. PR., p. 88. 
3. Kant's solution Rashdall rejects because 'it involved the 
impossible supposition that the past has no existence at all 
except in so far as it is thought by some finite mind in the 
present'. (PR., p. 91). 
4. PR., p. 90. 
5. Ibid., p. 91. This is hardly an intelligible statement, however; 
T77-if the time-series is infinite, God's existence must be 
included in it, and therefore God would not then be supra - 
temporal. 
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its habitual confusion of content with existence; abstract truth 
is timeless, but this does not imply that the mind which knows it - 
and for Rashdall it is the experiencing mind, not the abstract ideas 
it contains, which is ultimately "real" - is out of time. Hence, 
though he admits all the difficulties involved in conceiving of 
'God`as a time -occupying consciousness... - persisting through... 
a continuum of experience'(1), he believes that such a conception 
affords at least a partial answer to the problem, while to think 
of Him as timeless is wholly unintelligible. Therefore it may be 
said that his position, so far as it goes, affirms the idea of God 
as existing in an infinite time -series, which He nevertheless eternally 
causes. This involves the notion of a cause contemporaneous with 
its effect, - a notion which he regards as difficult, but not as 
entirely unthinkable (2). For religious purposes, he maintains, it is 
sufficient to hold that God causes the time -series, whether it be 
infinite or not (3). 
A third consideration, perhaps the most decisive of all, 
constrains Rashdall to hold 'that our time -distinctions must express, 
however inadequately, the true nature of Reality' (4). For his whole 
conception of the moral life is founded upon the presupposition that 
in the judgment of value an ideal end is acknowledged which is not 
yet real, but which may be attained through active effort; clearly, 
therefore, the notion of time as real is intimately connected with 
the validity of these judgments, and with the validity of a theism 
based on ethics. Consequently, every system which regards time as 
unreal, in effect denies that morality has any bearing upon the 
nature of reality; it reduces history to an illusion, and renders 
human effort incapable of really effecting 'any change in the 
Universe' (5). The logical outcome of such a system is a state of 
inertia or quietism, which denounces all ethical striving (6). 
Rashdall's ethical theism, because it conceives of God as pursuing 
benevolent ends, represents the moral life as one of active co- operation 
with God; therefore he thinks of 'God too as striving, but as striving 
for an end which will hereafter be realized in such a measure as to 
make the striving reasonable' (7). It must be one part of the truth 
about such a God to say that He is in time, though Rashdall believes 
that the antinomy at which human thinking halts must be transcended 
in God's knowledge, and that His relation to time must be different 
from ours. In any case, he maintains, if God knows our experience as 
it really transpires, He must know it as taking place in time (8). 
1. Proc. Arist. Soc., Supplementary Vol. No. 2., p. 120. 
2. He cites as a suggestive analogy the case of attention as the 
contemporaneous cause of one's comprehension of meaning while 
reading a book. 
3. Cf. PR., p.92. 
4. GE. II, p. 245. 
5. Ibid., p. 248. 
6. 77-ID., , Ch. V. 
7. GE. II, p. 354. 
8. Ibid., p. 248. 
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Lastly, he contends that both space and time are "real" in 
the sense that they qualify human knowledge and experience; but 
he would also contend that both are mind -dependent, since both 
imply relations which can be grasped only by mind. He does not 
mean to impugn their "reality" then, when he refuses to speak of 
them as "real beings "(1), for he conceives of selves alone as real 
beings. Evidently he regards space as entailing a type of external 
relation which characterizes "physical" objects alone, while time, 
he believes, inheres in the subjective functions themselves. 
One refreshing impression emerges from this rather complicated 
discussion. In his determination to press rational enquiry to its 
uttermost limits, Rashdall sometimes reaches conclusions which, 
for all their attempt at consistency, leave the haunting sense that 
his syllogisms have yet failed to uncurtain a mystery. It is 
heartening to find an intimation in his writings that after the 
intellect has reached its outermost boundaries, it has only touched 
the margin of a kingdom "wider than the measure of man's mind ". 
Appendix C. - Green, Bradley and McTaggart. 
Separate consideration of three thinkers - Green, Bradley and 
McTaggart - seems called for at this point, not only because it is 
in reaction to their metaphysical views, more than any others, 
that Rashdall seeks to find a middle path for theism between 
absolutism and pluralism, but also because a considered treatment 
of each of these writers enters integrally into the body of his 
own works. Criticism, in his hands, is as much a creative task 
as is the exposition of positive conclusions. Moreover, special 
mention of these philosophers will elucidate in more detail the 
considerations which have impelled him to take up the metaphysical 
position we are reviewing in the course of this chapter. 
2 
(i) - Green. 
Rashdall's debt to Green as an ethical thinker has been 
cursorily mentioned; in the end he rejects Green's theory of 
self -satisfaction as falling into an hlysteron- proteron similar 
to that underlying psychological hedonism. Ìn reality, Rashdall 
claims, satisfaction, like pleasure, is a result, not a condition, 
of the desires which inspire action(3). For the present purpose, 
1. Cf. GE.II, p. 240. 
2. Cf. GE.I, pp. 37 -43; II, pp. 204 f., 246 -9. 
3. Cf. GE.I, pp. 37 -43. For Rashdall's criticism of Green's 
conception of the common good, see GE.II, pp. 96 -103. 
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however, it is sufficient to note that Green's doctrine of the 
"timeless self" seems doubly to confuse his system, since desires 
and satisfactions have meaning only in relation to a self which is 
in time. Through reference to this timeless spiritual principle, 
Green ultimately identifies the self with universal reason to 
which he denies volition; and thus he unwittingly undermines the 
significance of ethics. Green's language about the self's 
"striving" after satisfaction is of course wholly inconsistent 
with the idea that it is timeless. 
Naturally Rashdall looks askance at this doctrine; Green, 
he believes, was misled by several rather elementary facts. 
Because the self persists through change, and, while existing 
in one time, can know events which took place in another, Green 
leaped to the wholly unwarranted conclusion that it is out of 
time altogether. Furthermore, his idealism led him to assume 
that the real world exists only for the thought -relation, and 
abstract thought is out of time; Rashdall, identifying reality 
as he does with the concrete mental events from which thought 
abstracts, holds that without relation to such events, which 
occur in time, universals have no existence and cannot be 
apprehended. Finally, Green seemed to believe that because the 
categories, when abstracted from their concrete data and 
employment, are out of time, the self which uses them is likewise 
timeless; Rashdall replies that a category is even 'less capable 
of identification with Reality'(1) than the abstract thought 
which it contains. 
(ii) - Bradley. 
Certain aspects of Rashdall's criticism of Bradley, which 
have not been sufficiently stressed in the foregoing chapter, can 
be brought together with considerable advantage by reviewing a 
masterly essay, entitled "The Metaphysics of Mr. F. H. Bradley ", 
which was published by the British Academy(2). 
When Bradley writes as an ordinary idealist, Rashdall finds 
himself predominantly in agreement with him. Bradley affirms, 
for example, that primary and secondary qualities are ultimately 
dependent upon perception; he even asserts that reality consists 
in experience, interpreting " *xcperience" as including feeling 
and willing from which thought abstracts. But he refuses to 
conclude from this (as Rashdall does) that the individual human 
self is ultimately real, because he finds relations unintelligible; 
his definition of reality'consequently demands that it involve no 
relation whatever. This employment of the word, Rashdall points 
out, excludes from its domain not only human selves and the God 
of theism, but even the usual notion of the Hegelian Absolute; 
for internal relations inhere within this Absolute, because it 
includes all lesser minds as inter -related parts. Knowledge of 
Bradley's Absolute, (as he himself contends) is impossible, because 
knowledge implies relation; yet all appearances manifesting 
themselves in relations imply a Reality beyond them, which they 
more or less adequately reveal. On the basis of this scepticism 
1. GE. II, p. 247. 
2. Cf. Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. V. (Reprinted 
ID., Ch. XII). 
t 
- 145 - 
Bradley seeks to expose the contradictions underlying all the 
categories: Knowledge is impossible without thought, yet thought 
implies the employment of universals which are abstractions from 
concrete reality. All knowledge is founded upon feelings and 
relations, which are unintelligible apart from each other; and yet 
to think of the two as related, ends in an infinite regress. 
Temporal existence involves contradiction, since 'that which becomes 
is and is not'(1); therefore the Absolute must be supra -temporal, 
although Bradley admits that he can attach no meaning to such a 
notion. Finally, morality presents an unresolved contradiction 
between self- realization and self- sacrifice(2); moreover, what 
conscience regards as evil can only be appearance, because reality 
must be perfectly harmonious and therefore good(3). 
This uncompromising agnosticism degenerates into 'something 
very like platitude'(4), however, when Bradley goes on to admit 
that there are various stages which increasingly approximate this 
unattainable knowledge of absolute truth and reality. Rashdall 
is merely conforming with this principle of degrees of truth, 
therefore, when he advances various doubts as to whether Bradley's 
own system approaches this ultimate goal as nearly as possible. 
In a word, he urges that this system incorporates three 
irreconcilable points of view: '(a) Idealism, (b) SpinoZism, 
(c) Phenomenalism'(5). The foregoing account started with 
Bradley's idealistic mood, but arrived at a point where we found 
sentient experience to be adjectival to an unknowable, impersonal 
Absolute which transcends all relations, even that of subject and 
object. This latter is a Spinozistic mood; and really the notion 
of a substance which is neither thought nor extension comes 
nearer to Bradley's conception of the Absolute than does his own 
phrase "conscious experience ", so long as that Absolute can know 
neither itself nor anything else. Bradley seeks to furnish an 
analogy from rudimentary consciousness in which feeling and knowing 
have not yet been discriminated; but this cannot serve to describe 
a consciousness which ex hypothesi is above, not below, the human 
level of knowing. If tie self's consciousness is rejected, then 
only a Spinozistic tertium quid remains as a key to the nature of 
Bradley's Absolute, unless he turns to matter for his analogy. In 
any case, this Spinozistic view relinquishes all that he has said 
as an idealist, and, incidentally, fails to provide an Absolute free 
from relations, since it still holds that selves are adjectival to 
the Absolute as substantive. 
When, in the closing pages of Appearance and Reality, Bradley 
seems to suggest that 'the Absolute in fact ex sts only in its 
appearances'(6), he renounces his fundamental distinction between 
the two, and writes as a Phenomenalist. Does Bradley believe in a 
conscious Reality over and above finite minds and appearances, or 
not? If the transcendent unity or harmony he speaks of is not 
achieved in or by a mind, he should not refer to the Absolute as 
experience and attribute feeling, or something which includes 
feeling, to it. But if it is achieved by a mind, how can this be 
reconciled with his suggestion that the Absolute exists only in the 
experiences of finite minds? Surely no human mind or minds can 
1. ID., p. 212. 
2. For Rashdall's rejection of this antinomy, see GE. Bk. II, Ch.III. 
3. Rashdall assumes that Bradley uses the term in an ethical sense. 
4. ID., p. 213. 
5. Ibid., p. 215. 
6. Ibid., p. 217. 
i{1 
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harmonize all contradictions and transcend all relations. 
By shifting from one of his three moods to the next, Bradley 
gives his system a certain plausibility; but he betrays himself 
thereby into entirely contradictory coneeptions of the Absolute: 
It is conscious experience and includes all knowledge; yet knowledge 
involves relation; hence the Absolute cannot know itself or anything 
else. In it there is no relation, yet it includes all relations. 
It includes all things; yet in it there is no plurality. If 
contradiction be the sign of unreality, Rashdall concludes, then 
surely Bradley's Absolute 'is the greatest unreality in this world 
of shams'.(1) To believe in it requires 'an act of faith ...(and) 
a sacrifice of the intellect (such) as no religious fanatic or 
infallible Pontiff has ever demanded'. In a word, 'Yr. Bradley has 
mistaken for Reality an (unachievable) ideal of knowledge'. (2) 
One cruôial point in the dispute between the two writers 
deserves special attention. Rashdall cannot accept at all the 
reasons which Bradley puts forwards for refusing to regard conscious 
Ifr<w1rtE 
experience in human beings as,,i,reál. Though Rashdall admits that 
sometimes knowledge may not correspond to absolute truth, because it 
involves abstraction from concrete perception, nothing whatever, he 
maintains, can be said against"eality of knowledge 'as an actual 
conscious experience'. (3) Perception and abstract knowledge 
(however imperfect), are both real. Considered as psychical experience, 
accurate and erroneous "knowledge" are equally real, and the distinction 
between them 'is best expressed by saying that there are degrees of 
truth, but no degrees of Reality'. (4) From this it follows that 
an Absolute which includes all human consciousness in a single, 
harmonious experience is veritably unthinkable; for if the human 
judgment that one sensation is posterior to another is really 
mistaken (as Bradley would contend), an absolute experience which 
includes no contradictions cannot include this judgment, and there- 
fore it cannot be the whole of experience. Reality cannot be 
identified with coherent truth; for all conscious experience, 
including both true and erroneous judgments, is real. This 
conclusion of Rashdall's is compatible, it will be noted with his 
contention that God can know all conscious experience (i.e. be 
omniscent), without being or including all conscious minds. Accord- 
ingly reality must consist of this omniscient experience plus the 
experience of all lesser minds. God's knowledge of a man's 
experience may be complete; but the man's experience remains distinct 
from God's knowledge of it. This position of course frankly abandons 
Bradley's conception of the Absolute as excluding all relation. 'To 
talk about a One which somehow "includes" many members without being 
related to any of them and without their being related to one another 
is simply to take back with one phrase what has been conceded by 
another'. (5) Rashdall conceives of reality as a united whole, 
which is not related to anything outside itself because it is 
co- extensive with all that exists; within that whole the constituent 
parts (persons) are of course related to one another. He is willing 
to grant Bradley's contention that all categories are inadequate to 
apprehend the nature of reality; but he suggests that whenever 
1. ID., p. 220. 
2. Ibid., p. 221. 
3. Ibid., p. 222. 
4. Ibid., p. 223. 
5. Ibid., p. 227. 
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Bradley seeks to transcend the use of these categories he ends in a 
position even more contradictory and inadequate. Once again, 
Rashdall admits that the process of abstracting from perception, by 
which in our ignorance we move from the unknown to the known (1), 
cannot be regarded as characterizing the thought of an omniscient Ivind. 
But he denies that this indicates that such a Mind must be free from 
all relation. 
In conclusion, therefore, it is necessary to state Rashdall's 
reason for refusing to believe that the idea of relation is 
contradictory. He writes: 'I do not see that, because we think of 
one sensation as related to another sensation, we therefore require 
a new relation to express the relation between the sensation and the 
relation, and so on ad infinitum. So to argue implies that we think 
of the relation as being an existence apart from that which is related, 
and that is inconsistent with the nature of a relation' (2). Once 
this point is established, Rashdall is free to contend that the 
distinction between God and other selves is real and intelligible (3). 
4 
(iii) - í`:cTaggart. 
Despite his rejection of pluralism, Rashdall finds certain aspects 
of YeTaggart's metaphysics instructive; the preceding refutation of 
Bradley manifests the influence of McTaggart's proof that the monistic 
Absolute either destroys the reality of human consciousness, or cannot 
be regarded as conscious itself. Furthermore, McTaggart, like Rashdall, 
regards ultimate reality as a society; but their agreement ends at 
that point. 
McTaggart's system differs from the usual type of spiritualistic 
pluralism; it is non -theistic, because it acknowledges the reality of 
human and animal minds only, and yet it holds that these spirits 
together form an ordered system or society. Such a theory, Rashdall 
1. Because perception alone does not furnish "knowledge ", according 
to Rashdall. 
2. ID., p. 230. 
3. This account has omitted certain statements in which Rashdall is 
hardly fair to Bradley. In one of these he suggests that in 
Bradley's system 'even the whole is not real, so long as it is 
considered as a whole, a collection, a plurality of parts' (ID., 
p. 209; cf. p. 214). Hoernlé (see the Review of Theol. and Philos. 
Vol. IX, p. 54) has brought out Bradley's point: The idea of the 
whole cannot be the whole, therefore it cannot be entirely true; 
the ideal of thought is to be the reality it contemplates, but if 
this could be achieved it would cease to be thought. The relevant 
point in Rashdall's refutation is that complete knowledge involves 
knowing all about its object, not being it. (Yet this would not 
hold, in Rashdall's system, in the case of God's knowledge of 
physical objects, wherein the existence of the object falls within 
His Being). 
Again Rashdall misinterprets Bradley when he takes (what the 
latter holds to be) this contradiction underlying all knowledge as 
meaning that knowledge and reality are at opposite poles, so that 
increasing approximation to the one implies correspondingly further 
removal from the other. (Cf. ID., p.211). 
4. Cf. GE.II, pp. 347 f; PR., pp. 96 -100, 123 -26. At the time when 
the passages on which this critique is based were written, 
&cTaggart's Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic, Studies in Hegelian 
Cosmolou, and Some Dogmas of Religion, were available, but 
neither volume of The Nature of Existence was. 
Cf. Rashdall's 
review of Some Dogmas of Religion in Mind, Vol. 
ACV, pp. 534 ff. 
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points out, gives rise to difficulties because TvcTaggart is too honest 
to assume that any soul, or even all souls taken collectively, can be 
omniscient. In fact, he admits that the known part of reality, without 
the unknown, does not form an ordered system; and yet, as an idealist, 
he must regard whatever is unknown by any mind as simply non -existent. 
Rashdall further objects to McTaggart's system because it involves the 
gratuitous theory of pre -existent, uncaused souls; it cannot even be 
strengthened through the device, common among pluralists, of 
attributing to God a scheme of pre -established harmony between soul and 
body. MoTaggart does believe that the universe, as an ordered system, 
has a final cause (1); yet, as we have seen, he denies the existence 
of one creative and purposive Mind as the seat of final causation. 
These contradictions arise, Rashdall suggests, from McTaggart's 
failure to reconcile two contrasting elements in his thought. His 
Hegelian affinites force him to assert that ultimate reality forms a 
unified system; but his pluralism, because it is non -theistic, 
destroys the only ground on which this former assertion could be 
substantiated without impugning the reality of individual consciousness. 
The influence of Professor Pringle -Pattison upon Rashdall's 
theistic system must also be remembered. Rashdall's frequent references 
to Hegelianism and Personality show that the measure of agreement 
between this book and his own conclusions is not fortuitous. A dispute 
which arose between the two writers (2) will be referred to in the 
critical section. An article entitled "Personality in Recent 
Philosophy "(3) contains Rashdall's critique of four Gifford Lecture 
series: those of Dean. Inge, Professors Webb, Pringle -Pattison and 
Sorley. To his mind these writers represent stages moving, in the 
order named, from the heresy of absolutism, to the full truth of a 
personalistic standpoint. Except for the chapter on freedom, Sorley's 
book contains an argument which Rashdall wholly accepts; apparently 
he overlooks the realistic tendencies which intrude themselves into 
Ioral Values and the Idea of God. 
1. Cf. PR. p. 120. 
2. This dispute arose as a result of Pringle -Pattison's criticisms 
of Rashdall in The Idea of God (pp. 387 ff.), and the latter's 
replies. 
3. In the Church Q,uarterly Review, Vol. XC, pp. 19 -50. 
1 
4. Personal Immortality. 
The fourth and last metaphysical postulate is that of personal 
immortality. It is a belief which is based upon acknowledgment of 
the objectivity of moral values, and which follows as a corollary 
from the foregoing conceptions of God and personality. Direct 
arguments on behalf of immortality, which depend upon establishing 
the "simplicity" of the soul, or its present independence of the 
body, require views which Rashdall regards as no longer philosophically 
tenable. Jesus rightly perceived, in his reply to the Sadducees 
2 
concerning the Resurrection, that belief in the future life flows 
directly from a man's conception of the nature of God. In espousing 
this same method, Rashdall continues to set himself against naturalism 
and absolutism, both of which are alien to the grounds and terms of 
his argument in behalf of personal survival; but these may now be 
left aside, since if he has not demolished them already, no further 
weapons in his arsenal can accomplish the task. 
3 
In conneet,ion with the problem of evil he has put forward the 
proposition that, if the world is willed by a rational and loving God, 
its existence must at least be better than its non -existence; such 
an argument, it may be noted, rests upon his assumption that 
quantitative categories can be employed in a discussion about values 
with sufficient accuracy to justify judgments which relate to the 
preponderance of good or evil within a given whole, - whether that 
4 
whole be the life of an individual or that of "the world ". Strictly 
1. Cf. DD. Ch. XI;. GE. II, pp. 213 -220: 261 -65: 352 f.; PR. 77 -79; 
PP. Ch. XXV; GM. Ch. V. 
2. Cf. Mark 12:26. 
3. Cf. i1 122. 
4. Cf. #t 46 ff. See also Church quart. 
Rev., Vol., XC, p. 46, where 
he defends this conception in criticizing Dr. Webb, et al. 
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this argument does not require him to do more than affirm that 
ultimately the good must predominate over evil in the lives of God's 
creatures; this might be so construed as to mean merely that the 
proportion of souls in whom good is uppermost will exceed that in 
whom evil is uppermost. But he is not content to let the matter 
rest at this point; he views the question in terms of the individual 
life, and, therefore he contends that in a rational universe no soul 
capable of goodness would be created unless good were ultimately to 
predominate over evil in that individual life. 
The question arises, however, as to why it is not possible, 
granting these assumptions, to have faith in the ultimate rationality 
of the universe without postulating immortality. Rashdall answers 
1 
this question in his King's College Lecture. It contains a reply 
to objections raised by Professor Laird in an article entitled "The 
2 
Ethics of Immortal Reward ". 
Laird begins by contending that 'the moral argument for 
immortality really implies the retributive theory of Punishment ... 
3 
and Reward'. He thus conceives of the moral argument as holding 
that, since in this life virtue is not rewarded and vice not punished 
in a manner adequate to fulfil the demands of the moral consciousness, 
these demands will be fulfilled by God in a future life, because they 
are valid and represent IIis will. This is, to a certain extent, 
the form adopted by Kant and Butler; but Rashdall, who has a 
deep -seated aversion to the retributive theory of punishment, rejects 
it as heartily as does Laird. 
Rashdall denies, therefore, that immortality is necessarily 
1. 
- 
- - "The /coral Argument for Personal Immortality". Reprinted in GM., 
Chapter V. 
2. In The Hibbert Journal, Vol. XVI, pp. 580 ff. 
3. GM., PP. 27 . 
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postulated merely to insure these self- centred ends. The future life 
envisaged in the teaching of Jesus and in the New Testament 
generally, he claims, is not one which plays upon hope of pleasure 
or fear of punishment as the sole motives underlying the performance 
of duty in the present. The "reward" for righteousness which Jesus 
mentions is simply a more complete righteousness, to be achieved in 
the future life; such a reward will satisfy the hungering and 
thirsting of a man who is genuinely righteous, but not the desires 
1 
of one who fulfils his duty solely from selfish motives. Hence the 
Christian belief in immortality is not based upon 'a low view of 
human nature', which assumes that men will be virtuous only for the 
sake of some reward other than that of virtue itself. As will be 
argued more fully, it is precisely because Christianity recognizes 
the high moral capacities of mankind - which go largely unfulfilled 
in this life - that it cherishes the hope of a future life; the 
better a man is, the more inconceivable it becomes 'that it was only 
2 
for this life that he came into the world'. 
Laird goes on to contend, however, that the rationality of the 
universe can be defended without recourse to any belief in immortality. 
He quite rightly points out that because virtue is an end in itself, 
its value is not contingent upon future reward: thus he is able to 
make the undeniable assertion that certain intrinsic values are 
actually realized in the course of history. Rashdall adds the 
comment that this empirical argument in support of the belief that 
the universe fulfils moral ends would seem to require that evil must 
be explained as a necessary means to the good - for example, as 
1. 
2. 
Cf. Appendix D. 
PP., p. 246. 
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contributing to the development of moral character. If this be 
Laird's position, it is intelligible thus far. 
Nevertheless, in Rashdall's opinion it does not afford sufficient 
ground for maintaining that the universe is ultimately rational and 
good; to make this further assumption without postulating immortality one 
must be able to hold that in this earthly life the good outweighs the 
evil. This implies not only that pleasure outweighs pain (which 
Rashdall doubts), but that enlightenment outweighs ignorance, beauty 
outweighs ugliness, and virtue outweighs vice. tiu'hen one resolutely 
confronts the vastness of the world's misery, stupidity and sin, and 
compares it with the small number of those who in this transitory 
existence bave realized with any measure of fullness the highest 
intellectual, aesthetic and moral ideals, the empirical evidence of 
history, taken by itself, seems positively opposed to belief in the 
1 
rationality and goodness of the universe. If this life be the end, 
Rashdall asserts, then it is impossible to say 'that the good (is) 
2 
worth the evil that it costs'; it is impossible to say that the 
world's existence is so much better than its non -existence that its 
creation may reasonably be attributed to a loving God. Nor can he 
find any ground for supposing that humanity in the future will have 
so radically changed and progressed that its condition will at last 
justify the aeons of suffering and sin which were the cost of its 
evolution: 'There is as little empirical justification for an 
optimistic view of the future of humanity as for an optimistic view 
3 
of its past or its present'. 
Hence Laird's refutation of the retributive theory of immortality 
may be accepted, and yet it still may be true that belief in the 
rationality of the universe demands some other theory of 
immortality. 
117 w 1. Cf. it 
2. PP., p. 242. 
3. GE. II, p. 215. 
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Indeed, only if this life be regarded as a means to an end which lies 
beyond terrestrial history - a preliminary stage for the discipline 
and development of the individual soul - can the world be regarded as 
created and governed by a rational God whose loving purposes for men 
will ultimately be accomplished. 
Not only is the total amount of evil disproportionate to that of 
the good, but their respective distribution is such as to increase the 
difficulty of believing in the rationality of the universe, if this 
1 
world be the end of life. Rashdall has already argued that virtue 
and happiness are both indispensable to the fulfilment of the whole 
meaning of goodness; hence to him a rational world -order demands a 
coincidence of these two elements in the life of a good man. He 
admits that if it were possible to believe that happiness and misery 
are distributed justly in this life, faith in immortality would not 
be a necessary corollary of belief in a rational God. But it is obvious 
he declares, that virtue and happiness do not in fact vary together 
in accordance with a rational distribution; on the contrary, high 
moral character in this life seems inevitably to bring with it much 
pain. This distribution is unjust and puzzling only on the hypothesis 
that this life is the end. If, however, by reason of belief in 
immortality, this life is viewed as a period of discipline and 
preparation for a better life, then the sufferings of good men may be 
regarded as permitted by a loving God solely because they are 
necessarily instrumental to a larger good which will be fulfilled in a 
future state. 
This affirmation of the ideal of distributive justice is not a 
reversion to the retributive theory. A rational ideal implies 
that the 
other values of life - happiness, knowledge, and the appreciation 
of 
1. Cf. 3t 14. 
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beauty - should be the possession of the virtuous man, not because 
he has earned them as a reward, but because virtue is not the only 
good; it alone does not constitute the ideal life. What must be 
emphasized is that the fulfilment of this complete ideal, even by the 
virtuous man - and still more clearly in the case of the ordinary and 
the wicked man demands the postulation of a future life. Especially 
in the case of the wicked man, pain may be a propaedeutic necessary to 
his appreciation and attainment of the higher goods; this transformation 
of character is the only justifiable purpose which punishment serves. 
Rashdall also admits, of course, that pain and suffering may serve a 
disciplinary purpose even in the case of the good man. But he insists 
that the moral and spiritual attainments possible in this life are 
inadequate by themselves to account or recompense for the magnitude 
of human suffering; for he will not say that the true end of human 
life has been fulfilled so long as some men are virtuous without 
being happy, while others enjoy the lower goods and perhaps for that 
very reason are prevented from becoming virtuous: 
'A Universe which would not ultimately bring about a greater 
co- existence of the higher and the lower elements of good than now 
exists' cannot be regarded as controlled by 'a righteous and loving 
Will' (1) . 
These various aspects of his argument can all be summed up in the 
conviction that man's capacity for goodness bespeaks some more 
ultimate destiny where it can achieve fruition. 
'The contrast between the immensity of human capacity and the 
poorness of the attainment - that is the inmost kernel of all the 
great classical arguments for immortality'(2). 
Sometimes belief in immortality has expressed itself as an 
egoistic desire which in its most degraded form becomes an 'enervating 
hope of Heaven and debilitating fear of Hell'(3). The true Christian 
1. GM . 
, 
p. w136 . 
___- 
2. Ibid., p. 137. 
3. PP., p. 243. 
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form of the belief, however, is one which is the outcome of a fully 
intelligible conception of the universe; in the absence of scientific 
evidence which definitely favours either belief or disbelief, the 
demands of reason and conscience afford adequate ground for espousing 
the former. The abuses which the doctrine has sometimes suffered 
need not blind one to the fact that, when properly understood, it 
gives meaning and hopefulness to the moral life in a manner otherwise 
unavailable. One who does not believe in immortality may be 
rigorously moral; yet if he is truly humanitarian, he cannot but be 
saddened and puzzled at the prospect of such great potentialities 
for goodness being cut off far short of fulfilment, so much suffering 
going unrequited, so many thwarted lives ending in defeat. Hence the 
belief is not cherished from selfish motives; it is desired for 
others, as well as for oneself, because of a disinterested conviction 
that the level of goodness attainable by men in this life is incommen- 
1 
surate with the more perfect destiny to which they are called by God. 
1. For Rashdall's conception of duration or permanence as enhancing 
the worth of good character, see GM., pp. 139 ff.; PR., pp . 76 f.; 
GE. II, pp. 261 -65. Concerning the immortality of animals, see 
GE. II, pp. 352 f. The lecture which has been followed above 
concludes with an attack on absolutism's refusal to regard time 
and the self as real. Rashdall's barrage in this instance is 
turned, not only against Bradley, but against Dean Inge. Even on 
absolutist assumptions, he maintains, there is no reason for 
rejecting personal immortality; for if the Absolute comprises 
lives in time now, why should it not comprise immortal lives in 
time? The problem of how a life in time is related to a timeless 
reality is neither made easier nor/harder if that life is 
regarded as immortal instead of ,oval. Of course the absolutist 
regards all life in time as unreal; but Rashdall's purpose is 
served if it be admitted that immortal life will be as real (or, 
if you will, as unreal) as this present life. On the ground that 
it entails an impossible sundering of values from .the personality 
which embodies them, he rejects any theory which postulates the 
perpetuation of "impersonal" spirit. Lastly, he shows that only 
a theory which regards temporal existence as unreal, requires that 
the idea of pre- existence accompany the idea of survival. 
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For Christian thought concerning immortality Rashdall accords a 
central position to the Resurrection of Christ, - not because it stands 
as an isolated and miraculous vindication of the Christian hope, but 
because it represents the culmination of a trust in the love of God 
which permeates the Christian's whole view of the world. 
'What (one) think(s) of the historic Resurrection will depend 
largely on what (he has) independently came to believe about God and 
Christ, about the meaning of human life and the destiny of the human 
soul'.(1) 
The critical difficulties surrounding the gospel accounts of this 
event are such as to justify some latitude of interpretation concerning 
2 
the exact nature of the risen Christ's manifestation to His followers. 
'The evidence for the Resurrection vision is of a kind which 
can hardly appeal to those who are not already at least predisposed to 
the belief in human Immortality'.(3) 
Rather than base faith in immortality solely upon the historicity of 
the Resurrection, he prefers to show how faith in the love of God and 
in immortality sustains belief in the Resurrection. Nevertheless, 
because through Christ men came to know the love of God as never before, 
and came to feel as never before 'that human nature at its highest is 
4 
fit for immortality', His Resurrection has been for His followers 
1. DD., p. 170. 
2. In a sermon entitled "Fighting Against God" (The Modern Churchman, 
Vol. I, pp. 696 -706), Rashdall points out that St. Paul's account 
of the Resurrection appearance to Cephas, the rest of the 
apostles, and finally to5Paul himself, is susceptible of a 
variety of interpretations with regard to its mode - physical or 
spiritual. This account he regards as the strongest evidence we 
possess for the Resurrection, because it was written twenty years 
before any of the gospel narratives (in their present form), 
forty years before the narrative of the empty tomb, and was, 
according tos :Paul's own testimony, the account widely believed 
by Christians shortly after the event. Rashdall claims, moreover, 
that various views of the mode of the Resurrection are equally 
compatible with the language of the Creeds. It is clear that 
in his own thinking he rejects the idea of a physical resurrection, 
and accepts that of a spiritual one. 
3. DD., p. 180. 
4. PP., p. 274. 
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in all ages the culminating point of their trust and assurance. 
Here Rashdall concludes a philosophical argument, which he 
believes to be independently valid, by showing that the traditional 
Christian doctrine is compatible with it. This is a method which 
will characterize the whole of the succeeding chapter, wherein he 
seeks to show that the great Catholic doctrines can legitimately be 
interpreted in such a manner as to be harmonious with the world -view 
which he has constructed through the exercise of reason. The 
significant fact to note is not the result, - for Catholic orthodoxy 
does not favour the contention that there is any serious estrangement 
between the findings of natural theology and those of revealed 
theology; what must be observed is that Rashdall's method seems to 
base itself upon the presupposition that human reason is the final 
court of appeal in these high matters, and that Christian doctrine 
is be brought before its The views which constrain him to 
adopt this procedure appear in the next chapter, and until they are 
fairly considered, it would be hasty to conclude that the order of 
his thought makes Christian doctrine a merely confirmatory, and 
almost superfluous, appendage to philosophical theology. Nevertheless, 
it is obvious, even at this point, that his temperamental affinities 
with the eighteenth century at least lay him open to that grave 
danger which Archbishop Temple has strikingly described in writing 
concerning the Cartesian philosophy: 
'It does not interpret the world in the light of knowledge of 
God, but makes use of God to vindicate its own interpretation of 
the world, and constructs its concept of Him with that in view. He 
is to be used for our purposes, not we for His. This is the 
essential principle of magic, which is thus found as a canker at 
the heart of Rationalism'. (1) 
1. Nature, Iv >an and God, p. 84 n. 
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Appendix D. - Christ's Teaching Concerning 
Future Reward and Punishment. 
Rashdall reviews the gospel evidence concerning Christ's 
teaching about the future life in an article in The Modern 
Churchman (1). The essay is important for several reasons: it 
refutes (by anticipation) Professor Laird's suggestion that the 
idea of immortality is really founded upon selfish hopes or fears 
as the motives for righteousness (2); it further confirms Rashdall's 
contention that Christ's eschatology was essentially spiritual and 
ethical (3); it exhibits the harmony between Christ's teaching 
concerning the destiny of the soul and His message of divine 
forgiveness (4). 
In the first place, Rashdall points out, Christ made love of 
God, and not a veiled form of self- interest, the primary motive for 
righteousness; but He rightly recognized that belief in immortality 
is a stimulating and disciplinary motive supporting virtue, so long 
as it is related to love of goodness for its own sake. The "reward" 
which He contemplated was simply the complete fulfilment of 
righteousness, together with the blessedness which attends it. In 
essence, He conceived of the future life as one in which the effects 
of this life would be perpetuated. Hence His conceptions of reward 
and punishment alike refer primarily to a spiritual condition. His 
metaphorical description of the Messianic banquet, because it is 
meant to represent fellowship in the Kingdom, is therefore grossly 
misunderstood if its images are given a predominantly carnal 
significance. Similarly the rejection of the wicked must be 
understood first of all as involving spiritual suffering, like 
remorse, although physical pain - which is not inconsistent with 
punishment inflicted by a loving God - no doubt entered into the 
conception also. 
Rashdall is mainly concerned to show that Christ did notteach a 
doctrine of everlasting punishment, because he regards this as 
inconsistent with His teaching about the love of God. Three 
passages in Matthew (5), in which Christ refers to "eternal 
punishment ", are regarded by Rashdall as ecclesiastical additions, 
and he gives detailed exegetical evidence in support of this 
conclusion. But he adds that, in any event, atw ,'.cs does not 
necessarily mean "eternal ", and that if Jesus actually used the 
Aramaic equivalent, He was probably referring merely to the future 
Messianic punishment, without looking beyond the Judgment. 
One last passage (6) concerning the sin against the Holy Ghost 
is susceptible of different interpretations, but in no case does it 
assert more than that the sin will not be forgiven at the Judgment; 
it says nothing concerning the duration of the punishment. Rashdall 
is inclined to regard Luke 12 :10 as a faithful statement of what Q 
1. OL. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 18 -30. Republished in CC., pp. 290 -306. 
2. --. # 150 ff. 
3. Cf. Appendix A. 
4. Cf. 
5. Matthew 18 :8; 25:41; 25:46. 
6. Matthew 12.32 and parallels. See also The Idea of Atonement in 
Christian Theoloy, pp. 56 ff. 
- 159 - 
contained, to which the other two synoptists have added their own 
explanations (1). In any case, he argues, a sin which is never 
forgiven does not necessarily imply eternal punishment; it might 
result in the extinction of the sinner, or in a full measure of 
punishment which is terminable. In putting forward this latter 
alternative, however, Rashdall seems to overlook the fact that if 
divine forgiveness is never granted, then the offender remains 
eternally excluded from fellowship with God; and surely exclusion 
from such fellowship is part of the essential meaning of any 
spiritual conception of punishment. 
Rashdall also cites several gospel passages which seem to 
imply that punishment of the sinful will not be endless (2). This 
evidence, he admits, may be insufficient to prove that Christ 
rejected the doctrine of everlasting punishment, but it at least 
affords additional ground for being suspicious of passages which 
have been interpreted to mean that He explicitly taught it. In 
fact, Christ's teaching is so concentrated upon the Judgment, that 
apparently it does not confront the question of whether or how 
punishment will be continued after that event. Because of this 
inconclusiveness, the believer is not bound to accept as Christ's 
own a notion which he regards as incompatible with His teaching 
concerning the love of God. 
1. Cf. Streeter's comments in Oxford Studies in the Synoptic 
Problem, p. 171. Lark's addition (3:29) Rashdall takes as 
implying merely the possibility an eternal sin; broxo5 
he suggests, may mean "is liable to" instead of "is guilty of ". 
2. Cf. CC., pp. 304 f. 
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CHAPTER IV - CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE 
1. Revelation.' 
Rashdall's view concerning what sort of knowledge it is possible 
for men to have of God follows directly from his assertion that the 
divine consciousness does not include that of human selves. Reject- 
ion of the notion that two selves can be identical in being, carries 
with it, he believes, the inescapable implication that the immediate 
conscious experience of another person can be known only through 
inference. He grants that, theoretically at least, the content of 
knowledge may be conceptually identical for two persons2; whether 
he should not have used the word "similar" instead of "identical" 
is a pertinent quest ion3; but apparently he holds, in any case, that 
such identity or similarity could be ascertained or verified only 
through an inferential process. 
Consequently he contends that knowledge of God must be gained 
in the same manner as knowledge of other human selves; a large pro- 
portion of the preceding chapter, in fact, has been devoted to the 
contention that God's nature is best apprehended by analogy or 
inference from the nature of human consciousness. Rashdall denies 
that this theory of religious knowledge lessens the intimacy of 
communion between God and man; on the contrary, he asserts, it safeguards 
it. Surely acquaintance with other human selves is one of the most 
1. This discussion of revelation is based primarily on the following 
sources; PR., pp. 106 -118; 127 -56. PP., Chs. XVIII and XXII. ID., 
Ch. I. GM. , Chs. VIII and X. Hibbert Journal, Vol. I, pp. 172 f; 
Vol. V, pp. 922 f. Modern Churchman, Vol. I, pp. 23 -35. Theology, 
Vol. I, pp. 196 -210. Four unpublished papers entitled: "An Address 
to the Durham Branch of the Churchmen's Union". "The Philosophy of 
Revelation ". "The Study of Dogmatics ". "The Study of Dogmatic 
Theology ". Full details concerning these writings are given in the 
bibliography. 
2. Cf. # 136... 
3. Cf. Professgr John Watson's article in Mind, Vol. XVIII, p. 245. 
See also # :°281 ft. 
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intimate and indefeasible forms of knowledge that the mind can 
ever possess; and yet sympathy with another's feelings, the under- 
:standing of his motives, the sharing of knowledge with him, is 
possible, Rashdall holds, only through analogy based on immediate 
acquaintance with similar feelings, motives and knowledge in oneself. 
Correspondingly, he views prayer as an activity in which man 
communes with God as with a friend. The distinctness of both God and 
the human soul in such a relationship is a necessary condition of 
there being any communion at all. If the self merely formed a part 
of God's consciousness, communion would be swallowed up in identity 
of being. 
Moreover, if God is the source of all truth, a true inference 
concerning His nature is no less due to His activity in communicating 
knowledge to our minds, than a more direct apprehension of His nature 
would be. Rashdall does not mean to imply, however, 'that God's know - 
ledge of us is only inferential'1; he acknowledges that the distinc- 
:tion between inferential and direct knowledge which is imposed upon 
the human mind cannot be supposed to apply at all to God's omniscience . 
While he presses the analogy between our own self -hood and God's in 
other respects, he partially relinquishes it as regards the mode of 
God's knowledge, because he believes Him to be omniscient. At first 
sight omniscience might appear to be a notion which could not be 
based upon or vindicated by analogy at all. For Rashdall, however, 
it seems to be implied in the very idea of perfect personality3, and 
to be necessitated, along with the conception of God as universal 
Cause, by the demand for an explanation of the unity of the world. 
1. ID. 
2. For Rashdall's ambiguity on this point, see #t :.1 3. 
3. Cf. Ñ' :_.132. 
The view 
opposed is of 
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of religious knowledge to which he is most resolutely 
course that form of mysticism in which the believer is 
united to God in an ecstatic transport, so that his own individuality 
seems lost in an immediate knowledge of or fusion with God's conscious- 
ness or Being. Even almost universal existence of belief in God, he 
argues, would not indicate in itself that this belief was founded 
upon immediate instead of inferential knowledge1. But as a matter 
of fact, belief in His existence is by no means universal, and this 
at least does away with the contention that an immediate knowledge 
of God is resident in every human soul. In reality missionaries and 
theologians have not found 'widely diffused intuitions of God' to 
which they could appeal; they have found it necessary and most fruitful 
to begin by arguing in favour of the world -view implied by theism; 
and having established this initial belief in God, they have then been 
able to lead their converts on to full Christianity. To be sure, 'the 
rational considerations which lead up to Monotheism are so manifold' 
that in widely separate regions and ages the Church has found beliefs 
already current which afforded a suitable starting point for its work 
among a people. 'But even among theistic nations an immediate know- 
ledge of God is claimed by very few', and 'its existence is in fact 
denied by most of the great theological systems - Catholic, Protestant, 
Anglican'2. 
Of course this must not be taken to mean that Rashdall denies the 
possibility of any form of immediate knowledge whatever. He has al- 
ready given such knowledge an important place in his moral system, and 
on this immediate knowledge, as we have seen, he bases a deductive pro- 
cess by means of which he arrives at a belief in God's existence. But 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
1. Cf. PR., p. 107. 
2. Ibid., P. 108. 
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"immediate", when Rashdall uses the term with reference to the 
indubitable knowledge that an end is good (or with reference to mathe- 
matical axioms), virtually means "self- evident" or a priori. Know- 
ledge of God he does not regard as possessing this character, since it 
is altogether possible to doubt His existence; and he holds that such 
doubts must be met 'by arguments or rational considerations'l. What 
he denies, then, is that intuitive knowledge of a self is possible, 
and he even goes so far as to apply this generalization to knowledge 
of one's own self: 
'It is only by reflecting on what is implied in many successive 
states of mind that I construct the notion of a continuous self. I 
will not say that my knowledge of myself is an "inferenpe "; it may 
better be described as an "intellectual construction ".' 
Christians in general, and virtually all of the great theologians, 
have been able to give reasons for holding their beliefs. If relig- 
ious truth is indeed perceived intuitively or immediately, Rashdall 
contends, then these men have followed a false procedure; for no 
ulterior reasons can be cited in support of truth so apprehended; one 
can merely point out its self-evidence. Therefore, though a few 
Christian mystics have claimed immediate knowledge of God, he takes 
his stand with the balance of ordinary Christians who have always 
admitted that belief in God rests not on the certainty of sight, but 
upon faith. It is fair to point out, however, that he really uses 
the word "faith" in this connexion as signifying "intellectual assent "; 
and though (as will appear presently) he repudiates the distinction 
between natural and revealed thology, nevertheless it must be recog- 
nized that Christian thought - in St. Paul, for example - has usually 
contrasted "faith" in this sense with "faith" as a mode 
of apprehending 
___________ - ___________________________________________________________ 
1. ID., p. 10. 
2. Ibid., D. 11. 
!! 
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revelationl. 
Rashdall does not hope to be able to disprove that a few eg peci- 
ally gifted mystics possess, spasmodically at least, an immediate 
knowledge of God. And he is aware of the fact that the importance 
which he has attached to the insights of gifted individuals2, together 
with his own assertion that "self -evident truths are not evident to 
everybody ", might be so construed as to support the Mystics' claim. 
He replies, however, that virtually all the propositions about God 
which appear to some as self -evidently true appear to others as self - 
evidently false3. Such contradictions arise, for example, as to 
whether God is a Person, and as to whether moral qualities can be 
ascribed to Him. Thus mysticism does not unequivocally confirm any 
body of religious truth; and when they conflict, one is left without 
criteria by which to decide between these alleged intuitions. 
He goes on to point out that persons claiming immediate religious 
knowledge do not restrict it to a mere belief that God exists. They 
also assert the immediate truth of convictions which are 'clearly de- 
rived from the traditional teaching of (their particular) ... religious 
community'4. A Lutheran claims immediate certainty for his own special 
ideas about the forgiveness of sins, a Roman Catholic for his belief 
concerning the Immaculate Conception, and so on. Thus within the 
Christian Church itself the intuitive theory runs foul of conflicting 
"immediate insights "; from this Rashdall concludes that the theory 
really has its origin in a natural tendency of the human mind to 
regard whatever it passionately believes as "immediately certain ". 
But surely this is one instance where Rashdall has argued too 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Cf. E. F. Scott: The New Testament Idea of Revelation, pp. 167 ff. 
2. Cf. # 57-f- 
3. Cf. ID., p. 13. 
4. PR., p. 109. 
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well; for could not the same be said of the immediate intuitions on 
which men hase their judgments concerning the goodness of ends? He 
has admitted that men do indeed disagree on such questions; and he 
has been wise enough, in the case of moral knowledge, to limit his 
remarks to the bareassertion that if one man is right, then anyone 
who contradicts him is wrong. Obviously this does not furnish a 
criterion for deciding between conflicting intuitions. In short, one 
of the very objections which he urges against the validity of mysticism, 
he rules out of court as an objection against the validity of moral 
knowledge. 
He recognizes that moral and religious discoveries are very inti- 
mately connected with the emotions and the willl; but he cannot 
regard this fact as furnishing any justification for the theory that 
thought is subservient to these irrational factors. Though profound 
moral insight and religious relief can hardly be the possession of 
one who has no interest or passion concerning such questions - though, 
indeed, their very quality is dependent upon character as a whole 
it is merely a perversion of this truth to conclude, as pragmatism . 
does, that a doctrine can be believed simply because one wishes it 
to be true2. To associate belief with the will in this manner sets 
1. He has already done this with regard to moral knowledge; cf., e.g. 
34. :f . 
2. Cf. FR., p. 130. Rashdall also criticizes the attempt of Nilliam 
James to overcome the difficulties inherent in mysticism by finding 
a "residual creed" which remains after the conflicts of intuition 
have cancelled one another. He writes concerning this attempt in 
The Varieties of Religious Experience: 'The most that it comes to, 
according to his own James') showing, is that there is some con- 
sciousness beyond that of the individual', though 'no moral qualities 
are claimed for' this consciousness. But, Rashdall retorts, many 
mystics - especially Eastern - would deny that any predicates, let 
alone that of consciousness, can be ascribed to the Deity; some even 
claim that "the One" must transcend the distinction between Being 
and Not -Being. "Faith" in the Christian God seems preferable to 
intuitive certainty about 'that which may be indifferently des- 
cribed as Being or Not -Being' (ID., p. 14). See also his review 
of James' Varieties in Mind, Vol. XII pp. 245 -50. 
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a false antithesis between faith and reason, between belief and 
knowledge. He does admit, however, that because religion re- 
lates directly to conduct, faith often adopts as a certainty 
for practice what the theoretical intellect alone might regard 
as merely probable; but this is not to say that such a proced- 
ure is irrational. 
In order to understand why Rashdall regards knowledge of 
God as inferential instead of immediate, it is necessary to 
examine carefully his use of terms. (1) Sometimes he employs 
"reason" in a wide sense as synonymous with the intellectual 
capacity by which any sort of knowledge is apprehended. There- 
fore he rejects the distinction between revelation and reason, 
because he holds that religious knowledge is acquired through 
the exercise of this same capacity by which men apprehend truth 
in all other spheres, instead of through the exercise of some 
supra -rational organ or faculty. (2) At other times he contrasts 
(a) "reason" with (b) "intuition" as modes of apprehending truth. 
Both of these modes, if they genuinely yield knowledge, are 
"rational" in the first sense. The contrast here is between 
(a) truths which must be apprehended as the result of a discur- 
sive process, and (b) truths which must be apprehended by 
immediate insight because they are self -evident. In the former 
case, the truth of an idea must be tested by relating it to a 
body of truth already established. Ideas of the latter type are 
self- verifying, and though they may be systematized, they form 
the data which enter into an established body of truth, and cannot 
be tested by anything ulterior to their own grounds. The essence 
of his position is that moral judgments fall under class (b), - 
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as "intuitive ", "immediate ", a priori, and "self- evident "; while 
the knowledge that God exists falls under class (a), as discursive, 
because it must be reached as the result of an inferential process 
which moves from immediate moral judgments (or other data)1 to a 
theistic postulate which is based upon them. (3) In other passages, 
which we shall examine presently, he draws yet another distinction 
concerning how ideas originate; this must not be confused with the 
distinction just made concerning how truth is apprehended. In this 
third case, (a) "reason" and (b) "intuition" are again contrasted; 
but because he is referring solely to "religious ideas ", the dis- 
tinction arises within the body of truths which fall under (2 a). 
He admits that some religious ideas may originate "intuitively ", 
while others originate as the result of a discursive process; but 
the truth of these ideas can be tested, in both cases, only in terms 
of their compatibility with a system which contains those self - 
evident truths indicated as falling under (2 b)2. 
What he regards as the true relation between philosophy and 
theology can be illustrated most clearly by comparing it with his 
conception of the relation between psychology and theology. In- 
creasing interest in the history and psychology of religion makes 
it urgently necessary, he feels, to distinguish between the psycholo- 
gical processes by which one arrives at religious (or any other) 
belief, and the reasons which make the belief true3. All forms of 
belief, whether they conflict or not, are data for the study of 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. See the arguments from the nature of human knowledge and volition - 
that is, the "idealistic" and "caUs3l" arguments. 
2. I regret that this analysis of his use of terms is so complicated; 
but the succeeding discussion would be entirely worthless unless 
these distinctions were made exact here. His language is very 
confusing in any case. There is an acute criticism of Ras hdall s g y "rational", üse öf " iatuitit", "immediate ", and in Dr. Webb`s 
Divine Personality and Human_ Li f c, pp. 174 -80. 
3. gee distinction (3) supra. 
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religious psychology, whose function it is to describe what actually 
takes place in the human mind; the question as to which are true, which 
false, falls within the domain of philosophy, - strictly within the 
domain of logic and metaphysicsl. The fact that a belief presents 
itself to an individual as immediately true, or as apprehended through 
"feeling ", is neither a guarantee of its truth, nor a proof that it is 
not really founded upon a particular conception about the nature of the 
universe whose truth must be judged by rational canons. 
This same contrast between the origin of an idea and the rational 
tests of truth makes clearer all that Rashdall has said concerning the 
religious importance of especially gifted prophets and teachers. He 
is quite willing to admit that frequently the greatness of these men 
has not lain in their speculative powers. In other realms besides 
religion - in that of science, for example - new ideas are often 
discovered by processes which are "inspirational" rather than 
reflective; but this is especially the case in morality and religion 
because the process of apprehending such truths is intimately connected 
with purity of will and intensity of feeling. Rational reflection 
1. In a symposium (with Schiller and Bosanquet) on the question Can 
Logic Abstract from the Psychological Conditions of Thinking ?" 
(Proc. Arist. Soc., Vol.VI, pp. 224 -70; Rashdall's remarks: pp. 
247 fr.), he argues that, though of course judgment is part of a 
psychological process which has other elements, it is nevertheless 
possible to attend to the question of a judgment's truth or falsity 
apart from these other features which stamp it as taking place in 
a particular mind. The pragmatist assertion that what we think to 
be true reflects what satisfies our desire, implies a distinction 
between satisfaction and truth, unless the assertion is a mere 
tautology; moreover, the pragmatist would hold the assertion 
itself to be "true" is a sense which presupposes this distinction. 
The fact that judging is a psychological process, attended by 
other psychological processes, may affect the individual's 
apprehension of the truth of a proposition, but not the truth of 
the proposition itself. Where emotional factors, for example, 
blur this apprehension, the only corrective is to focus attention 
upon the question of the proposition's validity, thus "abstracting" 
from the disturbing factors which attend the judging. process. 
1. 
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alone, then, probably never could have disclosed many of the most 
profound truths of science, of poetry, and especially of morality 
and religion. All this has to do merely with the question of origin, 
the question of how an idea first came into the mind; and that is a 
question which he always separates radically from the question of 
whether or not the idea is true. The latter question, he claims, is 
one which reason alone is competent to answer. The special nature of 
religious visions, for example, is no guarantee of their truth; visions 
may be wicked and false; it is only when they are seen to be good and 
true on rational grounds that one is justified in regarding them as 
authentically "revealed "1. While he thus acknowledges that revelation 
may originate in intuitive processes (so far as the man -ward side of 
revelation is concerned), he is at the same time concerned to point 
out that 'a great deal of hard thinkingr2 which underlies teachings 
like those of the prophets and Christ, often goes unrecognized because 
of a tendency to identify religious inspiration exclusively with 
intuitive gifts. He wishes to establish the fact that religious beliefs 
may have their origin in reflective processes as well. But his main 
point is that, whatever the genesis of a religious idea may be, the 
question as to whether or not it is revealed is identical with that as 
to whether or not it is rationally true. 
Now this position is open to a host of objections; and it is also 
suscertible of grave misinterpretation unless Rashdall's prevailing 
intention is discerned beneath his somewhat confusing use of terms like 
"reason" and "intuition ". The first and most obvious criticism is that 
1. In an unpublished paper on "The Philosophy of Revelation ", Rashdall 
illustrates this point by citing the case of St. Paul, who arrived 
at many of his religious ideas, not only because of the influence 
of a vision, but through rabbinic modes of thought and by assumptions 
concerning Old Testament inspiration, which men cannot share to -day. 
Here Rashdall implies that it is possible to accept religious 
beliefs 
which have not only been reached through psychological processes 
radically different from ours, but which rested on intellectual 
grounds,. that seem to us false. 
2. PR., P. 1440 
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such a theory makes religious truth the exclusive property of 
philosophers. In reply he reverts to one of his favourite convictions: 
that metaphysical arguments which the trained philosopher or theologian 
advances are in reality similar to the processes by which the beliefs 
of ordinary men are reached, except that the former are more thoroughly 
examined and more consistently worked out. Underlying what presents 
itself to the average man as self-evident religious truth is a world - 
view which he has probably accepted on authority, and which he is 
incapable of analyzing or defending against a scepticl. This does not 
gainsay the fact that such a world -view is an elementary metaphysical 
system, and that its truth must be tested rationally; nor does it 
gainsay the fact that it is the peculiar task and duty of the theologian 
to make explicit the rational grounds of belief. Rashdall realizes 
that belief cannot be postponed until every complicated question 
pertaining to it has been critically examined; but this merely shows the 
need for the acceptance of authority in a sense which he has already 
held to be compatible with the exercise of conscience and reason . 
Needless to say, many theologians would find the crucial objection 
against his view of revelation to be that it leaves no room for any 
body of religious truth, or any knowledge of God, which transcends the 
discursive operations of human reason. His method conflicts with the 
claim that in Christianity one confronts a special revelation which 
cannot be disclosed3 by any rational process whatever. In order to 
understand the form in which he holds this position, it is necessary to 
note that when he speaks of knowledge that God exists, he uniformly 
holds 
that rational inference, not intuition, is the mode of apprehension; 
but 
1. Cf. ID., p. 15. 
2. Cf. it 58 ff. 
3. "Disclosure" must here be distinguished clearly 
from "apprehension ". 
In the one case the human intellect constructs, 
in the other it 
receives. Of course reason "apprehends" 
what it discloses as the 
result of a discursive process. The question 
is as to whether, in 
religious knowledge, it apprehends something 
which it does not thus 
disclose or construct. Cf. :4 166 f. 
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in the last few paragraphs our discussion has brought out an argument 
wherein he holds a conception of "reason" as discriminating concerning 
the truth of "religious ideas" which may originate either rationally or 
intuitively. No contradiction is involved, however, because knowledge 
of. God's existence does not fall within the sphere of the "religious 
ideas" to which the latter argument refers. His real intention is 
disclosed in a reply which he makes to Auguste Sabatier's theory that 
certain great new religious insights, since their genesis cannot be 
explained in terms of past education or tradition, must 'be due to 
immediate revelation'. Sabatier's argument assumes, Rashdall maintains, 
'that we have somehow arrived independently at a conception of God to 
which such inspirations can be referred'1. Certain "religious ideas ", 
then, may originate intuitively; but they presuppose a belief in God 
which must be reached discursively. And, of course, even such data 
as intuition can supply (in this sphere) must be verified and tested 
by reason before being accepted as true. 
Such a theory may seem to relinquish the idea of revelation 
altogether. But Rashdall protests that, in accordance with his 
idealistic theism, 'all knowledge may be looked upon as a partial 
communication to the human soul of the thoughts or experiences of the 
divine Mind' 2 . All truth has its source in God, but its apprehension 
is in the last analysis possible only through reason3. Hence he rejects 
the old distinction whereby natural theology was conceived as a rational 
investigation into the data furnished by nature and human experience, 
while revealed theology was conceived as based upon authoritative sources 
the Bible4, the fathers, the creeds, - which contained truths directly 
communicated by God (and often guaranteed by miracles)5, only the more 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
1. PR., p. 115. 
2. Ibid., p. 141 
3. See distinction (1), #ß:165A 
4. For Rashdall's application of his general theory of revelation to 
the Bible, see DD., Ch. IV; CE., Chs. XVII -XIX; PP., Ch. XX. 5. Cf. Appendix E. 
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elementary of which reason might independently discover. To be sure, 
especial significance must be attached to moral judgments because they 
constitute an indispensable ground of the argument for belief in God's 
existence, and they afford the only available knowledge of His character, 
Moral and religious truths undoubtedly embrace the most important 
aspects of revelation; but this does not set them off as different in 
kind from other truth. 
We shall have occasion to criticize his conception of revelation 
in detail later; but here it must be noted that his rejection of the 
distinction between natural and revealed theology is ambiguous. It 
is quite possible to agree with him that when "reason" is understood 
in the first sense denoted supra, the distinction between revelation 
and reason is merely one which, within the sphere of religion, 
differentiates a truth from the apprehension of it1; but this is riot 
at all equivalent to agreeing with his contention that knowledge of 
God must be "rational" in the second sense - that is, discursive instead 
,of immediate or direct. He mistakenly identifies the idea of direct 
revelation or immediate knowledge of God with a form of mystical union. 
He writes as though, his refutation of mysticism left but one alternative; 
a discursive or inferential knowledge of God. Yet religious history 
abounds with evidence to show that the staunchest advocates of the idea 
of direct revelation have frequently been opposed to mysticism and 
(its usual partner) extreme immanentism. Many religious teachers have 
conjoined the declaration that God's existence is known because He 
speaks directly to men, with an equally fervent affirmation of God's 
"otherness". 
The ouestion remains, of course, as to whether these teachers 
presuppose 
that man's 
1. Cf. C.0 
a dualism between the natural and the supernatural so sharp 
rational capacities as a whole (in the first sense), even 
___________________ - ------------------------------------ 
.3. Webb: Problems in the Relations of God and Man, Part I. 
II 
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his capacities for moral knowledge, because they belong to the natural 
sphere, are regarded as incapable of receiving a knowledge of God. 
But it is possible to hold that knowledge of God is immediate instead 
of discursive, without holding that it is supra -rational in this latter 
sense. It is possible to assert that man has the capacity to receive 
what he could not discover by discursive reasoning, while at the same 
time acknowledging a limitation which arises, not only from the fetters 
which bind the intellect to the sensible and the temporal, but also 
from the blindness and waywardness instilled by sin. Man's capacity 
to receive revelation need not be denied, even though it be recognized 
that a gulf separates man from God which He alone can span, and that 
His self-revelation is at least as much a gracious work of saving man . 
from the sin which shuts him off from fellowship with God, as it is 
an illumination of his intellect. Because Rashdall maintains that 
knowledge of God is rational, not only the first sense, but in the 
second also, he seems to assume that no humanly insurmountable barrier 
separates the divine sphere from the created; we have yet to enquire 
as to whether this is really his intention. 
As a moralist he takes a serious view of sin, and he recognizes 
the close connexion between purity of the will and moral insight. The 
story of the Fall expresses for him the fact that mankind has always 
fallen short of its own conception of the ideal; knowing the higher, 
man has deliberately followed the lower. But he passionately rejects 
the notion of total depravity; the tragedy of man's innate tendency 
towards evil can be fully appreciated without leaping to the conclusion 
that this defacement of the divine image has reached the point of 
complete obliteration. The conquest of sin is to be achieved, not 
through some morbid fear of punishment, - for men cannot be 
frightened 
into virtue - but through the love of goodness which Christ 
instills 
- 174 - 
into the human heart. Love is stronger than fearl. 
Once this moribund doctrine of total depravity is repudiated, 
every man is seen to possess some capacity for moral insight; 
especially gifted men have this capacity in higher degrees; but any 
moral ideal apprehended through this natural capacity is, in so far 
as it is true, identical in principle with the purposes of God. The 
distinctive truths of Christianity stand at the apex of man's knowledge 
and experience, because they have their origin in One who fulfilled the 
highest capacities of human nature. But all truth is alike in that it 
issues from God and is apprehended by man. The supremacy of the 
Christian revelation does not imply that it has been received either 
through some abnormal agency operative in man, or through some special 
manifestation from the God -ward side different in kind from what occurs 
in the apprehension of all truth. This being so, what place can 
Rashdall assign to Christian doctrine? Revelation becomes in his system 
a matter of degree, 'and revelation at its highest is never of a kind 
which supersedes the exercise of reason and conscience'2. 
On its negative side his view is one which refuses to grant 
Christian documents and traditions an authority different in kind from 
that which he accords to great philosophers and other extra -Christian 
sources of teaching. In his desire to make all truth "of one piece", 
he denies that theology has any special sources of information which 
shut* off even a portion of its truth from the purview of philosophical 
investigation. On the contrary it should be the ideal of theology to 
bring traditional beliefs into harmony with modern secular knowledge. 
In an essay on Aquinas , Rashdall tries to show 
that his own view of 
r 
g 
1. This paragraph is based upon two unpublished 
sermons entitled 
"The F allofMan" and "Original Sin'}. The doctrine 
receives 
fuller treatment in the subsequent discussion 
of the Atonement. 
2. Theology, Vol. I, p. 198. 
3. Cf'. GM. , Ch. VIII. 
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theology is parallel in one important respect, to the Thomistic view 
because both conceive of 
'Theology as a science in which the results of all other sciences, 
the highest generalisations in all departments of thought, are summed 
up and harmoniously combined in a great theory about the ultimate 
mean}ng of the world - about the relations between God, the World, and 
man''. 
But there is of course this profound difference between the two; whereas 
Rashdall wishes to achieve his synthetic and unified system by 
harmonizing philosophy and theology through reason, St. Thomas firmly 
established for Catholic orthodoxy the distinction between natural and 
revealed theology; he took a modest view of what reason could discover 
independently, stopping short of the doctrine of the Trinity2; and 
revelation, he maintained, could disclose all the truths of natural 
theology, and then, in addition, those distinctive Christian truths 
which far transcend reason. 
It must be set down to Rashdall's credit, however, that he has 
no desire to achieve his contemplated harmonization either through a 
distortion of current (non- religious) thought so that it conforms to 
traditional doctrines, or through an artificial straining of doctrine 
in order to bring it into conformity with philosophic truth: 
'All in the new ideas that is true will have to be embodied in 
the theology of the future: and whatever in the theology of the past 
is not true will have to disappearr3. 
Thus secular and Christian thought may each contribute to a unified 
body of truth; but the standard of truth, the norm of selection and 
rejection, is reason. 
On its positive side, his theory by no means makes Christian 
----------------------------------------------------------------- - - - - -- 
1. Cf. GM., p. 198. 
2. Nevertheless it is primarily to Aquinas that Rashdall appeals in 
seeking to show the reasonableness of the doctrine of the Trinity, 
because St. Thomas (following St. Augustine) held that there were 
"analogies" to the Trinity in human experience. Cf. # 1.91 f. 
3. GM., n. 200. 
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doctrine superfluous. To say that all truth must be apprehended 
through the natural capacity of reason does not in the least discount 
the fact that only men of extraordinary gifts, especially men of 
exceptional moral purity and religious devotion, could have discovered 
the fundamental truths of Christianity in the first instance; after 
their discovery, of course, quite ordinary men can appropriate them, 
though they can onl do ,because these truths appeal to their own 
conscience and reason. It is precisely because men are sufficiently 
sensitive to moral and spiritual truth to be aware of their own 
limitations, that they find in Christ alone the complete and perfect 
revelation of God. 
Thus he recognizes that there is much in the Christian tradition 
which a theistic philosopher, building his system solely in the light 
of modern knowledge, could not evolve for himself; he is ready to admit 
that one of the great weaknesses of liberalism is that is has in some 
respects cut itself off from organic relationship to the many great 
truths contained in this tradition, because it has often neglected the 
task of studying dogmatic history. He declares that if whatever is 
of enduring value in Christian thought is to be made available for 
modern men, the great doctrines must be understood and their truth 
interpreted in the language of our own time. The succeeding portions 
of this chapter have to do with Rashdall's own attempt to contribute 
to the fulfilment of this task. The benefits which he anticipates 
from such a study are multifarious; but primarily, he believes, it will 
bring out afresh the fact that the teaching of the Church does not 
consist in a set of dogmas which were established at the outset, and 
then merely defined with greater precision through each succeeding 
period; it will show that the truth hes been reached through a process 
of gradual development in which men sought to meet specific problems 
as they arose. By disclosing instances wherein a given tendency like 
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Arianism was widespread in one period, but condemned as heretical in 
the next, it will leave the conviction that this same process of 
doctrinal development, which was legitimate and necessary in the past, 
is equally so to -day. 
In this manner Rashdall's conception of revelation places Christian 
truth in organic connexion with the whole body of truth; in Christ, 
God's unbroken and progressive) self- revelation to the mind of man 
reached its culminating point; but the history of revelation compasses 
man's whole, age -long quest for truth. Since Christ, the activity of 
revelation has been carried on by the work of the Holy Spirit, 
especially within the fellowship of the Church; but Christianity to -day, 
as in the past, is capable of appropriating, of "baptizing into Christ '2, 
ideas izhich have them: origin outside its ecclesiastical confines. 
This conception of revelation, he believes, is conducive to a 
proper appreciation of the degrees of truth represented by the ethnic 
religions; but it is noteworthy that, in comparing them with 
Christianity3,,he seems to make the "appeal to reason and conscience" 
a test external to all religions, - an independent standard in terms 
of which each is assigned its relative position on the ladder of 
revelation, with Christianity placed on the top rung. A general word 
of comment concerning this method must be added presently. Suffice 
it to say here that Rashdall emphasizes its superiority over the 
sunerficial eclecticism to which the study of comparative religion 
sometimes gives rise. All religions are not equally true, nor are 
they merely variant expressions of the same truth. His principle 
not only makes necessary a distinction between the higher and lower 
1. i.e. from the point of 3ricw of human ápprenhension. 
2. A phrase which Rashdall took over, I believe, from Dr. Percy 
Gardner. 
3. Cf. . rr 77 ff, 
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forms of religion'; it requires a frank recognition of the fact that 
even 'the highest religions ... are at certain points diametrically 
antagonistic to each other'2. 
On the other hand, while this same principle avoids the absurdity 
of claiming that Christianity possesses all truth and other religions 
none, it nevertheless raises the question as to whether Christianity 
may rightly be held to be the absolutely and universally true religious 
system. Rashdall answers this question in the affirmative; but his 
reasons for doing so are worth analyzing. Christ's teaching of 'the 
Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man'3, he finds, 'combines an 
ethical ideal which appeals to the universal Conscience with a Theism 
which commends itself to Reason'4. Is it unfair to paraphrase this 
by saying "Christ's teaching is absolutely true because His ethical 
injunctions are substantially identical with an ethical system which 
Rashdall believes to be independently true, conception 
of God is compatible with the theistic philosophy which Rashdall 
believes to be independently true "? Rashdall goes on to say that 
because moral and religious truth is inseparable from the personality 
of the teacher, Christ's own Person has rightly come to be regarded 
by His followers as the centre of the Christian revelation; but here 
again, as will be seen in what follows, the claim of Christianity to 
finality, the claim of Christ to be the perfect Revealer of God, 
rests ultimately upon the appeal which Christ Himself makes "to the 
moral and religious consciousness "5. That is, for Rashdall this claim 
1. This distinction is based on whether or not the religion in question 
is closely connected with morality. (Cf. DD., p. 178). To some 
extent Rashdall falls into the fallacy of judging primitive religion 
in terms of civilized, instead of primitive, morality. 
2. PR., p. 150. 
3. Ibid., p. 153. 
4. Ibid., p. xv. 
5. Cf. PR., p. 156. 
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rests upon whether it commends itself to reason, the sole arbiter 
of ethical, metaphysical and religious truth. 
1. 
Appendix E. - Miracles. 
Rashdallts remarks on the question of miracles merit special 
mention because they illustrate very clearly his consistent rejection 
of supernaturalism. The factors determining his view have already 
been set down in connexion with the distinction which he draws between 
the principle of uniformity and the idea of causality.(2) Because he 
regards the former principle merely as an empirical generalization, 
he refuses to concur in the assertion, widespread at the turn of the 
century, that a break in the uniformity of nature is a priori 
inconceivable; and yet this is not to say that he believes that any 
event whatever could happen without a cause. 
But when the question is one of historical evidence, rather than 
merely one of whether or not a miracle can possibly occur, it is 
necessary to take into account not only the documentary testimony, 
but the nature and probability of the event itself. Estimation of the 
value of the documentary evidence requires a specialized knowledge of 
the literary habits and mental peculiarities of the period or race 
concerned; but estimation of the likelihood of the fact itself requires 
that the uniformity of nature, within the physical sphere, be given 
due weight as an empirically established law. Documentary evidence 
itself is dependent upon the trustworthiness of natural law for the 
reliability of sense perception and of the host of inferences based 
upon it, without which any testimony would be unintelligible; therefore 
when this evidence implies a departure from natural law, it is 
destroying the basis on which its own verisimilitude rests. 
Consequently Rashdall concludes that though the possibility of 
an exception to natural law must be admitted, an isolated miracle 
could not be understood or related to experience as a whole; sufficient 
experience of a given type of non -uniformity would justify belief in 
it, but an isolated miracle can never be proven - no matter what the 
documentary evidence supporting it - because in the nature of the case 
it cannot provide this sufficient experience. For this reason, 'the 
devout modern Catholic who believes that, under certain conditions, 
miracles are matters of daily occurrence, (has) a much stronger logical 
position than the modern Protestant or Anglican, who believes that 
miracles were confined to Judaea and stopped at the end of 
the first 
century'. (3) 
All this applies, however, merely to the realm of 
mechanical 
uniformity, which is superseded in the psychological, and 
to a lesser 
extent in the biological, realm, in a manner for 
which general but 
not rigidly exact limits can be set. For example, 
knowledge 
concerning what sort of laws govern psychic phenomena 
is as yet very 
imperfect; but psychical research has indicated 
that the laws of the 
mind are different from those of mechanical 
necessity, and it therefore 
----------------- ------------------ 
1 This appendix is based on the following material: Proc. Arist. 
Soc., 
Vol. VI, pp. 1 -34.; CV., pp. 51 -56; 
PR., pp. 157 -161. An 
unpublished paper entitled "Miracles". 
2. Cf. 4, 94 f. 
3. Proc. Arist. Soc., Vol. VI, p.23. 
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proscribes the rejection of an event of this character merely because 
it cannot be reconciled with physical laws. If the "miracle" is one 
which belongs to a whole class of events, especially if it is of a 
type which occurs to -day, like faith -healing, then there is no reason 
why it should not be accepted on sufficient documentary evidence, even 
though the psychological law which it exemplifies is not yet thoroughly 
understood. To insist that all credible events must conform to laws 
which fall within the present state of our knowledge is to shut the 
door to scientific progress. 
These considerations greatly reduce the religious significance of 
miracles, because most of the "miracles" which are acceptable merely 
fall within the province of imperfectly known laws of psychology and 
biology. On the other hand, to base the truth of a doctrine upon the 
fact that it is attested to by some event which is literally supernatural, 
is exceedingly precarious, because scientific thought rejects precisely 
this type of miracle. In a word, revelation attested to solely by 
miracles of this sort cannot present an acceptable alternative to the 
truths which claim to be revealed upon rational grounds. Rashdall 
follows this latter conviction unwaveringly, notably with reference 
to belief in immortality and belief in the Incarnation. And above all, 
he insists that an accompanying miracle cannot be regarded as the 
guarantee of infallibility for a teaching, especially if that teaching 
is rationally indefensible. 
1. 
2. The Incarnation and the Trinity. 
The most regrettable public incident in Rashdall's life occurred 
as the result of a paper which he read on "Christ as Logos and Son of 
God" at the Cambridge Conference of Modern Churchmen in August 1921. 
That he intended as a modern defence of belief in the divinity of 
Christ was distorted by the press and blazoned forth as a denial of 
this belief. Rashdall was by no means the only victim of 
misrepresentation and of the bitter attack which ensued from Roman 
Catholics and high churchmen. His keen sense of justice was outraged 
by remarks which some of his critics made without verifying the report, 
and despite the fact that, because previously he had often expressed 
the same convictions contained in the paper, they must have known 
what his real views were. Several commentaries upon the conference, 
such as Dr. A. C. Headlam's article in The Church quarterly Review, 
----------- - - - --- -------- - - - - -- - - -- 
1. This discussion is based on the following sources: DD., Chs. II, 
III, V -VIÍ, XIV; CV., pp. 48 -51; PR., pp. 168 -85; CC., 
278 -85; 
Jesus : Human and Divine; PP., Chs. IV, XI; GM., Chs. 
III, IV; 
and many articles in journals, which are indicated 
in the 
bibliography. 
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Canon O. C. Quick's in The Commonwealth, and Father Vincent McNabb's in 
1. 
Blackfriars, were for the most part temperate, scholarly, and manifestly 
2. 
eager to be fair. However, Bishop Gore's reaction inflicted a deep 
personal wound upon Rashdall. Much of what follows is based upon the 
replies which he made to his critics - and with especial fervour t 
Bishop Gore - from his pulpit in Carlisle, and in the pages of The 
Modern Churchman. Later the original essay, and three sermons relating 
to it (the last only indirectly) were made into a little book entitled 
Jesus: Human and Divine. I have sought to omit, however, all references 
of a personal nature, and to glean from his replies to criticism only 
such material as elucidates his enduring attitude toward the questions 
involved. What strikes one most forcibly is the facility with which, 
under the pressure of attack, he found plausible support in dogmatic 
history for the view which he had always held. His very earliest 
sermons contain interpretations of the Incarnation and the Trinity 
which were the direct outgrowth of an already stable philosophical 
world -view; and long before the Cambridge controversy, he had sought 
to show the relationship between the form in which he adhered to these 
doctrines, and the language of traditional Christianity; but if it 
had not been for the controversy, many aspects of his significant 
attempt to bridge the gap between liberalism and orthodoxy might not 
have been published. 
For several reasons it is advisable to preface the statement of 
Rashdall's own views on these doctrines with a brief account of what 
he has to say about their historical development. As one who firmly 
believed that wherever possible the meaning of traditional dogmas 
1 - See the bibliography. W.J. +Sparrow- Simpson's Modernism and 
the 
Person of Christ (published two years later), also discusses 
this 
conference directly. 
2. This statement cannot be said to apply to Headlam's remarks 
about 
Kirsopp Lake and Foakes- Jackson. 
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should be understood and their value conserved, he had formulated his 
own conceptions of the Incarnation and the Trinity, long before the 
controversy, against the background of a penetrating study of Christian . 
history; this was a task for which his early training as an historian 
equipped him, in some ways, admirably; and by 1915, when he delivered 
his Bampton Lectures on the Atonement, he had painstakingly studied 
1. 
most of the important literature. As a matter of fact, he intended to 
write a full study of the doctrine of Christ's Person, corresponding to 
his volume on the Atonement; but English theology was deprived of this 
work by the disease which encumbered the closing years of his life and 
caused his comparatively early death. Directly after the outbreak 
of the Cambridge controversy he wrote: 
'...The only satisfactory way of filling in the outline which I 
give of a possible interpretation of the doctrine in my little paper 
at Cambridge - is a book...which should include a survey of the history 
of the doctrine, an estimate of the permanent philosophical value of 
the enormously various doctrines defended at different times by writers 
now commonly regarded as orthodox, and an attempt to decide how much 
of the elaborate structure which they have built up is capable of 
defence or re- statement in the language of modern philosophy. Such 
a book I hope, if I live, to write...' 2. 
What follows cannot in any degree repair the loss; by tracing 
chronologically the phases of doctrinal history wherein he did find 
a basis for his views, and then by briefly stating those views 
themselves, it can merely suggest in barest outline what would have 
been his most mature contribution to theology. 
1. See, for example, his statement (Atonement, p. .i%) to the effect 
that he had read through all the fathers there treated, except 
Augustine (and in his case, everything relevant to the subject); 
a glance at the table of contents will indicate what this seemingly 
casual remark implies. 
2. Modern Churchman, Vol. XI, p. 475. 
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(i) - An Historical Sketch of the Doctrines. 
The doctrine of Christ's divinity, Rashdall believes, was the 
outcome of the attempt on the part of the early Church to express its 
recognition of His unique significance; it was not explicitly contained 
in His own teaching about Himself. That is, unless the Fourth Gospel 
is regarded as containing a verbatim report of Christ's discourses, 
there is no evidence to indicate that Jesus claimed 'Divinity for 
2. 
Himself'. Even in this gospel - except for the prologue, which of 
course is not represented as a teaching of Christ Himself - few passages 
3. 
imply that He regarded Himself as a member of the God -head. That He 
did permit Himself to be called the Messiah is unquestionably true; 
4 
but the Jews did not think of the Messiah 'as God or equal with God'. 
This interpretation of historical fact does not in the least imply that 
the Church was wrong in ascribing divinity to Christ. Rashdall regards 
the doctrine as true, although it cannot be found in Christ's own sayings; 
and this is a position which the Church has never branded as heretical. 
On the other hand, the long process of development and controversy 
through which the doctrine of the Incarnation reached its final form, 
did take its point of departure from Christ's claim to Messiahship, and 
to a unique relationship with God. The first important stage in this 
process culminated in the Pauline teaching, in which the idea of 
1. 
1. At many points in the succeeding discussion Rashdall's 
interpretation is, to put it mildly, disputable. Here, and in the 
review of the historical chapters of his work on the Atonement 
(4'214 ft, my chief purpose has been to reproduce faithfully 
what 
he says. In a few of the footnotes I have added criticisms 
of 
his scholarship, but these by no means cover all the debatable 
questions. 
2. JHD. , 11. 
3. 'The claimto be the Son of God does not necessarily imply 
"God- head ''. (Ibid., p. 12 n). Cf. John 10:34 -36. 
JHD., p. 13 n. 
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Messiahship was identified with the conception of the risen Lord as 
a semi -divine figure which far transcended anything contained in 
Jewish thought. The strongest utterance to be found in any undoubtedly 
Pauline epistle is, "God was in Christ, reconciling the world to 
1. 
Himself ";St.Paul did not more explicitly define the relationship of 
Christ to God, except to affirm the pre -existence of the Messiah. 
Moreover, he identified the Spirit and the indwelling Christ in a 
manner which was modified by the more precise Trinitarian distinctions 
2. 
of later theology. 
Despite the relative simplicity of the Pauline Christology, the 
Church definitely profited from the fact that early Christian thinking 
did not rest at this point. Paul's failure to distinguish between the 
heavenly Christ and the man Jesus was remedied when his Christology 
came to be interpreted by the author of the Fourth Gospel in the light 
of the Logos doctrine. 
The notion of the Logos grew up in a period when metaphysical 
speculation had given rise to the conception of a God so ineffable that 
some intermediary was needed to establish connexion between the Deity 
3. 
and the created world. In one interpretation, God was believed to 
have given birth to the Logos, who in turn created the natural world. 
In attempting to interpret Judaism to the Greek mind, Philo of 
Alexandria imparted a highly speculative form to the conception; he 
used language strikingly similar to that of the Fourth Gospel - calling 
the Logos, for example, "the only -begotten Son of God "; but he did not 
identify it with the Messiah. This identification was the unique 
contribution of the author of the Johannine Gospel; so far as 
- 1. II Corinthians 5:19. 
2. For Rashdall's most extensive treatment of St. Paules Christology, 
see Atonement, pp. 127 - 30. 
3. Rashdall attributes this conception to Neo- Platonism, cf. JHD., p. 21. 
He apparently forgets that Philo and the author of the Fourth 
Gospel lived long before Plotinos. 
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historical research can disclose, he was the first to teach that the 
divine Logos, through whom God had been revealing Himself in all ages, 
finally became incarnate in the human Jesus. Thus he rectified the 
vagueness of the Pauline Christology by enabling Christians to affirm 
both the humanity of Jesus, and the divinity of the indwelling Logos. 
This interpretation of the Logos doctrine was developed further by 
both Justin and Origen. As apologists influenced by the heritage of 
Greek philosophy, they held that though the Word was incarnate in Jesus 
in a unique manner, it had nevertheless been operative in revealing 
God in all ages, dwelling in the prophets and enlightening all who 
earnestly sought and found God's truth; they believed that even pagan 
philosophers like Socrates and Plato could be said to have been inspired 
by the Logos. 
In the Fourth Gospel, however, the relationship between God and 
the Logos was left undefined; questions concerning the status of the 
Word before it became incarnate in Jesus, and the sense in which it 
existed as distinct from God the Father, remained unanswered. Through 
a long series of controversies the Church sought a solution. 
In the early stages two tendencies (Adoptionist and Sabellian) are 
distinguishable. One held Christ to be virtually a man who had been 
1. 
'deified after death on account of His virtues'. The other started 
from the divine side instead of from the human. It crudely identified 
the divine Son and the Father, holding that the one God had dwelt in 
the human body of Christ. 
In reaction against such tendencies the adherents of the Logos 
Christology sharpened the distinction between the Father and the Word, 
tending to make the latter a separate and inferior divine personality. 
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controversy resulted in the triumph of strict monotheism, so pervasive 
had been Arian influences, that it took many years of conflict after 
Nicaea to eradicate their effects within the Church, The Athanasian 
1. 
position, as embodied in the Nicene Creed, virtually saved monotheism; 
and its insistence upon the unity of the God -head became the orthodox 
2 
doctrine of the Church. 
So far as the metaphysical formulae of Athanasius can be understood 
in modern terms, it is apparent that when he affirmed the pre- existence 
of the Logos, he conceived of the "Persons" of the Trinity not as 
separate minds or beings, but as activities distinguishable within the 
3. 
undivided God -head. In declaring the Son to be equal, co- eternal and 
of one substance with the Father, Athanasius did indeed stress the 
fact that the distinction between the two "Persons" is not 'a distinction 
4. 
between two separate Divine Minds', and thus he struck the mortal 
blow against Arianism. Yet he was not a Sabellian; he quite clearly 
asserted that the distinction between the Father and Son was a real and 
eternal one. What he was concerned to maintain was that it was a 
1. Rashdall is here referring to the genuine Creed of Nicaea (325 A. D.), 
sometimes known as the "Nicene Faith ". This must be distinguished, 
of course, from the so- called Nicene or Nicaeno -Constantinopolitan 
Creed which is (perhaps mistakenly) said to have been framed at 
Constantinople in 381 A.D. 
2. The conception of the Holy Spirit underwent a similar development. 
'At first...(it was) regarded as identical with the Word'; but 
gradually the Word came to be thought of as alone incarnate in Jesus, 
and the Spirit as the medium whereby 'the subsequent word of God 
was carried on in human hearts' (PR., p. 170). Thus at last the 
doctrine of three distinct "Persons" within the God -head emerged. 
3. Neither "prosopon" nor "hypostasis" - the two Greek terns which were 
used as equivalent to "persona" - occur in the body of the Nicene 
Creed. The latter, which became the orthodox term for the Persons 
of the Trinity, is used in the anathemas attached to the Creed, but 
in the quite different sense of being synonymous with "ousia ". 
Thus, at the time of the Council of Nicaea, it was characteristic 
only of Arians to speak of three "hypostases" or "ousiai ". 
Athanasius belonged to the group who maintained that there was 
but 
one "ousia" and one "hypostasi,s" in the God -head, 'and were 
accused 
...of Sabellianism for doing so' (GM., p. 82.). 
4 JHD., p. 60. 
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1. 
distinction 'within the nature of...(a single) Divine Being'. There 
are, indeed, passages which would seem to indicate that Athanasius 
regarded the distinction, after all, as one existing between two 
separate personalities; but it must be remembered that he was bound 
by the necessity of accepting both Testaments in toto, together with 
2. 
"extra -canonical authoritiesX "sand that some of his inconsistencies are 
attributable to contradictions in his authoritative sources. Certainly 
his prevailing thought on the matter is reflected in his insistence 
upon the term "homo- ousion ", and upon the phrase "from the 'ousia' of 
the Father" in the Creed. The whole meaning of the Nicene Creed is 
that the external distinction between the Father and the Son is 
'not a distinction between the one eternal God and another inferior, 
created God,...but a distinction within the Being of the one and Only 
God'. 'The Logos did not owe His existence to any act of the Father's 
will, any "begetting" in time: the Logos was an element in His eternal 
Being'. (3) 
This is clearly seen from the fact that for Athanasius the Father 
and the Son did not each possess knowledge, as would be the case 
the distinction between them were one of "persons" in the sense of 
"personalities ". 'The Logos is the Wisdom of God: and there is no 
other Wisdom of God'. Against the Arians, who maintained that the 
Son was created by the Father's will and therefore 'had a beginning in 
time', Athanasius urged that 'the Father does not know except through 
the Logos'. Therefore, he argued, it is impossible to hold that the 
Logos was created; for 'before that creation the Father could not have 
4. 
had even the thought of creating the Son or the World through Him'. 
In a word, for Athanasius the Son is God as thinking and knowing. 
Rashdall accepts Athanasius' position up to this point; and he 
differs precisely at the point where Athanasius holds a view which was 
1. JHD,, p. 24. 
2. Cf. GM., p. 83. 
3. 
4. Ibid.,p8485. Cf. Or. contra Arianos, III, 61 -63; De Synodis, 18, 
52; De Sentent. Dionysii, 23. 
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1 
later to be condemned as Apollinarianism. So far as any unambiguous 
statement can be found, Athanasius relegated everything human in 
Christ to the sphere of the body; Christ's mind, he believed, was the 
indwelling Logos, and therefore was subject neither to limitation nor 
growth. In interpreting passages wherein ignorance is recorded of 
Christ, he ascribed that ignorance to the flesh, rather than to the 
2 
soul. At this period, then,Athanasius assumed 
'that in Jesus Christ there were two elements...the Logos which 
was divine, and a body which was human; and even the body ceased 
eventually to be human, since by the indwelling of the Word, it was 
actually by degrees converted into the divine substance'. (3) 
4 
'As an old man' at the Synod of Alexandria (362 A.D.), Athanasius 
conceded that Christ had a human soul, since he then had come to 
recognize that otherwise His redemptive work would not have included 
'the whole man'. But this does not alter the fact that his view at 
5 
the time of Nicaea was "Apollinarian "; and it may be doubted whether 
1. Cf. GM. pp. 87 ff. 
2. Concerning Christ's professed ignorance of the day and hour of the 
Judgment, Athanasius writes: '...the Nord, not as ignorant, 
considered as Word, has said, "I know not ", for He knows, but as 
showing His manhood, in that to be ignorant is proper to man, and 
that He had put on flesh that was ignorant, being in which, He 
said according to the flesh, "I know not ".' (Or. contra Arianos, 
III, 45. :;uoted, GM., p. 89). Similarly in explaining Luke 2 :52 - 
"Jesus increased in wisdom and stature..." - Athanasius ascribes 
increase to the body alone, since it is inapplicable to the Logos. 
(Cf. Ibid., III, 52. Quoted, GM., pp. 90 f). 
3. GM., p. 91. Or contra Arianos, III, 53, is the authority for the 
last clause. 
4. GM., p. 92. If this is an attempt on Rashdall's part to suggest 
that Athanasius was in his dotage when he came to believe 
that 
Christ had a human soul, it is quite unjust. In 
362 A.D. Athanasius 
was not over sixty -five years of age, and was apparently 
still 
quite virile. 
5. Cf. Gore: The Reconstruction of Belief, p. 
503 n. 'Dr. Rashdall... 
reproduces an earlier paper in which, with astonishing 
emphasis, he 
accused Athanasius...of being Apollinarian...In 
a note to the 
republished paper, in consequence of protests, 
he modifies his 
statement thus: "In his earlier days ". What 
should we think of 
an historian of to -day who should speak of Ayr. Gladstone 
in re- 
trospect as "a strenuous Tory ",...and 
then explain that he was 
referring to his hot youth ?' 
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even at this later period, Athanasius believed that the consciousness 
1. 
of Christ 'was not purely and entirely divine'. 
Therefore it remained for the Church to condemn Apollinarianism 
and thus finally to preserve 'the idea of any real humanity in Jesus 
2. 
...by the Catholic formula "perfect God and perfect man "'. The 
question of the relationship between the divine Logos and the human soul 
of Jesus was settled at last by affirming the equal reality of both. 
Rashdall holds that this solution is definitely contrary to Athanasius' 
3. 
doctrine that the Word remained "unchanged" in the Incarnation, since 
'there is surely a difference between a Logos united with a human soul 
and a Logos not so united. If there is a difference, there must be 
4 
change'. 
At the Synod of Alexandria it was finally decided that the word 
"hypostasis" could be used in two different senses: (a) as denoting 
either the Father or the Son, (a usage formerly associated with Arianism); 
or (b) as synonymous with "ousia ", (favoured by Athanasius as applicable 
to the unity of the God -head). Inasmuch as the former usage was 
precisely the one protested against at Nicaea, some change evidently 
occurred between the two councils. The nature of the change can be 
understood only if it be remembered that at the time of Nicaea the 
Church as a whole was on this point nearer Arius than Athanasius in 
sentiment. The latter's position was an innovation which had to win its 
_ 
GM. , p . 92 . - --I- criticize this statement infra, 
-# 340. - - - - - -- - - - -- 
2. PR., p. 171. 
3. Rashdall states that this doctrine was 'not asserted 
by the 
Nicene Creed'. (GM., p. 94). He must be referring solely 
to 
the main body of the Creed; for in the appended 
anathemas 
occurs the statement: '...those who say 
that the Son of God was... 
capable of change or alteration, these the 
Catholic Church 
anathematizes'. 
4. Ibid., p. 94. The attempt to maintain 'that the 
personality of the 
Logos was just the same after as it was 
before the incarnation, and 
therefore purely divine - leads up to 
the line of thought which was 
to culminate in the doctrine asserted 
at Chalcedon - but not 
contained in the actual Canons of 
the Council, or reproduced in our 
Articles - that the Logos took upon 
Him "human nature ", but not a 
human personality, that He was man 
without being a man'. 
- 190 - 
way against grave difficulties. The Synod of Alexandria probably 
represents a compromise. The Church had reacted against extreme 
Arianism to such an extent that the Athanasian party was willing to 
allow moderate Arians to use the term "hypostasis" in expressing the 
distinctions within the God -head; in return, 'the Arians gave up the 
three Ousiai and agreed that there was only one Ousia in the God -head'. 
As a result the usage of "hypostasis" in which it was equivalent to 
"ousia" was no longer necessary, and gradually disappeared. While'the 
Arians agreed to adopt the Nicaban formula, Homo -ousion, but they 
practically explained it in a sense approximating to the moderate 
1. 
Arian Homoi- ousion'. 
This compromise was brought about largely by the Cappadocians. 
When one compares their views with those of Athanasius it is quite 
apparent that although they asserted the unity of the God -head, they 
nevertheless thought of the three "hypostases" 'on the analogy of three 
2. 
human individuals', and thus approximated the position of the Homoiousian 
Arians. It was always 'difficult for the Cappadocians to avoid the 
3. 
semblance of (a) Tritheism' in which the separate Deities always acted 
in concert; despite the compromise, Athanasius - who continued to 
speak of the one hypostasis - presents a strong contrast to such views. 
St. Augustine's theology, which was based on this compromise, 
became the foundation for the conception of the Trinity that was 
destined to dominate Western Christianity. The Athanasian Creed is 
but a 'bad epitome' of his De Trinitate, - 'bad because everything 
which tends to explain the doctrine and make it intelligible is left 
4. 
out'. It is quite clear from this treatise and other passages 
in 
2, 
_ --------- - 
GM., p. 107. 
GM., p. 108 n. 
3. H.R.Mackintosh Tie Person of Jesus Christ (third edition), p. 104. 
Quoted, GM., p. 109. 
4. GM., p. 110. Cf. Atonement, p. 444 n. 
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Augustine's writings that he followed Athanasius in regarding the 
Trinity as representative of distinguishable activities within the one 
Divine Mind. He habitually employed the analogy of three faculties 
operative within one human mind in seeking to make intelligible the 
unity of the Triune God. The activities associated with the "Persons" 
vary somewhat. The Father is Principium, Memory or Mind; the Son is 
the Wisdom, Knowledge or Intelligence of the Father; the Holy Spirit is 
the Love or Will of God; but the term Principium is 'also applicable 
to the Son in virtue of the double procession', 'and sometimes... 
1. 
created beings'are...included in the being of the Word'. 
That Augustine did not conceive of the three Persons as distinct 
minds or personalities is most clearly shown in his teaching 'that the 
2. 
love of the Father for the Son is the Holy Spirit'. Such a statement 
is meaningless if the Holy Spirit is regarded as a separate personality 
or consciousness. Undoubtedly is possible to find passages in 
Augustine, as in the case of Athanasius, which are inconsistent with 
his real view; he was even more stringently bound by external authority. 
But wherever he succeeds in making the doctrine intelligible at all, 
it is clear that he conceives of the individual human mind as the 
Imá1ó Trinitatis, and of the Triune God as Una Mens. 
The scholastic view is really but a precise restatement of the 
Augustinian position. Abelard was the first medieval theologian to 
interpret the Trinity in this manner, holding that 'God is Power, 
3. 
Wisdom and Love or Will'. Though he was condemned 
by his ignorant 
contemporaries at one time for Sabellianism and 
at another for Arianism, 
his teaching was taken over by Peter Lombard in 
the Sentences, and 
GM,, P - 
-- ---------- - - - - -- 
111. 1. 
32. 
. GM., p. 111. Cf. De Trinitate VII, 
Ch. iii, 6. 
GM., p. 112. 
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became the orthodox interpretation of the doctrine. 
Aquinas accepted the work of Augustine and Abelard almost without 
change. In his formulation he applied the term Potentia to the Father, 
instead of Principium, but explained the former as meaning "the power 
of generating the Son ".1 He restated more clearly the Augustinian 
doctrine that God knows all the objects of His thought, including 
Himself, through the Son (just as the human individual can distinguish 
in introspection between the self as thinking subject and as the object 
of one's own thought); - and that God loves all the objects of His love, 
2 
including Himself, through the Holy Spirit. 
(ii) - Correctives. 
In the first instance Rashdall employs the facts of dogmatic 
history as a corrective against mistaken assumptions concerning what 
orthodoxy requires and proscribes. For one thing, it assuredly frowns 
upon any conception of the divinity of Christ which is so formulated 
1. GM., p. 113. 
2. Rashdall offers detailed evidence for these statements by citing 
specific passages from Aquinas' writings (Cf.GM., pp. 113 ff). 
In all these examples the Second and Third Persons of the Trinity 
are represented as activities of a single consciousness rather than 
as distinct and self- existing "personalities ". In a few obscure 
passages, (Summa Theol., ¿uaest. xxxvii, Art. 1, and Q. xxxvi, Art. 2. 
Cf. GM., pp. 115 f., foot- notes) in which Aquinas refers to the 
reflexive love of the Son for the Father, a separate consciousness 
seems implied; a careful examination of the passages suggests, 
however, that the love of the Word is for that which He thinks, and 
consequently a love for the Father from which the thinking proceeds. 
Nowhere is the separate consciousness of the Word asserted; and, even 
in these two difficult passages, the Holy Spirit is always "love ", 
not "a lover ". This latter fact in itself shows that the term 
"Person" did not per se connote "separate consciousness" to Aquinas. 
A further difficulty is created by the fact that Aquinas speaks 
of the "Persons" as "Hypostases ", meaning thereby "Substances" of 
which attributes m y be predicated, but which themselves cannot 
be 
attributes of anything else. This apparently contradicts 
his whole 
contention that the "Persons" are 'three'relations...within 
the 
divine Mind' (GM., p. 118). The use of the concept 
"hypostasis" was 
forced upon Aquinas by authority, and he employed the term 
to avoid 
the appearance of Sabellianism. He avoided self- contradiction 
only 
by claiming 'that in the divine nature relations.. 
are real things', 
there being 'no difference between the abstract 
and the concrete' 
(Ibid., p. 119). By this device the 
term "hypostasis" is construed 
merely as attesting to the concrete reality 
of the distinct activities 
Pf the three Persons, and does not at all 
imply that they could exist 
apart from each other. 
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as to conceal the reality of His humanity. Rashdall has already 
sought to show how Athanasius himself, at the time of Nicaea, was 
really an Apollinarian; and Irenaeus, though he too preceded 
1 
Apollinarius, held a similar view. It is therefore not surprising 
that both this heresy and Monothelitism have been unwittingly 
entertained down to the present time by Christians who have believed 
themselves to be quite orthodox. In reality the orthodox position 
asserts 'that Jesus was in the fullest sense a man', possessing not 
2 
only'a human body) but also 'a human soul, intellect, will'; any 
view which is irreconcilable with this position is quite as un- 
orthodox as one which seeks to derogate from His divinity. Rashdall 
himself regards a view which starts with a strong affirmation of Christ's 
humanity,as the key to an understanding of His divinity,as affording 
the surent foundation for Christian belief. Only when His 'struggles 
and temptations, ... His faith in God,(') and His love for men, are re- 
garded as those of a real human individual, and not those of an 
omniscient, supernatural Being, can men appreciate 'the attractiveness 
3 
of His character ,and the splendour of His moral and religious 
achievements. In the orthodox Christology he finds enshrined the 
absolutely central truth that Christ's divinity is to be discovered in 
the fact that He embodies human life at its highest. 
4 
Rashdall discerns in what he takes to be the Pauline doctrine of 
the "Kenosis" of the Son a useful corrective against Apollinarian 
tendencies, which at the same time illuminates the significance of 
Christ's humanity. For the doctrine is most reasonably interpreted 




strong evidence against this interpretation 
of Irenaeus. Cf. The Reconstruction of Belief, p.497 
n. 
2. JHD., p. 13. 
3. JHD., p. 43. 
4. Many critics to -day hold that the Kenotic theory 
is not Pauline, 
and that Phil., Ch.2, has been misinterpreted. 
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as meaning that when Christ took on the 4morphe4 of a slave, He 
!emptied Himself of certain divine attributes - that is, these 
attributes were in abeyance in the earthly life of the man Jesus 
Christ. The real humanity of Christ surely implies that this earthly 
life was not characterized by omnipresence and omnipotence. 'The very 
idea of Incarnation' loses all meaning unless it can be assumed that 
in Christ the divine power was working under human conditions and 
1 
limitations. Rashdall so extends this Kenotic doctrine as to hold 
that Christ also '4emptied Himself4 of omniscience; this has always 
been, he suggests, the last respect in which theologians have affirmed 
His real humanity. The reality of His sufferings was stressed at an 
early date in reaction against the danger of Gnosticism, and the 
importance of the Atonement kept alive within the Church a firm sense 
of the humanity of His body; the emotional aspects of His life - His 
sorrows and sympathies - were likewise regarded as implied in His 
humanity. But theologians have often been loathe to admit that His 
knowledge, His intellectual capacities, were likewise human and limitel. 
Rashdall argues, however, that full recognition of Christ's originality 
as a moral and religious teacher, and of His uniqueness as the Revealer, 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
1. DD., p. 36. 'The ubiquity of our Lord's Human Body ... has never 
(I believe) been entertained except as a support for the Lutheran 
doctrine of Consubstantiation.' (Ibid., p.36). 'The miracles ... 
do not prove Omnipotence, though they do prove the possession of 
more than the normal control of the human will over the processes 
of physical nature. The most striking ... are more often 
ascribed directly to the Father than to the will of the Incarnate 
Son.' (Ibid., p.37). 'Certainly Christ's works of healing ... 
would constitute a far less touching manifestation of tender, 
human affection than they do now, if we were forced to believe 
that 
in that human soul which felt sympathy with the sufferer, 
and felt 
the power to relieve his pain, there were also all the while 
the 
consciousness of capacity to bring to an end by one word 
of power 
all the sufferings of all humanity.' (Ibid., pp.37 
f.) . 
Of course Rashdall is here seeking 
to show the unacceptability 
of a conception which regards Jesus as omnipotent 
in the literal 
sense. Even when this sermon was written 
(1889), he would not, 
I believe, have attributed this power 
to remove all suffering by 
fiat to God Himself. 
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does not necessitate the belief that He was omniscient+ He goes 
on to show (following Gore partially) that Jesus clearly accepted 
traditional Jewish beliefs about the date and authorship of 
certain Old Testament passages which criticism has found to be 
erroneous. Also (however much eschatological theories need to be 
modified) it is probable that Christ 'entertained some expectations 
2 
about the future which history has not verified'. He admitted His 
own ignorance of the exact date of the Judgment; but it is 
reasonable to assume that He believed it to be nearer than the 1900 
1. Cf.j 188.n2.The sermon entitled "Limitations of Knowledge in 
Christ" (DD. Ch.III), in which he first expounded this interpretatioll 
Mundi: 
delivered a year before Bishop Gore defended the same notion 
with qualifications, in his well -known contribution to Lux .
, 
It is hardly profitable to enquire as to which theologian was the 
earlier to perceive this further possibility in the development 
of a Kenotic Christology. (Cf., however, Modern Churchman,Vol.XVII, 
p.482). Rashdall always cites Gore's Bampton Lectures and 
Dissertations on the Incarnation, as well as his essay in Lux Mundi, 
whenever he defends this notion, although he criticizes Gore's 
treatment of the question. He was prompted, I think, by a genuine 
sense of gratitude to Gore for the service his writings rendered 
to English theology, and he was anxious, wherever possible, to find 
common ground with a churchman from whom he so frequently and 
sharply differed; but at the same time a touch of irony underlay 
the manner in which he represented Gore as a haven of refuge for 
liberal_ theologians on this point. 
Rashdall contends that Gore makes the blunder of attributing 
limitation in knowledge to the Second Person of the Trinity. (Cf. 
the latter's Dissertations, pp. 93, 97, 105). Gore is so concerned 
to hold that the Word retained His personal identity in the 
Incarnation that he cannot accept the form of the Kenotic doctrine 
which attributes limitation to Christ's human consciousness alone; 
this, he sees, would involve a "Nestorian theory of double 
consciousnessx ". As a result, he has no alternative but to maintain 
that though the Incarnate Word was thus limited, nevertheless as a 
member of the God -head He remained at the same time omniscient in 
the "cosmic sphere,'', In order to avoid the implication that 'the 
Universe was for some thirty -three years carried on without'(GM. 
p. 97) the participation of the Omniscient Word, he is forced 
to 
suggest that the Incarnation necessitated a bifurcation 
of the Word 
Himself whereby the Word as subject to limitations 
of the flesh is 
ignorant of matters which the iord as omniscient 
eternally knows. 
And all this speculation is intended to support 
the contention that 
the Word retained His "personal" identity "unchanged": 
Gore's 
whole difficulty, according to Rashdall, results 
from the fact that 
he construes the term "Person ", when used 
with reference to the 
Trinity, as meaning "personality" in the 
modern sense; hence in 
attempting to explain how the human soul 
of Jesus was united with 
the Word so conceived, he is forced 
to resort to the desperate 
measures just indicated. Needless 
to say, Athanasius would have 
violently objected to any suggestion 




years which have intervened. 'Augustine and ... other Latin 
FathersX') who asserted Christ's omniscience, virtually 
2 
'impeached His veracity' in attempting to explain passages like 
this. Nor is there any ground for maintaining that Christ 
knew the vast body of facts which it has taken the physical and 
historical sciences thousands of years to accumulate, together 
with the infinite store of truth still undiscovered. If Christ 
could have known all this, only an infinitesimal segment of 
which the most gifted individuals can hope to master even with 
the aid of findings which centuries of research have produced, 
He would not have been human in any meaningful sense of the word. 
Here again, then, Rashdall argues that belief in Christ's 
divinity should rest not upon the infallibility of His 
knowledge, but upon the sublimity of His character. That Jesus 
did share current 'Jewish beliefs about the Old Testament, 
4 
about Angels, about the personal Tempterx') seems undeniable; 
but it is indefensible to insist that such beliefs must still 
be accepted on the presupposition that Christ's knowledge was 
infallible and His statements about such matters final. Such 
a procedure veils the real sense in which Christ was perfect, 
1. Because of the fact that the eschatological theory was 
one of the early turning -points in the current reaction 
against liberalism, it is interesting to note Rashdall's 
attitude towards it, as contained in his reply to Prof. 
Burkitt's The Failure of Liberal Christianity. As we 
have seen in Appendix A.), he stresses the manner in 
which Jesus "spiritualized" -that is, made ethical 
and rational - the traditional Jewish eschatology. But 
to the extent that Christ literally believed in an imminent 
cataclysm, Rashdall argues, His ideas must simply be looked 
upon as mistaken; and this is more embarrassing for 
conservative theologians than for liberals. Hence it does 
not strengthen the position of those who stress the "super- 
natural" in religion to have Biblical scholars point outsa 
"supernatural" element in the Gospel narrative which has to 




4. Ibid. p.47. 
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and the real reason for attributing divinity to Him. On the other 
hand, it is remarkable to what a small extent He was limited by the 
current conceptions of His time, and how completely he transcended 
them in the spiritual sphere. Such limitations of His knowledge 
as are apparent do not in the least detract from the infallibility 
1 
of His spiritual insight and the sinlessness of His character. Many 
truths concerning creation and nature which form a part of 
speculative theology did not enter into Christ's own message. The 
scientific, historical and philosophical ideas which He may have 
received from the thought of His own day have in many respects been 
superseded; but such ideas were only incidental to the gospel of 
divine love and human brotherhood which formed the essence of His 
teaching. Theeúernal truth of that gospel remains unaltered by 
changes in scientific and philosophical knowledge. In short,because 
His supremacy was in the sphere of spiritual insight, not in the 
sphere of natural knowledge, the Church may remain true to the Spirit 
of Christ and yet accept new scientific discoveries, even though the 
latter directly contradict opinions which He seemed to hold about 
natural phenomena. 
Two other conceptions which have often been associated with 
the doctrine of Christ's divinity must be mentioned briefly. In 
the first place, Rashdall points out, the orthodox position does not 
2 
hold 'that the human soul of Jesus pre -existed,', Origen maintained 
such a view because he believed in the pre- existence of all souls. 
St. Paul taught the pre- existence of Christ before the question of 
the two natures had really arisen. But the orthodox Christology of 
the Church teaches that it was the Logos, the Second Person of the 
Trinity, and not the human soul of Jesus that pre- existed. According 
to Catholic doctrine, the human soul of Jesus 'was born at a 
_________________________________________________ - ---------------- 
1. Cf. DIl., P.50. 
2, JHD., p.15. 
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particular moment of historyz') and remained distinct from, though 
1 
'perfectly and for ever united with the WordK', Rashdall has no 
difficulty whatever in accepting this orthodox teaching, because he 
also accepts the Thomistic interpretation of the Trinity in which it 
is denied that the Logos pre- existed as a separate consciousness. 
Rashdall contends that to look upon the Logos as a consciousness 
separate from the Father leads to Arianism if the former be made 
subordinate, or to Ditheism (or Tritheism) if the idea of equality 
be adopted. On the other hand, if the distinction between the 
Persons be conceived as arising within the divine Mind, the idea 
2 
of a pre -existent Logos presents no difficulties. It is hardly 
necessary to add that to contend 'that the whole Trinity was 
3 
incarnate in Christ' is heretical, and involves Patripassianism as 
one of its consequences. 
Secondly, Rashdall maintains that the question of the Virgin 
Birth has no decisive bearing upon the question of Christ's divinity. 
This is altogether in keeping, it will be observed, with his general 
conviction that miracles cannot provide a firm foundation on which 
to rest the validity of Christian doctrine. This conviction is 
especially strong with reference to the Incarnation, because as the 
history of doctrine shows, it has often been the attribution of 
miraculous powers to Christ that has made belief in His real humanity 
unintelligible. Belief in Christ's omniscience is a good example. 
Therefore Rashdall writes: 
'I do not see that the strongest assertions of a Divinity which 
is compatible with real humanity need involve miracle x', 'To say 
that Christ was the Son of God and a participator in the Divine 
nature while no other man ever was a Son of God or a participater (sic) 
1. PR., p. 178. 
2. Cf. Modern Churchman, Vol. IV, p.213. 
3. PR., p.179. 
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in that Nature in any sense or to any degree would, indeed, be to 
make Jesus so entirely a miraculous or exceptional Being that His 
appearance on this earth would by itself constitute the most direct 
and complete exception to the laws of nature - so much so that the 
assertion that he was nevertheless a man would become something 
quite unintelligible» 
But this is to anticipate. On the question of the Virgin Birth 
itself he points out that in those gospels which contain an account 
of it, it could not have been regarded as a proof of Christ's 
divinity, because these gospels do not even assert Christ's 
divinity, as distinct from His Messiahship.2 On the other hand,the 
Fourth Gospel, which does assert Christ's divinity, does not mention 
the Virgin Birth. 
'The author of the Fourth Gospel could not well have left the 
fact unrecorded if he had thought that the Divinity of Jesus 
stands or falls with the Virgin BirthA %3 
The question of the Virgin Birth is one which must be settled in 
terms of historical evidence; but that evidence is of such a 
nature that conscientious Christian scholars remain divided as to 
the correct answer. Surely belief in Christ's divinity cannot be 
held in abeyance, Rashdall suggests, until the issue is finally 
settled; nor need it be affected by a denial of the Virgin Firth. 
'The two beliefs are quite independent of each other. 
according to the Church's doctrine the Son of God did not become 
Son at the moment of the Incarnation. He was Son of God from all 
eternity'4 
(iii) - The Positive Meaning of the Doctrines. 
We are now in a position to consider the positive meaning 
which Rashdall attaches to the doctrine of the Incarnation, in the 
light of the considerations just outlined, but also in the light 
of his metaphysical views. Once Christ's real humanity is affirmed, 
1. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Modern Churchman, Vol.', pp.380f. 
2. Cf. Ibid., pp. 374 f., for evidence supporting this 
statement. 
3. Ibid., p.375. 
4. JHD., p.37, 
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the intelligibility of the doctrine becomes contingent, he believes, 
upon what conception is entertained concerning the relation between 
God and human nature in general. Here it is best to quote his 
opinion in full, from his Cambridge paper: 
'If "Divine" and "human" are thought of as mutually exclusive 
terms, if God is thought of as simply the Maker of man, if man is thought of as merely a machine or an animal having no community 
of nature with the Universal Spirit who is the cause or source or 
"ground "of the existence alike of Nature and of other spirits, then 
indeed it would be absurd to maintain that one human being, and one 
only, was both God and man at the same timer'. 'That man is not 
merely the creature and play -thing of God, that there is a certain 
community of nature between God and man, that all human minds are 
reproductions "in limited modes" ... of the Divine Mind, that in 
all true human thinking there is a reproduction of the Divine 
thought, and above all that in the highest ideals which the human 
conscience recognizes there is a revelation of the ideal eternally 
present in the Divine Mind - these are the presuppositions under 
which alone any real meaning can be given to the doctrine. All 
modern philosophers who recognize that the knowledge of God is 
possible are agreed that we can only attain such knowledge by 
thinking of Him in the light of the human mind at its highest'.' 'I 
quite agree ... that it is impossible to maintain that God is fully 
incarnate in Christ and not incarnate at all in anyone else. On the 
other hand, the philosophical critics of theology do not, as it 
appears to me, recognize how spiritially valueless - nay, how 
ethically pernicious - such a doctrine becomes when God is thought of 
as incarnating Himself equally in all human beings, the *worst as 
well as the bestx', 'There is much in human nature which is not 
Divine at all. It is just because it so emphatically negatives 
such a non -moral doctrine of Divine immanence that the Christian !' 
doctrine of a supreme Incarnation in one historical Person becomes 
so valuable,', 'If we once recognize that it is especially in 
the moral consciousness at its highest, and in the lives which are 
most completely dominated by such a moral consciousness,that God is 
revealed, then it becomes possible to accept the doctrine that in a 
single human life God is revealed more completely than in any other. 
If we believe that every human soul reveals, reproduces, incarnates ,+ 
God to some extent; if we believe that in the great ethical teachers 
of mankind, the great religious personalities, the founders, the 
reformers of religions, the heroes, the prophets, the saints, God is 
more fully revealed than in other men; if we believe that up to the 
coming of Christ there had been a gradual, continuous, and on the 
whole progressive revelation of God ( especially though by no means 
exclusively, in the development of Jewish Monotheism), then it 
becomes possible to believe that in One Man the self- revelation of 
God has been signal, supreme, unique. That we are justified in 
thinking of God as like Christ, that the character and teaching of 
Christ contains the fullest disclosure both of the character of God 
Himself and of His will for man - that is (so far as so momentous a 
truth can be summed up in a few words) the true meaning for us of 
201. 
1 
the doctrine of Christ's Divinity,;', 
Behind this statement lies the whole world -view which has 
gradually emerged in the preceding pages. The "community of nature ". 
between God and man of which Rashdall now speaks, is but another way 
of referring to his belief that ultimate reality is a society of 
persons. By reason of the very fact that they are persons, men 
are able to apprehend in part the truth whose source is in God,and 
to know and fulfil in part, through conscience, the purposes which 
He wills. The more fully they develop their highest human 
capacities, the more nearly do men become like God. Such a world - 
view, Rashdall suggests, can alone make the belief that Jesus 
perfectly revealed God consistent with His full humanity. A world - 
view in which the divine sphere is utterly different from the human 
makes the Incarnation miraculous, irrational; and for Rashdall this 
is equivalent to making it meaningless. 
Doubtless he would have held that any doctrine of the Fall 
which declares the Imago Dei to have been wholly destroyed, 
separates human nature from the divine so completely that both 
spheres could not possibly meet in one person. To be sure, he 
conceives of a very real difference, which arises primarily from 
man's moral imperfection, as separating man from God; but all men, 
in so far as they are morally good, have diminished that difference 
to some extent; in Christ, primarily because of His moral 
perfection as a mane, that difference vanishes. Rashdall's 
ethical 
and metaphysical convictions are such that a morally perfect 
man is 
facto divine, because his 
will, his entire consciousness 
1. JHD., pp.17 -21. This statement was 
taken over in large measure 
from his book on The Atonement (cf. pp.447 
ff.); hence his views 
concerning the Incarnation - the same views 
expressed in his 
Cambridge paper - were available to Bishop 
Gore and to all his 
other critics long before the Girton 
Conference. 
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within its human limitations, is nevertheless wholly in harmony 
with God's will and nature. God's nature is love; and that 
love was incarnate in Christ in the sense that He was perfect in 
love, even as God is. Rashdall's convictions are also such, 
however, that this "identity" does not imply a fusion between 
God's consciousness and that of Jesus; the identity is one which 
unites humanity and divinity, because there are respects in which 
they are alike; but the one Person in whom they meet is not 
"personally" identical with God. 
The key to the whole question of Rashdall's "orthodoxy" is 
his view of the relationship between the Logos, as a Person in the 
God -head, and the human soul of Jesus. Since for him their 
identity cannot be "personalz ", it must be, rather, one of principle, 
one of devotion to the same moral ends. Rashdall would contend, 
with the support of thinkers like Justin and Origen, that the divine 
Logos has been incarnate "to some extent" in every human being who 
has partially known God and sought to obey Him; but, in accordance 
with his constant recognition of the fact that men differ in degree 
in their spiritual insight and moral goodness, he denies that the 
Logos was fully incarnate in any person but Christ. And when he 
goes on to contend that 'however great the coincidence between ... 
the character of the human Jesus and of the God who was revealing 
Himself in and through Him, there remain two natures, two wills ... 
1 2 
not one,' he can invoke Chalcedon and the sixth council in defence 
of his position. Hence the indwelling of the Logos in Christ, 
though complete, does not imply) for Rashdall, that it supplanted the 
3 
'human will and understanding' in the soul of Jesus. To summarize 
his conception in the simplest possible terms: God and Christ 
1. CV., p.50. 
- -- - 
2. Held at Constantinople in 680 A.D. Rashdall, in his brief 
summary, neglects to cite the fact that it was this 
council 
which condemned Monothelitism. 
3. CV., p.50. 
10, 
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remain two separate personalities; but Christ is distinct from other 
men and uniquely united to God as His Son because Christ alone is 
like God in the only sense that it is possible for a man to be 
perfectly like God. Hence one cannot say that Christ was a "mere man ", 
because mere men are not perfectly like God; but neither can one say, 
without qualification, that Christ was God. Each statement denies 
one half of the two -fold truth. 
It is quite clear why the divine and human spheres are not 
discontinuous in Rashdall's thinking: they meet in the moral 
consciousness. 'For those who believe that truth is one ... God 
I 
can as little be above morality as ... below it ;, A theology which 
relegates morality to the sphere of the "natural" man, and then 
declares that this sphere has nothing in common with God, declares in 
effect that the practical reason cannot lead us aright and ends 
logically in moral scepticism; moreover, it destroys the distinctive 
claim of Christianity to finality - a claim which rests upon the fact 
that it clearly affi.e.uis the conn4ption between divine and human 
goodness as revealed in Christ. For the Christian, God is "above" 
man in the sense that He is perfect in love, knowledge and creative 
power, but He is not "above" man in the sense that he altogether 
transcends the moral distinctions which reason discloses. 
It is illuminating to observe how the preceding chapters fall 
together in a single theology of the Incarnation. In the chapter 
on ethics (I) we have seen how Rashdall maintains that in moral 
judgments human reason apprehends objective truth; in the chapter 
on metaphysics (III) how he argues that this implies 
that the 
highest moral ideal of humanity is the most adequate 
revelation of 
the character of God; and in the chapter on 
Christian ethics (II) 
how he shows that Christ, in teaching 
and embodying the gospel of 
universal love 
/ 






orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation - though couched in 
metaphysical formulae whose idiom is not that of today - 
expresses in essence the truth in which such a course of reflection 
culminates: that Christ perfectly revealed the nature of God,and 
perfectly consummated that ultimate relationship which binds all 
humanity to God. Because Christ fulfilled what man is eternally 
meant to be, He showed forth what God is. The centre of the 
Christian revelation, the centre of the moral ideal for humanity, 
therefore resides not in books, or rules, or doctrinal formulae, 
1 
but in a character; only when external authoritative sources are 
examined and understood under the guidance of the Spirit of Christ, 
can the truth which is in them be grasped. Thus a rigid literalism, 
even as regards the sayings and deeds of Christ Himself, must be 
supplanted by an interpretation which sees the events recorded in 
the gospels in due relation to one another and to the circum- 
stances under which they were uttered - an interpretation which 
glimpses, behind them all, the character of Him who shines through 
them. 
The sense in which Christ is unique, the sense in which the 
Logos was fully incarnate in Him alone, must be set forth with the 
full emphasis which Rashdall accords to them, even though these 
conceptions are almost purely ethical in his theology. It is 
precisely because all other men, even the best, have revealed God's 
nature so imperfectly that belief in the uniqueness of 
Christ is 
central to Christian faith. Rashdall leaves not the slightest 
doubt concerning his own conviction at this point. 
The difference, 
he says, between assenting to Christ's 
uniqueness in the sense of 
1. The title of the seventh sermon 
in Doctrine and Development 
is "Revelation by Character% ", 
205. 
1 
"monogenes huiost ", and merely affirming His high worth as the 
greatest of a class of religious teachers, is the difference between 
full Christian belief and the lack of it. 
This Christo- centric view of revelation, although it is woven 
skilfully into the whole fabric of his religious philosophy, is no 
mere convenience of thought. He has a profound antipathy for the 
type of theory issuing from both Christian and non -Christian 
writers, which would make a symbolic "Christ idea" the essence of 
Christianity, and claim that the truth of our religion would stand 
unaltered even if no such person as Jesus had ever lived. He 
believes that such a view grows largely out of the conviction that 
the search for the historic Christ and His actual teaching is 
futile; for, though it sometimes admits the probability of His 
having greatly influenced and in a sense originated the Christian 
ideal, it holds that His own conception of His message was 
immediately so expanded and re- interpreted by His followers,that 
it is now 
'impossible to disentangle the actual teaching of the Master 
from the teaching oflà:is schoolx'. It is impossible 'to see his 
ideas' apart from what 'has been read into them or evolved out of 
them under the influence of other ideas and other environments,',2 
This point of view, because it recognizes the importance of 
development in Christian thought, is misleadingly close to 
Rashdall's own. The cardinal difference arises from the fact that 
1. 
2. 
Rashdall writes, following Lightfoot's Clement of Rome's 
Commentary on Ad. Corinth., I.25, 'the true meaning of"monogene 
is not so much "only- begotten" as "the only one of his kind,c "' 
That is, the term as used in the Fourth Gospel means that Christ 
was a Son of God 'in a sense which (the phrase) can be applied 
to none other' - that He revealed 'God's nature in a way which 
no other has done or ... can dop'.(DD.,p.78). 
DD., pp. 90 f. Rashdall finds a variation of this view,of 
course, 
in Hegel, who seemed to take Christ 'as 
a mere symbol of this 
union between the divine and human nature,and 
...(make)little 
of the historical Jesuss'.(Atonement,p.448 
n). And the type of 
criticism against which Rashdall is primarily 
directing his 
attack is that of Baur and the Tübingen 
school, who applied the 
Hegelian dialectic to the figure 
of Christ; that method makes 
the "Christ- idea" a speculative 
fusion of the universal and 
the particular, which has little 
to do with the Jesus of 




for him the value of a doctrine like the Incarnation, and the 
legitimacy of its development, rest upon the facts of history. His 
estimate of creeds and controversies - what he accepts and what he 
rejects - is founded upon the criterion of what he believes to have 
been the actual character of Christ during His earthly life. By 
virtue of this criterion he is able to affirm the doctrine of the 
indwelling Logos, and yet to reject a denial of the human limitations 
of His consciousness. 
He believes that Christianity would be irreparably injured if 
the religious consciousness of Jesus came to be regarded as 'not what 
an actual human soul once felt and thought, but merely what the 
2 
imagination of His disciples postulated that He must have feltx'. 
Christianity owes its great power to the fact that it directs its 
allegiance to a Person who fulfilled in a real earthly life and 
under real human conditions the ideals for humanity which He taught; 
the appeal of a Person is always more commanding and concrete than 
that of a disembodied ideal. If a fictitiously constructed "Christ 
ideal' were really to make men lose faith in the historic figure, 
they would have no alternative but to turn to lesser men - prophets 
of other times, or their own fathers and teachers - to inspire them 
amidst the struggles and temptations of life. 
'Better, more stimulating, more helpful a thousand -fold, 
some struggling faulty life of warm flesh and blood that has 
really grappled with temptation and come out not wholly vanquished, 
with all its sins and all its shortcomings painted with the 
blackest brush that the most remorseless of biographers has ever 
wielded, than some imaginary portrait drawn by the selective 
imagination of discipleship or some frigid make -believe of modern 
metaphysical rhetoric:'3 
1. Rashdall holds that even the most non -human,speculative 
conceptions of Christ ever put forward, in an age when the 
historical sense was not alert, were fashioned in the serious 
belief that they represented Him as He really was. Cf.DD., pp. 
96 f. 
2. Ibid., p.98. 
3. bid pp.98 f. 
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Therefore Rashdall deems it idle to talk about fulfilling the 
Christian ideal except through following Christ Himself. For the 
relationship with God which Christ claimed for Himself, He claimed 
also for all mankind through Him. His mission was primarily one of 
mediation and communication; and to the extent that Christ as a 
human being transcends the religious and moral capacities of all 
other men, in that same measure men are able to establish a 
relationship with God through Christ which transcends anything that 
would be possible without His aid. "To as many as received Him 
gave He power to become the sons of Godx ",1 
some may be quite willing to assent to the fact that in Christ 
they see the noblest fulfilment of what man is meant to be, and 
consequently the most adequate revelation of God's nature that has 
been vouchsafed to man, and yet feel constrained to ask whether it 
is not possible that the course of religious evolution may at length 
produce one greater than He. From a speculative point of view, 
Rashdall replies, this possibility cannot be denied a priori; but 
for the practical verities of the religious life, it is irrelevant; 
it is enough that Christ was the first to incarnate the love of God 
in such fullness that all preceding revelations are seen to 
culminate in Him, and all subsequent developments within the Church 
which have stood the test of faith and practice are seen to be 
merely contemporary applications, or doctrinal statements, of what 
is explicit or implicit in the character and teaching of the Master. 
The work of the Spirit within the Church is never complete,because 
the riches of truth in Christ are inexhaustible. One who realizes 
the full import of Christ's character will not have time for 
egregious speculation as to whether human life can be "better" than 
His, or whether God can be "better" revealed than as unfailing love. 
1. John l:l2. 
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The significance which Rashdall finds in the doctrine of the 
Trinity can be briefly stated in the light of the foregoing. Once 
it is recognized that, according to orthodox teaching, the Persons 
of the Trinity are not separate consciousnesses,- once it is realized 
that modern divines who write as though this were the case would have 
been regarded by the framers of the creeds as sheer tri- theists - 
the greatest difficulty which the doctrine presents is removed. 
Undeniably the subtle metaphysical distinctions of the Athanasian 
Creed do not convey much to the modern mind; but its central 
teaching, as derived from Augustine, is susceptible of quite simple 
interpretation. The misunderstanding arising from the creeds and 
other references to the Trinity in worship is therefore quite 
1 
inexcusable, and it has caused much needless harm. When properly 
understood, the truth conveyed by the doctrine is simply the essence 
of Christian theism - that God is best conceived in personal terms,as 
2 
thinking, feeling and willing. 
1. Rashdall's attitude toward the creeds is stated in three 
articles in The Modern Churchman: Vol.I,pp.23 -35 ( "Is Liberal 
Theology a Failure ?" ; Vol.IV, pp. 204 -14 ( "The Creeds "); Vol. 
XII, pp.444 -51 ( "The Present Value of the Creeds "). (Cf. also 
PR., pp. 171 -75, and Matheson's Biography, pp.123 f.). He 
holds that where they reflect an outworn cosmology or an 
antiquated view of natural law, considerable latitude of inter- 
pretation should be permissible. The Athanasian Creed 
particularly needs such re- interpretation, because it contains 
a true conception (of the Trinity) which the average layman 
seldom grasps when hearing it (thirteen times a year) without 
explanation or qualification. 
(Cf. Modern Churchman, Vol.I, pp.30 ff.). 
2. In a reply to Dr. Sanday's article (in the Journal of 
Theological Studies, Vol. IV, pp.1 -16), which criticizes the 
form in which Rashdall interprets the Trinity, the latter is 
able to point out that these remarks really apply to St.Thomas' 
triad: "Power (or Princiium), Wisdom and Will % ".Rashdall 
himself prefers the division, "Power, Wisdom and Love" (which 
Dr. Sanday suggests); this differs from Aquinas in the sole 
respect of construing "love" to include "feeling "; Aquinas,of 
course, could not adopt such an interpretation because 
of his 
Aristotelianism. 
(Cf. PR., pp.183f. n.) 
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Moreover, if what Rashdall has said about the Kenotic theory 
of the Incarnation can be accepted, and if he has thereby shown 
successfully that the Logos as incarnate in Christ cannot be thought 
of as "unchanged" and "personally identical with" the Second Person 
of the Trinity, a further tremendous source of confusion will have 
been removed. 
'All the difficulties of the doctrine of the Trinity have 
arisen from thinking of (the) relation between God and the pre- 
existing Logos as if it were of exactly the same kind as the 
relation between God and the Incarnate SonK.l 
Once the Second Person of the Trinity is regarded as an 
activity of a God who is Una Mens, the doctrine of the 
"indwelling" of God in Christ is understood as affirming not a 
"personal identity" but a "community of nature" between God (or 
the Word of God) and Jesus. The belief that Christ completely 
revealed the character of God gives real meaning to the phrase, 
"of one substance with the Father, God from God..." Naturally 
the word "substance" (ousia) had a metaphysical connotation in 
the fourth century which we cannot recapture. But we can affirm 
that Christ was of one substance with God in the same sense that 
He was of one substance with men; this does not imply any 
bifurcation of His personality; it means merely that just as He 
partook of the essential nature of manhood, so He shared the 
essential nature of Divinity. This view is entirely compatible 
with the orthodox (Nicene) doctrine as regards the relation between 
God the Father and the Logos or Wisdom of God; and it departs from 
Athanasius' view of the personal identity of Jesus with the Second 
Person of the Trinity, and from the theory that Christ was man 
with- 
out being a man, precisely because it takes seriously 
the teaching 
of the Church concerning the human soul of Jesus. 
1. D:ü.p .22. 
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Needless to say, Rashdall can no more conceive of the Spirit 
as indwelling in human beings in a sense which implies "personals' 
identification, than he can conceive of the Second Person as being 
personally identified with the human Jesus. Enough has been said 
already about the Spirit, however, to make it evident that the Trinity 
has value for him as a doctrine which brings into °connexion the 
1 
two great aspects of the divine self- revelationxb, The Spirit is 
but the continuation of the historic revelation vouchsafed in the 
Son; it does not supersede what was manifest in that life; rather, 
it reveals the eternal meaning of Christ's life to believers in 
every age. Even the sayings of Christ, Rashdall has contended, 
must be interpreted in and through the Spirit if they are to be 
fully understood. 
Finally, Rashdall believes in a very broad sense that the 
Spirit "bloweth where it listethx ". Wherever the truth resides 
within the minds and hearts of men, the Spirit is operative. Often 
its workings are carried on outside the confines of the Church 
considered as a visible and terrestrial institution. Secular 
thought is continually bringing forth new knowledge of the nature 
of the world, which the Church should welcome;. voices other than 
that of theology may yet express great and fundamental truths of 
human life. In the Spirit of Christ the Church has a 'criterion 
by which to test all other theories of conduct, all ideals of life, 
2 
all schemes of social regenerationxj and by this criterion 
it may 
fulfil its mission of receiving 'all that the 
Spirit shall teadh 
3. 
by whatever organ He may speak', The claim of Christianity 
to 
finality rests upon Christ's appeal to 
the conscience of mankind; 
the eternal significance of His life 
can be discovered afresh,as 
contemporary in its implications, by men 
in every age. This is God's 
work of perpetuating through His Spirit 
the revelation given once and 




3. The Atonement. 
Fortunately Rashdall did have an opportunity to undertake an 
exhaustive historical exposition and re- interpretation of one 
central Christian doctrine. His Bampton Lectures, entitled The 
Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology, are his most important -
2 
contribution to theology and his last extensive published work, 
and they may be taken as an example of what he wished modern 
theologians to do for the whole body of Christian dogma. That is 
to say, in them he traced the origin and development of the idea of 
Atonement, with a view to preserving whatever truth might be found 
in traditional conceptions; at the same time he attempted to show 
the necessity and justifiability of continuing the process of 
doctrinal development by taking into account changed notions 
concerning the physical universe, concerning human relationships (in 
this case, especially with regard to punishment and justice),and 
concerning the nature of Biblical inspiration and authority. 
The need for such a study appealed to him as most pressing in 
the case of the doctrine of the Atonement. On the one hand he recog- 
nized the paramount importance of the question of salvation for the 
ï 
religious life of all Christians; he realized that for the great 
majority belief in the Incarnation has its primary significance in 
connexion with the work of Christ. On the other hand he was con - 
Booed that no doctrines except perhaps the closely associated ideas 
I. This discussion is based upon the following sources, in addition 
to his Bampton Lectures: DD.,Chs.VIII -X; CE., Chs.III 
and VI; 
GE.I, Ch. IX; PP., Ch. XII; ID., Ch. IX. Journal 
of Theological 
Studies, Vol.III, pp.178 -211. No fuller statement 
concerning 
Rashdall's views with regard to such ideas as grace, 
faith and 
justification, can be given than is contained 
in the course of 
this section. 
2. The lectures were delivered in 1915, 
published in 1919. His 
most important writings on ethics, 
philosophy and religion,thus 
fall, so far as their preparation 
is concerned, between 1902 and, 
1915. 
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of total depravity and eternal punishment, had been put forward in 
ways so repellent and fundamentally immoral. 
His purpose in undertaking an historical survey in this case 
is somewhat different from that which prompted it in his discussion 
of the Incarnation and the Trinity. There he was concerned to defend 
himself from the imputation of heresy. No such necessity could arise 
in his Bampton Lectures because an authoritative doctrine of the 
atonement has never been defined by a creed or a general council. 
Indeed, Rashdall used history in this latter case to show that no 
particular interpretation can claim to be the orthodox doctrine of 
the Church. The publication of his volume evoked the criticism of 
"objectivists, F,- but always tempered with admiration for the scope 
(though hardly the impartiality) of his scholarship. Despite the 
1 
fact that Rashdall called his survey 'brief and summaryr'j it contains 
such a wealth of critical detail, especially with regard to the New 
Testament and the patristic period, that it is impossible to do justice 
here to his exposition. Because the volume is readily accessible, we 
must be content with selecting for brief mention a few fundamental 
points which are indispensable to an understanding of his own inter- 
2 
pretation any details which such a procedure excludes now, but which1 
call for special consideration, will be indicated briefly in the latter 
portion of the thesis, at the time that criticism of them is offered. . 
1. Atonement, p.435. 
2. Therefore the additional material, appended to almost every 
chapter, wherein Rashdall offers exegetical substantiation for 
his interpretations, and a mass of other historical 
data, must 
be virtually ignored. His treatment of Greek theology after 
Origen (cf. pp. 288 -320) is especially valuable, 
but it falls 
outside the main argument of the book. 
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(i) - Punishment and Forgiveness. 
In order to understand the strong predispositions with which 
Rashall approached the history of the doctrine, it is necessary to 
keep in mind his own view of punishment and forgiveness. Once he 
had made up his own mind on a problem, he was peculiarly adept at 
finding support for his convictions in other writers; and sometimes 
he was peculiarly incapable of grasping the real intention of 
1 
opposing opinions, despite a genuine desire to be fair. As early, 
as 1892 he had preached a sermon in defence of the Abelardian 
2 
interpretation of the Atonement; when this fact is joined with his 
chapter in The Theory of Good and Evil on "Punishment and Forgiveness" 
it is possible to follow the positive and negative criteria which 
he brought to bear upon Christian literature throughout his Bampton 
Lectures. 
Once again it becomes evident that his theological opinions 
are in large measure determined by his moral theory. In a word, he 
evinces a strong antipathy for the retributive theory of punishment, 
because it is retrospective rather than prospective, and justifies 
punishment solely on the ground that the offender has merited it. 
It treats punishment as 'an end in itself apart from (its) effects', 
and thus treats human personality merely as a means. Now Rashdall 
does not deny that indignation and resentment, which often find 
expression in the retributive theory, are morally healthy so long 
as they are brought into subjugation to a higher principle. That 
--- - - - - -- --- - - - - -- - - - -- 
1. An Oxford professor said to me in conversation that Rashdall 
was especially remembered at New College for three qualities: 
His courage in undertaking colossal tasks of scholarship; his 
infectious, hearty laugh; his refusal to grant an opponent a 
single point. 
2. Cf. DD., Ch. VIII. 3 91. cit., Vol. I, Ch. IX. Cf. The International Journal of Ethics,, 
Vol. II, pp. 20 -31 ( "The Theory of Punishment "); Vol. 
V, pp. 
241 -43 ( "Mr Bradley on Punishment. An Explanation 
"); Vol. X, 
Pp. 193 -205 ( "The Ethics of Forgiveness "). 
4. GE. I. -n_ inn_ 
4 
3 
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principle, as he believes (in accordance with his ideal utilitarianism), 
is one which regulates punishment in the light of the good ends which 
it may serve both for the offender and for society; because punishment 
involves pain or some other evil, its goodness can be instrumental 
only, not intrinsic. Instrumentally it may have value both as a 
reformatory and as a deterrent agency. Even when punishment cannot 
accomplish its primary end of reformation, it is usually justifiable 
on the ground that the condition which it brings about in the mind of 
the offender, is less evil than would be the case if his wrong -doing 
went unpunished. Therefore the true good of the malefactor can 
always be promoted to some extent; but this extent must be kept 
within such confines that it does not conflict with the good of society. 
The most repellent theories of the Atonement Rashdall finds to 
be based upon the retributive notion that punishment somehow cancels 
guilt irrespective of its effect on character; but they do not even 
remain faithful to the retributive idea when they conceive of guilt 
as cancelled through the sufferings of an innocent one. The theory 
of vicarious punishment is inconsistent with belief in a righteous 
God; for this latter belief implies that God imposes punishment or 
1 
remits it only with a view to serving a moral purpose. "Goodness", 
for Rashdall, refers to an actual condition of individual character. 
Hence the only way in which guilt can be cancelled, sins taken 
away, forgiveness made possible, and the soul made righteous, is 
through a real inward transformation. Guilt and righteousness are 
not conditions which can be ',imputed". Naturally this has nothing 
to do with the wholly different conception of vicarious suffering; 
- 1. The reformatory theory of punishment also makes it difficult 
to conceive of God as condemning men to eternal punishment; 
if the God of love foreknows the destiny 
of souls, His remedial 
Punishment will in the end succeed in its purpose. Cf. Appendix 
D. 
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suffering for the sake of others enters into any life which dedicates 
itself to loving purposes. 
Even the acknowledged value of moral indignation, then, is 
contingent upon its being compatible with and subservient to love. 
Hence one of the greatest defects of the retributive theory is that 
it leaves no room for forgiveness. Resentment, as Bishop Butler 
1 
observed, is not necessarily incompatible with good -will, but 
forgiveness may imply remission of punishment. The alternative 
adopted must be the one which the best feasible ethical end dictates; 
ideally it Would further the welfare of the offender and society 
alike, but unfortunately in practice the wider interest often makes 
it necessary to punish men whose own moral good 'would be best 
2 
promoted by forgiveness'. Rashdall supplements Butler's rationalistic 
wisdom, however, with a still deeper insight borrowed from Sir John 
Seeley, the author of Ecce Homo: 
'Vengeance often loses its moral effect just because the avenger 
of the wrong is its victim, while forgiveness often touches the heart 
just because the forgiver is the man who suffered the wrong'.3 
This peculiar advantage of forgiveness over punishment in furnishing 
evidence of love must be remembered in deciding the path of individual 
duty; but it must also be taken as a guiding principle for 
understanding how the God of love reveals Himself to His children. 
(ii) - The Doctrine Considered Historically. 
Rashdall's historical enquiry concerning the Atonement begins 
with a study of what Christ Himself taught about forgiveness of sins. 
He asks whether our Lord connected it in any way, as Christian thought 
4 
has done, with 'the atoning efficacy of His death'. Here, as in the 
1 Cf. GE. I, p. 307. 
----- - - - - -- 
2. Ibid., p. 310. It is important to note how closely Rashdall associates 
?rgiveness with remission of punishment. 
3. Ibid., p, 311. 
4. Atonement 
, p . 4 
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case of the Incarnation and the Trinity, Rashdall maintains that a 
doctrine may be true, even though examination discloses that it is 
the product of later reflection. But here also, Christ's own teaching 
has a primary importance; for if no theory may claim to be exclusively 
founded upon His own conception of salvation, then the individual 
Christian is all the more free to decide which is most true; and, on 
the other hand, this decision will be greatly affected if any theory 
proves to be definitely imcompatible with the spirit of His message. 
Our Lord's earliest teaching joined a call to repentance - the 
fundamental condition of forgiveness - with His annunciation of the 
Kingdom. Enough has beensaid already concerning the fact that, despite 
their eschatological setting, His conceptions of His Messianic office, 
the Kingdom, and the conditions for entering it, were primarily ethical 
and spiritual. 
'The clear, unmistakable, invariable teaching of Jesus was that 
men were to be judged according to their works, including in the 
conception of works the state of the heart and intentions as scrutinized 
by an all- seeing God. The righteous were to be rewarded, the 
unrighteous were to be punishedx.l 
His conception of judgment according to works and character was 
not incompatible with His teaching of divine forgiveness because of the 
profound significance which he attached to repentance as 'a radical 
2 
change of heart or character': The sinner whose life is transformed 
by a.contrite return to God thereby becomes righteous and will be 
admitted to the Kingdom. This doctrine of forgiveness grew directly 
out of His teaching of the Fatherhood of God, which also implied that 
the punishment necessarily imposed on the unrepentant had a reformatory 
purpose and was therefore likewise an expression of divine love. Divine 
forgiveness was closely connected with human forgiveness, as in the 
------------------------------------- 
l. Atonement p. 12. See Appendix D, concerning the nature of this 
reward and punishment. 
2. Ibid., p. 24. 
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Lord's Prayer, because a man's willingness to forgive others was taken 
as a sign of a genuine change of heart wrought by repentance. 
The essential question is whether Jesus adds to this teaching the 
further condition of belief in His Messianship as necessary for approval 
at the Judgment. Rashdall's general conclusion is that the synoptic 
passages which might be held to confirm such an idea, reveal on 
inspection that what is enjoined as necessary for salvation is not some 
specific belief concerning His person or work, but obedience to His 
1 
words because they reveal the will of God. Nowhere in the Synoptic 
1. For detailed evidence in support of this statement, especially 
concerning Mt. 10:32, see óg. cit., pp. 21 f., and 56 -8. Two passages, 
which seem fundamentally opposed to Rashdall's interpretation, and 
which played an important part in the development of later theories, 
must be mentioned briefly. The first of these is the "ransom" passage 
(Mk. 10:43 -5, and parallels); Rashdall seeks to discredit it as an 
ecclesiastical addition, holding that Luke's account (22:27), in which 
the word "ransom" does not occur, is the more primitive, and also 
suggesting that the identification of the conception of the Suffering 
Servant with that of the Messiah (if this is indeed the intention of the 
saying) came more probably from later tradition than from Jesus Himself. 
Moreover, he regards it as an isolated passage, irreconcilable with 
Christ's teaching as a whole; and he tries to show that in any case it 
does not imply that Christ's death was expiatory or substitutionary, 
let alone the sole means of procuring forgiveness for sin. (See pp. 
27 -37 and 49 -56 for detailed exegesis). 
Concerning the second passage, which occurs in the account of the 
Lord's Supper (Mk. 14:22 -25 and parallels; cf. I Cor. 11: 23 -25), he 
maintains that the sole reference to forgiveness, in Matthew's narrative, 
'may most confidently be set aside' (Ibid., p. 38) as a gloss. The 
reference to "the blood of the covenant" Rashdall likewise refuses to 
regard as genuinely uttered by our Lord; at thesame time he seeks to 
show that, by reason of its association with Jer. 31:31, it implied 
free forgiveness, not expiation. "This is my body which is for you ", 
as recorded by St. Paul, - even disregarding the fact that the Synoptics 
(here Rashdall follows what he takes to be the genuine text of Luke) 
omit the words "for you ", and interpreting the saying as referring 
exclusively to His impending death, - means merely that He is about to 
sacrifice His life for His followers in fulfilment of His Messianic 
mission. So long as the Matthean reference to the remission of sins is 
omitted, there is nothings:either symbol to suggest 'that Jesus was dying 
"for" His followers in any other sense than that in which He had lived 
for them' (0n. cit., p. 44). 
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Gospels, he asserts, is there the slightest authentic suggestion that 
Jesus regarded anything besides repentance - whether it be His own 
1 
death, or any belief or sacrament - as necessary for divine forgiveness. 
'Even those who formulated the theology' of the atoning efficacy 
of His death, 'do not suggest that their teaching on this head rests 
upon any express word of the Master, nor do.they claim to be in any way 
authorized to contradict that teaching'.2 
Hence Rashdall contends that Christ's own simple, yet profound, 
teaching of divine forgiveness must be taken 0 the basis of any true 
doctrine of the Atonement, and a chief argument which he urges against 
some of the traditional theories is that they cannot possibly be re- 
conciled with this teaching. Yet he also finds in the idea of a 
suffering Messiah a revolutionary departure from Jewish traditions, 
which may be integrally associated with Christ's mission of revealing 
God's love. Nhether or not this idea constitutes a retrospective 
expansion of Christ's own teaching (and Rashdall believes that it does), 
it truly expresses the meaning of His work, - especially when it is 
seen to imply that in inspiring others to follow Him in the way of 
sacrificai love, He leads them into the way which, as He taught, brings 
forgiveness also. The primary fact to be remembered is that when 
Rashdall defends the notion that God judges a man in accordance with 
his actual moral condition, his inward character and its outward 
expression in works, he is basing his interpretation both on what he 
believes to be self -evidently true on ethical grounds and on what he 
believes to have been our Lord's own teaching. 
'If', through repentance, 'a man has actually ryturned to a right 
moral state', then he 'is already reconciled to God'. 
How, then, did Christians come to associate the forgiveness of 
sins with the atoning death of Christ ?. The absence of this idea from 
the early speeches of Peter and Stephen in Acts, Rashdall takes as 
indicating that for a period after the Crucifixion salvation through 
0 ------ - - - - -- 2Cp cit., . 26. 
-.1_1d77-p. 27 . 
3. Ibid., 
p. 49. 
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the Messiah was a belief which had not yet come to be connected with 
the prophetic passages which gave rise to the idea that Christ's death 
was an atoning sacrifice. That this connexion had been made before St. 
Paul began preaching, however, is apparent from his own statement that 
he had "received" the doctrine "that Christ died for our sins according 
1 
to the scriptures ". The idea that the Messiah could suffer an 
ignominious death raised a tremendous difficulty, especially for Jewish 
Christians; this was overcome, Rashdall believes, when some time not 
long after the Crucifixion the primitive Church found prophetic 
2 
passages, notably the Suffering Servant poems of Deutero- Isaiah, which 
could be taken as foretelling that the Messianic task would involve 
suffering in order to save believers from sin. Although the doctrine 
of the Atonement therefore came to be accepted on scriptural authority, 
it no doubt corresponded also with the moral regeneration which early 
Christians themselves experienced. Yet it was inevitable that this 
authoritative acceptance should be supplemented eventually with theories 
3 
which sought to explain 'why Christ's death was necessary', and how it 
alone made forgiveness available. The first of these, and 'ultimately... 
4 
the most influential', was that of St. Paul. 
Only Rashdall's own estimate of the Pauline theory need b 
considered here; this can be indicated best by presupposing those 
aspects of his treatment of the apostle which are the common property 
of all students of the Mew Testament, and by concentrating upon a few 
distinctive points. Assuming that St. Paul thought of sin as the in- 
evitable result of the Fall and man's fleshly nature, with death as its 
penalty, Rashdall distinguishes first of all between the objective 
---------------------------------------------------- - - - - -- 
1. I Corinthians 15:3. 
2. For the frequency with which this passage was cited in apostolic 
literature, see Atonement, pp. 79 f. 
3. Ibid., p. 82. 
4 p. 82. 
Yb,d, 
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1 
ground and the subjective appropriation of justification; St. Paul 
departs from the Master's teaching when he makes the former a purely 
gracious act, independent of the sinner's repentance. Because he 
accepts the doctrine on authority, he gives no explicit account as to 
why this act, the death of Christ, was necessary for the remission of 
sins; yet he clearly leaves the implication, as though unwillingly, 
that God's righteousness demanded it: Christ suffered death, the 
universal penalty for sin, in order that men might be released from 
both. The idea of vicarious punishment, then, cannot be eradicated 
from his system, although it does not occur very frequently. 
Furthermore, the efficacy of the death (though here again St. Paul 
is not explicit) is associated with the fact that Christ Himself 
2 
merited no penalty, and accepted the Cross voluntarily. Through 
participating in this one act of Christ the believer might be freed 
3 
from sinful flesh (and the Law), just as through the one act of Adam 
all men were made sinners; closely associated with this was the notion 
that Christ, as perfect man, incorporated the whole of humanity in 
Himself. But it must be noted that St. Paul expounds this expiatory 
or substitutionary theory mainly in juridical, rather than sacrificial, 
language. Moreover he represents reconciliation as involving a change 
in man, not in God; Man's sin is removed; God's love, which is 
compatible with the imposition of a penalty upon sinners, remains 
constant. Hence Rashdall's subjective explanation of how reconciliation 
is made possible, is to this extent compatible with the Apostle's 
thought. Here the fundamental agreement between St. Paul's conception 
of God and his Master's, is most apparent; divergence arose, Rashdall 
- 
- - -- 
1. Cf. oo. cit. g. 90. 
2. Cf. Ibid., pp. 94 f. The Anselmic theory is thus implicit in 
Paul's thought. 
3. But the Spirit carried with it a disposition to adhere to the 
moral (not the ritual) obligations of the Law; thusPaul's 
position does not end in Antinomianism. (Cf. Ibid., p. 106). 
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maintains, because the apostle felt obliged to reconcile an 
authoritative Old Testament teaching of death as the inevitable penalty 
for sin, with Christ's teaching of forgiveness. 
When St. Paul speaks of the subjective conditions of justification, 
it is possible, Rashdall believes, to detect two different strata of 
meaning. In his doctrinal statements "faith" is set forth as a form 
of intellectual belief about Christ, though it refers to His Messiahship 
and Resurrection, and not to some special theory of the Atonement. In 
these same statements justification itself means "declare righteous ", 
not "make righteous ". But this aspect of his thought is off -set by 
conceptions derived from his own inner experience, in which "faith" 
involves a personal surrender to Christ, and the Holy Spirit 
(communicated at baptism, - a rite attended by a 'profession of 
1 
repentance') brings with it moral regeneration and good works: thus 
justification results in santification. Only so is St. Paul able to 
avoid making ficitious the righteousness which is "imputed "; the 
process of santification, begun at the moment of conversion or baptism, 
is one wdich gradually regenerates the sinner, but does not make him 
fully righteous until the Judgment. Therefore, full salvation implies 
a moral regeneration which expresses itself in good works. Because St . 
Paul's own conviction brought with it wholly new capacities for 
fulfilling the commandment of love, he fell into the error of assuming 
that "faith alone" would have the same effect in others. There is 
nothing in his doctrinal statements to cope with cases which do not 
conform to his own experience. Therefore Protestant teaching concerning 
justification can rest its case upon the letter of his teaching; but 
his own inner conviction clearly associated full salvation with faith 
which also produces love; and the cleavage thus caused in his thought 
is best expressed by 
1. O2. -cit , p. 1.12,- 
__ -- 
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'the scholastic distinction between an unformed faith (fides 
informis), mere intellectual belief, which saves not, end a per`ecte d 
faith (fides formata) which saves because it produces love'. 
Hence Rashdall finds a cleavage, in St. Paul's teaching on the 
Atonement, between the demands imposed by the Old Testament upon his 
doctrinal theory, and the inner convictions based upon his own moral 
and religious experience. To the former belong his substitutionary 
conception of Christ's death, his conception of imputed righteousness, 
his conception of faith as intellectual belief. If his belief in the 
plenary inspiration of the Old Testament is no longer binding upon 
Christians, Rashdall claims, then neither are the theoretical conclusions 
which he reached because of it. On the other hand, the portion of the 
apostle's teaching which reflects his own experience, contributed 
inestimably to the understanding of Christ's work; for in this 
experience he saw revealed in Christ's life, and supremely in His death, 
the love of God; he saw that by re^ponding to the example of this life, 
men might be so transformed in character as to follow the same way of 
2 
love which alone could lead to full salvation and God's forgiveness. 
Unfortunately it is impossible to review here the chain of 
evidence, - running through all the remaining canonical books of the 
New Testament and through the earliest fathers and apologists up to 
Irenaeus - by which Rashdall supports certain theses already put forward. 
Suffice it to say in summary that wherever these writers refer to anything 
approaching a substitutionary or expiatory theory, they do so (he holds) 
on the scriptural authority of "Messianic" prophecies. For this reason 
such references usually consist in a simple affirmation of the fact 
3 
that Christ died "for" mankind, thus making possible the forgiveness of 
1. a. cit., p.- 120,- 
- - - - -- 
2. Concerning the extent to which St. Paul's own experience reflects 
the "Mind of Christ ", see especially op. cit., pp. 106 ff., and PP., 
Ch. III. 
3. Concerning the distinction between 
á.-T' and v,r£(2, see Atonement, P. 93 . 
Except for I. Thess. 5:10 and Gal. 1 :4, in which some readings give 
Ireer, , St. Paul uses árr ; and this is generally the case 
with these 
other early Christian writers. Concerning the use of 4-Tr in the 
ransom passage, see DD., pp. 128 ff. 
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sin; therefore these writers feel under no complusion to defend the 
doctrine by furnishing an elaborate explanation of it. Here Rashdall 
finds further evidence for his belief that the doctrine originated in 
an acceptance of scriptural authority, however much it may have found 
confirmation in the reflection and experience of the early Church. 
In fact, none of these writers follows St. Paul in putting 
forward even a tentative explanation of the idea of 'substitution or 
vicarious punishment'. Where they do provide any explanation, 'the 
efficacy attributed to Christ's death is subjective rather than 
objective, prospective rather than retrospective, moral rather than 
1 
judicial'. 
Here again, then, Rashdall finds an hiatus between doctrine 
accepted on authority and explanation based on experience; this is 
widened by the fact that for most of these writers the ethical effects 
asociated with the latter spring from the Incarnation viewed as a 
whole, and are not identified exclusively with Christ's death at all. 
Rashdall finds especially noteworthy this refusal to follow the central 
ideas of the Epistle to the Romans, even as St. Paul came to have 
increasing authority. This was partially due to the fact, he believes, 
2 
that St. Paul's doctrine of justification was simply not understood. 
Hence even when his language was ostensibly accepted, it was so re- 
interpreted that the major emphasis fell solely upon his inspired 
utterances concerning the moral regeneration wrought in the heart of 
the believer by Christ's life and death. 
Special mention must be made of the Epistle to the Hebrews, 




1. Atonement, p. 148. The Epistle to Diognetus, IX: 2 -5y 
one of the 
latest writings in the period under discussion, seems 
to contain 
an exception to this generalization; but the substitutionary 
passage in question contains no theoretical explanation; 
it merely 
reiterates the ransom passage, interpreted 
in the light of Is. 53 
and St. Paul. See Atonement, p. 206 
n; pÿ. 215 f. give the entire 
passage. 
2. Cf. Atonement, p. 149. 




and blood of Christ are represented as the symbol of an accomplished 
work of purification. Thereby the writer seeks to make Christianity 
acceptable to Jews who attach great significance to such rites. Far 
from putting forward an idea of vicarious punishment, he always explains 
the redeeming effect of the sacrifice in terms of a new knowledge of 
God's will and new power to perform it, which Christ's life as a whole 
makes available. Iherever salvation is dependent upon anything 
objective, it is always the intercessory activity of the risen Christ 
which this writer emphasizes, not His death. For him, faith implies 
belief in God, but he values it because it enables men to do good works, 
1 
not because it constitutes 'by itself a new kind...of righteousness'. 
And the object of faith is not some past event, but 'the future 
2 
fulfilment of God's promises'. 
In all these writers, for reasons similar to those given in the 
case of St. Paul, Rashdall rejects the idea of vicarious sacrifice, 
but finds the basis of a true doctrine of the Atonement in their 
conception of salvation through the moral and spiritual influence of 
Christ's life and teaching. 
Clement of Alexandria, the first of the important patristic 
writers whom Rashdall considers, really falls under the generalizationd 
just discussed; in his teaching salvation comes through the knowledge 
of God, which the whole Incarnation, and not merely the effect of 
Christ's death, made possible. Clement, too, sometimes repeats the 
formulae derived from prophecy, but his explanations always turn upon 
moral and subjective transformation. 
In Irenaeus Rashdall finds the first definite objective theory 
of redemption to be formulated after St. Paul, - a theory necessiñated 
partly by the Gnostic controversy, in which discrepancies between the 
Old Testament conception of God, and the God of mercy revealed in Christ, 
1. a atonement, -p. 161. - -_ 
2 
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again came to the fore; - but also necessitated by the canonical 
authority which St. Paul's writing were coming to possess. Irenaeus 
calls attention to the fitness of God's method of redemption by 
stressing the parallelism in the restoration through one man's obedient 
suffering, of what had been lost through one man's Fall; this gradually 
takes the form of a theory in which the whole creation is recapitulated 
in Christ, and it even anticipates the notion that all humanity 
suffered in Christ. Hence for Irenaeus,the very idea of salvation 
involves the Incarnation as a whole; for only a man could remove a 
1 
penalty incurred by man; yet only a man 'united with God' could be 
incorrupt, and God alone could grant salvation. Greek theology largely 
followed Irenaeus in thus making salvation primarily a 'restoration 
of...incorruptibility and immortality' rather than a 'retrospective 
2 
forgiveness of sins'. But he explains this salvation as being brought 
about through a ransom paid to the Devil for the release of mankind, 
3 
who had become subject to him through the Fall. Presumably this theory 
was designed as in keeping with the righteousness of God; because Satan 
had no claim over the sinless Christ whose death he caused, God therefore 
had the right to release man from his power. 
Rashdall notes that Irenaeus and his followers failed to see the 
incompatibility between a ransom theory and a theory of expiatory 
sacrifice or vicarious punishment;yet if Christ died to satisfy the 
claims of the Devil, He did not die to save men from the punishment 
demanded by God's wrath or righteousness. Rashdall adds, in fairness 
to Irenaeus, that in his writings the triumph over the Devil sometimes 
seems to be through the regenerating influence which Christ brought 
into the world. For nearly a thousand years, however, the ransom 
al 
theory dominated tradition thought concerning the Atonement; to be sure, 
- - - - - -- 
1 02. pit., p. 239. 
2. 02. cit., pp. 239 f. 
3. Irenaéús may have arrived at this idea by substituting the Devil for 
Marcion's "Demi- urge ", - the God of the Jews, from whom Christ set 
me f e bbutt n case Christ sedemtive. work. nrs reviling7y 
Cf. aÌbi.d.at 241 
lfe as a triumph o som sort over e ev1 . 
, 
pp. 
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many variations not found in Irenaeus were introduced; and this fact 
is exhibited by each of the next two writers whom Rashdall considers. 
In Tertullian, the theory receives its Latinized, judicial 
interpretation; several distinctive, End for the most part unfortunate, 
features therefore first gain prominence in his writings; actual 
corruption, as well as actual guilt, seemsto be inherited; the death 
of Christ is the chief purpose of the Incarnation, and the latter would 
1 
not have occurred at all had it not been for the Fall; the power of 
the Devil over man is treated virtually as a just one; morality is 
dependent upon the arbitary will of God, though this is incompatible 
2 
with Tertullian's attempts to show the justness of the Atonement. 
Many elements in this coarse theory, in which relations between God 
and man are exhibited primarily as legal transactions, endured long in 
the theology of the West. 
In Origen, for the most part, Rashdall finds a theory very nearly 
3 
approximating whet he regards as the truth of the Atonement doctrine; 
for Origen makes the teaching and example of Christ's whole life, and 
not merely His death, the means of salvation. It is by the moral 
influence upon the believer of the love and self -sacrifice revealed in 
Christ, that His work is accomplished. This, of course, is essentially 
pre- Irerean in tone; but there are other strains in Origen's writings, 
not only where the death is plainly used merely as a symbol for Christ's 
whole life and influence, but where the ransom theory seems to be 
accepted. Origen even adorns the theory with the notion that through 
Christ's death the Devil was tricked into his oven undoing. Yet his 
theory is not couched in legalistic terms, nor does it attribute 
anything virtually immoral to God Himself. Becauses he uses traditional 
1. Cf.- Op. 
-- 
-cit., pp. 249 f. 
2. Cf. id. , p. 253. 
3. He also esteems, of course, Origen's view 
of the Logos, and of 
philosophy as the propaedeutic to theology. 
No doubt his admiration 
for Origen is well founded. But his deprecation 
of Irenaeus' 
ability is hardly warranted merely by the 
fact that Rashdall holds 
a different theory. 
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conceptions, he often speaks of Christ's death as a sacrifice or 
propitiation; but the explanations which he appends always lend an 
ethical significance to these terms such that he can 'attribute()... 
the same kind of efficacy, in :n inferior degree, to the deaths of the 
1 
martyrs and the good works or intercessions of other good men'. He 
once speaks as though God's punishment for sin fell. upon Christ; but 
Rashdall seeks to show that this is merely an obeïance " to 
authoritative language which is foreign to Origen's real theory. 
Similarly, Origen seems to accept St. Paul's doctrines, but in 
commenting upon them he follows only those aspects which can be 
construed as teaching that justification means "making righteous" 
instead of "counting righteous". It is impossible to give any place 
here to Rashdall's account of Origen's world -view, except to say that 
the latter's emphasis on free -will required him to regard the love 
revealed in the Incarnation and the Cross as persuading rather than 
coercing men to choose goodness. Origen's "moral influence" theory 
was, Rashdall concludes, a replica of Christ's teaching, with 'the 
2 
quite consistent addition' that the example of Christ Himself instills 
the repentance which brings with it regeneration and God's forgiveness. 
The ethical explanations which Rashdall believes to have harboured 
the real views of most early Christians were swallowed up in the ransom 
theory, against which only a few scattered protests, from Adamantius 
and Gregory of Nazianzus for example, can be found before the twelfth 
century. Yet Eastern theology mitigated whatit accepted as a traditional 
doctrine, because it accorded primacy to the Incarnation as bringing to 
man knowledge of God, and the recapture of his lost divinity; thus it 
found reason for Christ's coming other than as a device for saving a 
fragment of the race from sin and death; and it was free from juridical 
------------------------ 
1. Op. cit., p. 263 
2. IEid. , p. 275. 
- 
conceptions. Latin theology, on the other hand, had the merit at 
least of holding more steadfastly to the reality of Christ's humanity 
and suffering, though this very tendancy also gave rise to a separation 
between the Father and the Son whereby one Person in the God -head might 
"placate" the other by His sacrifice. The legalistic scheme of 
Tertullian reached its culmination in St. Augustine, but several writers 
1 
contributed significantly to the intervening development. 
In a rather harsh section, Rashdall seeks to show that St. 
Augustine's theology, so far as the Atonement is concerned, merely 
crystalized and hardened elements taken over from St. Paul. Irenaeus 
and Tertullian. Therefore this exposition, which is largely carried 
out in the form of a comparison of St. Augustine's teaching with St. 
Paul's, need not detain us. It extracts almost all the worst features 
of a juridical, substitutionary theory from St. Augustine's writings; 
the Incarnation would not have occurred if the Fall had not made 
necessary redemption through Christ's death; Christ's suffering is 
represented usually as substitutionary punishment, just in itself 
because through inherited guilt all men deserve it; this suffering 
destroys the Devil's "just" dominion over. man. And then, at the end of 
his treatment, Rashdall attacks St. Augustine's own character as one in . 
which "asceticism and ecclesiasticism have extinguished morality ". 
Interwoven with this account are remarks which may help to relate 
Rashdall's general philosophical position to his attitude toward certain 
doctrinal conceptions; these are more germane to our purpose than a 
review of notions which have already been mentioned in previous writers. 
First of all, so long as the idea of original sin is not interpreted 
in terms of a literal Fall, Rashdall finds a great measure of truth in 
it. He has no sympathy with Augustine's idea that man's will was free, 
' 1. Cyprian, Ambrosiaster, and Ambrose, Augustine's own master. 
Cf. op. cit., pp. 327 -30. 
2. Ibid., p. 345. 
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in the indetermistic sense, before the Fall, and he repudiates the 
doctrine of inherited guilt and total depravity; he would stress the 
fact that the doctrine of original sin is compatible with a belief that 
the Imago Dei was merely impaired, not destroyed, while Augustine only 
1 
admits this perfunctorily. On the other hand Rashdall rejects the 
Pelagian teaching which assumes that, theoretically at least, man could 
become sinless apart from grace. In other words Rashdall, as a 
determinist, acknowledges the moral dependence of the individual upon 
heredity and environment; more specifically, he cannot conceive of a 
sphere in which the individual could act without divine assistance, and 
this is what he means by "grace ". In a very real sense he acknowledges 
that such goodness as man achieves, he "receives "; he receives the ideal 
which prompts him to good actions, and the power which enables him to 
perform good actions. 
'Certainly no modern theistic philosopher', he writes, 'will 
quarrel with St. Augustine for saying that neither right belief nor 
right action is possible without a divine activity in the soul'.2 
But of course Rashdall would hold that the virtues of the so- called 
"natural" man are within the sphere of the effects of grace and not 
ttic 
outside it, and thatAoperation of grace is by no means confined to the 
sacraments, as St. Augustine tended to believe. 
For similar reasons he can accept the idea of predestination, but 
not in its Augustinian form; the whole question turns, he contends, on 
'our idea of the end for which men of evil character are brought into 
3 
the world'. He rejects St. Augustine's theory because it arbitrarily 
confines salvation to those who have fulfilled certain requirements of 
belief, and thus automatically condemns to eternal torment - for example- 
all pre -Christian pagans, irrespective of their actual moral character. 
ne also rejects St. Augustine's purely negative view of evil, which 
1. Cf. a. cit., p. 336. 
2. Ibid., T7-341. 
3. Iid, p. 338. 
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conserves God's absolute omnipotence without making Him the cause of 
evil. In connexion with a discussion of "faith ", it comes out quite 
clearly that Rashdall objects to making specific doctrinal belief a 
condition of salvation; for he cannot approve of St. Augustine's 
teaching on the subject, even though the latter makes both faith (belief) 
and love indispensable. Evidently Rashdall holds that to show forth love 
like Christ's is the primary test of "faith" in Him, and that this is 
sufficient for salvation even when unaccompanied by intellectual assent 
1 
to a particular dogma. 
The way is now clear to consider the few pages wherein Rashdall's 
historical exposition is most freighted with significance for his own, 
and all modern, theology; for the twelfth century revolt against the 
ransom theory brings us to Anselm and Abelard. His remarkably clear 
and succinct résumé of Cur Deus Homo needs no reproduction here; what 
he commends most is St. Anselm's steadfast insight into the blasphemy 
of contending that God owed the Devil a just debt, orthat the Devil had 
any rights over mankind which had to be circumvented. Moreover, St. 
Anselm held that through the example of Christ the believer might be 
aided in his effort to avoid sin, once he had availed himself through 
baptism of the "satisfaction" which the Son offered to the Father. Thus 
he gave some place to the "moral influence" theory; but this stands side 
by side with the idea that Christ's sacrifice obtained forgiveness even 
for post -baptismal sins, so long as the sinner himself gave satisfaction 
2 
for them through penance. Except for his one revolutionary departure, 
St. Anselm's theory is but a more consistent and skilful attempt to 
show the justice of the Atonement in juridical terms like Tertullien's 
and Augustine's. 
Rashdall finds, beneath St. Anselm's masterful logic, a confusion 
- - - - -- ----------------- 
1. Of. 0p. -cit., p. 341. Rashdall's attitude on this question is 
defined more exactly in what follows; Cf. ¡ 239 f. 
2. Cf. Ibid., p. 355. 
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between a debt, or a personal affront, which ordinary justice permits 
the creditor or injured party to forgive voluntarily, and a criminal 
or moral offence, the penalty for cannot rightly be set aside. 
But his primary reason for rejecting the Anselmic theory is that, like 
all substitutionary theories, it allows the attribution of guilt, which 
should be confined to the offending individual, to be extended to all 
mankind, who suffer eternal torment to satisfy God's honour unless they 
are redeemed; and, conversely, it implies the even more repellent 
notion that a penalty inflicted upon a sinless Christ can somehow make 
1 
it just to release those who are really guilty. Such a theory (Rashdall 
asserts) reflects a conception of justice cruder than any St. Anselm 
himself would have employed in human affairs. It was possible for him 
to indulge in such reasoning only because he followed 
'the old bastard Platonism which makes the universal "human 
nature" into an entity separable from any and all individual men... 
"Humanity" is supposed to have contracted the debt in the first Adam 
and to have discharged it in the second'.2 
Finally, though St. Anselm himself conceived of 'the Father as fully 
3 
co- operating in the scheme of redemption', his theory inevitably 
tended towards a dichotomy between the justice of the Father and the 
love of the Son. 
4 
In Abelard's theory, except for a few minor lapses, Rashdall at 
last finds teaching about the Atonement which in its simplicity reaches 
the source of the doctrine's power, and eliminates all immoral and 
unintelligible accretions. 
'The efficacy of Christ's death is now quite definitely and 
explicitly explained by its subjective influence upon the mind of the 
sinner. The voluntary death of the innocent Son of God on man's behalf 
moves the sinner to gratitude and answering love - and to to consciousness 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Rashdall acknowledges Anselm's distinction between satisfaction and 
punishment; but he adds that it cannot be regarded as absolute, 
because Anselm himself sometimes refers to Christ's death as 
punishment. Cf. Ibid., p. 352. 
2. Ç. Cit., p. 353. 
3. Ibid., p. 357. 
4. Cf. Ibid., p. 363. 
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1 
of sin, repentance, amendment'. 
What most appeals to Rashdall is that here, merely by isolating from 
all abstract theories the moral transformation which takes place in 
the heart of man at the thought of Christ's love as e revelation of 
God's love, Abelard has made God's punishment and forgiveness apply to 
the actual moral character of the individual, and has cut away all 
fictions concerning inherited guilt or imputed righteousness. The God 
of love is not one who brings into the world souls predestined to 
eternal torment because in the sin of Adam they too had derogated from 
His honour; the God of justice is not one who punishes Christ in order 
that He may "count" the real sinner righteous. A great many Christian 
writers had taught the central idea of the Abelardian theory; Abelard's 
originality consisted in casting off the murky cloak of traditions 
which concealed it. 
The nature of Rashdall's approval must be clearly understood. In 
the Incarnation he sees God actively revealing His nature as love to 
mankind; the funness of this revelation required that it culminate in 
Christ's suffering on behalf of His followers. Therefore, to put it 
simply, Rashdall believes that God was doing something of supreme 
significance in Christ (strictly, through Christ) in the hearts of men. 
What was God doing? Through the revelation of His own love in Christ 
He was providing the only means wholly adequate to an awakening of 
such repentance for sin, and such gratitude for love, that forgiveness 
would be possible. The Atonement does not represent a bargaining, in 
some celestial realm, between the Persons of the Trinity; it is the 
direct activity of God in bringing about the true moral welfare and 
salvation of His children; and this loving purpose 
He could not achieve 
without the suffering of His Son. And it 
is only when this cosmic 
significance of Christ's death is grasped, 
through belief in the 
0,. cit., - 1. p. 358. 
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Incarnation, that the subjective response awakened in the heart of the 
sinner has its full regenerative effect. Christ is the medium of 
reconciliation only when 'gratitude to (Him) passes into and becomes 
indistinguishable from gratitude to the Father whom He reveals'. 
Rashdall's account of scholastic theories must be dismissed with 
a very few words; this is one of the ablest chapters in the book, 
possibly because research for his Universities of Europe in the Middle 
Ages had early given him a considerable acquaintance with the thought 
of the period. In Aquinas, of course, he finds new magnificence of 
structure rather than ne_ material, except that several (Platonic) 
extravagances of St. Anselm are corrected through the infusion of 
Aristotelianism. For the idea of humanity as a Platonic universal in 
the first and second Adam, 'Thomas substitutes the simpler Pauline 
2 
thought of the head and its members'. He fuses the Anselmic emphasis 
on merit and satisfaction with the idea of a ransom paid, not to the 
Devil, but to God; and at the same time he makes room for the Abelardian 
theory. His doctrine of the "efficiency" of Christ's death - a really 
Pauline parallelism between His death as cause and man's death to sin 
as effect - makes way for a close connexion between the Passion and the 
3 
sacraments as a "stream of grace". Although his Aristotelianism caused 
him to regard the individual's moral status as the result of his own 
actions, Aquinas really shared St. Augustine's determinism, except in 
so far as he (Aquinas) contended that original sin alone could not make 
a man worthy of damnation; the good works preparatory to justification, 
4 
which St. Thomas mentions, are accordingly due to "prevenient grace" . 
The very capacity to earn merit, which plays such an important róle in 
1. a.cit., p. 361. I have stressed this point more fully than Rashdall'S 
own lectures do, because since their publication many critics have 
assumed (erroneously, I believe) that his "subjective" theory 
necessarily weakens appreciation of the fact that in the reconciliation 
of the individual believer the initiative lies with God. 
2. Ibid., p. 374. 
3 Cf. Ibid., pp. 377 f. 
4. Cf. a^p. 379. 
1 
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the scholastic scheme, is itself a gift of grace. Justification 
therefore involves an actual infusion of virtue through grace, and, 
correspondingly, the faith which saves requires love and good works. 
This central characteristic of the scholastic teaching is one which 
Rashdall sets over against Lutheranism sharply; but he regrets that in 
Aquinas' teaching the operation of grace came to be associated almost 
exclusively with the sacraments, especially with penance, and the stress 
on merit gave rise to the immoral idea that credit could be transferred 
from a treasury accrued through works of supererogation. All this 
prepared the way for the priestly commercialism against which Luther 
rightly revolted. 
In the Scotist reaction against Aquinas, with its emphasis on the 
will and upon grace as love, Rashdall naturally finds traces of 
undeniable advance. Even pagans are capable of some virtue because 
they a.re not wholly beyond the reaches of divine love. The death of 
Christ is conceived as a sacrifice for sin, but not as a substitutionary 
punishment; God willed to accept it simply through love. But the 
dependence of goodness upon the arbitrary will of God is limited only 
by the fact that 'the first table of the decalogue' springs from His 
1 
'essential nature'; hence love and good works in the human sphere come 
to be associated with obedience to the arbitrary commands of the Church. 
The nominalist opponent of Duns Scotus, Occam, became really his 
successor in theology to the extent that he carried this tendency out 
to its fullest; some of the nominalists even went so far as to make the 
first table of the decalogue dependent on the will of God, thus 
destroying the idea of intrinsic goodness altogether. In them the 
dichotomy between revealed and speculative truth became virtually 
complete; hence they felt any rational explanation of the Atonement to 
be entirely unnecessary. 
E. cit., p. 384. 
-- 
1 Cf. 
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This account of scholasticism, inadequate though our summary has 
been, provides indispensable prolegomena for understanding Luther and 
the other reformers. Rashdall seeks to show that Luther's diatribes 
apply only to that degenerate nominalism in which he himself was trained; 
even then, Rashdall claims, they misrepresent the later scholasticism 
when Luther asserts that it conceived of salvation as possible without 
grace. Rashdall's own admiration for the best aspects of scholasticism, 
especially for Aquinas' attempt to bring all knowledge under the aegis 
of a unified theology, and for the Catholic conception of "faith working 
1 
through love ", partially accounts for the ferocity of his chapter on 
2 
Luther. 
He begins by characterizing Lutheran theology as a hardening of 
St. Augustine's, which in turn represents a hardening of perhaps the 
3 
worst aspects of St. Paul's. Hence in Luther culminates that fixation 
upon the death Christ neglects 'His Person, work, and teaching' 
Yet in accounting for this death, while there are traces of the ransom 
theory and of Anselm, Luther largely follows merely the worst phase of 
Nominalism in making it wholly arbitrary and utterly irrational; but 
whereas writers like Occam had renounced reason only in contrast to 
revealed theology, not in speculation, Luther renounces it altogether. 
Worse still, he revives the idea of a substitutionary punishment; and 
his irrationalism of course spares him the necessity of reconciling this 
with the simultaneous assertion that Christ's death springs from the 
love of God. He presses the consequences of the Fall 
farther than St. 
Augustine had ever done by holding that it completely obliterated 
the 
ß Lm-- Dei. In all these tendencies he was followed by Calvin, sometimes 
4 
1. Gal. 5:6. Cf. Atonement, p. 368. 
2. It must be admitted that Rashdall's familarity 
with German sources 
on the Atonement is obviously much 
less extensive than his study of 
the Greek, Latin, and even French, 
literature. 
3. Cf. Atonement, p. 397. 4 Ibid., p. 398. 
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even more uncompromisingly. Thus Reformation theology wholly rests 
upon an immoral doctrine of the Atonement; Roman Catholicism could at 
least part withlthese base elements, if it would, and still have 
something left. 
Other important aspects of Luther's teaching must be noticed 
briefly: his contempt for human nature, which denies freedom of any 
2 
sort, and ends in the ultimate extravagance 'of holding that, even 
3 
after grace, a man ought to hate himself and desire his own damnation' 
; 
his agreement with St. Augustine (but also with scholasticism) that 
faith is impossible without grace, but his departure from St. Augustine 
in denying that even after justification man is capable of good works; 
his emphasis on depravity and "faith alone" to such an extent that at 
times he disparages repentance; his doctrine that divine pardon does 
not alter sinfulness at all, so that the righteousness imputed is 
fictitious, not only at the moment of justification, but equally so 
afterward. This last teaching is Luther's sole claim to originality; 
for St. Paul had taught that after justification God gradually makes 
a men really righteous, and St. Augustine had taught that justification 
itself makes a man righteous. To be sure, Luther sometimes admits that, 
4 '5 
in santification God begins to make men really better; but this,filatly 
opposed to the dominant view at least of his later writings, and it 
conforms, in fact, with the scholastic teaching which he is eager, above 
all else, to discredit. 
This revulsion went so far with regard to the scholastic 
conception of faith that for Luther the word comes to mean 'mere 
5 
intellectual belief - that and nothing else'; for him justification 
1. . cit., p. 400 n. 
2. In t7-27 Luther fell into the Pelagian 
error of holding that an 
act willed by man could not at the same time 
be willed by God, and 
therefore lay wholly outside the area 
of grace. Cf. Ibid., p. 402 
n., and Rashdall's own theory, # 123 f, 
3. Ibid. p. 401. 
4. Cf oP. cit., pp. 406 and 412. 5 Ibid. ; p07. 
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is accessible, not only without penances and indulgences, but without 
good works and love itself. 'At...times belief in the atoning 
efficacy of Christ's substitutionary death becomes the sole article 
1 
of faith'; and this entails a confidence on the part of the individual 
concerned that in his particular case salvation is assured. "Believe 
2 
that you are saved, and you .re saved ", is no caricature of Luther's 
teaching. Anyone who wishes to show that these statements represent 
3 
'temporary aberrations provoked by the heat of controversy', who 
wishes to contend, in short, that the true Luther, as seen especially 
in his early writings, really believes that justifying faith involves 
love, is in effect appealing to an argument which makes Luther's 
position on this point indistinguishable from the best scholastic 
teaching. Rashdall does not put this observation forward as implying 
that the Reformation was unnecessary; as a revolt against institutional 
absuses, he believes that it was. But so far as doctrine is concerned, 
he writes: 
'It is not too much to say that there was nothing in Luther's 
positive (as distinct from negative) teaching that was at once new 
and true'.4 'The least valuable part of the inheritance which modern 
Christendom owes to the Reformation...is its distinctive dogmatic 
theology, which was in truth very largely moulded upon the traditions 
and idees of medieval Scholasticism in its last and Tost degenerate 
phase'. 
This is the core of Rashdall's diatribe against Lutheranism; but 
he relentlessly heaps on other charges. He seeks to show that 
Reformation theology generally, in its temper though not in its formal 
statements, gave rise to a divorce in the mind of the ordinary religious 
person between the loving mercy of the Son and the wrath 
of the Father. 
Again, he finds Luther specifically denying 
that Christ's message 
brought a new and higher moral law into the 
world. Finally, Luther's 
exclusive emphasis on belief in a specific 
doctrine makes the perdition 
1. 4. 9E. cit. p. 409 
2. Ibid., pp. 409 f. 
44 3g 
- 238 - 
of non -Christians certain and throws doubt on the salvation of 
everyone but Lutherans; furthermore, it sees in incredulity, honest 
1 
doubt, 'serious enquiry into religious truth', the archetypal sin. 
The only reformer who really mitigated this doctrine of election was 
Zwingli. 
At the end of the discussion Rashdall utters a word of esteem 
for Luther's courage and admits the rightness of his protest against 
ecclesiastical corruption; he recognizes that in many important 
respects Luther brought about an effective reassertion in practice 
of the connexion between Christianity and high morality. But even 
then he cannot refrain from interpolating remarks about Luther's 
grave personal faults; and as a "parting shot" he quotes a passage 
to show a different side of the practical effects of this teaching 
in which Luther admits that his own certainty of salvation often le *d 
2 
to negligence and indifference. 
(iii) - The Doctrine Considered Systematically. 
The foregoing pages have been designed to reveal Rashdall's 
own views as they emerge in his survey of the history of the Atonement 
doctrine. Negative considerations have played an important role, 
because of his conviction that, in regard to this doctrine especially, 
the removal of immoral accretions is the primary task confronting 
anyone who desires to set free the jewel of truth embedded beneath. 
Perhaps a word more in this vein is advisable before we turn to a 
brief glance at the positive side of the matter. Most 
aspects which 
Rashdall finds objectionable in the traditional scheme 
of redemption 
fall away as soon as belief in the verbal infallibility 
of the Bible 
is outgrown; for on this belief rest the idea 
of a literal Fall, and 
the whole anthropology which underlies Pauline, 
Augustinian and 
Lutheran theology; on it, too, rests the 
very authority of St. Paul's 
1. Op. cit., p. 415. 
2. T6id7 , p. 417. 
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theorizing, an aspect of his teaching which otherwise might never 
have captured the mind of the Church. Again, all substitutionary 
theories rest upon a retributive view of punishment which presupposes 
that God must satisfy some abstract principle of vengeance, 
irrespective of the welfare of mankind, in order to be just. But it 
is noteworthy,Rashdall suggests, that the retributive theory itself 
makes punishment of the innocent, in place of the guilty, immoral; 
at the same time it makes Christ's own teaching of forgiveness immoral. 
This idea of retribution is still involved in any theory which holds 
that all humanity suffered punishment in Christ; furthermore, this 
latter theory involves a fearful abuse of the Platonic universal, in 
which the universal of humanity, incarnate in Christ, is separable 
enough from individuals to spare them actual punishment, but at the 
same time so inseparable that every individual 'may nevertheless be 
1 
deemed to have been punished' in Him. And then to regard Christ as 
2 
a mere universal, Rashdall maintains, is to deny His real humanity. 
Rashdall's own positive view of the meaning of "faith" grows 
directly out of critical and historical considerations. Once the 
Lutheran formula is rejected, he believes, the way is open to regard 
Christ's death as inseparably connected with that revelation of God's 
love which His character and His whole ministry brought to mankind; 
salvation from sin, viewed as an awakening of love which transforms 
the heart of the sinner, must be seen as flowing from the Incarnation, 
from which Christ's death cannot be isolated for purposes of exclusive 
emphasis. Moreover, rejection of this same formula makes possible a 
return to the perennial teaching of the Church, prior to the Reformation, 
that justification implies an inward moral transformation 
which must 
be included within the very meaning of the word 
"faith ". Rashdall 
takes this as indicating, not only that 
belief without love is fruitless, 
1. Op. cit., p. 494. 
2. Cf. Ibid., p. 425. 
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but that repentance and moral goodness are sufficient to make a man 
justified, 'no matter what may be the state of his intellectual 1 
belief'. This latter assertion, however, misrepresents his real 
intention; for he does not really mean to maintain that the gradual 
moral improvement which he associates with the meaning of 
2 
justification can be carried forward in any full sense without that 
aid and influence from Christ which follow from certain definite 
beliefs about Him. He is eager to show that any theory of forgiveness 
which disregards o4ninimizes a genuine change of heart is unfaithful 
to the teaching of 
1l 
the Master; and this eagerness betrays him into an 
exaggeration directly opposite .to the formula "faith without love" 
which he places on Luther's lips. A moment later, however, Rashdall 
returns to a true statement of his own position when he affirms that 
belief in Christ is the most powerful force in the world working for 
man's salvation. He desires to dissociate himself from the assumption 
that those outside the Church can be neither morally good, nor the 
recipients of grace, in any sense; but even so, he recognizes that the 
highest secular morality in the world to -day owes much to Christ; and 
as for those who have never heard of Him, the goodness which in some 
3 
measure "justifies" them 'is the goodness which Christ approved'. 
One further word needs to be added lest it be supposed that, 
in rejecting the notion of imputed righteouness, Rashdall seems to 
affirm that a man must become actually sinless before he receives 
forgiveness. Justification, which he conceives as a relationship 
between God and man brought about through the influence of Christ 
within the heart of the believer, is the process of making the sinner 
righteous. As will appear in a moment, he certainly does not believe 
4 
tha__t this process can ever be 
- 
completed_ in_ this earthly_ life. Divine 
1. Atonement, p. 428. - _-- _ 
2. He refuses to distinguish it sharply from santification. Cf. OD. 
cit., p. 418. 
Ïbid., p. 430. 
'* rT is point has already appeared, it will be remembered, in the 
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forgiveness, then, does precede the attainment of complete 
righteousness, but it is offered because by its sa.crifical nature 
it awakens that love and gratitude, that desire to overcome sin, 
which in themselves constitute the primary conditions of righteousness 
1 
and of sustained fellowship with God. Hence the Cross does not make 
all other sacrifice unnecessary; rather, it draws all believers into 
that same sacrificai way which leads on steadfastly in love, even unto 
death. 
Once again, as always in his discussion of Christian doctrine, 
Rashdall closely associates the concluding question as to what 
positive teaching about the Atonement is true, with the question as 
to what 'will most commend itself to the knowledge and experience of 
2 
the present day'. His own view has been sufficiently expressed and 
defended in the course of the previous survey; it is found most 
clearly in Abelard, but Rashdall would claim that it has its root in 
the most vital aspects of early Christian experience, especially St. 
Paul's, and that - apart from intrusions which are really inconsistent 
with it - it is in keeping with 'the dominant view of the best Greek 
3 
theology...pre -eminently of Origen' . And his view of justification 
is, of course, essentially that of the best period of scholasticism. 
He finds, too, that modern writers must choose in the end between 
this subjective view and some substitutionary 
only confusion can result from the attempt -Lb 
seems to characterize some contemporary works 
or expiatory theory; 
avoid this issue, 
on the subject. 
which 
The chief objection urged against the subjective 
view, as 
Rashdall recognizes, is that (though true as far as 
it goes) it is 
insufficient, because it leaves no room for the 
'objective necessity 
1. Cf. DD., pp. 162 f. 
2 Atonement, p. 436. 
3 Ibid., P. 437. 
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for the death of Christ 'independently of its effects on the believer' 
2 
But Rashdall shows conclusively, in a reply to Dr. Denney, that the 
moral transformation which Christ's revelation of God's love brings 
about in the hearts of men is itself one term of a necessary and 
intelligible relation between the work which culminated in Christ's 
death, and the condition of sin which necessiltated that work. In 
other words, the Crucifixion was the necessary consequence of Christ's 
faithfulness to His task of revealing God's will through perfect 
obedience. Rashdall and more conservative theologians are agreed, 
then, that in the work of redemption the initiative lies with God; 
the difference arises when Rashdall claims that no expiatory or 
substitutionary device is necessary because God can accomplish His 
redemptive purpose through a revelation in His Son, which vanquishes 
sin when the believer responds in repentance and love to the divine 
love beheld in Christ. he views the Atonement as a, 
primary, but not as the sole, purpose of the Incarnation. And once 
his view of the Trinity is accepted, no such difficulties can arise 
as those which result when the Son is conceived as a separate Being, 
pre- existing with a will of His own distinct from that of God the 
Father. Still less can the Atonement be thought of as some kind of 
legal transaction between two Persons in the God -head. 
Rashdall's conception of Christ's death as the culmination 
of His unbroken task as the revealer of God's love, likewise 
brings 
his view of the Atonement into harmony with 
his entire view of 
revelation, 
.nd. its forcefulness depends upon a 
whole- hearted belief 
in Christ's divinity: 
'All human love, all human self -sacrifice 
is in its way and 
degree a revelation of God... In proportion 
as' this is felt, 'the 
answering love which the self- sacrifice awakens 
will be love to God 
1 OP. cit., p. 439. Italics mine. 
2. Cf. Atonement, p. 440 n. Rashdall's 
reference to Denney's 
The Death of Christ, reads "pp. 126 
-7 "; it should be read 
"Pp. 176 -7" . 
1 
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as well as love to man. The love of Christ will have this 
regenerating effect in a supreme degree in proportion as it is felt 
that the love of Christ supremely reveals the character of God'.1 
This raises, of course, the whole question as to whether the 
sufferings of Christ reveal a suffering God. Rashdall's metaphysical 
position naturally safeguards him from Patripassianism in one respect; 
for him, the sufferings of the human Jesus could not be the sufferings 
of God. But on the other hand, he conceives of God as capable of 
feeling, or of something corresponding to it. The opposing 
Aristotelian view, which underlies the Catholic aversion to this idea, 
is incompatible with the doctrine that God is actively loving. If 
Christ's character is taken as revealing the character of God, then 
it is inconceivable that the Father does not suffer because of the 
sins and pains of. His children, and it is above all inconceivable 
that Ile should not have suffered with Christ. The sufferings which 
Christ endured through love may be taken as representative of the 
sufferings which God Himself endures, because His nature is love. 
The Atonement, then, is the culmination of Christ's task as revealer 
because: 
'No kind of death could have revealed the sympathy of God so 
impressively as a death of suffering, voluntarily submitted to from 
love of the brethren'.2 
In conclusion it may be well to point out the way in 
which 
Rashdall's conception of salvation continues the line 
of thought 
suggested earlier in his discussion of immortality. To 
do this it 
is necessary to go even further back, where 
in the chapter on moral 
theory we considered his contention that value, 
especially the more 
3 
spiritual goods,is enhanced by duration. Couple 
this with his 
impassioned remarks about how far short 
even the best men fall of 
4 
Perfect goodness in this life, and it 
becomes apparent that though 
- 1. Cf. op. cit., pp. 449 f. 
2 Ibid., p. 454. 
3 - especially # 43 and # 155 n. 
4 Cf. 6. 152. 
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he conceives of salvation as a process of actual moral improvement 
which begins here, he follows the teaching of St. Paul in believing 
that it can only be completed hereafter. And by very reason of this 
present incompleteness, even in Christians, Rashdall finds reason to 
hold that the hope of salvation cannot be entirely withheld from 
those outside the visible Church who nevertheless through repentance 
have become in some degree better. For to the extent that men are 
loving and become better, they are fulfilling what Christ taught. 
To recognize degrees of salvation, as well as degrees of revelation, 
is merely to recognize that God proffers His grace to all the 
creatures whom He has made in His imege. Again it appears, then, that 
the supernatural- in this case the operation of grace - cannot be 
regarded, according to Reshdall, es a sphere sharply differentiated 
or disconnected from the natural or moral; ordinary human goodness, 
1 
wherever it is found, is a manifestation of grace. This does not 
bedim, rather it intensifies by contrast, our appreciation of the fact 
that full salvation from sin, full forgiveness, full knowledge of 
God's love are to be found through Christ alone. 
2 
Appendix F. - The Church end Its Relations. 
No survey of Rashdall's religious philosophy would 
be complete 
which failed to mention his profound sense of the importance 
of the 
institutional and practical side of religion. Unlike 
many liberals, 
he was fully appreciative of how much had been gained 
through the stress 
which the Oxford Movement laid on worship. In 
fact, one volume of his 
sermons 
( Christus in Ecclesia)is devoted almost 
entirely to an 
interpretive study o Christian institutions. 
This aspect of his work 
should always be remembered when his views concerning 
the authority of 
the Church seem to tend towards a rampant 
individualism which he really 
did not countenance. For example, he repeatedly 
criticized Harnack's 
1. Cf. CE., pp. 82 ff. 
- - - -- 
2. This appendix is based primarily upon 
the following sources; DD., 
Ch. XV; CE., Chs. I, II, IX, XXI -XXV.; 
ID., Ohs. II -IV. The Modern 
Churchman, Vol. VII, pp. 331 -44 ( 
"The Spiritual Independence of the 
Church "); Vol. X, pp. 518 -24; cf. 
also pp. 570 f. Meunion and the 
Lambeth Proposals"); Vol. XIII, pp. 21-29 
( "What Isthe Church ?). 
129 ff. ("Our Unhappy 
Contemporary Review, Vol. LXXXI, 
pp. ( 
D visions" - in collaboration with 
several others). "Clerical 
Liberalism" in .Anglican Liberalism, 
pp. 77 -134. 
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lectures on What is Christianity because, in their Ritschlian stress 
on individual piety, they failed to do justice to the importance of 
corporate worship and ecclesiastical organization. 
On the other hand, Rashdall gave much attention throughout his 
life to the social implications of Christianity, to the relations 
between Church and state, to the Christian use of wealth and property, 
and to concrete problems of administration, discipline, liberty and 
religious education arising within the Church.1 Unfortunately these 
wider questions must for the most part be passed over in the brief 
statement which follows concerning his formal conception of the Church. 
Rashdall's answer to the controversial question as to whether the 
Church is visible or invisible can be put very simply. The Church is 
a terrestrial society which is striving to realize the Christian ideal; 
hence any adequate conception of it must include both its visible and 
invisible aspects. To identify the Church with an unascertainable body 
of elect souls, to make it wholly invisible, is to overlook the fact 
that the Christian community is concerned to foster definite purposes 
and to carry on definite activities within this world, although this is 
not, of course, its sole task. On the other hand, to identify the 
Church completely with a visible institution is to overlook the fact 
that no earthly society, in its doctrinal pronouncements, its moral 
teaching, or its temporal activities, ever can wholly and infallibly 
fulfil the truth of the Christian ideal. To the extent that a group 
of His followers succeed in fulfilling Christ's ideal of love for God 
and man, it is a Church; and to the extent that it fails, it is not. 
From this conception of the Church, several conclusions follow: 
For example, Apostolic succession cannot provide a decisive criterion 
for distinguishing between what is a part of the Church and what is notQ 
Or again, the decisions of majorities at councils, whether in the past' 
or the present, cannot be regarded as infallible statements of Christian 
1. In this connexion his articles in The Economic Review and his 
contribution to Anglican Liberalism are e- specially worthy of 
attention. For his interpretation of Christ's own teaching on 
specific moral questions like the use of wealth, see CC., pp. 119 
ff. Some of Rashdall's own best pulpit teaching on these questions 
i6 to be found in Principles and Precepts, especially Chapters V, 
VI, VIII, XIII, XIV. His essay, "The Philosophical Theory of 
Property ", in Property, Its Duties and Rights (Zdited by Bishop 
Gore), pp. 33 -64, contains hit mó t extended discussion of a 
question which he felt to be of paramount importance for Christians. 
2 Rashdall subjects the whole question of the episcopacy, apostolic 
succession and the principle "no priest, no eucharist 
", to a close 
examination in the course of five articles in The Modern 
Churchman, 
Vol. IV, pp.74 -78; 146 -157; 251 -261; 318 -328; 
371-M77-Cf. CE., 
Chs. VII and VIII). He comes to the conclusion 
that none of these 
ideas can claim historical foundation in the 
form that they are 
held by orthodox churchmen; therefore, he 
suggests, their value - 
which he is far from denying - should 
be conserved in some manner 
which will not arrogate exclusive claims 
to the Anglican Church. 
The true test of a Church is spiritual, 
not ritualistic. 
These articles illustrate clearly 
the courageous way in which 
Rashdall, when he became convinced that 
an idea was false, always 
adopted the policy, not of disregarding 
it by following his own 
conscience in silence, but of speaking 
out in active attack against 
it. In fact, he hardly left room 
for compromise. 
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truth; Rashdall feels especially strongly on this point because he 
habitually attaches the largest measure of authority to the insights 
of the best men, 0% , and they ere usually in a minority, 
ms especially, he see to think, where Bishops are gathered together, 
Rashdall is ready to defend these conclusions on the basis of 
critical evidence. The gospels do not indicate, he declares, that 
Christ's commissions to His followers conferred the power to rule or 
to decide infallibly on doctrinal questions; there is no well- attested 
passage2 which suggests that He gave an exclusive power to the apostles 
which was transmitted to succeeding Bishops in the laying on of hands. 
In fact, government by a group of Presbyters or elders probably 
preceded the episcopal form. So far as Christ's own teaching is 
concerned, the Spirit is to be with all His followers, wherever two or 
three are gathered together in His name. Christ founded the Church as 
a brotherhood, marked off from the rest of the world by the fact that 
it sought to follow His teaching. Some form of organization became 
necessary for this society in the spreading of the gospel; but the 
same authority which established the resulting orders and rites, has 
the power to alter them. Episcopacy, for example, has value in 
securing continuity; but no exclusive necessity attaches to it which 
should be allowed to prevent re -union where that is possible on the 
basis of brotherly love. None of these remarks is intended to minimize 
in the least the indispensability of the Church for the perpetuation 
of Christianity; earnest Christians who see its defects should not,fbr 
that reason, remain outside it; on the contrary, they should work for 
its perfection from within by assuming the responsibility of membership 
in some definite organized branch of it. 
In practice Rashdall strongly favoured re -union as an ultimate 
ideal, although he realized that the serious barriers to it must be 
surmounted very gradually. He did not believe in dispensing with 
episcopal ordination; but he urged the opening of Anglican services 
to Non -conformist ministers, and their voluntary reabsorption into 
the Anglican communion with or without such ordination.3 
He supported the idea of establishment because he thought that 
under such a system the Church had more freedom to pursue its 
spiritual ends than would be the case if it were governed exclusively 
by the majority decision of an autonomous ecclesiastical assembly; the 
clamour for disestablishment, he felt, was motivated not by a desire 
for liberty, but by a desire on the part of high churchmen to crush 
dissention and restrict membership and priesthood to those who would 
assent to narrowly confined dogmas. At the same time he recognized 
the need for widespread reforms in the present system`. 
Rashdall's view of the relation between Church and state is 
based upon the general conclusions reached in his ethical writings5. 
He rejects the social contract theory (and, of course, that of 
divine 
right) as the basis of political obligation, and 
represents the 
authority of the state as coterminous with the extent 
to which it 
serves the true well -being of its citizens; and 
that well -being he 
conceives as identical with the Christian ideal. This 
leaves 
rebellion as a right and a duty when the state 
fails to serve its true 
purpose. On the other hand, no institution like 
the Church, which 
1- A previous discussion -( 54 ff. ) has already disclosed 
why 
Rashdall attributes authority, but 
not infallibility, to the Church. 
2. The only passages in which IKKAK 
a occurs in the words of Jesus 
 
are in Matthew, and almost certainly 
reflect early second century 
views. 
3. Cf. Modern Churchman, Vol. X, pp. 
518 -24. 
4 Cf.- Vol. Vll, 331 -44. , 
u. For his discussion of this tonict 
see especciia11 Ifl , Chs TI and 7 
E. h o a çl {waIiti.end( it aaYy °Y.ET__Ranaj p.FKg lon oft e 
take In XXI n ' 
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affects the state's ultimate end, can be wholly outside the sphere 
of its authority; the extent to which it controls or grants autonomy 
to such institutions, should be detereined solely in the light of 
how the state may best promote the spiritual welfare of its people. 
Although the Church and state thus serve the same end, the 
former must retain its identity, because it can best promote this 
end through functions and methods which the state cannot take over. 
For example, the state must be coercive, - the Church, voluntary. 
Moreover, the state must serve its essentially Christian purpose 
while at the same time taking into account the suffrage and rights 
ofnon- Christian citizens. On the other hand, the Church is obliged 
to exert itself, not only in its task of teaching and worship, but 
in attempting to remove political and social evils by every legal 
means, where the state has failed to do so; it cannot look with 
indifference upon material conditions, or the economic system 
underlying them, which hinder the promotion of an individual and 
collective life dominated by the spirit of brotherly love. 
When it is asked how these considerations affect the status 
of the individual, Rashdall replies that the ordinary "rights of Man" 
should be protected by the state in so far as this conduces to the 
general welfare, and that they should not be sacrificed unless the 
individual's own interests are given their due place among those of 
all concernedl. To carry this topic further would lead us beyond 
our present theme; suffice it to say that the temporal authority of 
the Church, no less than that of the state, must find its limits at 
that point where its intervention prevents the growth of character 
by undermining individual responsibility in economic, political and 
moral matters. Both institutions are justified in securing 
and benefits the individual when he is unable to 
provide for himself, - not those which he could so provide. Usually 
the individual can best fulfil his political and religious duties 
by submission to authority; but when he is convinced that rebellion 
or schism, despite all its evil consequences, is more compatible 
with the Christian ideal than submission, then he must be 
faithful 
to the Christian ideal. 
1. Cf. CE. I, Ch. VIII ( "Justice "), and ID., Ch. 
IV ( "The Rights 
of the Individual "). 
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PART TWO - CRITICAL REFLECTICNS 
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Introduction. 
The primary purpose of this thesis has now been accomplished; 
I have thought it best to systematize and interpret Rashdall's 
writings without unduly interrupting the continuity of the argument. 
Tereas the fulfilment of this intention has necessitated an attempt 
at thoroughness, the critical reflections which will now be offered 
do not constitute a complete examination of what the preceding section 
contains. A few fundamental themes have been selected, not because 
they are necessarily more important than others which are neglected, 
but because they seem to me, for various reasons, to represent the 
points at which Rashdall's system most needs further scrutiny. 
I have sought to show the interconnexion between my comments in 
the course of an argument which is primarily concerned with the analysis 
of specific problems; but because these remarks are based, in so far 
as possible, upon the implications of Rashdall's own system, no explicit 
criticism of his thought as a whole is offered except in connexion with 
his theory of revelation. There I briefly indicate a view which, in 
my opinion, avoids the defects of his unmitigating rationalism. This 
Muchmore radical type of criticism - a type which is based upon my own 
Point of view instead of upon his - also inevitably colours my 1 
discussion of the Incarnation and the Atonement. 
The succeeding arguments follow roughly the order of the expository 
section. Perhaps my own interest in the problem is sufficient excuse 
for the attention which I devote to a purely ethical question at the 
outset. 
1. The R and the Good. 
Recent controversy in ethics has raised many difficult questions 
concerning 
the relationship between the two notions "right" 
and "good ". 
Hence 
one who reads Rashdall's ethical writings 
will continually judge 
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them unfairly, - will find them, in fact, confusing, - unless he 
remembers that distinctions which are widely accepted to -day were 
only beginning to appear (or, in many instances, merely reappear) 
when he was writing his last books in this sphere . One fact, above 
all others, must be remembered throughout the ensuing discussion: 
the distinction between an action and its consequences, upon which 
all deontological1 theories rest, always appeared to Rashdall to be 
radically artificial and unintelligible. To ask whether an action 
would be wrong apart from all harmful effects, was to raise a meaningless 
question concerning a meaningless abstraction; for without these effects 
it would not be the action which it is. While this point of view must 
of course be tested against later expositions of the deontological 
theory, it is only fair to keep in mind the fact that he had no 
opportunity to develop and strengthen it in the light of them. 
The best point of departure for an analysis of Rashdall's use 
of ethical terms is the passage in The Methods of Ethics2 where 
Sidgwick dintinguishes between a wider and a narrower significance 
of the term "ought ". In the narrow, categorical sense of the term 
it implies, as Kant contended, that the agent is capable of doing 
what he ought to do. In the wider sense the term involves reference 
to ideal conditions, whose realization may transcend the capacities 
of the agent, although he "ought" (in the narrower sense) to strive 
to realize these conditions in so far as he can. 
Rashdall follows this distinction. He uses the terms 
"right" 
as synonymous with "ought" in its narrower sense, as applying solely 
to voluntary actions. He employs "ought" in its 
wider implication to 
"Deoantological" is used to -day to denote the 
theory opposed to 
"teleological "; Sidgwick was followed by 
Moore and Rashdall in 
employing "intuitionism" in this connexion; 
but, as Professor 
Broad has remarked, this term misleadingly 
suggests a distinction 
based on epistemology, with "empiricism" 
as its opposite. 
Cf. Five Types of Ethical Theor , P. 206. 
2 
Cf 2,. cit . (Sixth edition) , pp. 31 -34. 
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express the hypothetical idea that a contemplated state of affairs 
ought to be brought about by agents if they can bring it about. . 
difficulty arises, however, when (in The Theorem of Good. and Evil) 
he also uses the wider sense of "ought" with reference to affairs 
other than actions. Because this wider sense ( "ought to be ") is for 
him synonymous with "good" or "value ", we are thus confronted by the 
question as to whether he attaches meaning to the latter notion apart 
from any reference to what some agent is hypothetically or categorically 
obliged to promote. He writes: 
'Entirely apart from the question, "who caused such things ?" I 
judge that pain or discordant music or ugly pictures (i.e. as 
experienced by conscious beings) are bad things. They seem to me to 
be bad whether they arise from chance or necessity or voluntary action. 
Only because I have so judged is there any ground for the judment 
it is right, in so far as it is possible, to get rid of these thin s ; 
but, whether they can be got rid of or not, they are equally bad' (1). 
This is a serious mistake. In a metaphysical system like Rashdall's, 
the notion of obligation can have no meaning apart from its bearing 
(hypothetical or categorical) upon the voluntary actions of persons. 
In terms of such a system if a state of affairs "ought to exist ", although 
it transcends the capacity of any human agent to bring it about, then 
this can only mean that God ought to bring it about; for obligation can 
exist only in and for minds2. But God cannot be subject to obligation 
because He has no impulses to do what is other than best; in Kant's 
terminology, His will is "holy ". Therefore there is no sense of "ought ", 
apart from hypothetical or categorical reference to the actions of some 
other conscious agent or agents, which can have any meaning. This is 
a Point of the utmost importance; for, once established, it reveals the 
fact that if Rashdall remains faithful to his metaphysical position, 
- - - - -- -- - - - - -- 
2. 
C f . I 
P . 136 
------ - - - - -- 
#t 112. 
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he cannot claim that "value" or "good" supplies any ground for 
pronouncing judgments concerning "right " which is not already entailed 
in the meaning of what it is or would be right to do. In that case 
"right" would not be deducible from "good" or definable in terms of it. 
Because his ideal utilitarianism seems to have many features in 
common with Moore's Principia Ethica, one is apt to leap to the 
conclusion that Rashdall, like Moore (in that book), holds "right" to 
be definable as instrumental to the good. But in his last ethical 
writings', he nowhere speaks of "right" as definable2; and yet in those 
books he retains the teleological criterion (of "right ") which he 
expounded in The Theory of Good and Evil. The conclusion to which 
this mode of reasoning leads him is that "right" and "good" are 
correlative notions, which mutually imply one another, but neither 
of which is deducible from the other. In other words, the relation 
which binds the two notions together is synthetic, not analytic. 
Now although Rashdall fails to give any indication of the fact, 
I can only interpret this as representing an important change in his 
position. In The Theory of Good and Evil he puts forward a conception 
of value which is incompatible with the idea of mutual implication. 
As we have just seen3, he there holds "good" to be logically prior to 
"right"; he asserts that until a judgment of value is pronounced, there 
1. Ethics (1913) and Is Conscience an Emotion? (1914) 
2. To be sure, he often speaks misleadingly of "right" 
as meaning 
"that which promotes the good" (strictly, the best possible), 
and of "good" as meaning "ought to be pursued ". (Cf. 
Ethics, 
pp 61 and 63n). His remarks in other contexts, however, make 
it clear that he does not regard either notion 
as definable in 
terms of the other. Despite a somewhat careless 
use of language, 
then, 
We may 
take it that he intends to follow 
Sidgwick in holding 
that, though a right action is indeed one which 
tends to promote 
universal well -bein g, this relation 
to the notion "an intrinsically 
good (or best) end" does not constitute 
a definition of "right ". 
No other interpretation seems possible in 
the light of (a) many 
explicit statements to the effect that "right" 
is an unanalyzable, 
sui eneris notion, which cannot be defined 
in terms of any other 
notion which does not already imply it, 
and (b) many similar 
3 
statements to the effect that "good" implies 
"what ought to be done ". 
Of also t 25. 
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is no possible ground for forming a judgment concerning "right ". 
If "good ", in this connexion, does not necessarily imply "right ", we 
can only conclude that at this stage of his thinking Rashdall regarded 
"right" as deducible from "good". As we have seen already, this 
earlier position is one which can be shown to be irreconcilable with 
his metaphysical views; and perhaps it was a discovery of this fact, 
or the direct criticisms of Prichard2, which caused Rashdall to 
abandon it. 
The real question which confronts us, then, is whether his later 
view is compatible with the teleological criterion which he never 
abandons. In other words, does the theory that judgments concerning 
"right" are strictly immediate (as they must be, if "right" is strictly 
indefinable and sui generis) necessarily imply that "right" can be 
known without reference to the value of consequences, or does it not? 
Even in The Theory of Good and Evil he contends that "right" is known 
immediately in the sense that if I know what action within my power 
will realize (either in itself, or through its consequences, or both) 
the greatest good in a given situation, then it is self -evident that 
this action is right, and that I ought to perform it. So long as "good" 
does not necessarily imply "what ought, if possible, to be done ", however, 
this contention does not fulfil what deontologists desire; for either 
it still implies that some ground, other than the notion of obligation 
itself, can be cited as furnishing a reason why it is right to perform 
the action in question, or it appeals to the notion "ought to be ", which 
is meaningless unless it already presupposes that the object "ought to 
be promoted, in so far as possible ". In other words, if Rashdall really 
1. I cannot see why this 
_ 
does not also imply "definable in terms of ", 
although Rashdall does not explicitly use the expression, even in 
The Theory of Good and Evil. 
2 Cf. 
ir 26 f. 
°. This is a question yet to be discussed. 
3 
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attaches independent meaning to the term "good ", he must represent 
moral knowledge as entailing two distinct judgments; (a) a judgment 
concerning the value of the end which the action will promote, and 
(b) a judgment concerning the obligation (or absence of it) to bring 
about the state of affairs possessing these (positively or negatively) 
valuable characteristics. The latter, howeverx "self- evident" when 
considered alone, is not "immediate" (as he takes the former to be) 
in the sense of resting on no grounds other than what the notion in 
question itself implies. Indeed, he admits this when he writes: 
'We saw that fundamentally these moral jud rents were judgInents.- of 
value: they decide what is good, not immediately and directly what is 
right'(l). 
Does his later view of mutual implication circumvent this 
difficulty? Here the essence of his contention would seem to be that 
it is meaningless to talk about what action is right without reference 
to an end which ought to be promoted; and, conversely, it is impossible 
to conceive of an end as being good except as that toward which it is 
or would be right for some conscious agent to direct his action. We do 
not deduce from the fact that an action is right that its end is good 
(or best), nor do we deduce from the fact that an end is good (or the 
best possible) that it is or would be right to promote it. This 
position still reflects his refusal to speak of either the action or 
its end in abstraction from the other. Moral conduct entails a purposive 
relation; therefore, to denominate the two terms of that relation is 
merely to look at the same thing from different aspects; 
and to discuss 
either term as though it could stand independently 
of the relation is 
to indulge in meaningless abstraction. As 
Dr. Broad has put it: 
l' 
GE. I, p. 100. 
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'It is surely possible that both "good" and "right" are 
indefinable, as both "shape" and "size" are, and yet that there is 
a synthetic, necessary, and mutual relation between them, as there 
is between shape and size'(1). 
Whatever may be said in criticism of it, this new position is 
much more defensible than that put forward in The Theory of Good and 
Evil (at least, as there stated); and, so far as this question is 
concerned, it is a pity that the larger work has inevitably received 
more attention than the less accessible smaller books mentioned supra. 
One basis for reconciliation between deontological and (idealistic) 
teleological theories which Dr. Muirhead suggests in his review of the 
whole recent controversy, turns out to be precisely the conception of 
mutual implication just discussed2. Yet most critics ( Muirhead 
included) have assumed that Rashdall's position at this point is either 
identical with Moores, or merely a variant of it, and The Theory of 
Good and Evil affords at least some justification for this assumption3. 
Before proceeding further, perhaps I should summarise the manner 
in which Rashdall has revised his position at two points: (a) "Right" 
is indefinable and sui generis; this is incompatible with any teleological 
theory which implies that consideration of the value of an end can 
furnish a logical ground for asserting that it is right to promote that 
end. (b) "Right" and "good' mutually imply one another; this is 
1. Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 177. 
2. An illustration of Muirhead's is identical with one of Rashdall's. 
Compare Rule and End in Morals, p. 45, with Ethics, p. 14, and 
Is Conscience an Emotion ?. p. 46. 
Perhaps I should here draw attention to the fact that on pages 45 
and 46 in this last book the word "analyzable" appears in a context 
which makes the argument nonsense unless this be taken as a misprint 
for "unanalyzable ". Rashdall's handwriting, as I know from 
consulting his manuscripts, was amazingly bad; as a result, his 
proof sheets must have contained an unusually large number of errors; 
some of these were never corrected, and they may be found in all his 
books. Usually they are obvious, but sometimes they leave the reader 
with the sensation that either he or the author has momentarily lost 
his wits; cf., e.g., ICE, p. 29, line 6, where "more" should read 
"less ". 
3. In what follows, however, we shall see that even on the basis of this 
work Rashdall has sometimes been misinterpreted. 
IP 
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incompatible with the assertion that "good" is logically prior to 
"right ". 
One point at which, even in The Theory of Good and Evil, Rashdall 
seems to differ from Moore, has to do with whether "right" is related 
to the intended or to the actual consequences of an action. For very 
different reasons, Moore and deontologists agree that rightness may 
conceivably have nothing to do with the ends which the agent intends 
to promote; the former holds that rightness is dependent upon actual 
effects, and the latter hold that in the first instance it is not 
dependent upon effects at all, actual or intended. Rashdall has argued 
that, although the general effects of an action are frequently so clear 
that their connexion with duty is obvious, once it be admitted that the 
value of consequences is necessarily related to the rightness of the 
action, then there is no escape from admitting that the total chain of 
consequences - extending indefinitely into the future - should, ideally, 
be taken into account. As he acknowledges, this fact imposes a severe 
limitation upon the practical trustworthiness of casuistry. Moreover, 
even if "right" be related synthetically, instead of analytically, to 
"good ", the possibility still remains that in any given case the 
extension of one's knowledge concerning the value of the action's 
consequences (since this involves at the same time an extension of one's 
knowledge concerning what it is right to do) may necessitate a revision 
of judgment concerning one's duty in that situationl. 
Now is the value (of the consequences) here referred to (a) that 
which the agent intends to produce by the action, or (b) that which 
actually results from it? Clearly the former alternative might entail 
the admission that some actions are right even though their actual 
----------------------------------------------------------------- -- - - -- 
1. Cf. it 18.f. 
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consequences are bad or indifferent. The latter alternative opens 
the way to the converse possibility that an action done from evil or 
indifferent motives might be right because it actually produced the 
best possible results. Rashdall's remarks fail to clarify his position, 
because they may be so interpreted as to support either alternative. 
For example, if on Monday an agent performs an action whose 
consequences he expects and intends to be the best possible in the 
situation, and if on Tuesday he discovers, through an extension of his 
knowledge concerning those consequences (and thus concerning what it 
was right to do) , that a different action, which he could have performed 
on Monday, would have produced better results, then was his action on 
Monday right or not ?1 Obviously from Tuesday onwards, he should act 
in the light of what he now sees to be his duty in such situations; 
perhaps this is what Rashdall means when he speaks of extended knowledge 
as sometimes resulting in a "redirection" of duty. If this implies 
that a right action is always one which is intended to promote what the 
agent supposes to be the best possible results, then the agent's action 
on Monday was right, and Rashdall has adopted the former alternative 
mentioned above. To say that the action on Monday was not right implies 
that rightness depends upon a relation to which motivation may be 
entirely irrelevant (i.e. the latter alternative supra). He seems to 
prefer the former alternative, even in The Theory of Good and Evil, 
despite the fact that it really involves reliniquishing the criterion 
of ideal utilitarianism; but one can never be sure of this because he 
uses the ambiguous expression, "tends to promote universal well -being ", 
with reference to right action. Because the difficulty under discussion 
-------------------------------- 
1. For the sake of simplicity, we must generously assume that the 
agent's mistake on Monday was not due to any moral defect or 
culpable negligence. 
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is a commonplace one, it is disconcerting to find no adequate attempt 
to deal with it in such an extensive treatise. 
Obviously, error can arise in two respects in connexion with 
purposive action; one may err in judging (a) concerning whether an 
action actually will promote a given end, and (b) concerning whether 
the end promoted is actually good (or best). This gives rise to four 
logically possible ways in which the rightness of an action may be 
related to the value of its ends, although in practice, I think, ethical 
writers would seek to defend only the first or the last. Rightness 
may be related to: (1) the actual value of the actual consequences, 
(2) the actual value of the intended consequences, (3) the supposed1 
value of the actual consequences, or (4) the supposed value of the 
intended consequences. 
In order to avoid complications we have thus far neglected an 
extremely important aspect of Rashdall's theory, and perhaps discussion 
of it now will throw some light upon the question just raised. As we 
have seen already2, it is incorrect to interpret his position as 
attributing intrinsic value to ends alone, and not to actions as well3. 
1. This word is used merely for want of a better. It is meant to 
indicate that what the agent judges to be the value of a given end 
may or may not be its actual value. 
2. it 19 f. . 
3. Professor Joseph has rightly pointed out (in Some Problems in Ethics, 
P. 100) that on a strictly utilitarian view right action cannot 
possess intrinsic value; therefore right actions (e.g. on the part 
of others) cannot be included among the ends (which, ex hypothesi, 
possess intrinsic value) promoted by a right action. This he takes 
to be a sufficient refutation of Rashdall's position in The Theory 
of Good and Evil. But the refutation simply neglects the fact that 
in this treatise Rashdall does regard right action as possessing 
intrinsic value. Intrinsic value, on his theory, attaches to the 
conscious "states" of selves; and I see nothing contradictory in 
claiming, as Rashdall does, that an action, considered as a "state" 
of the self (which usually manifests itself externally in bodily 
movement) can possess positive or negative value, just as do other 
experiences or states of the self. I put forward this comment with 
some trepidation, because Professor Joseph was for many years a 
colleague of Rashdall's. 
(Continued on Page 259) 
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He does not agree with Moore that the value of an action is wholly 
instrumental; he contends, on the contrary, that an action possesses 
intrinsic value which must be taken into account as related to that 
action's rightness. Let us begin by examining his assertion that, 
although it is meaningless to consider the rightness of an action 
apart from relation to the value of its consequences, this does not 
imply 'that its morality depends wholly upon those consequencesl'. 
Rashdall's meaning cannot be interpreted properly unless a rather 
obvious point is understood in connexion with the idea of mutual 
implication. This idea, if it is intelligible at all, must presuppose 
that the whole gamut of degrees of goodness is at least hypothetically 
related to rightness. That is to say, many ends can be judged to be 
good, although the promotion of them is not judged to be right because 
they are not the best possible ends in the situation; nevertheless, if 
the idea of mutual implication is to be taken seriously, the judgment, 
"X is good (in however slight a degree) ", must always be taken as tacitly 
implying that it would be right to promote X, if there were nothing 
better which one could promote. Now if the statement under consideration 
can be reconciled with Rashdall's revised position, it must be taken as 
(Continued from Page 253 ) 
Nevertheless, the statement quoted on # 19, another remark in which 
he differentiates his own position from Moore, who 'appears to be 
unwilling to give the good will the highest place in his scale of goods' 
(GE. I, p. 79n), and his whole discussion of the pre- eminent position of 
"virtue" or "d.;utiful action" in the summum bonum, cannot be interpreted 
except as indicating that Rashdall attributes intrinsic value to right 
action. Therefore, Professor Joseph's remarks are extremely puzzling 
when, in criticizing Rashdall's position, he writes: 'For the act which 
has no intrinsic goodness is held right because its consequences have; 
but if these are acts like it, they can have no intrinsic goodness 
either, and, therefore, cannot justify the action whose consequences 
they are... He (i.e. Rashdall) agrees with Sidgwick that I can only owe 
to do an action, or that an action can only be right, because of its 
consequences...? (op. cit., p. 100. Italics mine). 
1. Cf. #t 19. Although the statement here in question occurs in The 
Theory of Good and Evil, the same position is retained after he 
has revised his view concerning the relationship between "right" 
and "good ". 
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an attempt to suggest that an action may possess an intrinsic value 
which involves this same hypothetical reference to "right". Many 
actions may be said to possess an intrinsic value additional to (but 
not unrelated to) the value of their ends; and although this intrinsic 
value may be recognized, even when the action is not right (because 
it is not related to the best possible end in that situation) , neverthe- 
less this recognition implies that the action would be right if no 
intrinsic value greater than that which it embodies could be realized. 
One qualification must be stressed, however; because he refuses to 
divorce the action from its consequences, it would seem to follow that, 
although the intrinsic value of an action can be recognized as distinct 
from and additional to the intrinsic value of its consequences, the 
two could never occur or be judged out of relation to one another; and 
it might follow from this that these two types of intrinsic value vary 
together. If this last is really the case, then Rashdall is committed 
to the theory that rightness (and the intrinsic value of an action) 
is related to the intended, not to the actual, consequences; and he 
should then say that an action possesses intrinsic value in a degree 
which corresponds to what the agent supposes to be the degree of 
value possessed by the ends which he intends his action to promote. 
The statement under consideration has been overlooked by all 
critics who assume that The Theory of Good and Evil maintains the 
thesis that the rightness of an action is to be judged solely by 
reference to the value of its consequences. Ivoreover, it is difficult 
to believe that Rashdall could have meant this statement to imply 
that an action acquires intrinsic value only as a result of its being 
right; for obviously if (as he holds in this work) intrinsic goodness 
may be appealed to as a logical ground for the rightness of an action, 
this "good" must be known prior to "right ". Unless one is willing to 
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suppose that he fell into a very elementary fallacy', his statement 
in The Theory of Good and Evil must be interpreted as referring to 
some intrinsic goodness in an action which, like the intrinsic goodness 
of its consequences, may be known prior to and apart from its rightness; 
while, because he retains the conception after revising his position, 
it must be supposed that in this latter case he takes the intrinsic 
value of an action (like that of its ends) to be known in connexion 
with the rightness of that action. 
Now that the intrinsic value of right actions has been discussed, 
we may return to the question as to whether, on Rashdall's view, 
rightness is related to actual or to intended consequences. If he 
regards the rightness of an action as related3 to: (a) the intrinsic 
value which attaches to an action when its motive is good, and (b) 
the intrinsic value which actually resides in the action, then the 
relationship between "right" and "good" must be restated; for here 
the value of an action cannot be regarded as a consequence of the action 
(for the sake of which it is performed); hence whereas formerly right 
was held to be somehow related to the value of consequences, it must 
now be held to be related to whatever value comes into being in, as 
I. J.G. Riddell seems to believe that Rashdall falls into this fallacy 
in GE. Cf. Riddell's article: "The New Intuitionism of Dr. 
Rashdall and Dr. Moore" in The Philosophical Review, Vol. XXXX (1921), 
pp. 545 - 65. 
2. That is to say, whatever the order in which a thinking subject does, 
as a matter of psychological fact, view the question, there is seen 
to be no logical order of priority- posteriority between "right" and 
"good ", once the process of thought is completed. Whether the 
subject begins with "right" or with "good" (to be realized in or 
through the action), either notion necessarily implies the other 
from the outset; neither is reached by deduction from the other. 
Of course, the subject may be unaware of the fact that this is the 
case. 
3. Analytically in The Theory of Good and Evil; synthetically in his 
revised theory. 
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well as through, the action. This position may provide a ground for 
mediating between the agent's intention and the actual results of 
his conduct; but it raises problems of its own. Let us consider what 
some of these problems are. 
If rightness is related solely to intention, right acts might 
have bad results; if rightness is related solely to actual results, 
right acts might be done from bad motivesl. This is the fundamental 
dilemma which must be solved, if possible. Now if an action possesses 
intrinsic value whenever its motive is good, then this actual intrinsic 
value which the action brings into being is related to intention, not 
to actual results. But if the actual results were bad, then the 
positive intrinsic value of the action would have to be weighed against 
the negative intrinsic value of the actual effects. Here, it will be 
noted, one sort of actual intrinsic value is being compared with 
another. An action done from good motives - whatever its actual results - 
always brings into being some intrinsic value (namely, the intrinsic 
value of the action itself); but does this intrinsic value always 
outweigh the value of the effects? This becomes a peculiarly difficult 
question when it is remembered that, according to Rashdall, the "virtue" 
of another person may constitute a factor in the intrinsically good 
end which an action promotes. If an action which was intended to 
promote the moral welfare of others were to eventuate (through no fault 
of the agent) in the moral degradation of the others instead, then would 
the intrinsic goodness of the action be sufficient to outweigh the 
intrinsic badness of its effects? For unless the action brings into 
being a state of affairs which is good on the whole, the action (in 
accordance with the idea of mutual implication) cannot be said to be 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Deontological theories, dissociating rightness from results altogether, 
must also hold that right acts might be done from bad motives. 
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right. 
Rashdall has contended1 that the "virtue' of others (as an end) 
cannot come into competition with the virtue of the agent, because 
if his action promotes an end in which the various types of value are 
accorded consideration appropriate to their relative importance 
(quality) and magnitude (quantity), then the agent is performing his 
duty; but this argument fails to make clear whether this good end, in 
which virtue, cultural interests and pleasure are properly adjusted to 
one another, is the end which the action actually promotes, or is 
merely intended to promote. Hence the fundamental dilemma remains 
unresolved. 
There is a possible solution to this problem which Rashdall does 
not elaborate, but which is implicit in his revised position. At first 
glance it might seem that with regard to the above example he would be 
forced to say that, ceteris paribus, the actual moral welfare of several 
persons is more important than the actual moral welfare of the agent; 
this would lead to the conclusion that the action brought into being 
a situation which was bad on the whole. And if "good" implies "ought 
to be brought about ", then the action was not right, despite the fact 
that the agent's intentions were the best possible, But the dilemma 
can be stated in this manner only by neglecting the hypothetical bearing 
of obligation upon the agent's actions; if it be remembered that "good" 
implies "ought to be brought about in so far as possible ", then the 
agent has fulfilled this condition. If the agent promoted the moral 
welfare of others (judging this to be the best possible end) to the 
best of his ability, then his action was right. This may be seen by 
viewing the question in the negative. It was obligatory upon the 
1. Cf. # 24, 
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agent to avoid making any contribution to the moral degradation of 
others, in so far as he could avoid this; and he has fulfilled this 
obligation, despite the fact that his action actually did contribute 
to their moral degradation, and therefore brought about a bad result 
which ought not to have been promoted, if the agent could have avoided 
it. 
This solution remains faithful to the idea of mutual implication, 
and it avoids that dichotomy between the value of an action and the 
value of its consequences, which Rashdall deplores. On the other hand, 
the intrinsic value of an action (since it depends upon intention) 
can never come into conflict with the supposed value of the intended 
consequences, because the two reflect an identical condition of the 
agent's intellect and will. Moreover, from the moralist's point of 
view, there would seem to be considerable justification for holding 
that an action is what the agent intends to bring about thereby, once 
the efficiency of the means and the value of the end have been judged 
as accurately as possible. 
Some writers (notably Prichard) have protested that, because one 
cannot control motives, it can never be one's duty to act from certain 
motives. Admittedly, no particular desire or emotion can be summoned 
at will to give rise to an action which promotes a good end. But the 
formula which has been followed throughout has qualified right action 
as promoting good ends in so far as possible. The limitations which 
circumstances impose upon an agent may circumscribe not only his 
capacity to carry out a given course of action, and his capacity to 
judge accurately the value of a contemplated end, but also his capacity 
to desire that end. If he is (e.g., physically) unable to bring it 
about, or unable to recognize its goodness, or unable to feel any desire 
or inclination to bring it about, then, so far as I can see, he is not 
obligated to perform the action in question. Of course, any of these 
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disabilities may have arisen as the result of failure to perform 
his duty in the past; that is a different point. 
When it is asserted, then, that right action is related to the 
supposed value of the intended consequences, and to the intrinsic value 
of the action itself (which reflects the character of its intention) , 
this assertion presupposes that some motive actually does underlie the 
agent's intention; and if his intentions are good, the motive is good; 
if his intentions are bad, the motive is bad. It cannot be one's duty 
to act from good motives if he cannot do this; but unless he acts from 
good motives, his action is not right. 
In order to hold, then, that an action is right, it is not 
necessary to contend that the ends which the action actually brings 
about are actually good or best. It is merely necessary to contend that 
what the action brings about (in itself and through its ends) constitutes 
the best state of affairs which the agent could promote1; and this may 
be true even when the action actually brings about bad or indifferent 
effects. 
The foregoing analysis has been designed to disclose, if possible, 
the strongest position which can be found anywhere in Rashdall's 
writings on ethics; and it has elaborated this position in respects 
which he overlooked. If we had taken these writings as a whole, and 
had then proceeded to set earlier arguments over against later, 
contradictions could have been easily, but fruitlessly, exposed. The 
change which took place in his thinking concerning the relationship 
between the right and the good, although he draws no attention to It 
explicitly, is almost the only one of fundamental importance which can 
-------------- ------------------------------------------- 
1. "Could" takes into account the fact that he may be unable to feel 
any desire or inclination or other motivating force (like the 
sense of obligation)., which will cause him to set about performing 
the action. 
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be found anywhere in his writings. For that reason it has merited 
careful attention. 
His revised position is immune to some of the criticisms which 
have been brought against The Theory of Good and Evil, but not immune 
to all. In his refutation of "Intuitionism" he has contended that an 
action which is not directed toward some good end is, from the 
moralist's point of view, fundamentally irrational. As it stands, this 
refutation seems to mean that an action, if it is to be regarded as 
right, must be done for some "reason" other than its mere rightness. 
But the discussion of the judgment of value, which concludes this very 
refutation of "Intuitionism", should have made the flaw in this argument 
obvious to his mind. For if a judgment of value, as Rashdall there 
claims, can be rational even though it is based upon immediate insight 
and not upon grounds external to what "value" itself implies, why cannot 
the same be consistently said concerning judgments of "right "? As Dr. 
Ross has put it: 
'When we have to choose between the production of two heterogeneous 
goods, say knowledge and pleasure, the "ideal utilitarian" theory can 
only fall back on an opinion, for which no logical basis can be offered, 
that one of the goods is greater; and this is no better than a similar 
opinion that one of two duties is the more urgent'(1). 
When he later admits that "right" is indefinable, and hence, that it 
must be known immediately, Rashdall is thus abandoning the teleological 
position in so far as it implies that the goodness realized in or 
through an action can furnish a logical ground for holding that action 
to be right. But does this admission require him to admit that "right" 
can ever be judged in abstraction from, and without any reference 
whatever to, the value which the action is intended to bring into being? 
He would contend that it does not; and the preceding analysis has shown 
that, although he fails to state clearly the nature of the value - 
situation to which he conceives rightness to be related, such a statement 
------------------------ 
1. The Right and the Good, p. 23. 
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can be constructed on the basis of what his position implies. 
When he assents to the fact that recognition of "right" is 
immediate, he is conceding the point for which deontologists chiefly 
contend1. Therefore only theories which hold, as against the idea of 
mutual implication, that "right" is logically prior, and that "good" 
is deducible from it, remain fundamentally opposed to his position. 
For this reason it was necessary to stress the fact that Rashdall does 
not regard the intrinsic value of an action as dependent upon and 
logically posterior to its rightness2. 
By revising his theory, he greatly reduces the distance which 
separates him in The Theory of Good and Evil from the position of a 
writer like :J2'richard. Rashdall would have to admit that the 
obligatoriness of an action is not logically grounded in the fact that 
doKt 
the action is purposive - that is, forf,the sake of bringing some value 
into being, either in itself or through the end which it serves. If 
recognition of "right" is immediate, then to seek its logical ground 
in the value of the action or its ends, constitutes a fallacy analogous 
to the epistemological absurdity of attempting to cite reasons in order 
to prove that one knows that he knows. Prichard has stressed this point. 
On the other hand, however, Rashdall might admit that rightness cannot 
be logically proven by reference to (what Prichard calls) non -moral 
factual data (i.e. the value of the action or its ends), and yet he might 
contend at the same time that rightness, though judged immediately, 
can never be known apart from these data because the very action which 
is so judged always does, as a matter of fact, either possess intrinsic 
value, or conduce to ends which possess it. "Right", while known 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Nevertheless, even after making this admission, Rashdall might be 
accused of treating the value of an end as though it supplied a 
logical ground for holding the action which promotes it to be right. 
2. Cf .# 260 f. This is a fundamental point at which Rashdall, in his 
own opinion, differs from Kant. 
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immediately, is nevertheless always known in connexion with "good ", 
and cannot be known apart from this connexion. Indeed, Prichard seems 
near to admitting something of this sort when he recognizes that non - 
moral processes of thinking which take into account the relations of 
the action to moral agents (the individual agent and others) and to 
good ends, may be necessary before the general character of the action 
is understood; once this non -moral thinking is completed, however, 
Prichard claims that obligation is appreciated immediately, not 
deductively. If this non -moral thinking were regarded as necessarily 
implied in connexion with judgments of "right ", then the two writers 
would be in agreement at this point. To be sure, Rashdall must now 
admit, as against his earlier position, that discrepancies of moral 
judgment between persons reflect varying degrees of insight into the 
obligatoriness of actions which cannot be deduced from varying degrees 
of insight into the value of ends; yet he can still maintain that the 
two types of insight vary together. 
At one point, however, an important difference arises between the 
two writers. Prichard claims that an action can be right without being 
done from a good motive'. For example, one can fulfil the obligation 
of paying a debt without being motivated by the sense of obligation, 
and without desiring to produce any good effects whatever; one can even 
pay a debt from bad motives. As we have seen, Rashdall so relates 
rightness to the intention to promote good ends that, in his theory, an 
action cannot be right unless the agent can and does possess some motive 
1. Prichard mentions (a) acting from the sense of obligation, and 
(b) acting from a desire or an emotion which is good (because 
directed to good ends), as the two main types of acting from 
good motives. He agrees, however, that a right action cannot 
possess intrinsic value unless done from a good motive; the two 
types of motivation just mentioned thus give rise respectively 
to values which are related to each other; but neither value is 
deducible from the other. The best action is one which is right, 
and at the same time motivated by both (a) a sense of obligation 
and (b) a good desire. Cf. Mind, Vol. XXI. (1912), pp. 21 ff. 
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which causes him to promote the best consequences, in so far as he is 
permitted to do so by the instrumental circumstances, his own insight 
into the value of ends, and his own capacity to be motivated toward 
them. 
No other ethical problems can be discussed at length in these 
pages; but I must mention very briefly one further source of confusion 
before turning to other topics. Certain passages in The Theory of 
Good and Evil seem to treat the various elements which Rashdall 
describes as "types" of value as though they possessed value in 
isolation from anything else. In accepting Moore's doctrine of the 
organic whole he writes: 
'It is equally true that we could not pronounce on their value 
as elements in a whole unless we found a value at least in some one 
of them taken separately... Just so pleasure is a good taken by 
itself.. .' (1) . 
If this statement is to be taken literally, it is utterly irreconciliable 
with Rashdall's own insistence upon the indivisibility of consciousness2; 
the whole point of his argument in this latter connexion is that 
pleasure cannot even occur "separately" or "by itself" - that is, apart 
from other aspects of consciousness which possess other types of value 
(positive or negative). Every judgment which pronounces upon the value 
of a "state" of consciousness therefore has an organic whole as its 
object, and the elements which enter into this organic whole cannot be 
judged out of relation to it. The sentences just quoted, and other 
similar remarks, imply that an action which produced pleasure 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. GE. II, p. 40 n. 
2. Cf. j 15. Compare the statement quoted above with GE. I, p. 75: 
'It may be true in a certain rough and popular sense that in 
thought or even in the good will, if either be taken in abstraction 
from the two other elements, we could discover no value at all, 
while in pleasure we could find such a value. That is the 
assumption upon which all Hedonism is based; and the assumption 
might perhaps be admitted... if we could attach any meaning to 
Pleasure taken absolutely by itself'. 
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unaccompanied by anything else, would be better than one having no 
valuable results; but Rashdall's real meaning, I think, is that, of 
two results which possess equal value in all respects except pleasure, 
the one yielding the greater pleasure possess the greater intrinsic 
value. 
Similarly, when he speaks of "virtue "1 as possessing intrinsic 
value, and therefore as being a suitable element in the end which it 
is right to promote, he really means that when two ends are equally 
valuable in every other respect, that which possesses more "virtue" 
is likewise more valuable. Yet there are passages in which he seems 
to assume that a single right action, taken separately, possesses the 
highest intrinsic value. 
In fact, in his entire chapter on the commensurability of values 
he writes as though each type of value were to be apprehewded through 
distinct intuitions, which could then be compared and brought together 
in a second intuition, the latter giving rise to judgments concerning 
the value of the whole. However, to claim that an ideal of conduct 
can be built un from an aggregate of isolated immediate judgments 
concerning the value of particular "goods ", is not different in 
principle from the unsystematic intuitionism concerning knowledge of 
"right" which Rashdall strongly criticizes. 
`What I have taken to be his prevailing view avoids these difficulties 
and stands much more closely allied to orthodox idealistic doctrine in 
ethics than many of his critics realize. For if value is regarded as 
a notion which characterizes every aspect of consciousness, and if no 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. "Virtue" would here refer usually to the value of right actions and 
of good moral character in others, which a particular action of the 
agent promotes. It does not refer to the "virtue" of this particular 
action, because the intrinsic value of this action cannot be its own 
end. Cf. j 260 f. 
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aspect of consciousness can be intelligibly abstracted from the 
others, then the value of particular things or experiences is 
dependent upon how they stand in relation to a unified pattern or 
standard of value. Virtue, knowledge and pleasure are related to 
value as species to genus1. Of course nothing inclines him, however, 
to the wider notion in which human willing is included in a universal 
will, as a part in a whole. 
Nevertheless, the manner in which he associates each "type" of 
value (virtue, knowledge or cultural interests, and pleasure) with a 
corresponding aspect of consciousness (willing, thinking and feeling) 
rests upon a. radically defective, though trite, division. Iskould 
prefer to regard the distinction between cognitive and non -cognitive 
events as fundamental; this would obviate expressions like those in 
which Rashdall writes as though the "intellect" were external to 
conation and emotion, for these latter are cognitive. Despite his 
rejection of the facultative psychology, it is a tendency to 
hypostatize these mental "capacities" which leads him into the blunder 
of holding that particular goods have value even when taken separately. 
A sounder psychology would have held him faithfully to his principle 
that this is to indulge in unjustifiable abstraction. Especially it 
would have saved him from treating pleasures and pains as though they 
constituted a separate kind of experience. As I see it, the 
pleasure -pain series can qualify both cognitive and non -cognitive events, 
because sensations fall under both of these categories; that is, some 
sensations (e.g. visual) are cognitive, and some are not. 
(An adequate discussion of judgments of value would leave 
us insufficient space for very pressing questions. One 
criticism of Rashdall's theory was so fundamental that I 
__________________________________ - ____________________________________ 
1. If I understand his theory, this is precisely what Joseph means 
when he speaks of "right" as "a form of goodness ". Cf. Some 
Problems in Ethics, p. 73, and his discussion of the doctrine of 
organic wholes, pp. 84 f. 
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ventured to incorporate it in the expository section, 
ft 42 ff ; clarity concerning his conception of "moral 
objectivity" was indispensable to a proper interpretation 
of his metaphysical system. I briefly refer once again 
to this topic infra, If 310 ff. ) . 
2. The Idealistic Argument. 
At the beginning of a discussion of idealism it is important to 
specify the meaning of the term. Rashdall employs it primarily with 
reference to the theory that matter cannot exist apart from the 
experience of some mind, and we shall follow this usage. Many writers 
use the term to include 'all those philosophies which agree in 
maintaining that spiritual values have a determining voice in the 
ordering of the universe'1; in this sense all theists are "idealists ", 
even though they may hold realistic views concerning knowledge or 
perception. On the other hand, many arguments for theism are not 
"idealistic" in Rashdall's narrower sense:; hence they are not affected 
by what I shall say in the following pages. Indeed, the succeeding 
criticisms must be understood throughout as referring solely to 
Berkeleian idealism, and not even to other forms of idealism (e.g. 
Royce's system) which also might be brought under the narrower usage 
just denoted. This is a legitimate procedure, because in some respects 
Rashdall's idealistic argument (with its attendant view of causality, 
and the personalistic metaphysics in which it culminates) follows 
Berkeley so closely that many objections apply with equal force to both. 
Berkeley's "new philosophical principle" was put forward in the 
first instance as a protest against the doctrine of representative 
Perception and its distinction between (a) the object as independently 
existing, and (b) the object as perceived. The latter of these, in 
the Cartesian theory, is regarded as a tertium quid between the mind 
- _______________ - ______________________________________________________ 
1. Norman Kemp Smith: Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge, 
n. 1. Pringle- Pattison also follows this usage; cf. Mind, Vol. 
XXVIII, p. 1. 
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and the real object. Initially Berkeley argued that the object as 
perceived is the real object; and at this stage he admitted that "ideas" 
could be "representative" only in the very different sense of 
"representative of other ideas ". He contended that if a proximate 
object intervenes between the mind and the "real" object, there is no 
possible way of determining (i.e. by comparison) whether, or to what 
extent, it faithfully represents the real object. His own theory, of 
course, does away with any radical distinction between appearance and 
reality. 
Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities rested 
upon the representative theory and its dichotomy. In order to 
substantiate his own views Berkeley therefore repudiated this distinction, 
and his argument forms, as we have seen, the starting point for Rashdall's 
idealistic "proof ". It is important to observe, however, that Rashdall 
rightly interprets Berkeley's dominant view when he claims that his 
idealistic thesis does not destroy the distinction between subject and 
object, although it does make this distinction infra -mental. Berkeley's 
principle is essentially an affirmation of the mutual inseparability of 
subject and object; but he regards each term as signifying a mode of 
existence distinguishable from the other. This distinction has an 
important bearing upon the way in which Rashdall formulates his final 
metaphysical views. For a subject, on this theory, can never be a 
perceived object; its reality consists in the active exercise of the 
functions of thinking, willing, perceiving and feeling. On the other 
hand, an object can never be a centre of subjective activity; it cannot 
produce changes in other objects; hence the Berkeleian view cannot locate 
the source of causation in the "physical" world. 
Although Berkeley's writings do not always unequivocally affirm 
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this view, Rashdall is justified in cleaving to the distinction on 
which it rests. He too holds that, although objects are "in the mind ", 
there remains an irreducible distinction between (a) what is experienced, 
and (b) the activity of experiencing. 
In Rashdall's idealistic "proof" of the existence of God, three 
quite distinct types of argument can be discriminated; they have to 
do respectively with perception, conception and relations. The second 
of these1 is really incidental; it alleges that objects which are not 
perceived are nevertheless related to mind whenever they are cognized 
in any form, even whenever they are imagined as existing independently. 
This is the only respect in which the Berkeleian argument is 
"epistemological" in the sense of being based on the nature of knowledge 
as such, instead of on a particular theory concerning the characteristics 
of material things and how they are perceived by us. If it were valid, 
it would apply to all objects of knowledge, and not merely to physical 
objects. Epistemological arguments are probably the weakest in the 
entire idealist case; and we shall not linger over this one. It may be 
reduced to the assertion that whatever is known2 is a concept, and 
concepts exist only in minds. 
Now unless one is willing to contend that a concept does not refer 
to anything beyond itself (and Rashdall does not contend this), it is 
necessary to draw a distinction which this argument overlooks. "To 
conceive" may refer to (a) the concept as "a mental state or act ", or 
to (b) what the concept "stands for" objectively. The former of these 
is of course mind -dependent; but this does nothing to prove that the 
latter is. The concept, "an object existing independently ", is in 
103 
----------- - - - - -- ------------------ 
1. Cf. 
#f 
2. According to Rashdall bare perception does not yield "knowledge" 
in the strict sense of "being objectively true ". 
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relation to mind in the former sense; but the object for which it 
stands is not for that reason necessarily in relation to any mind; 
hence until some other reason is brought forward, the concept itself 
is by no means unintelligible. If it is contended that all concepts 
refer1 to objects which are necessarily mind -dependent, this contention 
must be based on some ground other than that which this argument supplies. 
Berkeley and Rashdall support this contention, of course, because they 
hold that our concepts (in the former sense) refer to "ideas" existing 
in the mind of God. But in that case the argument from concepts is 
not a "proof" of the existence of God; rather, the existence of God is 
Postulated in order to support an idealistic thesis which could not 
stand otherwise. 
The first argument - from perception (or qualities) - must be 
distinguished from the second and third. It must be distinguished from 
the second because a representative theory of perception is quite 
compatible with the assertion that we possess direct awareness 
(non -inferential knowledge, other than that afforded by perception) of 
objects as existing independently; some realists to -day actually follow 
this procedure, while others hold that direct awareness implies direct 
perception. On the other hand, it is possible to contend that our 
perception of physical objects is direct, while we only come to know 
than as existing independently of our minds by means of some other type 
of cognition which transcends the evidence of perception; this other 
type of cognition may be direct and intuitive, or it may be inferential. 
Rashdall's view, I believe, ultimately implies both a representative 
theory of perception and a representative theory of knowledge (the latter 
including all objects of cognition, and not merely physical objects). 
1. In the latter sense supra. 
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But if Berkeley's early views concerning perception were rigidly 
maintained, they could be reconciled with his argument for the 
existence of God only by contending that knowledge of physical objects 
is representative (i.e. of "ideas" existing in the mind of God), while 
perception of them is not; otherwise Berkeley, too, would be forced 
into the theory of perception which above all else he sought to avoid. 
The first argument must be distinguished from the third because, 
at best, the Berkelaian argument from perception can establish only 
that we have no evidence for believing that any material things exist 
independently of our human perception, while the argument from relations 
attempts to show that belief in matter as existing apart from mind is 
intrinsically unintelligible; obviously the latter, and not the former, 
is reconcilable with the belief that physical things can exist 
independently of our minds so long as they are dependent upon God's mind. 
These distinctions make it almost self -evident that the first 
two arguments are virtually useless so far as supporting a theistic 
Proof is concerned. Together they establish merely that objects cannot 
be perceived or known apart from some mind which perceives or knows. 
This hardly needed proving. It is a proposition which must be true 
whether or not material things are dependent upon perceiving and knowing 
minds for their existence. If all cognition, as well as perception, 
is regarded as "shutting us up to our own ideas ", then clearly the 
conclusion that we have no evidence of their existence apart from these 
"ideas" cannot be used as an argument for believing that objects 
(physical or otherwise) exist in the mind of God. While if either 
cognition or perception is held to refer beyond itself to ideas existing 
in the mind of God, one is forced to adopt a representative theory in 
either case; and in neither case does the evidence of our own cognition 
or perception do anything to establish the idealistic hypothesis 
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concerning the ontological status of the trans -subjective objects 
to which they refer. If the term "object" is taken as necessarily 
correlative with "subject ", then 'objects" cannot be said to exist 
apart from some mind; but it does not follow from this that all 
existing things are objects. The assertion that no material thing 
can be perceived or conceived as existing except in relation to a 
perceiving or thinking subject, does nothing to prove that no material 
thing can exist except in these relations. 
The strongest mode of reasoning which a Berkeleian idealist can 
adopt is to argue that the intelligibility of the relationship between 
material things and knowing minds favours the probability of his 
general hypothesis that matter cannot exist apart from some mind 
(although it does not furnish a sufficient ground from which this 
hypothesis follows necessarily). Rashdall's argument from the nature 
of relationsI could serve this purpose; but, as he says, it is 
irreconcilable with the empiricism of Berkeley's Principles. What it 
purports to demonstrate is a universal and necessary connexion between 
relations and a mind which does the relating; hence it goes beyond the 
evidence of human experience, and asserts that precisely because many 
relations lie beyond the purview of any human mind, they imply the 
existence of a divine mind. If this argument is valid, it leads to 
the conclusion not only that the entire physical world is dependent upon 
God's mind (since each part is related to every other), but also that 
all human minds are dependent upon God's mind (since we continually 
stand in relations to the physical world and, granting for the moment 
the conclusion of the argument, to God, of which no mind other than God's 
could be continually aware). Recognition of this dependence in the case 
1. Cf. #. 102. 
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of the material world leads Rashdall to speak of it as existing "in" 
God's mind; perhaps other parts of his metaphysical system are 
sufficient to justify his refusal to regard our dependence on God's 
mind as likewise implying that our minds are included in His; but 
undeniably the argument from relations, when thus generalized, tends 
to diminish the sharpness of the distinction which he draws between the 
ontological status of human selves and that of material things. 
In any case, the fact remains that what this argument assumes 
concerning the intelligibility of relations seems self-evident to some 
philosophers, and not even plausible to others. For this reason the 
theistic "proof" which is based upon it is inescapable only if one 
begins by assenting to the idealistic premiss; and it is difficult to 
see how the necessity of assenting to this premiss can be established 
by argument. Nothing besides the relation is required to hold its own 
terms together; the only question which arises is whether the relation 
itself must be "in" a mind in order for it to do this; and I can see 
no way of forcing anyone by logical argument to answer this question in 
the affirmative. 
By postulating God's existence the Berkeleian argument avoids 
what has often been cited as the cardinal fallacy of idealism, namely, 
the epistemological contention that the individual mind "makes" the 
objects which it perceives or conceives. But the considerations which 
necessitate a theistic conclusion are incompatible with the first two 
arguments which Rashdall retains as factors in his theistic proof. He 
admits that (a) physical objects possess continuity and stability; 
(b) several minds may perceive one object simultaneously1; (c) we 
perceive (and know) objects without ourselves causing the perceiving 
1. This point will require further examination. 
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(and knowing). These considerations clearly imply that the material 
world has existed and still does partially exist apart from the 
perceiving (and knowing) of the individual; while the first two 
idealistic arguments, if valid, would show that we have no reason for 
believing that it can so exist. 
Berkeley's error can therefore be summarized as follows: (1) his 
arguments from _perception and conception, if valid, would establish 
(of course) the conclusion that matter cannot exist apart from some 
mind; (2) his theistic postulate renders these arguments invalid, yet 
he retains the general conclusion which they would establish if valid; 
(3) hence he argues that matter can be independent of the individual 
human mind only because it is dependent for its existence upon the 
miîu9 of God. In so far as Rashdall revives these first two arguments, 
his reasoning falls into the same contradiction'. 
One further point must be mentioned. An argument by analogy from 
human to divine cognition is well -nigh contradictory if based on the 
Principles. To be applicable to God's knowledge, the thesis there in 
question (that the esse of physical things is percipi) would necessarily 
imply sensuous limitations which Berkeley was unwilling to attribute to 
God because he associated them with physical embodiment. Rashdall's 
own argument has the advantage of differing from Berkeley's in two 
contrasting ways: (a) he does not defend Berkeley's thesis in its 
extremely empirical form; (b) he is willing to attribute "something 
corresponding to feeling" (but not, of course, bodily limitation) to God. 
To point out the respects in which God's knowledge must differ 
----------------------------------------------------------------- - - - - -- 
1. Hence it is unfortunate that he joins the argument from relations 
so closely with the first two. Moreover, even on purely Berkeleian 
grounds the above fallacy might be avoided by retaining only the 
argument from causation (in conn4Ition with the argument from 
relations). That is, it might be claimed that human perceiving and 
knowing are caused by some agency other than the individual, and 
that a mind endowed with will is the only possible cause of anything. 
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from ours does not invalidate an argument from analogy if relevant 
points of similarity remain. But, so far as Rashdall and Berkeley 
are concerned, this analogy breaks down. For if physical things can 
exist apart from human knowledge1, but not apart from God's, then God's 
cognitive relation to them differs at precisely the point where analogy 
is supposed to establish a similarity. Rashdall evinces some misgivings 
when appealing to analogy in this connexion2, although he gives no 
indication of realizing that his first two arguments are inconsistent 
with any appeal to analogy whatever (concerning cognition). 
A theistic idealism which admits that physical objects are 
independent of our minds, while yet maintaining (for reasons other 
than those given in Rashdall's first two arguments) that matter is 
dependent for its existence upon some mind, might be compatible with 
realistic theories concerning human perception. Dr. Ewing thinks that 
Rashdall's system can be brought under this generalization3.. Rashdall 
nays very little attention to modern realism, but his objection to it 
as an ontology cannot be divorced from his views concerning perception 
and knowledge. For reasons which we shall examine presently, he is 
forced into representative theories concerning both; and Ewing's remarks 
fail to show that on a representative theory of perception (at least, 
such a form of it as Rashdall must hold) 'the identical object we 
perceive at the same time (could be held to exist) independently of us 
in the experience of God'4. 
1. The same holds with regard to perception. 
2. Cf. #/ 129, # 133 and # 161. 
3. A.C. Ewing: Idealism. Cf. pp. 387 ff. 
4. Ibid., p. 388. Italics mine. Indeed, I cannot reconcile this 
statement with Ewing's admission on the preceding page: 'And any 
ideas of physical objects that God may have are in any case never 
conceived by Berkeley as being either the immediate object of our 
perception or in direct relation to our perception, for the causes 
of our perception are for him not God's ideas but God's will. Even 
if there are physical objects "in God's mind ", according to Berkeley 
they are not the physical objects which we perceive in any ordinary 
sense of the word Perceive'. 
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Thus far we have seen that the Berkeleian argument, even as 
Rashdall restates it, cannot move with logical necessity from the 
sphere of human consciousness to the sphere of divine consciousness. 
Even when the theistic case is assumed to be established, however, 
several difficulties arise. First of all, do the qualities which a 
perceived thing presents to different observers belong to a numerically 
identical object? So far as I can see, Rashdall can admit only that 
what each observer perceives is qualitatively similar to what the 
others perceive; each object of perception remains numerically distinct 
from (though similar to) every other. On this theory the unity of a 
publicly existing physical thing arises from the fact that the 
numerically distinct objects are respectively presented to many different 
percipients as the result of a single act of God's will. Furthermore, 
there is an archetypal world of physical objects in God's mind; hence 
when several human percipients are acquainted with the "same" object, 
there is a qualitative similarity between the object in God's mind and 
the object in each percipient's mind; yet the archetypal object - A - 
remains numerically distinct from all the objects like it - a1, a2,.... 
an - in tfinite minds. 
So much for perception. Rashdall's theory of cognition is also 
representative because he holds that one individual can know an "object" 
which exists in another mind only by means of an "idea" (concept or 
judgment) which "represents" (or "refers objectively to") that other 
"object" (i.e., that other concept or judgment as a mental state or 
act; the cognition which is thus carried out is inferential, not 
direct. Hence even when his theory of perception is supplemented by his 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Rashdall admits that he does not believe in the existence of any 
objects other than "ideas ", so long as this admission is not taken 
to mean that he restricts this existence to ideas in his own mind, 
and so long as the word "idea" is made equivalent not to "sensation" 
(cp. Berkeley), but to "object of thought". Cf. Mind. Vol. XVIII, 
10. 108. 
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theory concerning judgments and concepts, the archetypal object - 
A - exists solely "in" the mind of God, al exists solely "in" the 
mind of human knower 1, a2 solely "in" the mind of human knower 2, 
etc. Accordingly, the continuous existence of A can be postulated by 
knower 1 only on the ground of an inference which transcends the fact 
that a1 (which, ex hypothesi, is similar to A) exists only spasmodically 
(i.e., whenever 1 perceives or in some way cognizes it). 
I have outlined this matter in some detail because Rashdall has 
been accused of defending a theory which must either (a) lead to a 
pluralistic monadology or (b) admit that human minds can know directly 
(non- inferentially) archetypal objects as they exist in God's mind. 
He refuses to accept pluralism, and the latter alternative is even 
more obnoxious to him because it would imply (if subject and object 
are strictly correlative) that the subjective activity of the individual 
is in some sense identical with or included within the subjective 
activity of Godl._'ersonally I believe that the continuity and stability 
aet 
of the physical world ks4knowndirectly, not inferentially; but my 
purpose here is to analyze Rashdall's argument fairly, not to present 
a defence of a realistic theory of direct cognition. 
The Berkeleian theory of causation can be reconciled with Rashdall's 
foregoing views. Concerning God's knowledge of the objects existing 
in our minds, however, he seems unwilling to say -that it is merely 
inferential. Otherwise the assumption that al, a2, a3,....an are 
numerically distinct from A would require the curious assertion that 
God has no direct knowledge of the objects which He produces in finite 
minds through an act of volition; but even if His knowledge of these 
objects were merely inferential, 
------------------- - - - - -- - 
1. Cf. G. l4'awes Hicks: Berkeley. 
One of the chief contentions 
escape these alternatives. 
that would not mean that they are in 
-------------------------------------- 
(Leaders of Philosophy Series). 
of this book is that Berkeley cannot 
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no sense objects of His cognition . 
Once again, sna.ce -time is not broken up into a Plurality of 
self- enclosed spheres unless it be denied that finite minds can know 
space -time, and the physical world which it contains, inferentially 
(instead of directly) es they exist in God's mind. 
A further word must be added concerning Rashdall's relation to 
Berkeley; he fails to call attention to the fact that in Siris the 
latter modified his position, to a great extent abandoning the 
empiricism of his earlier works in favour of a quasi- Platonic theory. 
Yet the corrections which Rashdall suggests with regard to the 
Principles, in according an important róle to conceptual thought and 
judgment, were largely made by Berkeley himself in this last of his 
philosophical writings. Here he relinquishes the doctrine that for 
material things esse is vercipi; and, although in its place he contends 
that conceptual thought is necessary for knowledge of real things, he 
does not now assert that they are dependent for their existence upon 
being thus known by the human individual. He retains his idealistic 
hypothesis only by conceiving of reality somewhat after the manner of 
Platonic Forms which exist eternally "in" the mind of God'. Consequently 
the "ideas" presented to finite minds in perception are now regarded as 
transitory, phenomenal appearances of this objectively real world, 
which can be apprehended only imperfectly by human beings. This pursuit 
by Berkeley of the implications of his earlier theistic position seems 
to lead to a conception of God as including finite minds; for if the 
real world is regarded as existing after the manner of Platonic Forms 
in the mind of God, then the conceptual knowledge which finite minds 
1. Unless one assumes that all knowledge must be non -inferential. 
2. This interpretation of the Platonic system was the dominant one in 
Berkeley's own day; some writers contend that it originated with 
''kilo. Most scholars now take the Timaeus as elaborating a world - 
view in which the Forms constitute a hierarchy external to the 
mind of God. 
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may have of it is possible only through particioation in the mind 
of God. Iee^ seems at times to suggest that finite minds are dependent 
for their existence upon this participation. 
Siris, I take it, was written as the result of long reflection 
during which Berkeley came to suspect that his earlier system led to 
a pluralistic monadology in which each person (including God) is 
confined to a self -enclosed sphere. I have attempted to state fairly 
Rashdall's reasons for thinking that he avoided this latter difficulty; 
he holds that one self can have inferential knowledge of another self 
and its states. Nevertheless, this does not adequately account for 
the unity of a publicly existing physical object. Can anyone believe 
that when a ball is thrown over a high wall from A to B, the ball 
which A throws is numerically different from the ball which B catchesx 
'(A being the only human mind which experiences the throwing, and B 
the only human mind which experiences the catching)? And can anyone 
believe that the ball remains numerically the same throughout the whole 
process only for God's omniscient mind, and that this ball is numerically 
different from that (or "those") which A and B experience? Moreover, 
even if one can defend this position, is the belief that the ball 
retains its numerical identity really based upon an inference as to 
the character of God's knowledge? And if so, does not this inference 
give one a knowledge of the "real" ball of which one's own experience 
is but a partial, a "phenomenal ", appearance? The proper answers to 
these questions would show, I believe, that in an idealistic system 
which reduces the physical world to mental events, there is no middle 
ground between monism and pluralism; we have no space to pursue this 
subject except to note that Siris tends to support this general 
conclusion. Rashdall's emphasis upon inference fails to meet the 
difficulty for the following reason. This inferential process affords 
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knowledge of a reality which is either more ultimate than our direct 
experience or equally ultimate with it. If the ultimate reality of 
a physical object be regarded solely as what it is in the mind of God, 
then the unity of the world is accounted for, but only at the cost of 
a phenomenalistic theory concerning human (direct) knowledge of that 
ohysica.t object. While if each individual's knowledge of a physical 
object be regarded as a reality distinct from (though similar to) and 
equal in ultimacy to God's knowledge of that object, the resulting 
theory avoids phenomenalism, but it fails to account adequately for 
the unity of the world. 
One concluding word needs to be said as to why many writers have 
not been favourably impressed by Rashdall's attempt closely to 
associate theism with Berkeleian idealism. He often uses language 
which seems compatible only with a correspondence theory of truth; 
yet in apologizing for this mode of expression he once admits that 
Professor J-oachim's criticism of the correspondence theory must strike 
1 
all idealists as forceful . This is a topic which receives so little 
attention in Rashdall's writings that there are really no sufficient 
data for discussing it. From what he does say, however, concerning 
the fact that every judgment possesses an objective reference which 
determines its truth or falsity, it seems difficult to imagine how he 
could consistently have avoided the admission that a true judgment is 
true of something other than itself. Of course the object of a 
judgment need not be external to the subjective experience of some human 
self; for example, it can be the sensations or emotions of the judging 
individual or those of another self; or it may be another judgment (or 
concept) in the mind of some human self. But all of these possible 
objects themselves ultimately imply a reference to some object which is 
------------------------------------------------------ - - - - -- 
1. GE. II, p. 210 n. Cf. H.H. Joachim: The Nature of Truth. 
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external to the psychological states of any human self 1. On Rashdall's 
theory an infinite regress is avoided because every judgment refers 
either directly, or indirectly (through one or more other subjective 
processes), to an object other than itself which exists in the mind of 
God. Now if he regards this ultimate object as merely another judgment 
(or concept), his position is at least akin to the coherence theory, 
which mentions only a system of judgments (or concepts) in its account 
of truth. But is this judgment (or concept) in the divine mind true 
of something other than itself? Rashdall must say that so far as the 
archetypal world of physical objects is concerned, their existence and 
God's knowledge of them both fall within the divine consciousness. 
So far as the subjective states of other selves are concerned, they are 
external to God's mind; they are objects which transcend the judgments 
by which He knows them. God's knowledge must involve something akin 
to sensory perception; otherwise Rashdall is caught in Berkeley's 
difficulty; for the only type of cognition which the latter (in Siris) 
can attribute to God is the intuitive apprehension of universals, and 
this Precludes God from knowing the particularity and concreteness of 
the world. Furthermore, if this were the character of God's knowledge, 
it is impossible to imagine how He could know the perceptual content 
of our minds even inferentially, inasmuch as this inference must be 
based on something similar in God's own experience. 
The realist protests most vigorously at this point that in all 
our knowledge it is not (primarily) the cognitions "in" the minds of 
other selves which constitute the objective reality to which one's 
own cognitions refer; rather, one's own cognitions and those of others 
alike refer to objects which are external to the minds of all. On 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Only judgments or conce -ts are true or false; but Rashdall admits 
that sensations and emotions Presuppose a transcendant object 
(physical or ideal), even when it is not fully known. 
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this basis he demands why we should not suppose the same to be true 
in the case of God's knowledge; thus he might claim that he, and not 
Rashdall, has some right to argue by analogy from the nature of human 
cognition to that of divine cognition. Realism can meet the difficulty 
concerning perception, while avoiding the arbitrary assumption that 
God's cognitions must constitute the objective reality to which the 
cognitions of human minds refer, and vice versa. 
Without entering into a defence of the realist position, we may 
acknowledge that, so far as the physical world is concerned, Rashdall 
avoids in one respect the blunder of identifying the knower's 
experience with the reality of the object known, only to commit it in 
another; he avoids it with regard to human knowledge only to commit it 
with regard to divine knowledge. Naturally he is reticent about making 
confident assertions with regard to this latter; but his theory clearly 
leaves God's knowledge of physical things without any objective 
reference to a reality such as is presupposed (instead of constituted) 
by knowledge in every instance of human experience. Yet he does not 
fall into the absolutist preconception that knowledge and being are 
universally correlative, because even in the case of God's knowledge 
he postulates a type of reality (the subjective experiences of other 
selves) which God can genuinely know1, but which falls outside the 
sphere of His own being. 
It is altogether possible to reject Rashdall's doctrine that 
physical things are ultimately reducible to the subjective experiences 
of some mind, without postulating the meta)hysical self- existence of 
things. Many of the ablest protagonists of theism in recent years 
have occupied an intermediate ;position, in which minds and things are 
---------------------------------------------------------------- - - - - -- 
1. As we have seen, Rashdall says nothing unequivocally about the 
character of this knowledge except that it cannot be immediate 
for God in the same sense that it is immediately present to the 
individual mind which experiences it subjectively. 
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regarded as existences distinct from, but not independent" of, 
each other; the organic relatedness which these writers stress seems 
to them to require that neither the physical nor the mental be 
regarded as reducible to the other. Such a theory postulates a 
physical world which is dependent upon God's knowledge and creative 
activity, but which exists externally to Him and to all other minds, 
instead of merely as a form or -phase of some conscious exxaerience. 
From such a standpoint, for example, 'ringle- Fattison has offered 
very incisive criticisms against Rashdall's idealistic argumentl. 
He has shown how it is entirely possible for the realist to hold that 
the physical world exists not self -sufficiently, but as the medium 
for the divine creation of conscious life and the enhancement of 
spiritual values. 
3. God and Human Selves. 
Let us next consider the adequacy of Rashdall's conce-p tion of 
God as "personal" in the sense of being a particular self external 
to all other selves. Already we have found reason to believe that 
his analogy from human to divine cognition cannot hold. We shall have 
occasion to question the argument from analogy in other respects in 
a moment. Yet he might urge that he has fully admitted the limitations 
of his argument; he does not seek to impose upon God those restrictions 
which characterize human knowledge and power, especially as they arise 
from the conditions of physical embodiment. To this, however, there, 
are several replies which might be urged by one who yet defends the 
theistic position. 
For one thing, when the idea of personality is abstracted from 
its associations with human limitations, only a series of negatives 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Cf. Mind. Vol XXVIII, pp. 1 - 18. A host of other recent writers 
regard a realistic epistemology as compatible with theism. 
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seems to remain, while personality is surely something positive. 
Rashdall's list of the positive characteristics of self-hood hardly 
escapes this criticism: for these characteristics can be ascribed to 
God only as kinds of thinking, feeling, willing, continuity through 
time, etc., which are unlike ours in the very respects which seem to 
make these characteristics what they are. He must conceive of God 
as thinking in a manner which is foreign to what, for all we can know, 
is the essential nature of thinking; and so, too, with regard to willing, 
feeling, and His relation to time. If these be regarded as conditions 
which no theistic system can escape, because God must be conceived as 
transcending human limitations, then they serve to throw doubt upon 
the one point at which he does retain a definite characteristic as 
qualifying divine and human personality alike, namely, that of 
"impenetrability411; for he does not modify his insistence that so far 
as its subjective experience is concerned, every self is external to 
every other. 
Here it may prove illuminating to compare Rashdall's argument 
with that of Lotze, on whose support he draws at this point in combating 
absolutism. The two arguments are similar in that they both regard 
personality in man as but a partial approximation to the full and 
Derfect personality which can be attributed to God alone; moreover, 
they are alike in that they both find the essence of personality in 
the self-existence of a centre of conscious experience. To a certain 
extent, this association with Lotze renders Rashdall's argument 
impervious to the objection, which nevertheless has been frequently 
urged against him, that he conceives of God "merely as one of the 
selves". This objection is unfair if it neglects the fact that Rashdall 
1. Rashdall deprecates such expressions, but I can find no better 
word. I do not mean it to minimize the importance of his contention 
that one self may have genuine (inferential) knowledge of another. 
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does not regard God as confronted by other beings of the same status. 
The distinction between perfect and imperfect personality remains, 
and the selves who are external to God's Being as centres of 
consciousness, are nevertheless dependent upon him for their creation 
and continued existence. Rashdall's argument seems to be more 
consistent than Lotze's at one point; for the latter writes that 
because 'full Personality is possible only for the Infinite, perfect 
Personality is in God only'1. If "infinity" be construed strictly, 
as excluding nothing, it is difficult to see how Lotze can reconcile 
his own conception of personality with it. 
Yet there is still a great deal to be said for the contention that 
Rashdall arbitrarily retains this one characteristic of "impenetrability", 
which is associated with human limitations, as applicable to divine 
personality, after having relinquished such limitations in every other 
respect. However proper it may be to remain agnostic concerning the 
mode of God's self-conscious existence, it is fair to ask whether what 
his own theory implies at this point is more intelligible than any 
other. If, for example, his belief in divine omniscience is pressed, 
then clearly he must say that although the immediate experience of a 
human self is never directly present to God's mind in the same sense 
that it is directly present to the mind of the individual, nevertheless 
God's knowledge of this experience is perfect and complete, while the 
individual's knowledge of it is not. Yet how can this be the case, so 
long as the experience in question is regarded as internal to the 
conscious life of the individual, but external to that of God? 
Rashdall may well ask, however, whether one can give up the 
conception of God as a centre of consciousness distinct from every other, 
1. Microcosmus. E.T. Vol. II, p. 685. 
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without falling into an absolutism which is really alien to 
ethical theism. So long as thinking, feeling and willing are 
regarded as necessarily correlative with the existence of a 
particular centre of consciousness, his arguments on this score 
are, indeed, well -nigh unanswerable; but it might be urged, with 
considerable foundation, that the very distinctions which he draws 
between these functions as exercised by God and as exercised by 
men, seem to indicate that this correlation cannot be pressed with 
any confidence with regard to God's consciousness. 
Many advocates of theism would admit what he has to say 
concerning the externality of one self to another, and for this 
very reason they would protest that an individual cannot be 
regarded as external to God in the same sense that he is external 
to other human selves. Admittedly consciousness, as we know it, 
cannot include another consciousness; but Rashdall himself (they 
might urge) does not attribute consciousness as we know it to God. 
Such a position necessarily relinquishes Rashdall's conception of 
personality1 as applicable to God, but its proponents would not 
admit that this involves relinquishing the conception of God as 
a conscious Mind or Spirit2. 
'Thus I should say, writes Dr. Webb, 'that if by affirming 
the "Personality of God" we mean that the relation of man to God 
is such as that in which the religious man knows himself to stand - 
a relation which expresses itself in prayer, worship, thanksgiving - 
1. I.e., in so far as it involves the idea that God is a particular 
centre of consciousness external to every other. 
2. Rashdall rightly protests, it seems to me, against Pringle - 
Pattison's terminology when the latter uses "God" in one sense 
as a conscious centre distinct from the Absolute, and in another 
sense as an all- inclusive Being identical with the Absolute. 
(Cf. Church Quarterly Review, Vol. XC, p. 43). In the succeeding 
discussion I attempt to throw some light on the question as to 
whether God can be conceived as a Mind which is (a) more than 
the finite selves included in it, and yet (b) not a centre of 
consciousness separate from or external to these elements which 
it includes. 
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then to deny the personality of God is to make religious experience 
illusory; but that on the other hand the very relation, which is 
thus experienced, is quite distinguishable from the relation of 
one finite person to another finite person. So that, if we 
refuse to use the word "personality" except of a finite person, 
I think we must deny that "personality" in this sense can be 
rightly attributed to God'(1). 
This alternative view will appeal to theists who feel that -6,4d2,105 
theory fails adequately to explain how God integrates the 
various experiences of human selves, each of which affords a 
partial knowledge of the material world and in so doing affords 
a partial knowledge of the divine experience which unifies the 
whole material world. The explanation of these facts demands a 
community of knowledge which cannot be accounted for merely in 
terms of inference2. 
Again, Rashdall's theory sunders content from reality, because 
he holds that a content may be "common" to many selves, while its 
"reality" cannot be3. He would reply that "reality" is constituted 
by a conscious experience which contains content, but which is not 
exhausted by it; this content as experienced is not sundered from 
reality; but the content of knowledge or purpose qua "common to many 
selves" is a universal which is abstracted from the conscious 
1. Problems in the Relations of God and Man, p. 252. 
2. So long as God is regarded as organic to the world, this criticisn 
of Rashdall could be based on the realistic, as well as on the 
idealistic position. The idealist protests because he conceives 
of the common physical world as internal to the life of God, and 
the individual's partial knowledge of it as non -inferential. The 
realist protests because he conceives of this common physical world 
as external to God and to human minds (though not out of relation 
to God, if the realist be theistic), and knowledge of it as like- 
wise non -inferential. The criticisms of idealists like C.F. D'Arcy 
and John Watson are therefore similar in many respects to those of 
a realist like Pringle -Pattison; but Watson fails to understand 
Rashdall when he accuses him of solipsism. Re D'arcy: cf. Proc. 
Arist. Soc. Supplementary Vol. II. (1919), pp. 148 -58. Re Watson: 
cf. his The Philosophical Basis of Religion, pp. 108 ff., and Mind, 
Vol. XVIII, pp. 105 -17; 244 -51. ße Pringle -Pattison: cf.# 299 "n.3. 
3. This applies to community of purpose or goodness, as well as to 
community of knowledge. cf. GE. II, p. 68. 
- 293 - 
experience of any particular selfl. 
1. Rashdall asks whether, if two minds begin with different contents 
and then gradually become increasingly alike in content, at the 
moment when the contents become "identical" they would become one 
mind; and he answers in the negative. (cf. Proc. krist. Soc. Sup. 
Vol. 2., pp. 109 ff.). Now we have already found reason for 
supposing that he can never declare that the contents can be 
numerically identical; but if the question is asking what would 
happen if they could be, then the answer - on strict Berkeleian 
principles - would have to be in the affirmative. The identity 
which Rashdall really has in mind is not, however, numerical; it 
is what remains when one has abstracted from individual differences; 
but even so, the answer should be in the affirmative, because in 
order for all qualitative differences to vanish, the two contents 
would have to be perceived by completely similar organs occupying 
the same points in space -time. 
Even if he could prove his case with regard to human minds, this 
would afford no justification for assuming that there are not 
differences between the divine mind and those of men which are not 
manifest between them qua centres of consciousness. 
Another point may be mentioned here, although it has little 
significance for philosophical theology. Rashdall's view of the 
self cannot make room for the phenomenon of multiple personality, in 
which one mind literally "includes" another; for example, personality 
A may know all that personality B does, while B has no knowledge 
of A. (cf. Morton Prince: The Dissociation of a Personality). 
This evidence has little bearing upon religious belief because the 
latter has to do with a conviction that there can be harmony of 
will and purpose between God and men. Nor does multiple personality 
indicate that an "inclusive" mind is necessarily righteous and 
benevolent. Dr. Schiller once suggested that a God conceived on 
this sort of an analogy would be mad. (cf. Proc. Arist. Soc. Sup. 
Vol. 2., pp. 140 ff.). 
Any evidence tending to substantiate telepathy as an empirical 
fact is also incompatible with Rashdall's views concerning our 
necessarily inferential knowledge of the contents of other minds. 
Finally, Rashdall's identification of reality with conscious 
centres implies that "reality" expands in accordance with the birth- 
rate; and because of immortality, it is continually expanding. 
He rejects Bradley's conception of degrees of reality (cf. # 146); 
as centres of conscious experience, therefore, human minds are 
segments of reality additional to and equal in reality to God's 
mind. I pass over the question as to at what point in the evolution 
of the individual or the race there begins to be a reality external 
to the mind of God, because Rashdall has admitted that it cannot 
be answered (cf. # 131 f. ). But the statement - that "personality 
is a matter of degree" (cf. i 131.) - on which he bases this 
admission, is one which seems to be utterly irreconcilable with his 
rejection of Bradley's doctrine. 
And what of animal minds? If he will not contend that an animal, 
like a physical thing, exists only as what it is in relation to God 
and human minds, then is he willing to admit that the experiences 
of animal minds constitute a third type of reality external to 
human and divine experience? If so, could he maintain that this 
"reality "is not different in degree from the other two types? 
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The crucial question here is whether or not Rashdall regards 
God's experience as participating in a universal, which is common 
to that of other selves, in such a sense that the universal itself 
no more "exists" in His mind than it does in the mind of any particular 
human self. In terms of his own theory it is clear that if the 
universal does not exist in God's mind it is not "objectively" valid. 
While if it does exist in His mind, then God is not one of a system 
of selves, externally related to every other; for the experiences of 
these selves are included within this universal. Here his own argument 
concerning relations might well be used against him; he has admitted 
that every self stands in a relationship to God of which the self 
is not constantly aware; when this is the case, Rashdall's idealistic 
theory of relations would require him to say that this relation 
exists only in God's mind. In other words, God's relation to human 
selves is internal to His mind, not external. If one self cannot 
thus include another, then the only alternative is to admit that God 
is not a self in this limited sense. 
Rashdall protests against this alternative on the ground that it 
makes God an abstract universal without any existence or self- identity 
other than that of the particular selves which it includes. In reply 
an analogy might be suggested which is at least as legitimate as his 
own, inasmuch as both move from the known to the unknown. The human 
mind is an inclusive unity, although it contains diverse elements 
(sensations, emotions, conations, concepts, etc.) which arise from our 
experience of an impersonal material world; this unity insures their 
proper qualities and relations to these elements, without transmuting 
them into something else, and without being merely co- extensive with 
them. The self contains diverse elements without being a mere 
aggregate of conscious phases or statesi. On this basis an analogy 
1. Rashdall would agree with the argument up to this point. 
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might be drawn whereby it is suggested that, similarly, human selves 
are unified in the all -inclusive mind of God in such a way as to 
secure to each its own individual identity. Just as the self 
includes sub -personal elements within a personal identity, so God 
includes selves within an all- embracing, supra -personal identity to 
which nothing is external; but this identity is something more than 
a mere aggregate of the selves which participate in it. The analogy 
implies that this "something more" is not separate from or external 
to these finite centres of consciousness (i.e., as one centre is 
external to another), any more than the unity of the self is separate 
from or external to its phases or states. The dependence of human 
selves upon God, which Rashdall fully admits, will then be due to the 
fact that a self, abstracted from the supra -personal whole into which 
it enters, is as inconceivable as is an isolated sensation or emotion 
when abstracted from the unified life of the self. All this can be 
said without affirming that finite selves can merge subjectively. 
Some other aspects of the question at issue will be discussed 
presently; it may be asked here, however, whether to conceive of bad 
men as thus included within the Being of God is any more or any less 
objectionable, on ethical grounds, than to conceive of God as in 
some sense causing their bad actions. Furthermore, whether this is 
a feature to be welcomed or deplored, it is clear that the view based 
on our analogy can express the notion that God is both transcendent 
and immane.ent1, as a self is both transcendent of and immanent in 
the particular elements which enter into its experience. The more 
fully one recognizes the multiplicity and individuality of the human 
spiritual world, the more difficult does it become to explain its 
1. I here use these terms in Rashdall's sense. He regards God as 
transcendent only, because he holds that He is external to all 
other selves. 
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unity so long as God is regarded solely as transcendent, as external 
to human selves. And to whatever extent Rashdall admits that this 
externality does not limit God's relation to selves as it limits our 
relation to other selves, he lessens in a corresponding measure the 
force of his "personalistic" argument. Even if one grants his point 
that the subjective experiences of individuals cannot enter into the 
mind of God with the same immediacy that they enter into the mind of 
the individual, is not a "Self" who can perfectly know all that other 
selves know, will all that they will, and feel that they feel, 
necessarily a Being who transcends the limitations which Rashdall 
places upon the idea of divine Personality? 
Finally, the foregoing considerations tend to weaken the cogency 
of his argument when he asserts that because we can know other human 
selves only inferentially, we can know God only inferentially. To 
whatever extent he admits that God's relation to us surmounts the 
barriers which separate other selves from us, he must admit that God's 
communication to us of His will and nature is not circumscribed by 
restrictions similar to those placed upon human intercourse. I do 
not propose to dwell further upon this point because it is not affected 
by whether or not one agrees that knowledge of another human self must 
be inferential; and a discussion of the idea of revelation (to which 
we shall turn presently) should suffice to elucidate Rashdall's views 
on that question without touching directly upon his theories concerning 
the "impenetrability" of personality. 
4. Purpose, Evil and Freedom. 
The idea of causation is important, quite apart from Rashdall's 
idealistic employment of it, because of its logical connexion with 
the notion of cosmic purpose, which theistic writers naturally interpret 
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in terms of divine will1. All theistic writers must confront the 
problem of how divine causality, which creates and sustains the very 
instruments through which it operates, can be at all analogous to 
human volition, which we exercise primarily through the effort 
demanded by a more or less recalcitrant environment. Purposiveness 
seems to be allied with the limitations involved in human conation 
and feeling; it operates through selection and construction in the 
adjustment of available means toward the realization of an end yet 
to be attained. 
In what respects, then, is purposiveness attributable to God, 
and in order to be so, in what respects must it be purged of human 
associations? It is clear, in the first place, that God's creative 
activity cannot be conceived narrowly on the analogy of a designer 
who adapts himself to conditions independent of his intellect and 
will2; Rashdall renounces the argument from design in this form, In 
his conception the end is not severed from the process; it is, rather, 
the key to the interpretation of the process as an organic whole. 
Purpose does not supervene upon the natural order; it is immanent in 
it throughout its extent. 
Again, divine purpose transcends human purposes in the sense 
that the latter are often not wholly rational, not universally worth 
achieving. In the teleological activity of a divine Mind, who is 
subject to no conditions external to His own nature, the outcome 
justifies the process. 
At two points, however, Rashdall retains characteristics which 
1. Rashdall's defence of the validity of the idea of causation itself, 
is incidental to the wider argument, and any discussion of this 
prior question would be too extensive an undertaking for this 
thesis, especially since the recent development of the "regularity" 
theory at Cambridge. 
2. Rashdall tends to agree with the Thomist view that God's will is 
determined by His reason. 
9 
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he believes to qualify all purposiveness. First, he cannot escape 
a temporal reference, for he refuses to regard process are illusory. 
Yet the fact remains that God's creative activity must be continually 
the realization of perfect goodness (i.e., of the greatest possible 
goodness); if this be regarded as a contradiction, he could only 
reply that the sustenance of the supreme values, as God's eternally 
realized purpose, seems to require the temporal process. Why this 
is the case - that is, why the temporal world exists at all, - must 
remain an unfathomable mystery. If, then, there is a cosmic goal, 
which from the temporal perspective is not yet achieved, this can 
only be because it is continually being achieved through the temporal 
process, which is the only possible means for bringing it about. 
Secondly (and this follows necessarily from the preceding point), 
he retains the notion that purposiveness, even in God, implies 
something akin to effort. The necessity under which God operates is 
not external to His nature, nor is it willed by Him. It arises from 
the fact that He is a determinate Being in whom "conation co- exists 
with fruition "1. In other words, we have no data for conceiving of 
Him in abstraction from His nature as Creator. Volition cannot be 
attributed to Him in a sense which suggests the possibility of a free 
choice between achieving His ends through process or achieving them 
through fiat; but it can be attributed to Him in a sense which implies 
the continuous affirmation of His own essence as creative Goodness. 
Before turning to a consideration of the relation of this 
conception to human freedom, it is important to note that, although 
Rashdall regards the problem of time (i.e., whether or not the time - 
series is infinite) as insoluble, his position really requires the view 
1. I think this is Bosanquet's phrase, but it is applicable in this 
context to Rashdall's position. 
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that creation is eternal, not in time1; the notion that the world 
and the divine activity which sustains it are coeval with God's 
existence, is in agreement not only with the results of the foregoing 
discussion, but also with the principle that subject and object are 
meaningless abstractions when conceived apart from one another2. 
Augustine's suggestion that the world was created cum tempore, non 
in tempore would appeal to him as unsatisfactory because it postulates 
an absolute beginning of time, and thus still involves an initial 
abstraction of God's existence from the creative process. The Greek 
doctrine of the eternity of matter, against which the Christian 
conception of creation ex nihilo arose, is conversely unsatisfactory 
because it likewise postulates an absolute beginning of God's creative 
activity, prior to which matter existed. 
One other special point deserves attention here. Professor 
Pringle -Pattison has criticized Rashdall's views on the ground that 
when divine activity is regarded as motivating every natural event it 
becomes indistinguishable from mere physical force3. Efficient 
causality, he contends, is a category which is applicable only within 
the physical world; accordingly he maintains that it cannot express 
relations in which God, as a spiritual Being, is involved. He does 
speak of God as willing, but the action of His spirit upon human 
spirits operates after the manner of final causation, and is not at all 
analogous to physical force. 
1. Cf. # 141 ff. 
2. The advantage of this position is greatly lessened, however, 
because of his Berkeleian "mentalism ", which prevents him from 
asserting that the archetypal world - existing as the object of 
God's thought - is cominontito (i.e. numerically identical ;with) 
the world which we know,` Vhus his position is always open to the 
charge that it divests reality of that genuine "otherness" which 
gives rise to the common content of all minds, human and divine. 
3. Cf. Mind. Vol. XXVIII, pp. 17f. For the entire dispute with 
Pringle -Pattison cf. his The Idea of God, 387 ff., 407 n., and 
Mind, Tome cit., pp. 1 -18; and Rashdall's replies: Mind, Vol. XXVII, 
pp. 261 -83; Proc. Arist. Soc., Supplementary Vol. II, pp. 114 ff.; 
Church Quart. Review, Vol. XC, pp. 40 -44. 
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Rashdall would admit this last point, but he would include 
efficient as well as final causation in a spiritual category which 
must not be confused with the principle of uniformity in nature, 
although the former explains the latter1. Granting that a soul is 
created, not ab extra, but through a process in which it is given 
an opportunity to "make" itself, he asks whether the ordering of 
nature, which the efficacy of this process entails, is itself uncaused. 
He contends that it is unintelligible to conceive of God as willing 
good ends, through the exercise of final causation, without willing 
the means also. Indeed, Pringle -Pattison's criticism seems to 
overlook his own doctrine that the realization of value depends upon 
the stability of the natural order, of which God is the "cause" (if 
only in the sense of being the ratio whose nature is expressed in the 
system as a whole)2. Rashdall cogently urges that it is difficult to 
conceive of how God's nature can thus afford an explanation of the 
particular things and events which enter into this system if He does 
not exercise efficient causation in relation to them3. 
The fundamental difficulty remains that if the time -series is 
infinite, efficient causality must be 'initially" contemporaneous with 
its effect4; but this is not insuperable, Rashdall claims, so long as 
one renounces Pringle -Pattison's notion that one event causes another, 
and recognizes that the true cause of the infinite series is a 
spiritual Being who persists through the succession of events. Moreover, 
because he interprets causation in terms of will, Pringle -Pattison 
must attribute some sort of volitional "activity" to physical events 
1. Cf. # 94 f. 
2. Pringle -Pattison admits that God is the cause of the natural order 
in this sense. 
3. Cf. The Idea of God, Ch. XVI, and Mind, Vol. XXVII, pp. 270 ff. 
4. Rashdall admits this difficulty in the case of an infinite time - 
series; I should think it more likely to appear in the case of 
a finite time- series, but I do not propose to discuss the problem. 
- 301 - 
themselves, or regard them as uncaused. 
ae are now in a position to discuss a problem so difficult that 
almost any theistic system falls into formal contradiction in 
attempting to solve itl. In terms of Rashdall's thought it takes 
the following form; If God's volition embraces the whole temporal 
process, then what men will must fall within this inclusive purpose. 
On the other hand, if human willing is distinct from God's, as his 
whole system requires, then God's power would seem to be externally 
limited. How can Rashdall affirm that God is finite in the sense that 
He does not include human wills, and at the same time assert that this 
finitude does not involve any limitation which is ultimately external 
to His power? Rashdall's reply, of course, is that what men will, so 
far as content is concerned, must fall within the divine purpose; but 
in willing, as an aspect or function of the self's existence, every 
human individual remains distinct from the will of God as an aspect 
of His existence. Just as in cognition our knowing is distinct from 
God's knowledge of it, although He remains omniscient, so in volition 
our willing is distinct from God's, though it falls within His purpose 
and He is all -powerful. Whether such a position does not require an 
extension of the idea of divine personality beyond the limits which 
Rashdall places upon it, is a question which has already been mentioned; 
certainly nothing in human experience can provide an analogy for a 
self, in Rashdall's sense, on whom other selves are thus dependent. 
It should be noted, however, that to conceive of God as including 
human wills (in such a sense that individual personality is not 
destroyed but fully realized therein, because God's purpose is more than 
a mere aggregate of these wills, and bestows on them an organic unity) 
1. I do not mean to imply that the problem has no rational solution; 
in what follows it will appear why I must confess that I have 
not yet found one. 
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does not necessarily imply that He is omnipotent in the sense of 
being indeterminate. In short, such a conception is quite reconcilable 
with the sense in which Rashdall conceives of God as limited solely 
by the necessary character of His own nature as Creator and as Goodness. 
The question immediately arises, on Rashdall's view, as to 
whether our exercise of volition (granting that it remains distinct 
from God from the point of view of subjective origin) can ever go 
contrary to what God wills if we are dependent for our existence and 
thus for our power of action upon the fact that these latter fall 
within the divine purpose. The problem as to how one can say that sin 
retains its intrinsic character as rebellion against God, without in 
some way admitting an external limitation upon His power, seems to be 
not susceptible of a rational solution. Hence I shall not cavil 
against Rashdall because his proffered solution fails to accomplish 
the impossible. He admits that sin, although it is contrary to the 
will of God, must arise as a result of the necessary conditions which 
determine the mode of God's creative activity; but ultimately sin falls 
within the divine purpose because the temporal process within which 
sin occurs is the continual realization, in so far as possible, of 
God's essential goodness. This position, then, involves a formal 
contradiction: sin is contrary to the will of God, yet He must cause 
it (i.e. will it) in the process of fulfilling what is in accordance 
with His will. 
Rashdall's distinction (/1 125) between man, who wills evil as 
such, and God, who wills evil only as a necessary means to a good 
which redeems it, fails to remove this difficulty. For that men 
should will evil as such must somehow fall within the divine purpose 
as a limiting condition. 
Therefore in replying to McTaggart's question, ... 1How can God's 
nature at once impel towards an end and yet be the sole obstacle to 
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his realising that end ?'1 Rashdall admits that there may be no 
ultimate answer2. Many critics3 have failed to do justice to the 
answer which he does give, however, because they assume that the 
necessity which imposes limitation upon God's power must either be 
willed by Him or be external to His nature. In reality Rashdall 
adopts neither alternative, and it is possible to avoid them both. 
He claims that although God possesses "all the power there is ", this 
is insufficient to bring about His perfectly good ends without 
employing any evil means whatever; but this insufficiency is not itself 
willed at all; it merely sets the limits to what God, as perfect 
Goodness, can will. Is theism destroyed, then, by a theory which 
admits that God, although He does not cause this limitation, does 
cause the evil which arises necessarily as the result of it? To claim 
that it is destroyed assumes, it seems to me, that possibility and 
impossibility are alike to God; and for several reasons this is 
indefensible. As has been argued already, to attribute volition to 
God does not imply that He chose to create this world after freely 
considering a number of alternatives. The actual world is the ground 
of the distinction between possibility and impossibility, and to 
conceive either of God or of some "possible" world, apart from or 
prior to the actual world involves meaningless abstraction. As 
creative Goodness, God's nature is determinate. 
However difficult this conception may be, it is preferable to 
either alternative. For to hold that God is externally limited by 
the conditions which determine His nature is to assume that truth 
and goodness have meaning apart from His essential nature. On the 
other hand, to hold that He is not in any sense limited by truth and 
goodness, so that they are the result of His fiat rather than 
1. Some Dogmas of Religion, p. 232. 
2. Cf. Mind, Vol. XV, p. 540. 
3. E.g., Pringle -Pattison in The Idea of God, pp. 387 ff., and 
R.B. Tollinton in The Modern Churchman, Vol. V, pp. 532 f. 
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necessary aspects of His nature, is to assume that contradiction of 
the laws of logic and wanton hatred of mankind are "possible" for 
Him. Hence Rashdall claims that just as God's intellect is limited 
by rationality, so His power is limited by what perfect goodness can 
accomplish. In this sense a world with less evil is impossible. Why 
this should be the case is ultimately inexplicable. 
The chief difficulty in Rashdall's theory arises in connexion 
with the sense in which God may be said to be the cause of evil. If 
I understand his doctrine of double causality (r 123), it implies that 
although human volition is genuinely distinct from God's, nevertheless 
every occurrence is willed by God. Accordingly, every action which 
men cause is in some sense willed by God at the same time; from the 
point of view of self -hood, two wills are thus involved; but from the 
point of view of what is willed they are identicall. Occurrences which 
lie beyond the province of human voluntary control are of course 
caused by God alone. It is on the basis of this hypothesis that 
Rashdall differentiates sharply between causation in which a human self 
is active, and that which takes place at a mechanical level. 
Solely within the terms of his own deterministic position, however, 
this theory cannot ultimately escape the idea of external limitation of 
God's power. This can be shown by comparing it with its opposite. 
Obviously indeterminism could be supported in a fashion which would be 
more compatible with emphasis upon the distinctness of human volition 
from God's. Moreover, it can give a satisfactory account ofithe true 
nature of sin, as literally contrary to the will of God, the 
responsibility for which rests solely upon man. The indeterminist may 
admit that God is responsible for the conditions which give rise to the 
possibility of sin, but not for the sinful action itself; and this 
1. Qualitatively, or "in principle "; not numerically. 
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possibility which God does permit may be regarded as a necessary 
condition of there being a moral order at all - as a necessary 
condition, in other words, of the world's being the best possible. 
On the other hand Rashdall must contend that the sinful action falls 
within the all- inclusive area of what God wills; the difference 
between the divine and the human causation of a sinful action arises 
not from what is willed, for that is the same (or similar), but from 
the character of the two personalities involved. God wills it because 
it is an unavoidable means to the good; man wills it from intrinsically 
evil motives. Unless this latter distinction is wholly abandoned, 
therefore, God does not cause the sinner to have intrineically evil 
motives. Thus there remains a sphere which is external to what God 
wills. For this reason Rashdall fails to reconcile the conception 
of God as free from external limitation with the doctrine that man is 
"free" in the sense of exercising self -determination; and I cannot see 
how any other consistent argument could accomplish this task. 
An attempt to employ indeterminism as an expedient for safeguarding 
God's omnipotence as well as His benevolence soon ends in self - 
contradiction. Rashdall argues rather convincingly that any consistent 
defence of this position implies an external limitation on God's power. 
Apart from this, the indeterminist who urges that God Himself wills 
that men shall be free, ends in a contradiction similar to the one 
already noticed. For in plain language this argument is reducible 
to the notion that the fulfilment of God's purpose entails that men 
shall be empowered to obstruct the fulfilment of His purpose. 
Some indeterminists attempt to avoid this dilemma by contending 
that because God's time -span is infinite, His understanding embraces 
knowledge of all events, past, present and future, in an immediate 
intuition. This view differs from Rashdall's in so far as it implies 
that man is free to act within certain spheres in a way which God does 
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not cause in any sense; but both agree that God foreknows that human 
action will ultimately serve the purpose which He does will, namely, 
the fulfilment of the moral order. Rashdall's deterministic position, 
however, is much more compatible with this conception of divine 
foreknowledge. How is it possible to contend, for example, that God 
foreknows not only the possibility, but the actuality of sin, without 
at the same time admitting that God causes sin in the sense of willing 
the condition (human freedom) which gives rise to it? Again, 
indeterminists often maintain that universal knowledge does not 
necessarily imply universal determination; but in the nature of the 
case is it not impossible to account for how there could be 
foreknowledge of a genuinely undetermined action? Genuine contingency, 
which sets the cardinal distinction between determinism and 
indeterminism, implies that God Himself cannot foreknow whether or not 
the gift of freedom will ultimately fulfil, instead of defeat, His 
universal moral purpose. The argument that God may know human minds 
from within, even if it is valid, does not afford any avenue of 
escape from this for the indeterminist. For surely the individual 
himself, on an indeterministic theory,,does not know the character 
of his spontaneous acts until they are performed. 
Is there any rationally consistent view which can claim that man 
is the sole cause of sinful actions, without admitting the possibility 
that God's purposes may ultimately be frustrated? I shall only 
suggest an outline of the preliminary requirements of such a view. In 
the first place, it must avoid one of the contradictions just discussed 
by relinquishing the conception of divine foreknowledge in the sphere 
of free moral actionl. In the second place, it must eschew Rashdall's 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. The principle of indeterminacy in physics may affect the question 
of God's foreknowledge and determination of mechanical events; but 
this must not be confused with the topic now being discussed. 
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attempt to maintain that whatever power man does have, although it 
is external to God's power as selves are external to one another, is 
not external in the sense that it may go contrary to what He, on His 
part, wills1. These are the demands of speculation; they cannot 
satisfy the religious consciousness, which accepts belief in God as 
ultimate reality, together with belief in the reality of moral evil, - 
not as a speculative theory, but as a paradox of faith. So far as 
rational argument is concerned, however, Rashdall has shown that anyone 
who regards his determinism as incompatible with full moral 
responsibility, must either fall into contradiction or admit divine 
limitation at two points where he refuses to do sot. Nor is it possible 
to argue that because moral freedom is a necessary condition without 
which God's creative purpose could not be fulfilled, therefore, because 
moral freedom is real, His purpose is being or will be fulfilled. The 
utmost that can be said on an indeterministic basis is that, though 
freedom to sin is real, it results in spiritual death; in accordance 
with the extent to which, through the self -discipline learned under 
freedom, men become concerned in the triumph of the spiritual order, 
and hence in the destiny of their own souls, sin will promote its 
own destruction, righteousness its own conservation3. 
1. I have confined myself in the foregoing to the problem of sin, 
because it is paramount for a deterministic view like Rashdall's. 
For an indeterministic theory the paramount problem is man's 
initiation of moral goodness. Thus arises the antinomy: either God 
is in no sense responsible for the moral goodness and evil of human 
actions, or He is in some sense responsible for both. In either 
case His goodness implies some form of limitation. But it would be 
difficult to find a theological system which remains within these. 
confines. The strict Calvinist, for example, somehow reconciles 
belief in God's unfailing love with an array of notions like 
omnipotence, total depravity and irresistible grace. 
2. I.e., re divine foreknowledge and undetermined human action. 
3. Theistic belief does not necessarily postulate that all moral evil 
will be conquered or extinguished; so long as the future life is 
envisaged as temporal, the necessity for moral effort in the future 
life against the presence of evil is neither more nor less inexplic- 
able than it is in this life. Rashdall himself is inclined to doubt 
Origen's optimism concerning the salvation of all souls. (Cf. 
Atonement, p. 458). 
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This last point must not be confused with the conception that 
the natural order is so constructed that evil contains the seeds of 
its own destruction; for on the plane of natural evolution it is 
difficult to argue that traits which give rise to moral evil are 
self -eliminating. On the contrary, they often possess survival value 
in a high degree; hence on this level the evidence is indecisive, 
although, conversely, the survival value of traits which give rise 
to altruism and love should not be miñ thited. As an environment fit 
for the education of morally free agents, the natural order is malleable 
to both good and evil purposes. Moreover, the threat of physical 
death or misfortune as a consequence of moral evil, though it may play 
an appropriate part in the discipline of embodied souls, does not 
disclose the true meaning of freedom, wherein moral maturity can be 
attained solely through factors which lie within the sphere of 
individual assent. 
The question of physical evil presents the final aspect of our 
problem. Rashdall has rightly urged that an indeterministic view of 
sin does nothing to account for the origin of evils which are not 
related to moral factors. The problem can be avoided by maintaining 
the Kantian view that only the good will is good; in that case pain 
is intrinsically neither good nor bad, and hence its reality occasions 
nothing incompatible with belief in God's goodness, though it does 
require some explanation as to how pain conduces to making life better 
(i.e. morally better) than it would be without itl. This is not 
Rashdall's view, however, and the problem of pain is doubly important 
for him because he attributes efficient causality to God in willing the 
laws of nature. This seems to necessitate the hypothesis that the 
particular evils which attend the operation of natural law are willed 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Cf. R.G. Collingwood's article entitled "'What is the Problem of 
Evil ?" in Theology, Vol. I, pp. 66 -74. 
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by God as means to a particular good end. Therefore he must believe 
that no particular physical evil is ever greater than is necessary for 
the welfare either of the suffering individual or of some other person. 
It is not solely for this reason that Rashdall believes in personal 
immortality, but this belief does afford him the only possible ground 
for an adequate solution to the problem thus raised. Even so, he does 
not attempt to explain how sufferings which in this life do not 
conduce to human welfare - and he admits that they occur - can be 
instrumental to some future well -being which will justify them. 
I shall merely mention a solution which seems to me to be more 
satisfactory. Some degree of regularity in the natural order can be 
shown to be requisite for the nurture of moral beings; and the onus 
of proof lies on anyone who claims that such a natural order could 
serve this good function without giving rise collaterally to pain. 
Hence the theistic solution to the problem would in this case take the 
form, not of showing that pain necessarily conduces in every instance 
to moral good, but of showing that it necessarily attends the regular 
operation of the natural order, which is good as a whole because it is 
instrumental to the temporal appearance and maintenance of the moral 
order. Then the maldistribution of value in the lives of individuals, 
so far as physical evil is concerned, will be taken as not specifically 
willed by God at all. Against this theory Rashdall would doubtless 
press the question as to how God could will the general uniformity of 
natural law without willing the particular operations incidental to 
which the evil in question arises. To this there could be no complete 
answer; but when the absence of a moral order is seen to be the 
alternative to natural regularity, it is possible to contend that all 
individuals share to such an extent in the benefits which result from 
this regularity that the evils attendant upon it, though in some 
particular instances they do not conduce to moral improvement, are 
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nevertheless worth the price. 
5. The Objectivity of the Moral Law. 
Rashdall's theistic argument from the objectivity of the 
absolute moral ideal ( # 112 f.) which can exist only for some mind 
and yet is neither apprehended nor realized fully by any human mind, 
has been criticized by Dr. Tennant'. It must be admitted that the 
word "absolute ", which Rashdall uses in this connexion, is open to 
misconstruction. He does not mean it to suggest a morality which has 
no connexion with particular circumstances; he merely means that 
because moral goodness, like physical nature, is presented to our 
minds instead of being created by them in the act of judgment, it must 
have an "existence" which is not dependent upon our apprehension of 
it. Here the idealistic argument (when corrected as above) and the 
moral argument are parallel to each other. 
Nevertheless this argument, if it is valid, must be applicable 
to all universal propositions. The moral ideal of which Rashdall 
is speaking falls in the class of universal propositions which are 
true without necessarily being true of anything actual in space and 
time2. Rashdall's Berkeleian metaphysics lead him to say that all 
such propositions3 "exist" in the mind of God; but in order to avoid 
confusion it is necessary to note that most writers would prefer to 
say that such non -existential propositions "subsist ". All propositions 
which are true whether or not they are realized in fact (and moral 
judgments are of this nature) must be regarded as hypothetical; but 
it may be possible to hold that, in the case of moral judgments, such 
1. Cf. Philosophical Theology, Vol. II, pp. 97 f. 
2. At least, so far as our knowledge goes; and I think that Rashdall 
would admit that the moral ideal as it "exists" in God's mind, 
while it is relevant to all temporal events of a moral character, 
might also be in some sense supra -temporal. 
3. E.g., the laws of logic. Cf. Leibniz' theistic proof based on 
the necessity of postulating a God to think these laws. 
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propositions always refer to characteristics of actual existents, 
while they (i.e. moral judgments) remain hypothetical only because 
they are valid whether or not these characteristics are ever actually 
related in a certain wayl. But Rashdall's system requires him to 
say that all valid hypothetical propositions, whether or not they 
possess this bearing on existence (as we know it)2, nevertheless 
"exist" in the mind of God. Dr. Tennant seems to me to be unfair 
to Rashdall, however, when he suggest that 'ideals and ideas may 
thus "exist" without even being valid'3; Rashdall's point is that 
when we pronounce propositions which remain valid even though they 
may refer to nothing actual in space and time, these propositions 
can be valid only because they refer to a sphere of reality wider 
than existence as we know it. Invalid propositions, he would say, 
do not refer to anything real; and while it is true that valid and 
invalid propositions alike as psychological 
subject, the very distinction between them is that the former agree 
with an objective reality while the latter do not. 
Rashdall might have avoided such misinterpretation by frankly 
distinguishing between "reality" and "existence" (as we know it), 
making the former a term which includes the latter and much else besides4. 
1. For example, willingness on the part of one man to sacrifice his 
life for another in a noble cause is judged to be good, whether 
anyone has actually done so or not; but all the characteristics 
involved can be conceived only as possessed by existing persons. 
So far as I understand his views, this is Professor Sorley's meaning 
when he writes of 'value as a unique predicate with a definite 
bearing upon existence'. (Moral Values and the Idea of God, p. xiv; 
cf. pp. 76 f.). 
2. And some, like those of geometry, almost certainly do not, though, 
as Sorley suggests, they may be radically different from moral 
propositions. 
3. 02. cit., p. 98. 
4. Sorley adopts this expedient; cf. 2E. cit., pp. 206 ff. Professor 
Taylor prefers to widen the terms "existence" and "actuality" to 
include "values and "ideals" as well as the spatio -temporal world. 
(Cf. The Faith of a Moralist, Vol. I, pp. 51 -55). 
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Still, his meaning is clear; all propositions (true and false) 
which are ever entertained at all "exist" subjectively in some 
mind; but when a proposition would remain valid even though nothing 
in the spatio -temporal world ever "realized" it, or when it remains 
valid even though no human mind apprehends it, such a proposition 
must accord with or express (as the case may be) something which 
is real only because the latter "exists" in the mind of God; the 
use of "exists ", as contrasted with "subsists ", is - in his system - 
merely a question of language. Rashdall chooses the former term 
because he believes that God exists, and that He thinks all valid 
universals whether or not these universals are, or ever could be, 
concretely realized in particulars. 
This gives rise to the very important question as . to what is 
the relation between God's thought and these universal laws. If 
the moral law "exists" independently of our knowing it, then the 
point which appeared earlier is again raised: Does not an argument 
from analogy indicate that the moral law "exists" independently of 
God's knowing it? Clearly Rashdall must either abandon the analogy 
between human and divine cognition as regards moral value, or he 
must admit that there is a sphere of being which is external to all 
minds, including God's. What he says about the moral law "existing 
in" some mind, and his personalistic system as a whole, constrain 
him to choose the former alternative, just a previously he was 
forced to relinquish the same analogy with regard to knowledge of 
physical objects. It does seem to be true that by the universality of 
a valid moral law we do not mean in this case "valid whether or 
not any mind thinks it "; for the law could not be valid where it is 
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inapplicable, and it is - on any theory - applicable only to the 
lives of persons. For Rashdall, who regards the "thinking" of 
anything impersonal as constituting its existence, to say that 
the moral law is thus dependent upon some mind, without being 
dependent upon our minds, necessarily implies that it exists 
"in" a (presumably) super -human mind. 
It is instructive to notice the parallel which is thus 
established between our knowledge of value and our knowledge of 
the physical world; in both cases our own judgments can apprehend 
directly only what is essentially subjective; they apprehend what 
is objective and independent of our minds as the result of inference 
based on what we do know directly. In our knowledge of the physical 
world concepts as they exist "in our minds" are apprehended 
intuitively or immediately, not inferentially; and Rashdall can hardly 
mean anything more than this when he speaks of our knowledge of value 
as being intuitive or immediate. The "objective" world of value, 
as well as the archetypal world of physical nature, then, exists in 
the mind of God, independently of what we feel, will or t hinkl 
Such a view is compatible with his conteiation that value can reside 
only in some conscious personality, and yet it safeguards him against 
identifying value itself merely with the human states of consciousness 
which it qualifies. His failure to bring out the full significance 
1. If the right and the good are regarded as synthetically related, 
and "right" is made dependent upon motivation (cf. # 256 ff.), 
then the categorical obligatoriness of actions, and the value 
of the ends to which they are directed, are both dependent upon 
the subjective conditions which limit the individual's capacity 
to recognize and to perform his duty; but, granting these 
subjective conditions, propositions which assert categorically 
that an agent ought to perform a certain action, or that a certain 
end ought to be promoted by the agent, remain universally valid. 
They remain valid even when the agent does not recognize his duty, 
because a categorical obligation is one which he can recognize 
and fulfil. Hypothetical propositions likewise remain universally 
valid (as such), and they are of course only hypothetically 
contingent upon the subjective factors just mentioned. 
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of this implication of his theory has already received sufficient 
attention in the expository section'. 
This refusal on Rashdall's part to regard the sphere of 
value as a hierarchy which exists independently of God's mind, 
makes his view one which is often connected with the doctrine 
that the moral law depends upon what God wills arbitrarily. It 
is clear that he cannot accept the scheme of the Timaeus, in 
which the Forms and "Necessity" (as a negative or limiting cause) 
are external to God's Being; yet he certainly repudiates the 
teachings of Duns Scotus and Occam, despite the fact that they, 
with him, regard the Forms (or the order of value) as existing 
"within" instead of "externally to" the mind of God. How Rashdall 
can occupy a position which mediates between two such opposing 
views is easily explicable so long as one remembers that he 
conceives of God as a self- determined Being, neither indeterminate 
nor externally determined. Hence, he would contend, God's will 
can be determined or limited by an order of intrinsic goodness, 
without that order being external to His Mind. God's nature being 
what it is, He could not will what is not perfectly good, and 
1. Cf. 142 ff`, Indeed, there are passages in which Rashdall seems 
to fall into the fallacies connected with his first two arguments 
for idealism, and to argue that value and physical things have 
no existence apart from what the individual mind "creates ". His 
remarks in GE. II, pp. 197 f., for example, seem to be entirely 
incompatible with the theistic view that value and physical 
things exist independently of our cognitive processes and are 
"presented" to our minds instead of "constructed" by them. In 
this passage he uses language which, if consistently applied, 
would condemn his own representative theory as phenomenalistic. 
He writes: 'the more fully it is recognized that in knowledge 
the mind is building up or contributing an essential factor to 
Reality, and not merely recognizing a Reality which is what it 
is quite independently of itself or of any other subject, so 
much the more intelligible does it become that there should be 
a truth which has no external " thing -in- itself" corresponding 
to it'. Here, in attempting to refute realism, he apparently 
forgets everything which he says elsewhere in support of the 
contention that his Berkeleian system can safeguard idealism 
and at the same time explain how value and the physical world 
can be independent of our minds. 
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yet remain Himself. What God "conceives" to be good is thus 
determined, to be sure, by the necessary nature of goodness, 
but this necessary nature is identical with what He, being 
God, wills. Thus the old puzzle as to whether a thing is good 
because God wills it or whether God wills it because it is good, 
is swallowed up in the conviction that God and goodness are 
identical in essence. Absolute goodness is a sphere of being 
which "exists" independently of us; hence it can be attributed 
to us only adjectivally. But it does not exist independently 
of God; hence it cannot be attributed to Him adjectivally; He 
alone is not "good ", but "Goodness "1. While it remains possible 
to distinguish logically between the notions "God wills X ", and 
"X is perfectly good ", it is impossible for the theist to attach 
a meaning to either notion which does not imply the other. 
The entire preceding argument makes it difficult to understand 
how Rashdall can attempt to differentiate between his first 
postulate (the belief in a self which causes its own actions) and 
his second (belief in the existence of God) as regards their 
necessary connexion with an "objective" morality2. When he 
first draws the distinction3, he admits that an atheist could 
find "some meaning" in morality: for example, an atheist could 
say (in Tennant's terminology) that it has an over -individual, 
but not an over -social, validity; but he could not say even this 
without believing in the reality of an active self. So much is 
clear. But a few pages later Rashdall writes: 
1. Cf. A.E. Taylor's remarks Proc. Arist. Soc. Supplementary Vol. 
XI, (1932) pp. 167 f. This essay, entitled "Is Goodness a 
quality ? ", was later republished as the last chapter of his 
Philosophical Studies. 
2. Cf. # 86 f. 
3. Cf. GE. II, p. 212. 
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... 'A certain belief about the self and its relation to 
human action may be described as the primary postulate of 
Ethics, since the incompatibility between its negation and a 
real belief in an objective or absolute Ethic is obvious on 
the face of it, obvious at the level of common -sense thought".. 
The words which I have underlined indicate how this statement differs 
from the preceding one. The only meaning which he ever gives to 
"an objective or absolute Ethic" connects it with the conformity 
(or lack of conformity) of our moral judgments with an independent 
moral law embodied in what God thinks and wills. Hence recognition 
of any relationship between the first postulate and the notion 
of "an objective or absolute Ethic" is obviously logically 
posterior to the apprehension of the latter notion itself; and 
this latter notion, unless Rashdall's whole argument concerning 
the objectivity of the moral law is invalid, is meaningless apart 
from theism. A plain contradiction exists between his first 
statement, in which atheistic morality adheres to the first 
postulate although its ethic is not objective or absolute, and 
his second statement, in which this first postulate is said to 
be necessarily connected with an objective and absolute ethic. 
Nevertheless, we must not permit this contradiction to 
obscure a real distinction which Rashdall has in mind concerning 
the relation between theism and belief in an objective morality. 
It is this: while he must say that a true moral judgment accords 
with a moral law which "exists", independently of our cognition 
of it, in the mind of God, he can yet acknowledge that we may form 
a true moral judgment without knowing that this is the case. It 
is in this sense that moral judgment is autonomous; it is in this 
1. Cgt. GE. II, p. 218. Italics mine. 
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sense that it contains 'no explicit reference' to belief in God, 
although the latter belief is reached by inference 'as soon as the 
attempt is made to developtwhat is contained in the actual moral 
consciousness and to harmonize it with other parts of our experience'1. 
6. Revelation. 
We have just seen that with regard to ethical ideals, as well 
as to physical things, Rashdall asserts that the transcendent object, 
to which a concept or judgment "in" the individual mind refers, can 
be known only inferentially. This assertion affords the key to a 
proper interpretation of his remarks concerning revelation, 
He causes serious confusion by setting reason and intuition in 
sharp contrast when he speaks of religious knowledge, while stoutly 
maintaining, when writing about ethics, that judgments concerning 
value are the work of reason, notwithstanding the fact that they 
are intuitively formed. It is possible to show, I believe, that he 
really regards moral knowledge as a form of revelation, so that the 
distinction between "immediate" moral knowledge and "immediate" 
religious knowledge, which his aversion to mysticism constrains him 
to postulate, is misleading, and conceals the true import of his theory. 
Let us succinctly restate what this theory implies. A moral 
judgment, so far as the individual mind is concerned, is "immediate" 
in the sense that it is not deducible from ulterior logical grounds; 
but the transcendent object to which it refers cannot be apprehended 
directly, if it lies outside the subjective experience of the individual. 
If this judgment is true, however, it affords knowledge which actually 
does accord with the moral law which exists objectively in the mind 
of God, whether or not the individual recognizes that this is the case. 
This latter recognition can arise only through inference, and this 
--------------------------------------------------------------- - - - - -- 
1. 22.. cit., p. 218. 
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inference is based upon the immediate judgment1. Therefore it is 
impossible to acquire a direct knowledge of the objective moral 
law which enables one to say whether or not this particular immediate 
judgment is true or false. 
The chief defect of this theory is not so much what is contains 
in itself (although presently I shall protest against that); from 
the point of view of understanding Rashdall's real meaning, the 
chief defect is that he has here confined himself to an account of 
the ordo cognoscendi. Now so long as he remains faithful to the 
principle that the data which enter into true conceptions and 
judgments are presented to our minds, not constructed by them, - so 
long,that is, as he adheres to the principle that all knowledge is 
made available as the result of divine activity, - an account of the 
ordo cognoscendi is inadequate. It is easy to understand why he 
regards the work of revelation and the work of reason as different 
aspects of the same process; the one is disclosure from the God -ward 
side; the other is apprehension from the manward side. Yet his 
discussion of revelation is almost entirely restricted to his views 
concerning the latter. 
His theory implies that, although a true moral judgment may be 
prior to theistic belief in the ordo cognoscendi, nevertheless our 
"immediate" apprehension of moral truth is posterior to divine 
activity in the ordo essendi. It may be justifiable to claim that the 
process of inference involved in the ordo cognoscendi is an much due 
1. The inference takes the following form: "Because I believe (on the 
ground of immediate insight) that this moral judgment is true, I 
infer that it holds true for all rational creatures, and that it is 
in accord with the objective moral law as it exists in God's mind ". 
Needless to say, a particular moral judgment can be universally true 
in this sense: if it truly asserts that E is good, then this holds 
universally, despite the fact that it may be the duty of A, but not 
of B, to promote E; that is, E may be the best feasible end for A, 
but not for B. Moreover, a proposition which asserted that it 
was A's duty to promote E in that situation would be universally 
true; while a similar proposition concerning B would be universally 
false. 
L 
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to God's activity as is the immediate judgment on which this process 
is based (cf. # 161) . But the fact remains that if this immediate 
judgment is true, its truth presupposes God's existence and activity, 
whether or not the judging individual consciously makes this 
presupposition, or whether or not he even believes in God. In the ordo 
cognoscendi belief in God is a logical consequence of belief in the 
objective truth of moral judgments only because in the ordo essendi 
the existence and activity of God are necessarily prior to this belief. 
The interpretation which we place upon our moral knowledge naturally 
moves from the human sphere to the divine; but this knowledge is itself 
possible only because God has first disclosed it. No subjective fusion 
between God's mind and that of the individual need be postulated at all. 
Rashdall fails to do himself justice because he habitually identifies 
revelation solely with the knowledge that a true moral judgment accords 
with the divine moral law, whereas he could have consistently affirmed 
the theory that what God wills is known to us immediately in true 
moral judgments. In the ordo essendi the primary data of revelation, 
and the primary act in man's apprehension of them, are to be found in 
this immediate moral judgment itself. 
His objection to mysticism is based upon a refusal to believe (a) 
that one mind can know the content of another mind, as it presents 
itself subjectively to that other mind, or (b) that one mind can 
otherwise know non -inferentially that a given content is present to 
another mind. It is possible to defend the latter against his objectinns 
without affirming the former. In any case, however, both of these 
points could be granted to Rashdall, without making it necessary to deny 
that the content which is directly present to one mind may also be 
directly present to another; thus he might have put forward a theory of 
direct, non -inferential knowledge of what God discloses, no matter what 
theory he espoused concerning how man comes to recognize this knowledge 
for what it is. 
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If this had always been made clear, he could have spared himself 
the appearance of arguing, in practice, that God must conform to the 
moral judgments of men. He might also have avoided the appearance 
of testing Christian doctrine by ethical canons which are "independently 
true ", if this latter phrase be taken to mean "independent of the 
sphere of revelation ". Perhaps it is true, as he claims, that moral 
judgments provide the only data for knowing God's character; but, if 
so, this is only because moral truth falls within the sphere of 
revelation, and for that reason may be made a ground for distinguishing 
between what is revealed (i.e., what is in accordance with God's will) 
and what is not. Once this be acknowledged, much of what he says 
concerning moral judgment may be taken as a fair description of the 
manner in which recognition of duty brings home to the minds and 
hearts of men what it is that God wants them to do. 
Some critics have objected that Rashdall's theory of revelation 
fails to provide certainty in any form. A conviction that an individual 
moral judgment is certainly either true or false, they protest, does 
nothing whatever to help determine which is the case in any given 
instance; and so long as our own immediate moral insights are uncertain, 
the theistic conclusion which follows as an inference from them is 
likewise uncertain. Rashdall could of course reply to the latter 
criticism that the very possibility of a judgment's being objectively 
true or false ultimately implies (in his Berkeleian system) a belief in 
God. But I cannot see how any theory of revelation can possibly escape 
the former dilemma; for to hold that any fact or teaching is revealed 
is to formulate an individual judgment about it, however humbly one may 
admit that the revelation transcends his own powers of comprehension; 
and this judgment is either true or false, but no criterion more ultimate 
than this judgment, and the immediate insight on the basis of which one 
believes its subject to be revealed (if the judgment is not its own 
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ground), can determine which it is in any given instance. Or if it 
be claimed that it is in a Person, not in propositions, that revelation 
resides, Rashdall would certainly agree, but he might add that individual 
appreciation of the significance of this Person is subject to precisely 
the same limitations, the same differing degrees of insight, as is our 
apprehension of moral truth. 
So far as human apprehension of truth is concerned, then, Rashdall's 
theory merely acknowledges the inescapability of (what Professor Perry 
has called) "the ego- centric predicament ". So far as the divine 
initiative in revelation is concerned, it acknowledges that the 
relationship between God and man is not one of coercion, and that God 
works within the limits of human receptivity in imparting knowledge 
of Himself to His creatures. 
The problem of error, especially in moral judgment, is one which 
every theistic system must confront; for Rashdall the fact that God 
must be said in some sense to cause or permit error is an aspect of 
the problem of evil which certainly is no more pressing than the 
problem of sin; the two, indeed, are closely related, although he 
would contend that sin is a primary cause of moral blindness, and 
not merely a result of ignorance. Any theodicy must strive to solve 
both problems, those of sin and error, in similar ways. The attempt 
of absolute idealism to divert attention from temporal evil by regarding 
it as an illusion is self- defeating; for as a psychological fact, an 
illusion is as real as any other experience; and an illusion which 
conceals from us the perfect goodness of the universe (as absolutism 
would have it, sub specie aeternitatis) is itself an evill. 
Nevertheless, even when it is restated in the preceding form, 
Rashdall's theory of revelation is inadequate. To admit that our 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Several writers have urged this point, though Rashdall makes it 
only obliquely. Cf. Tennant: Philosophical Theology, Vol. II, 
p. 181, and McTaggart: Some Dogmas of Religion, pp. 208 -10. 
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knowledge of human selves must be inferential does not necessarily 
mean that our knowledge of God must be inferential likewise, unless 
one supposes that God's communication of His will and nature to 
our minds is subject to the limitations which circumscribe human 
intercourse. I have already attempted to show the weakness of 
Rashdall's view when he makes this latter supposition; I should 
be inclined to go further and to follow Professor Cook Wilson in 
renouncing the idea of "inferred friends" as well as that of an 
"inferred God ". Rashdall's assertion that our "knowledge of God" 
is like our knowledge of a friend would connote to most minds a 
form of knowledge by direct acquaintenande. The single phrase 
"knowledge of God ", however, conceals a fundamental distinction 
which must be drawn between (a) knowledge of what God is like, 
and (b) knowledge that God exists. If Rashdall's theory of 
revelation is valid it has exhibited the necessarily inferential 
nature of our knowledge that characteristics which we apprehend 
in true moral judgments must qualify God, as well as all other 
rational creatures; and it may or may not be true as a universal 
generalization that our knowledge of what another self is like - 
that is, our knowledge of his intellect, will, emotions, etc., 
as subjective functions, which on Berkeleian principles can 
never become direct "objects "1 - must be inferential. But his 
argument on this score does not show that our knowledge that God 
exists must be arrived at as the result of an inferential argument. 
If knowledge of what a self is like must be inferential, 
is it not apparent that any such inference must presuppose the 
existence of the other self, to which its attributes can be 
___________________________________________ -____________________ 
1. Cf. # 273. 
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referred ?1. One could never become convinced of the existence 
of another self as the result of a discursive argument, if one 
did not believe in the existence of that self on the ground of 
direct acquaintance. 
Similarly, our knowledge that God exists is based in the 
first instance upon religious experience as the genuine cognition 
of an object which is presented to the mind. Nothing more ultimate 
than such a presentation, and nothing less than it, can be sufficient 
evidence for believing in the existence of anything. All of the 
ultimate data of knowledge - moral and aesthetic values, an external 
world, other selves - transcend demonstration by a discursive 
argument because they are the starting points for discursive argument; 
but if belief in their reality is not irrational, then neither is 
belief in God. So far as rational verification of religious 
experience can go, consciousness of the reality of God exhibits the 
same characteristics which distinguish these other forms of cognition 
from mere illusion; He is known as an abiding presence without which 
not only this knowledge of Him, but many other aspects of experience 
would be inexplicable. Rashdall makes a fatal mistake when he bases 
his theistic "proofs" upon various aspects of experience in which 
Prima facie God is not known, and then attempts to move by inference 
to a position where knowledge of His existence appears as a conclusion. 
If this were really necessary in the case of theistic belief, it 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Furthermore, because Rashdall bases inferential knowledge of 
another self on knowledge of one's own self -hood, it is necessary 
to point out that it is only through interaction with other 
selves that the individual becomes a self at all or that he can 
construct a notion of his own y.elf -hood. Thus, for a second 
reason, the inference to which Rashdall refers presupposes the 
existence of other selves instead of yielding knowledge of that 
existence as a conclusion. Therefore Rashdall is quite right 
when he argues that intuitive "religious ideas" presuppose the 
existence of a God to be revealed (cf. # 171. ), but wrong when 
he assumes that knowledge of this existence must be infernntial. 
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would also be necessary for the physicist to use principles 
which had not been derived from a study of his data in attempting 
to prove the existence of his data, and it would be necessary for 
Rashdall himself, as a moralist, to start with non -ethical data as 
the premiss of any argument by which he might seek to prove the 
validity of ethical knowledge. 
Now he admits that such a procedure in the case of moral 
knowledge is not only unnecessary, but impossible. But if moral 
insight is knowledge, although it is not reached inferentially, 
surely the same may be claimed for the insight of religious worship 
or of the prophetic consciousness. I should contend that the test 
of an intuitive knowledge that God exists, like the test of an 
intuitive knowledge of moral value, cannot be more ultimate than 
the data which the intuition furnishes. Because his rejection of 
the theory that one mind can include another gives rise to the 
implication, on his Berkeleian principles, that what another self 
is like must be known inferentially, Rashdall erroneously concludes 
that for the same reason the existence of another self must be known 
inferentially1. But an argument concerning the character of God, 
even if it must be inferential, cannot proceed unless knowledge that 
God exists is included in the ground of that argument. If one does 
not know directly that God exists, no argument, so far as I can see, 
can move from a premiss in which God's existence does not appear 
to a conclusion in which it does appear. This generalization applies 
even to the moral argument for theism because it is really only 
the atheist who demands that this argument should start with the 
1. I should contend that both the existence and the characteristics 
of another self are known directly. 
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moral law as a mere regulative norm and then move inferentially 
to a conclusion in which that law becomes a manifestation of the 
nature of God. And I can see no more reason for permitting the 
atheist to dictate the mode of approach to an understanding of 
the religious experience, than for permitting the morally obtuse 
to dictate the mode of approach to an understanding of the moral 
experience1. 
The foregoing protest against Rashdall's views does not require 
a return to a radical distinction between revelation and reason; 
all it implies is that the knowledge of God's existence, which he 
assigns to reason operating discursively, should be assigned to 
reason operating intuitively. God's direct self- revelation transcends 
what man's ordinary rational powerq,operating discursively, can 
disclose; but it does not transcend what man has the capacity 
intuitively to receive, although men differ in this capacity. Moreover, 
that direct self -disclosure can be related harmoniously to what 
natural theology takes as its province, once the evidence of religious 
experience be taken as the true starting point of any discursive 
argument in the sphere of theology. Any belief must suffer if it is 
incapable of rational justification; but it must be remembered that 
belief in the existence of God is held in the first instance 
independently of any rational justification, and rational justification 
takes that belief as its point of departure. Rashdall is right in 
contending that Christians have been able to give reasons for holding 
their belief in the existence of God2; but they have not believed 
because they could give reasons; rather, they have given reasons 
--------------------------------------------------------------- - - - - -- 
1. Or for permitting the tone -deaf and colour -blind to dictate in the 
case of aesthetic experience. 
2. Cf. it 163. 
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because they already believed'. 
Because belief in the existence of God has its orgin,not in the 
assent to certain doctrines or propositions, but in fellowship with a 
Person, it is not a "religious idea" to be tentatively accepted, subject 
to some final assurance as to its truth or falsity which logical 
demonstration can provide. Natural theology serves the important function 
of satisfying the intellectual demand which impells us to trace such 
harmony as is discernible between a revelation which presents itself as 
ultimate and a rational interpretation of other aspects of experience. 
However, the difference between revealed and natural theology reflects 
the distinction between God's immediate self -revelation in fellowship and 
worship, and His mediate self -revelation in the physical world and 
ordinary human character. And it is not too much to say that the 
discursive reason, apart from the data supplied by religious experience, 
cannot give a content to ideas like God, freedom and immortality, which 
will satisfy religious needs. 
For Christian theology (if the preceding argument is valid) the 
revelation of God in Christ is an ultimate fact which must be accepted 
as the starting point of its interpretation. I shall therefore conclude 
this thesis by attempting to indicate the respects in which Rashdall's 
views concerning the Incarnation2 and the Atonement fail to do 
justice to certain aspects of the revelation in Christ, whose significance 
cannot be wholly grasped by a method which seeks to test their truth 
or falsity in terms of a preconceived ethical and metaphysical system. 
Specifically I shall criticize his position because it implies that 
Christ can be in no sense "personally" identical with God. I agree 
with Rashdall that "personality" is the most adequate category which 
we can use in our thought about God; but he has constructed his 
1. I do not mean (to uote Bradley's famous phrase that the Christian 
gives bad reasons for what he believes upon instinct. So long as 
it furnishes good reasons= natural theology.is not mere 
"rationalization - of a blind prejudice; it is an earnest effort to 
interpret its data, and no science can claim to do more. 
2. The Trinity is discussed only incidentally in what follows. 
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conception of that category apart from Christian doctrine, and 
then has sought to aply his conception of it to the Person of 
Christ. If my views concerning the function of natural 
theology are valid, his procedure is illegitimate. I have 
already sought to indicate the defects in his argument 
concerning divine personality from a speculative point of view; 
now I shall criticize it as it applies to Christian doctrine. 
In so doing, I am not attempting to minimize the respects in 
which the significance of Christ's Person and work can be 
related to "ordinary" human experience; what I wish to contend 
Wkfn 
is that only4He is regarded as a member of the God -head can this 
relationship be properly established. 
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7. The Incarnation as Revelation. 
RasMa ll's interpretation of the Incarnation must be understood 
first of all in the light of the principles concerning his own general 
idea of revelation which I have already tried to make explicit. He 
approaches the doctrine in a way which seems to make acceptance of 
it contingent upon (and hence logically posterior to) two notions: 
(1) that the possibility of a unique and complete Incarnation of 
God in a human individual is dependent upon a community of nature 
between God and man such that all men reveal God to some extent; (2) 
that the evidence for the fact that this unique Incarnation actually 
took place must be sought in the appeal which Christ makes to the 
conscience of mankind, such that he is acknowledged to have fulfilled 
1 
the highest moral ideal . But here again, the distinction between 
the ordo essendi and the ordo cognoscendi must be kept in mind. For 
the grounds on which the doctrine is accepted as true may benimmediate" 
and "independent" only in the latter order. 
1. The'only mention of the argument in Conscience and Christ in this 
critical section occurs in the succeeding remarks. -fin-Chapter on 
Christian Ethics was included in the expository section, not merely 
because without it our account of Rashdall's writings would have 
been incomplete, but because Conscience and Christ contains the 
clearest and most extensive statement of hls vv ews concerning the 
historical Jesus. His treatment of Christian doctrine is radically 
affected by the fact that he strives to reduce apocalyptic elements 
in the gospels to terms which are compatible with a moralizing 
purpose. It would be rewarding to discuss what he says concerning 
Christ as an ethical teacher; but in the main he presents a very 
familiar, semi -Ritchlian interpretation. Because Rashdall passes 
from a study of Christ's greatness in this regard, to an 
affirmation that He was the unique Revealer of God, I have thought 
it more profitable to presuppose the former point and confine our 
attention to this latter. One criticism of the book may be of 
especial interest as coming from the pen of T.S. Eliot: 'It follows 
almost inevitably, if one holds a theory of conscience similar to 
Dr. Rashdall's, that conscience will consist in the usual structure 
of prejudices of the enlightened middle classes. To this middle - 
class conscience the teaching of Jesus is gradually assimilatedx'. 
(Int. Jour. of Ethics, Vol. XXVII, p. 111). Eliot goes on to 
accuse -HIE of "eí -Cher denying or boiling away by the Principle of 
DevelopOment everything anarchic, unsafe or disconcerting in what 
Jesus said ". 
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Indeed, if this distinction is forgotten (and Rashdall 
certainly fails to make it explicit), his argument seems to 
be reducible to the contention that the truth of the doctrine 
is contingent upon its acceptance by, or its acceptability to, 
human minds. His real intention appears to be quite different 
from this . He believes that Christ was "divine" in the sense 
that He perfectly revealed the nature and will Of God; the 
doctrine which expresses this truth is valid, whether the moral 
ideals of any given individual, or of humanity collectively, ever 
are or have been such as to make it acceptable. But when, and in 
so far as,, men do apprehend the truth of the doctrine, they do so 
primarily by means of true moral judgments. Hence he cannot 
say that the perfect revelation of God's will in Christ provides 
an independent criterion for testing the validity of particular 
moral judgments; for in the ordo cognoscendi this belief in Christ 
is a consequence of our apprehension of moral truth; therefore 
such a belief cannot be (in the first instance) a ground of 
this apprehension. Once the truth of the doctrine is accepted, 
of course, the moral goodness of any iadividual or of any society 
is seen to be dependent upon the extent to which the revelation 
of God's will in Christ is therein recognized and obeyed; yet 
the apprehension (not the truth) of this revelation still remains 
contingent upon the individual's own insight into moral truth. In 
the ordo essendi, as we have seen, the individual's "immediate" 
apprehension of moral truth arises from God's activity in self - 
revelation, - an activity which Christ perfectly mediated. 
Rashdall is really seeking to maintain merelY that men must have 
the capacity to receive this revelation. 
The same distinction affects the first "ground" mentioned 
--------------------------------------------------------------- - - - - -- 
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1 
above - the "community of nature between God and man ". In the 
ordo cognoscendi it may be the idea of human moral goodness which 
gives rise to the notion of this community of nature; but in the 
ordo essendi it can only be because this community of nature 
exists in fact (whatever one supposes to be its extent) that man 
can apprehend moral truth in the first instance. At the same time, 
a somewhat different point emerges; even in the ordo cognoscendi 
the notion of a community of nature presupposes some knowledge 
of what God's nature is; and it presupposes this knowledge prior 
to belief in the Incarnation. Let us assume that human nature 
at its best (apart from Christ) affords the most adequate revelation 
2 
(apart from that in Christ) of God's nature. Now in direct proportion 
as one acknowledges the degree to which human nature at its best 
is infected with sin, one will be forced to admit, in a corresponding 
degree, the limitations placed upon any knowledge of God which 
human life can reveal apart from Christ. What Rashdall's argument 
amounts to, then, is that this partial knowledge of God is logically 
prior to knowledge of God as Christ -like. ?;'Then he writes: 'We 
must believe in the existence of God on other grounds before we can 
1. This expression must not be misinterpreted; Dr. Gore and Dr. 
Headlam, it seems to me, both fail to understand it. Of 
course Rashdall does not intend it to blur the distinctions 
between God and man as respectively Creator and creature, "All - 
powerful" and finite, Holy and sinful, Redeemer and redeemed. 
All he means to convey (apart from the fact that God and men 
are alike spiritual beings) is that in whatever measure man 
is morally good, that goodness is identical in principle with 
God's goodness; what he wishes to combat is the doctrine of 
total depravity, which would set an absolute distinction 
between God's righteousness and the ethical knowledge and 
conduct of the "natural" man. 
2. Most adequate because it alone can furnish grounds for 
believing in God's benevolence; teleological arguments based 
on physical nature alone cannot do this. 
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believe that Christ reveals Him', he is in reality referring 
respectively to two distinguishable conceptions of God; belief 
in the existence of God "on other grounds" yields a partial 
conception; belief in the existence of God as revealed by Christ 
2 
yields a complete conception. 
It seems to me that the logical order which Rashdall is here 
describing is one which it would be very difficult to establish 
as necessary, and I am not sure that he means anything of this 
sort. Otherwise the question at issue seems to relate solely to 
psychological processes which cannot be analyzed accurately. 
Certainly many people claim to have come to believe in the existence 
of God solely through contemplation of the life of Christ, even 
v4hen they possessed no prior theistic belief whatever; .nd it seems 
arbitrary to conjecture that they must have gone through a possibly 
subconscious and nerve process of metaphysical reasoning which 
moved logically from a general belief in theism to a belief in the 
Incarnation. 
However psychological questions are irrelevant to the main 
point which I wish to make, namely, that there is no general 
metaphysical evidence which of itself can lead to a fully Christian 
conception of God, although such evidence may provide helpful 
prolegomena or subsequent corroboration for belief in His existence 
as revealed in the Incarnation. 
One other question concerning the nature of Christ's task as 
Revealer turns upon the contrast between the ethical and the 
eschatalogical interpretations of the New Testament. What is the 
view of Christ and the early Church concerning the nature of moral 
----- = ------------------------------------------------------ - -------- 
1. Modern Churchman, Vol. I, p. 383. 
2. All this presupposes that the doctrine of the Incarnation is 
true; this is not unfair because Rashdall accepts the truth of 
the doctrine in the sense here implied. 
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knowledge? For one thing it is clear that human moral knowledge 
is not regarded as a self -sufficient sphere, to which we may be 
sure that God conforms; instead, knowledge of and obedience to the 
moral law are represented as instrumental to a knowledge of God. 
But the fundamental dualism underlying the world -view of primitive 
Christianity sets a gulf between men's earthly moral judgments and 
the moral knowledge which refers to another world, a supernatural 
sphere, and which alone possessAthe character of revelation. Is 
there not a marked contrast here between Rashdall's contention 
that any true "earthly" moral judgment must be in accord with the 
will of God, - and the teaching of Jesus, which is startling and 
paradoxical because He is talking about another world, a Kingdom 
in which earthly judgments will be reversed? In Rashdall's system 
there is no room for a radical conflict between the moral judgments 
of the "natural" man, which conform to this world, and those of the 
regenerate man, which conform (though only partially, while he is 
living in this world) to a higher, a supernatural reality; for 
Rashdall the only question is the extent to which any human judgment 
is true, and this extent reflects the individual's own goodness of 
character, that is, the extent to which he has been regenerated. 
Every man is part sheep, part goat, in varying proportions; there 
seem to be no groups which are wholly one or the other, and which 
can therefore be separated as such at the Judgment. 
The contrast which presents itself here arises from the fact that 
in the one world -view the dualism is purely ethical, while in the 
other it is (for want of a better word) cosmic. In Rashdall's system 
ethical tension arises merely from the stress of opposite forces 
within one spiritual world; it is a tension which works itself out 
in the temporal process through a progressive moralization of the race. 
This process is necessitated by evil as a real limiting condition, 
-------------------------------------------------------------- - - - - -- 
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but that condition falls within God's nature and control. On the 
other hand in the New Testament (although it is difficult to 
generalize) ethical tension arises from.a conflict between two 
worlds; the forces of evil which God overcame in Christ, and which 
had held the temporal world and the human soul in bondage, are 
conceived as lying outside God's nature. Earth is the scene of 
this conflict, and men are saved by participation in the divine 
victory which Christ brought about on their behalf. By virtue of 
His work, those who have fellowship with God, though they dwell in 
the temporal world, are already not "of" it; they are already 
members of another Kingdom, into whose perfect fellowship they 
ultimately enter. 
The question arises as to whether there is a contradiction 
between "earthly" moral judgments and those commands which 
constitute revelation from a supernatural sphere. Here I think we 
must agree with Rashdall that in so far as our "earthly" moral 
judgments are true, they constitute a form of revelation; it is 
possible to agree in this manner without overlooking the necessity 
for a radical change of heart, wrought within sinful human nature 
by Christ's saving work, before our moral judgments do become true. 
Many writers hold that the Pauline conception of faith (as 
"trust ", not merely as "intellectual assent "), and the Johannine 
conception of the Spirit both seem to postulate a supra -rational 
form of knowledge. It is true that the capacity in human nature 
which St. Paul and St. John regard as intrinsically allied to the 
divine nature seems to be one which is quite foreign to what is 
ordinarily meant by "reason ". This is the case, however, because of 
the two -fold meaning of the term. If it is taken as synonymous with 
man's cognitive capacities,. all knowledge must be regarded as 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. See distinctions (1) and (2), # 166 t 
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"rational ", however unique or supernatural its object may be. But 
"reason" may also be used with reference to the processes of 
discursive thought by which one type of knowledge is brought into 
coherent relationship with others. It is in this latter sense alone, 
I think, that our apprehension of revelation may be supra- rational, 
as incommensurable (in some respects) with all aspects of knowledge 
derived from our acquaintance with the temporal world. 
I have protested against Rashdall's denial that knowledge 
of God is supra- rational in this latter sense. His theory of moral 
knowledge, when taken in connexion with his theistic belief, fulfils 
one aspect of the meaning which I have attached to the idea of 
revelation, because he regards moral knowledge as intuitive and at 
the same time as falling within the sphere of the operation of grace. 
He rejects the doctrine of total depravity not because he believes 
that men can attain moral knowledge :.nd virtue without divine aid, 
but precisely because he believes that no man is wholly inaccessible 
to the divine influence. This leaves yet to be discussed the question 
as to whether Christianity does not cease to be a religion when the 
Incarnation and the Atonement are interpreted in purely ethical 
terms, - the question as to whether an adequate explanation of 
Christ's Person and work (and man's salvation) does not demand that 
His unity with God be regarded as one of personal identity instead 
of mere ethical similarity (however complete); hence we now turn to 
these latter topics. 
B. The Incarnation and the Trinity. 
A few points in Rashdall's historical sketch concerning the 
Incarnation and the Trinity must be mentioned, although our chief 
concern will be a consideration of the relations between these 
doctrines and Rashdall's own philosophical position. The essential 
- 335 - 
question concerning Christ's own conception of His Person has to 
do with whether He regarded Himself as more than human. Here 
differences of interpretation arise as a result of different 
presuppositions; critics who hold that Christ was "personally" 
identical with God find many synoptic passages in which He uses 
language about Himself which could be applicable only to such a 
personality; Rashdall construes the same passages as indicating 
that Jesus was aware of His unique relationship to God, but adds 
that 'never in any critically well- attested sayings is there anything 
which suggests that His conscious relation to God was other than 
1 
that of a man towards God'. Where the former find the distinction 
between Christ and other men to involve the distinction between Deity 
and humanity, Rashdall expresses the difference solely as being 
between a sinless man and sinful humanity. 
An appeal to exegesis therefore cannot settle this dispute; 
nevertheless there are at least one or two synoptic passages which 
cast considerable doubt on Rashdall's view. If one holds (as 
Rashdall does) that in Mark 12:35 -7 (Cf. Mt. 22:42) Jesus takes the 
2 
110th Psalm to be Messianic, is not His reply best understood as 
meaning that the Jewish conception of the Messiah cannot solve the 
problem of how David can call his descendant "Lord "? The Phatisees 
would not have been silenced by a discussion merely of how a 
descendant can be greater than his ancestor. Christ is suggesting, 
it seems, that only if the Messiah is "divine" can He be at once 
David's son and David's Lord. Again, in Matthew 11:27 (Lk.10:21 f.) 
------------ - ------------------------------------- = ------------------ 
1. J.H.D., p. 12 
2. I realize that according to some critics Christ propounded 
the enigma to showthe incorrectness of the view that the Messiah 
was to be of Davidic stock. 
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Christ speaks of the knowledge of Father and Son as reciprocally 
perfect. The passage seems undeniably to set the Father's knowledge 
in contrast with all human knowledge; and then it classes the Son's 
1 
knowledge Ivith the Father's. 
Many similarily significant passages could be cited; Uhrist 
always draws a distinction between man's relationship to God, and 
His own; He teaches His disciples to say "Our Father "; He Himself 
says "My Father ". There is no discoverable consciousness on Christ's 
part of having received unmerited gifts. He places loyalty to 
2 
Himself above human relationships. He is recorded to live regarded 
Himself a_ the future Judge of the Kingdom, although Rashdall 
3 
questions the authenticity of these passages. Yet none of this 
evidence can be entirely decisive, because Rashdall might construe 
it all as expressing a sinless man's consciousness of unique 
relationship to God.. For this same reason the significance of Mark 
4 
2 :3 -12 cannot be stressed; as Dr. Mackintosh points out, Christ 
does not say "I forgive thy sins "; nevertheless in this incident His 
own power to mediate divine forgiveness would appeal to most minds 
as partaking of a super -human characte :. Moreover, if Christ's 
consciousness was free from sin, they Rashdall's statement, which I 
5 
have just quoted, is misleading; for it fails to express that His 
relation to God was different from that of every other :man. Lastly, 
1. This correlation of knowledge naturally suggests some sort of 
correlation of being; although Rashdall is right in contending 
that the passage does not specifically express the idea of 
Incarnation, it affords perhaps the strongest basis for it that 
can be found in the words of Jesus. 
2. Mt. 10:37. Cf. Mt. 10:32 f. - the cor:secuence of confessing 
or denying Him. 
3. Cf. f 65 . Gore protests against this, cf. The Reconstruction 
of Belief, p. 226. Rashdall contends that, in any case, "Judge" 
doe; not imply membership in the God -head. He cites Acts 17:31:... 
'He (God) will judge the world in righteousness by the man whom he 
bath ordeined`. (Cf. JHD., p. 13 n) 
Off. 
4. Cf. The Christian Experience of Forgiveness,p. 88 n. 
5. cf. f/ 535. 
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if the divinity of Christ properly means, as he would have it, complete 
harmony (but not personal identity) between God and Christ, then 
Christ's own conception of His Person (at the very least) fulfils the 
1 
only sense in which Rashdall is willing to speak of Him as divine . 
Yet Rashdall declares that the interpretation of the Incarnation which 
he himself advocates can be found only in later reflection within 
the Church, and not in the Synoptics. 
If the orthodox conception of a personal identity between the Son 
and the human Jesus be taken as the norm, there is some reason for 
holding that from the outset the Church possessed, in a rudimentary form, 
the conception of a sinless divine personality incarnate, instead of 
two erroneous views (as Rashdall seems to suggest). Dr. Headlam has 
urged, for example, that it was not the Logos doctrine which first gave 
rise to the specific notion of Incarnation; rather, he argues, 'the 
term Logos became personal because it was associated with our Lord'2. 
Admittedly, Christ was reticent in disclosing to the disciples whatever 
insight He had into the significance of His own Person; and perhaps it 
is impossible to dogmatize concerning whether the incident at Caesarea 
Philippi and His reply before the Sanhedrin indicate that His own 
consciousness of Messiahship emerged late in His ministry, or that it 
was present with Him from the Baptism3 but only disclosed by Him - 
and that indirectly4 - toward the close. But Rashdall's suggestion 
that the current Jewish conception did not regard the Messiah as God, 
or equal with God, proves nothing, inasmuch as Jesus transcended 
1. Unless Mk. 10:18 be taken as implying that Jesus did not regard Him- 
self as sinless. Critical opinions concerning this passage are so 
conflicting that I do not venture to express my own except to call 
attention to the contrast between goodness maintained under temporal 
conditions amidst human temptations, and the eternal, unchanging 
goodness of the Father. 
2. Church Quart. Review, Vol. XCIII, p. 214. 
3. Or even earlier, cf. Lk. 2:40 -52. 
4. Except for M. 14:61 f.; but compare with parallels rt. 26:63 f. 
and Lk. 22:67 f. 
- 338 - 
Jewish ideas concerning the Kingdom and the Messiah in other respects'. 
One further point deserves brief notice. Rashdall's interpretation 
of the synoptic evidence affects the extent to which he conceives of 
Christ's knowledge as limited during the Incarnation. Except for 
the suggestion that our Lord's ethical teaching may be supplemented 
to include cultural values in the moral end, he restricts this 
limitation to non- spiritual and factual matters; but if he takes 
Christ's failure to announce His own divinity as indicating that He 
was in reality ignorant of a truth which Christians later grasped 
2 
, 
then this constitutes a limitation of a very paradoxical sort. 
Especially if the Atonement be conceived as a work which involves the 
unmediated participation of God3, Rashdall's position implies that 
Christ was ignorant of the central significance of His redemptive task. 
The synoptic evidence on this question will be considered later. In 
general it may be observed that Rashdall's argument does not affect 
the perfection of Christ's insight into the duty of men before God; 
but it does affect what insight we may believe Him to have had into 
His task as Mediator, from the God -ward side, to the minds and hearts 
of men. 
`Ae cannot afford to dwell long upon the development of the 
doctrine, which Rashdall touches so briefly. His description of the 
Pauline Christology does justice to the extent to which it anticipates 
the two -nature theory, but it needs supplementation. What has been 
1. A similar point is argued in more detail infra, # 353. 
2. This seems to be Rashdall's intention; but the fragmentary nature 
of the synoptic evidence can be explained equally well, if not 
better, as due to the fact that Jesus was seeking gradually to 
dissociate the idea of Messiahship from Jewish political aspirations 
before making His own claims fully known to the disciples; in this 
latter case, His own sayings cannot be regarded as a complete 
statement either of what He believed concerning His own Person, 
or of what He intended that His followers should finally believe. 
3. This is not, of course, Rashdall's view of the Atonement. 
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held to be the locus classicus for the Kenotic interpretation 
(Philippians, Ch. 2), for example, clearly seems to imply that the 
"form of God" was Christ's original state, in which He pre -existed, 
while the "form of a servant" was one which He assumed temporally. 
Though the reference to equality with God is somewhat cryptic, it 
indicates that St. Paul regarded such equality as involved in the 
original state of the pre -existing Lord - a state which He temporarily 
relinquished during the Incarnation. If so,then4Paul espoused a 
conception of the pre -existent Messiah which was startling for a 
Jew1. It is true that, in this passage, St. Paul conceives of God 
as exalting Christ, because he is stressing the reality of our Lord's 
assumption of human limitations. On the other hand, the reference in 
the same verse2 to 'the name which is above every name', could only 
mean one thing to a Jewish mind. 
Rashdall claims that the Johannine Christology remedied certain 
sr. 
defects inAPaul's teaching: 'It made it possible to admit that the 
human Jesus had a beginning in time like other men, and to confine 
pre- existence to the Divine element in the historic Personality'3. 
This statement must be understood in the light of Rashdall's assumption 
that this "Divine element" is not "personally identical with" the 
human Jesus. In the Fourth Gospel, so far as I can see, Christ's 
personality is divine, and there is no distinction between it and 
the historic personality. It is the same personality (i.e. the Logos) 
which pre- exists, and then becomes incarnate4. The history which 
----------------------------------------------------- -- -------- - - - - -- 
l. Rashdall follows Wrede and Brüchner in holding thatjaul's conception 
of the pre -existent Messiah was derived fr®i Jewish sources (cf. 
Atonement, pp. 127 ff.). Against this cf. Dalman, The Words of 
Jesus, pp. 128 -32, 248, 252. 
2. Phil. 2:9. 
3. JHD., p. 22. 
4. Cf., e.g., John 16:28; 17 :5. This point is not affected by the theory 
that the Prologue is a later addition (because the Logos conception 
occurs only once, while the ideas of this author recur again and 
again), and that in the body of the Fourth Gospel Christ is 
substantially the Son of Man of the Apocalypses (not the Logos). 
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thus begins, as human, in time, is a phase in the life of the 
eternally existing Son. This conception is irreconcilable with 
Rashdall's metaphysics; for that reason it is inexcusable to fall 
into the anachronism of interpreting the Fourth Gospel in a manner 
which makes it conform to his metaphysics. 
Only one other historical point need detain us. Concerning 
Athanasius the primary question is whether the Orations contain only 
a formal, instead of a whole- hearted, recognition of the fact that 
our Lord had a human intellect and consciousness. Rashdall originally 
asserts flatly in his Cambridge essay that Athanasius was "Apollinarian "; 
he qualifies this in a foot -note so as to apply it to the Nicene period; 
but he there suggests that Athanasius' later formal modification of 
his views did not greatly affect 'his general way of thinking'1. 
However, Athanasius' whole theory of Incarnation and Atonement turns 
upon the belief that Christ restored the Tmago Dei by taking on human 
nature; and this theory is gravely weakened unless he regards the 
Incarnation as involving human nature in toto. Moreover, his 
condemnation of Apollinarianism in the latter part of his career 
indicates an attitude which was more than merely formal. In fact, 
one of the passages which Rashdall quotes from the third Oration2, 
could equally well support the theory that although Athanasius uses 
°'áe; (as equivalent to "man ") to express the idea of Incarnation, he 
means it to include lox" in a sense which involves the whole (human) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. JHD., p. 14 n. 
2. Cf. #p 133 n. 2. 
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consciousness'. 
Let us turn without further delay to a consideration of 
Rashdall's own Christological views. Personality, in his system, 
is inextricably bound up with functions which cannot be shared; 
every personality, so far as "the stream of consciousness" is 
concerned, is external to every other. Now it might be claimed 
that the Chalcedonian Christology is reconcilable with these 
presuppositions; but only because it holds that Christ's personality 
was a member of the God -head which took on impersonal manhood; 
manhood is in this case really adjectival2. According to the terms 
of Rashdall's system (since it rules out the idea of a duplex 
personality as heartily as does Catholic orthodoxy), there is only 
one possible alternative which may be set against this view; and 
that is to regard Christ's personality as human, his divinity as 
"impersonal" or adjectival. However one expresses these distinctions, 
the fact emerges (it might be claimed) that Rashdall affirms Christ's 
divinity in a sense similar to that in which the Chalcedonian view 
affirms His humanity3. If the one does justice to the idea of two 
natures harmoniously joined in one Person, then so does the other. 
1. Most scholars agree that this is the meaning of Athanasius' 
language in the Third Oration. Rashdall was misled by the fact 
that Athanasius' early position (cf. De Incarnatione; circa 320 
A.D.) was "Apollina.rian "; it is difficult to understand why he 
refused to believe that Athanasius changed his view fundamentally. 
Nevertheless, Dr. C.E. Raven (in his Apollinarianism, p. 202) goes 
so far as to suggest that the Biblical scholarship of Apollinarius 
did not 'allow him to follow Athanasius and expurgate from the 
Gospels the mark of the Lord's humanity'. 
2. The Sabellian and Arian, the Nestorian and Monophysite heresies, 
all turn upon the interpretation of the words used to express what 
in modern speech is called "personality ", - a concept which 
Chalcedon itself left undefined, 
3. Except that "man" is a universal covering a class of particular 
entities, while of course with regard to Deity there arises no 
distinction between genus and species. 
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This might give Rashdall some ground for claiming that in renouncing 
as unintelligible the view that Christ was human without being a man, 
he is not doing violence to the remainder of the Chalcedonian 
Christology. Such an argument overlooks the fact, however, that in 
the Chalcedonian conception manhood and God -head were regarded as 
two quite different entities; it was this difference which set the 
problem for the orthodox and the heretical alike. In Rashdall's 
theory, on the other hand, the union of the divine and the human in 
one Person is possible because in the sphere of moral perfection they 
are not different. 
Furthermore, as I have tried to show, the Pauline and Johannine 
views regard Christ's personality as that of Deity in a sense allied 
to the Chalcedonian statement rather than to Rashdall's; at the same 
time, these writers regard Christ definitely as a man. In St. Paul 
and St. John the Church passed beyond Adoptionism to the view that 
the same Personality who is from all eternity in the God -head, was a 
man on earth. Influences like that of St. Cyril introduced a 
rationalistic element into the decisions of the Chalcedonian Council 
which prevented it from recapturing the purity of the New Testament 
view; and to that extent the Council fell short of what is otherwise 
its chief virtue; the formulation of a statement which does full 
justice to the reality of our Lord's two natures, without attempting 
to supply a rational explanationl. A simple affirmation of the idea 
that the divine Son became a human soul with an earthly history, as it 
stands in the New Testament Christology, is more a description than an 
explanation; such theoretical notions as are there employed do not 
conceal what His contemporaries had actually found in Christ. 
1. "Rational" is here used to qualify an explanation which relates a 
given datum to other aspects of experience by bringing all under 
common categories. 
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Unfortunately later Christian speculation has seldom kept within 
these limits. Thus the Chalcedonian conception has sometimes resulted 
in an "incredible dualism" in which 'Christ executed this as God, it is 
said, and suffered that as man'1; while on the other hand, the doctrine 
of anhypostatic manhood has required the equally incredible notion of 
a Person who can have human experiences without being a human subject 
of those experiences. Besides being incredible in themselves, these 
rational explanations wander into a region remote from the fact which 
they are supposedly designed to interpret - the fact that God lived 
the life of a man in history. 
In criticizing Gore2, Rashdall has asked: "How did the Logos 
carry on His cosmic functions during the Incarnation ?" The question 
is unfair because it overlooks the fact that the functions of the Son 
as Incarnate furnish the only data on which any theologian can base 
assertions in this connexion. In order to answer Rashdall's query, 
a theologian would have to possess some avenue of knowledge concerning 
the nature and mode of God's creative activity in the logos more 
adequate than that which the Incarnation provides; but the fact that 
he does not possess such an avenue of knowledge furnishes no reason 
for relinquishing the data which he does possess or for renouncing 
the task of interpreting them within their limits. Everything which 
we do not completely understand challenges intellectual investigation, 
and it is right to carry such investigation as far as possible. But 
to deny a fact because we cannot completely "rationalize" it is madness. 
For example, the relationship between mind and body leads in all 
directions to theoretical absurdities; yet we do not doubt its reality. 
Is it unfair to claim that the Incarnation presents a case of this sort? 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. H.R. Mackintosh: The Person of Jesus Christ, p. 294. 
2. Cf. i 195 n. 1. 
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Dr. Mackintosh refuses to discuss the question which Rashdall 
raisesl; while Rashdall himself avoids this theoretical difficulty 
only at the expense of regarding God and Christ as two distinct 
personalities. There is no doubt as to which attitude is nearer to 
the New Testament; where a fundamental Christian doctrine transcends 
complete rational explanation, as here seems to be the case, one must 
decide which alternative is worth what it costs. If the Incarnation 
(that is, God as "personally" dwelling in a human soul and body) was a 
fact, it was partially inexplicable to early Christians, and it remains 
partially inexplicable now, because there is nothing else in human 
experience comparable with it2. But to reject a doctrine solely on 
this ground would lead to disastrous consequences. In connexion with 
the notion that God is a Person, Rashdall acknowledges rational 
difficulties at every step; but he accepts the notion because, despite 
these difficulties, it accounts for what he takes to be the facts better 
than does any other theory. Dr. Gore might have said the same thing in 
reply to Rashdall's question concerning this aspect of his Christology. 
When I say that the Incarnation remains partially inexplicable, I 
do not mean, of course, that the significance of Christ's life cannot 
be directly related to human goodness in general as revealing in history 
a "new beginning" in the relationship between God and the human race. 
But there remains an irreducible distinction between the conception of 
Christ as a man who acted in perfect harmony with the Logos, and the 
conception of Him as a member of the God -head incarnate. To my mind no 
difficulties in the latter doctrine are as great as those which arise in 
1. Cf. O cit., pp. 483 ff. 
2. Dr. Sparrow Simpson's remarks (cf. Modernism and the Person of Christ, 
pp. 64 f.) are pertinent here. If the historical method confines 
itself in principle to what is explicable in terms of causes within 
the sphere of human experience, the critic who follows it must of 
course disregard passages which represent Christ literally as a member 
of the God -head incarnate; but in so doing, he becomes an exponent of 
his own beliefs, not those of the evangelists; in other words, his 
interpretation is not exegesis in the proper sense. 
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connexion with the former; for all of its emphasis upon Christ's 
kinship with humanity, Rashdall's Christology, especially because 
of his deterministic theory of grace and "freedom ", must postulate an 
unaccountable break in the moral history of the race. Why did God 
endow a particular human person with sinlessness at a particular time? 
If one man could be sinless without it being necessary for God to 
become "personally" identical with a human soul, why does God work 
through a human Christ as Mediator? If God could make one man sinless 
directly, without being Himself "personally" incarnate, why could He 
not do the same for all men? 
Rashdall raises another objection against the view that the Logos 
and the human Jesus were personally identical; for this view implies 
that the Logos, as a member of the Trinity, is a distinct personality. 
Rashdall's own treatment of the latter doctrine is a logical consequence 
of his Christology and of his theistic metaphysics, and his historical 
discussion concerning it constitutes a pertinent warning against tri- 
theism. Several critics (e.g., Headlam and quick)1, while admitting 
this, nevertheless have urged that Rashdall overlooks the fact that the 
distinctness, but not the separation, of the Persons of the Trinity 
must be affirmed in order to conceive of God as self -existent and at 
the same time as perfect Love. The argument on which these writers rely 
(though neither elaborates it) runs as follows: If the world and its 
creatures were the only objects of God's love, this love could not be 
perfect, for perfect love involves harmonious communion and reciprocity 
with an equal. A variation of the same argument can avoid the 
objectionable implication that God's love toward man is not perfect, by 
laying the stress on the eternity of God's love (the world being conceived 
1. Cf. their respective articles in The Church Quart. Review, Vol. 
XCIII, pp. 201 ff., and The Commonwealth, Vol. XXPVI. pp. 287 ff. 
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as not co- eternal); but even this requires a conception of God which 
abstracts from His creative activity. In short, any interpretation 
of the Trinity in its traditional form (as amans, amatus, amor) 
either does not naturally connote three distinct (even though 
harmoniously united) centres, or it still bears the semblance of 
tri- theism. 
On the other hand, Rashdall's own conception of the Trinity 
encounters a difficulty1. He points out that it is heterodox to regard 
the whole Trinity as incarnate in the human Jesus, but he says nothing 
further about the matter. However, it is obvious that when he construes 
the Trinity as symbolic of aspects or functions of God's consciousness, 
he must regard all of these functions as equally incarnate in Jesus - 
no matter what view he takes concerning the nature of this indwelling. 
An extremely literal -minded person might infer that his theory attributes 
only divine wisdom to the human Jesus; for he speaks of the Father as 
Power, the Son (Logos) as Wisdom, the Spirit as Love. And the same 
literal -minded person would have to conclude that, if Rashdall is 
unwilling to regard the whole Trinity as incarnate, then he must contend 
that Jesus was united to God's wisdom in some sense that He was not 
united to God's will and love. Needless to say, this is not Rashdall's 
intention; but because it is not, we must suppose that when he speaks of 
1. In a well -known passage in De Trinitate (xv. 12), St. Augustine 
works out the theory that each Person in the Trinity has a knowledge, 
memory and love of His own. (cf. Ibid., xv. 7, and Epistle clxix. 6). 
Rashdall admits the presence of passages which are inconsistent with 
St. Augustine's prevailing doctrine; but he does not sufficiently 
emphasize that St. Augustine repeatedly apologized for the inadequacy 
of his analogies based on the functioning of a single self. Although 
Rashdall's own view of the Trinity undeniably háa. authoritative 
support in St. Augustine and St. Thomas, it is also similar to that 
held by the Sabellians. But the latter were forced into a position 
which was really Docetic, in order to avoid Patripassianism. Rashdall, 
as we have seen (h 243 ), believes in a suffering God as revealed by 
Christ, or as suffering with Christ, not as suffering in Christ. So 
far as I can see, there is no middle ground between Docetism and some 
form of Patripassianism. 
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the union between. Jesus and the Logos, the latter term is really meant 
to signify God's consciousness in all its aspectsl; and the unity 
referred to is of course a perfect moral similarity rather than a 
subjective identity between Christ's intellect, will and love, and God's. 
He admits that his view of the Trinity is therefore one which any 
Unitarian could accept; but this is because, as he sees it, the choice 
really lies between monotheism and tri- theism2. 
The notion that the Son. remained "unchanged" in the Incarnation, 
against which Rashdall protests, was intended to safeguard orthodoxy 
from just such theories as his. As J.K. Mozley has written: 
'The four words of the Chalcedonian Definition which we translate 
"without change, without confusion, without division, without separation ", 
do no more than say that in Christ what is divine remains divine and 
what is human remains human, while they are not isolated from one 
another as they would be if there were one Person who was divine and 
another Person who was human'(3). 
These expressions were not intended to deny that the relations of the 
one personality changed. Because orthodoxy does not teach that the 
human soul of Jesus pre- existed, it holds that when the Son took on 
human flesh and a "reasonable" (i.e., as against Apollinarius, a "human ") 
soul in time, this Incarnation indeed involved a new relation. Moreover, 
orthodoxy holds that this new relation is a permanent one; in the words 
of the twenty first question of the Shorter Catechism: 
'The Lord Jesus Christ, being the eternal Son of God, became 
Man, and so was, and continueth to be, God and Man in two distinct 
1. Rashdall therefore retains the term "Logos ", I believe, because 
of its historical associations in doctrine as the medium of God's 
self -revelation and creative activity. 
2. Canon C6uick (loc. cit.) rightly calls attention to the Unitarian 
implications under 7 ng Rashdall's thought at this point; but he 
overlooks Rashdall's whole metaphysical system when he suggests 
that this view of Christ's relation to the God -head might tend 
to reduce Deity to mere ideal manhood - that is, to a notion which 
has no reality apart from human aspiration. Rashdall never leaves 
the slightest doubt as to the firmness of his own conviction that 
God exists as a reality distinct from humanity, even at its highest. 
3. Essays Catholic and Critical, p. 189. 
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Natures, and One Person for ever 'l. 
But a change in relations does not imply a change of personality. 
Human experience of course relates the self very closely to its 
embodiment; and the notion of the eternal God as entering a 
human body and undergoing the career of a human soul requires a 
conception of the relations between the temporal and the eternal which 
transcends the limits of imagination and understanding. All this 
must be admitted. Yet in our own experience personality enters into 
various changing relations with its own body and its environment, 
and it engages in various modes of conduct, while yet remaining 
self -identical. To conceive of God as remaining "self -identical" 
through the profound change in His relations represented by the 
thought of Him before, during, and after His earthly life may be 
impossible; but the impossibility arises from the limited character 
of human imagination and experience. Apart from this, there is 
nothing which implies - as Rashdall's objection assumes - that an 
incarnate personality must be distinct from God's; personality can 
endure through changes in its relations, and it is unsound in principle 
to attempt to bring the idea of Incarnation within the ordinary confines 
to which these changes are restricted in human experience2. 
One aspect of traditional Christological doctrine, however, 
definitely favours Rashdall's general position. That is the 
condemnation of Monothelitism. It is possible for the modern mind 
to comprehend, if not to accept, the notion of one Person and two 
1. Italics mine. 
2. Cf. Paul Elmer More: Christ the Mord, p. 299 n. 'The logos of 
man differs from the in being reE71-ós subject to 
mutation. This is not to say that the divine Logos, as áTec- ros 
is fixed in stark immutability, but that through all its changes 
its essential nature remains unaffected. In man change is of the 
radical sort designated by the Stoics as "passion ", aof ®os f. 
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natures, so long as "nature" is understood as a class name, instead 
of as a reference to specific subjective functions. But the 
conception of one Person and two wills causes great perplexity 
unless it be assumed that the Personality possessed1 one will, 
and was merely in complete harmony with the other without in 
the same sense possessing it. Rashdall holds that Christ was a 
human will, acting in perfect conformity with God's will; the 
opposite alternative is unintelligible. And to hold that Christ 
was, or possessed, two wills in precisely the same sense, seems 
almost monstrous to our minds to -day. The only remaining possibility 
is to say that He possessed one will which was both human and divine; 
and, if the theory of anhypostatic union be rejected, the single 
centre of consciousness which possessed this will was both human 
and divine. A difficulty will always remain for strict orthodoxy 
on this point; it seems to have arisen from the fact that although 
the Fifth Council at least tended toward the view that Christ had 
but one will, and that divine, the Sixth Council's acceptance of 
Dyothelitism was really a reversion to Nestorian ideas which cannot 
be brought into harmony with Chalcedonian standards. 
Having examined Rashdall's conception of Christ's relationship 
to the God -head, we now turn to his conception of the difference 
between our Lord and other men. Christ and men are alike in being 
personalities distinct from God; therefore the mode in which they 
reveal God is the same for all men; for however much they may 
be like God, they cannot be in any strict sense identical with 
His personality. Yet Rashdall does not express the difference 
1. The verb "to be" would express modern thought better than "to 
possess "; its volition is the self from a particular point of 
view. 
a 
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between Christ and other men merely as one of degree; when he 
says that the Logos dwelt completely in Jesus, while He has 
dwelt only partially in all other men, he regards our Lord 
as the unique Son, "the only one of His kind ". Even though he 
interprets this "indwelling" in a sense which still leaves 
Godhood logically external and merely adjectival to the personality 
of Jesus, the distinction remains; and it is a distinction which 
cannot be wholly expressed in terms which stress exclusively 
the continuity between the life of Christ and the life of the 
race. Fortunately, therefore, he avoids the fruitless question 
as to whether the end -term (sinlessness) of a series (degrees of 
moral goodness) falls within the series. Abstract, quantitative 
categories cannot express the finality of the revelation in Christ 
of human goodness, as well as of God's relation to man. 
Nevertheless, Rashdall's conception of the Incarnation 
and orthodox doctrine do not represent two variant ways of 
expressing the same thing. The ideas of sacramental union which 
we find in the New Testament are directed toward something which 
He is Himself, and not toward a God -head external to Himself which 
He perfectly reveals. Rashdall's aversion to mysticism prevents 
him from pressing on to the conviction whereby St. Paul taught 
that in Christ men may become "perfect ". Yet the notion of union 
with Christ does not at all imply that the believer ultimately 
loses his personal identity; it expresses, rather, the conviction 
that the believer's salvation from sin may ultimately be complete 
and unqualified. From the earthly perspective it is right to 
recoil from self- righteous assurance as to one's own superiority 
over others in the sight of God; but from the perspective of 
eternity, the hope for perfection is integral to the Christian 
- 351 - 
faith. 
Rashdall's theory that a perfect man is ipso facto divinity 
incarnate (in the only permissible sense), cannot fulfil the 
orthodox conception as to how human perfection is brought about. 
He might recognize that a distinction remains eternally between 
Christ and the men who are ultimately made perfect in response to 
the love of God which He reveals; for a development through sin to 
repentance, amendment, forgiveness and salvation is different from 
the development in which the earthly life of our Lord matured 
without sin. But in orthodox teaching morally perfect manhood is not 
synonymous with "divinity "; for the former, in this teaching, is 
possible for men only because the latter belongs to Jesus Christ 
alone. A perfect man derives his perfection through the Logos; 
but Christ's perfection is not derived, because He is the Logos. 
Therefore Rashdall's conception of the Incarnation has the 
closest possible connexion with his interpretation of the Atonement. 
In his thinking, the significance of Christ's work, as well as 
that of His Person, turns primarily upon the notion that He was 
the Revealer of God's nature and moral purpose. The question 
which confronts us is whether or not this conception does justice 
to the truth that in Christ God initiated and carried through a 
supreme act of redemption for mankind. Canon Quick has written, 
in criticism of Rashdall's views: 'If the Incarnation... is only 
the personification of a moral ideal, then indeed we are "yet in 
our sins ".'1 The justness of this criticism depends upon whether 
or not redemption implies that God (: or a member of the God -head) 
was "personally" in Christ. 
------------------------------------------------------------ - - - --- 
1. The Commonwealth, Vol. XXVI, p. 289. 
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9. The Atonement. 
Much of what Rashdall says in his "Bampton Lectures° concerning 
the inadequacy of traditional theories of the Atonement is 
indisputable. A thorough -going attempt to examine this historical 
evidence would demand an extended discussion; consequently the 
ensuing remarks do not constitute an adequate appraisal of his 
historical research; they are intended merely to point out a few 
basic defects which directly affect his own conceptions. I shall 
confine my criticisms to three points in his account which seem to 
be crucial in this regard: his treatment of the Synoptics, of St. 
Paul, and of Luther. 
Although repentance can be described as the beginning of moral 
transformation, is it not clear that in Jesus' own teaching, notably 
in the parable of the Prodigal Son, such moral improvement as does 
take place in the penitent is represented as the outcome, and not 
as the cause or condition of repentance? If the essence of the 
Master's teaching was a promise of forgiveness, of restoration to 
fellowship with God, while we are yet sinners, then His teaching 
may only be made a foundation for theories in which forgiveness is 
a condition of being "made righteous "; the reverse theory, in which 
repentance is regarded as a form of becoming righteous (as a condition 
of forgiveness), and for which Rashdall attempts to find a basis in 
the Synoptics, is not very different in principle from the Jewish 
legalism which Jesus transcended. 
The discrepancy between the apostolic doctrine of Christ's 
death as propitiation, and Jesus' own teaching of forgiveness as 
a consequence of repentance, was (to say the very least) not nearly 
so great as Rashdall supposes. The passages in which He explicitly 
connects forgiveness with His own death are admittedly few; in a 
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mome nt we shall consider whether Rashdall is justified in eliminating 
even these. In any case, certain considerations which he fails to 
emphasize, should be taken into account. Christ's ovum teaching 
about His Person and work was subject to definite limitations. It 
is not necessary to postulate the theory of a "Messianic secret" in 
order to realize that His self- disclosure was limited by the extent 
to which His disciples could comprehend (what to Jewish minds was 
well -nigh unthinkable) the notion of a suffering Messiah. Yet 
when the evidence in Mark that Jesus foresaw the necessity for His 
suffering is taken in conjunction with His consciousness of 
1 
Messiahship, it indeed seems gratuitous to suppose that the Suffering 
Servant passages were associated with His work only after the 
Crucifixion, and did not help Him to understand His own destiny. 
While He was alive, the disciples were manifestly unable fully to 
comprehend the significance of His death; but is it not arbitrary 
to eliminate all the passages in which Jesus, whose whole interpre- 
tation of the Messianic office so transcended previous Jewish 
conceptions, seems to comprehend it? For Rashdall to suggest, as 
he does,that because current thought did not identify the Servant 
and the Messiah, therefore this identification probably arose from 
the reflection of the apostles after the Crucifixion instead of from 
the teaching of Christ Himself, indeed seems irreconcilable in 
principle with his eagerness in)other respects to emphasize the 
originality of our Lord's teaching. If He did make this identifica- 
tion, but could disclose it only through anticipatory hints which 
the disciples did not fully understand at the time, would they not 
have remembered it, and at last understood it, after the Crucifixion? 
1. The question as to when Christ came to repognize His Messiahship 
and the necessity for His death is not here decisive. Rashdall 
seems inclined to date both from Caesarea Philippi; but there is 
some ground, at least, for claiming that Jesus must have understood 
both notions, and their connexion, at the time of His Baptism and 
Temptation. 
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In that case Jesus' own teaching stands in organic connexion with that 
of His followers. 
The discrepancy which Rashdall seems to find is better explained 
as arising from the fact that Jesus was teaching before the event, - 
while by its very nature His atoning sacrifice could be understood 
by the disciples only after the event. His teaching largely took 
the form of questions whereby He elicited a partial understanding, 
as they were "able to bear it "; but the fact that His statements 
are therefore rarely explicit, affords no justification for ruling 
out those which are. 
Now let us consider the two synoptic passages in which, if they 
are genuine, Jesus was planting the seeds which later matured in the 
apostolic teaching concerning the atoning efficacy of His death. 
Admittedly it is impossible to find in Christ's own teaching a theory 
concerning the connexion between atonement and His death; the 
question is whether the Synoptics furnish any evidence for holding 
1 
that He connected them at all. 
In general I think it is fair to say that the Ransom Passage 
and the accounts of the Lord's Supper are an essential part of the 
valid evidence in the Synoptics that Jesus did interpret His own 
mission in the light of the Suffering Servant poems and their 
2 
message of vicarious sacrifice. 
1. This question must be distinguished from that of whether He 
connected forgiveness exclusively with His death. 
2. Prof. Burney has suggested, in direct criticism of Rashdall's 
"Bampton Lectures ", that Lk. 4:18 in which Jesus reads from Is. 
61 and then declares it fulfilled' "this day" is also very strong 
evidence indicating that He connected the Suffering Servant 
passages with His own Messianic task. (Cf. his The Old Testament 
Conception of Atonement p.11. S.R. Driver agre fi w3 this 
interpretation). He also suggests that Jesus was consciously 
fulfilling the one Old Testament passage which makes this same 
connexion (Zechariah, Ch.9) when He made His triumphal entry upon 
an ass. And another such instance of conscious fulf ilment,Burney 
adds, was His silence before the High Priest and Pilate; cf. Is. 
53:7 'He was oppressed, yet when he was afflicted he opened not 
his mouth'. Furthermore, there are passages in which our 
Lord's references to His death as the fulfilment of scripture at 
least lend corroborative support to the above contention. Cf. 
Mk. 9:12 Mt. 26:24, 54, 56; Lk. 18:31 -33; 2237 (quotes Is.53: 
12). Lk.24:25 -7 46tcontain similar allusions, but they are spoken 
after the Crucifixion -on the way to Emmaeus, and just before the 
Ascension. 
- 355 - 
The former passage is open to suspicion only if it is supposed 
that AJTeov is necessarily connected with later theories. If, 
however, the statement is taken as signifying simply that Christ's 
death will constitute a "covering ", a "satisfaction ", for sin, so 
that lives which had been forfeit because men were in bondage to sin 
bF 
will nowAreleased, there is no reason for reading into it later 
theories, nor for supposing that Christ could not have said it. At 
the same time, the substitutionary or representative significance 
which cannot be eliminated from the saying need not be taken as 
1 
associated with punishment at all. The context in which the 
expression stands shows clearly that Jesus does not regard his 
sacrifice as one which will rescue His disciples from physical 
suffering and death(which the Jewish mind inevitably connected with 
punishment; the same way of suffering, He says, in incumbent upon 
His disciples. 
Rashdall (unlike Johannes Weiss, for example) does not attempt 
to claim that there is no connexion between the Lord's Supper and His 
coming death; he merely attempts to show that the symbolism had 
nothing to do directly with the forgiveness of sins. However, the 
passage in Jeremiah which underlies Christ's reference to the New 
2 
Covenant contains a reference to the forgiveness of sins. The 
textual problem concerning these accounts is too complicated to be 
discusssd here. But anyone who wishes to arguethat mediation of 
forgiveness through Christ is a conception inconsistent with His own 
teaching, and that therefore the words of institution must reflect 
the later ideas of the Church, has to consider other synoptic evidence. 
1. Rashdall associates the offering of a vicarious sacrifice to God 
with punishment for sin, partially because of his pre -occupation 
with later theories, but also because of a misinterpretation of 
the Old Testament conception, which did not imply that the sin 
was transferred to the sacrificial animal. 
2. Jer. 31:34. 
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The idea of the New Covenant signifies that God takes the initiative 
in seeking out sinners and receiving them in penitence; but this 
same conception of the divine initiative underlies Christ's whole 
teaching of forgiveness, and His work as Mediator cannot be 
1 
dissociated from it. If, then, there is really an incompatibility 
between (a) assuring men that repentance will bring forgiveness, and 
(b) so living and dying as to mediate this forgiveness, it affects 
the whole synoptic account and not merely the narrative of the Last 
Supper. What one takes to have been Christ's own conception of His 
Person naturally determines, to a large extent, what one takes to 
have been His own conception of the nature of His task as Mediator. 
The fundamental question, which again raises the issue concern- 
ing an alleged discrepancy between apostolic teaching and the words 
of Jesus, is whether (a) forgiveness of the penitent, and (b) 
2 
propitiatory mediation, are mutually exclusive or supplementary 
ideas. The essence of the idea of propitiation is that sin raises 
a barrier which has a two -fold aspect because the relation has two 
participants. If Christ realized that His death was necessary for 
forgiveness, as a revelation of God's love which would inspire 
repentance, that in itself would establish a connexion which Rashdall 
does not seem willing to admit as existing in Christ's mind. This, 
of course, has to do solely with the man -ward aspect of forgiveness. 
The idea of propitiation also implies that God must meet a necessity 
arising out of His relation to the sinner, - a necessity wherein 
the barrier raised by sin requires the oblation of a substitute as 
well as man's repentance. Now so long as God's love is regarded 
1. For example, the four parables of forgiveness in Mt. 18:23 -35 
and Lk. 15, cannot be dissociated from Jesus' own work as 
Messiah. 
2. The attempt to claim that the words of institution are not 
associated with Jewish ideas of propitiation seems peculiarly 
unfounded. 
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as a cause, not a result, of propitiation, Christ's identification 
of Himself (e.g., at the Baptism) with sinners, and His obedient 
offering of Himself in a representative capacity for mankind, fulfil 
the conditions of this Jewish system in a manner purged of all crude 
and repellent associations. Whether the idea entered into Christ's 
own mind that a life of perfect obedience could alone make perfect 
reparation for sin, is a question which need not be raised here; 
for, irrespective of it, is there any fundamental incompatibility 
between the idea that the Messiah mediates forgiveness through 
vicarious suffering offered in reparation for sin, and the idea that 
men should themselves make such reparation as they can through re- 
pentance? Surely the two ideas are supplementary, not contradictory, 
and that is enough to suggest that Christ could have spoken the words 
which Rashdall in inclined to regard as a gloss (as irreconcilable 
with His teaching as a whole).. That the "substitutionary" or 
"representative" interpretation alone takes account of the God -ward 
side of the relation broken by sin, is a further contention which 
will concern us later. 
A word needs to be added about the earliest aposto'ic teaching. 
It is true, as Rashdall says, that there is no explicit reference in 
the speeches of Peter and Stephen in Acts to the death of Jesus as 
offered for the remiss ion of sins; nevertheless, if the Suffering 
Servant passages were used by Him to interpret the significance of 
His death as an offering for the sins of others in obedience to God's 
will, then there is definite evidence to the effect that Peter, at 
least, came to understand this interpretation and use it in his 
1. Cf. Atonement, p. 77. 
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preaching; for he refers four times to Christ as a "Servant". 
While these references assuredly do not constitute a theory (and, 
in any case, the author of Acts was not here attempting to furnish 
an account of early Christian doctrine), they undermine what 
Rashdall seeks to prove by a questionable appeal to the argument 
from silence. The same sort of argument (i.e., one based solely 
upon the evidence in Acts) could prove that (except for 20:28) 
St. Paul had no theory of the Atonement at the time he made the 
speeches which this book records. 
Moreover, if the preceding criticism of Rashdall's treatment 
of the synoptic evidence is at all valid, then the connexion between 
prophecy and Christ's death, which became the foundation for 
authoritative explanation, does not bear the appearance of being 
an apologetic tour de force,as it does in Rashdall's account. He 
does not deny that the beginnings of a theory were supported by the 
experience of the early Church; but he does make sweeping state- 
ments on the basis of what must be regarded as insufficient evidence. 
For example he writes: 
'Apart from some authoritative assurance that God had forgiven, 
and forgiven in consequence of Christ's death, there was nothing to 
suggest any special connexion between what the Christian experienced 
and the death of the Messiah'.2. 
If the doctrine which St. Paul received from the apostles 
were one which indeed had foundation in the words of Jesus toward 
the close of His ministry, then the apostle's theoretical 
1. Cf. Acts 3:13, 26; 4 :27, 30. With regard to Peter's dis- 
courses, cf. also Acts 2:23. Moreover, it is important to 
note. that Acts 5:30 and 10:39 refer to the passage in Deuterono- 
my (21 :23) which St. Paul quotes in Gal. 3:13. Finally, 
Philip's quotation from Is. 53 in Acts 8:32f. is not without 
significance, although it contains no direct allusion to 
forgiveness. 
2. Atonement, p.82. The "authoritative assurance" referred to is 
an acceptance of passages like Is. 53 as predictions of Christ's 
death; Rashdall is arguing that the early doctrine was 
grounded on prophecy, not on any teaching of Christ. 
explanation of the Atonement was not merely a necessary attempt 
to vindicate the infallibility of the Old Testament and its 
"Messianic" predictions. While it is possible to distinguish as 
to form between doctrinal and experiential passages in his writings, 
there is no such hiatus between them, in content and meaning, as 
Rashdall supposes. A direct tie connects the cosmic significance of 
the Cross and the inward experience of regeneration in the apostle's 
mind. 
In one respect at least, St. Paul's teaching of justification 
is a legitimate development of Christ's message of forgiveness; both 
hold to the promise that God offers forgiveness to men while they 
are yet sinners. Assurance of this brought to the apostle the 
inward experience of release from bondage to the law; and in his 
doctrinal teaching he sought to show that in the Cross alone was to 
be found the secret as to how a righteous God could thus deal with 
sinners, 
Rashdall's exposition of Pauline teaching somehow fails to 
come to grips with these fundamental points. He rightly interprets 
St. Paul as holding that God provides atonement; the change wrought 
by the work of Christ is within man; God's attitude toward men is 
one of constant love. But it is still conceivable that St.Paul's 
theory does more than Rashdall's to explain how God's constant love 
operates in removing the power and guilt of sin against which man 
himself is impotent. Once again, Rashdall's own teaching is at one 
with the apostle's to the extent that for the latter salvation 
(potential in this earthly life, actual at the Judgment) is contingent 
upon a man's actual moral state; but salvation is not the same as 
1 
reconciliation. St. Paul holds that men may become perfect in Christ 
______ =-_____________________________________________________________ 
1. Rashdall lays the whole stress on the technical term 
"justificationXss; he mentions "reconciliation's only in a note 
(cf. Atonement, pp. 124 f.); there his comment upon how 
infrequently the word is used takes account of the substantive 
only, and not of the verb. 
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and thus saved, only because they may be cleansed from guilt and may 
enter into right relations with God before they are themselves 
righteous; they are then able to combat sin and work out their own 
salvation because they do so as children of God, not as slaves to a 
moral law which, unaided, they are unable to fulfil. For him 
reconciliation and the assurance of forgiveness are causes of moral 
regeneration, liberating conditions which make possible the beginnings 
of righteousness. Rashdall, on the other hand, seems to make 
justification and reconciliation follow as consequences of moral change; 
a man must first become righteous to a degree by repenting, and by 
determining to alter his mode of living, and to that extent he thereby 
becomes "justified" in the sight of a righteous and loving God. Only 
the former teaching, as Protestantism has always held, provides a 
gospel for sinners. Rashdall, of course, does not regard man's own 
desire to improve morally as "meritoriousx ") since this improvement is 
obligatory upon him; moreover, he holds that this desire is called 
forth in response to a revelation of God's love in Christ. He does 
not, then, conceive of man as becoming righteous in any degree without 
God's aid. Yet he overlooks two cardinal facts: (1) moral improvement 
cannot cancel guilt, and (2) however great this moral improvement may 
be, it remains woefully inadequate. Therefore his theory fails to 
answer two questions: (1) How can we be cleansed from guilt? 
(2) If restoration to fellowship with God is dependent upon man's 
actual moral condition, whothten can be saved? St. Paul answers both 
of these questions by showing how the needs they express were fulfilled 
in a finished work, a redemptive act; this was necessarily God's 
work because nothing man can do will deliver him from the sin which 
otherwise would exclude him eternally from the presence of a righteous 
God; yet this is a work in which man can participate by union with 
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Christ. The idea that God's love thus initiates a redemptive act 
which appeases His wrath, may be distorted into a caricature; St. 
Paul, however, found revealed in the Cross at what great cost God's 
love operates in a manner consistent with His righteousness. 
Without minimizing the necessity for moral change, the apostle 
taught that we may be saved by corporate unity with the living and 
dying of One who was perfect and yet identified Himself with sinners. 
Rashdall's purely individualistic interpretation of the sinner's 
relationship with God overlooks the corporate character of guilt. 
Moreover it implies that this relationship cannot be affected by what 
God does through His Son, except as this gracious gift awakens 
regenerative forces within the sinner; this neglects the fact that 
these regenerative forces, apart from their basis in the sinner's 
participation in Christ's redemptive act, do not of themselves 
overcome sin and guilt within the soul. Rashdall's own temperament 
rendered him inaapable of appreciating St. Paul's doctrine of union 
with Christ; yet this doctrine was central to the apostle's 
1 
conception of the substitutionary significance of the Atonement. 
1. Rashdall contends that the idea that Christ was punished 
for our sins cannot be entirely eliminated from St. Paul's 
thought. Agreement with Rashdall's view would not affect 
the criticisms just offered; nevertheless there is much 
to be said against it. The sufferings of Christ do not 
have, in St. Paul's teaching, the same character as 
punishment that they would have had if a sinful man had 
been enduring them. Here the distinction involved is 
closely analogous to Anselm's; Rashdall seeks to show, 
however, that Anselm himself did not treat the distinction 
between "punishment" and "satisfaction" as absolute. 
(Cf.. Atonement, pp. 351 f). 
It is only because he fails to comprehend this essentially 
religious (and as most writers agree) mystical element, that 
Rashdall falls into the error of regarding the Pauline conception 
of redemption as primarily legalistic in temper. 
Other respects in which his exposition of St. Paul's teaching 
is inadequate can be indicated only in barest outline. His radical 
distinction between formal and experiential aspects leads Rashdall 
1 
to say that the apostle regards faith as mere intellectual belief; 
and his later qualification of this statement would seem to 
invalidate the distinction on which it is based. Throughout the 
epistles, St. Paul primarily means by faith "trust in God "; it is 
by this attitude that the believer appropriates God's offer of 
forgiveness, and though it of course contains an intellectual 
element because it implies belief in God and His work of reconcilia- 
tion, it transforms life because it establishes that relation 
whereby His love works within us. 
Again, St. Paul's teaching concerning the Atonement is indeed 
couched in legal language; but to overlook the fact that he used 
such language to express a wholly new, non -legalistic meaning, is to 
miss the point of his conviction that the gospel offers deliverance 
2 
from the idea of law. Rashdall seems to think that the legalism 
of Latin theology was a logically inevitable extension,instead of 
a distortion, of the apostle's teaching, and he fails to do justice 
1. Cf. Atonement,p.108. 
2. For example, Romans, Chs. 3 and 4 on the one hand and Ch.6 on 
the other, if they had been written by different men, might be 
said to present contradictory conceptions - the former being 
"legalistic," the latter "mystical # ") but, as flowing from the 
thought and experience of one man, each passage must be inter- 
preted in the light of the other. 
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to the manner in which Luther recovered St. Paul's conviction that the 
gospel brings freedom, not to disobey the law, but to fulfil and 
transcend it. This, and many other defects of Rashdall's treatment, 
seem to be the result of attempting to confine Christian soteriology 
wholly within ethical categories. 
We must pass over comments which might be made concerning the 
chapters in his "Bampton Lectures" which trace the doctrine from 
apostolic times to the Reformation, except to observe that most of 
the objections which he urges against Anselm's theory would be 
assented to by writers who yet maintain that the significance of the 
Atonement cannot be restricted to a "moral influence" theory. 
Because of his rather impatient scorn for the doctrine of justi- 
fication by faith, Rashdall misrepresents Luther as he does St.Paul. 
In the case of Luther there might be some excuse for distinguishing, 
not between his theory and the demands of his own religious experience 
(for the latter gave rise to the former), but between the bald state- 
ment of his theory as a reaction against Roman Catholic views of merit, 
penance and grace, and the more temperate statements in which Luther 
looks beyond justification to its fruits. Rashdall unduly concentrates 
attention upon the former of these, and thus finds an undeniably large 
body of evidence in support of his thesis that Luther over -emphasizes 
intellectual assent to a particular belief and under -emphasizes the 
necessity for moral regeneration. However, in the light of his own 
admission that Luther says much which is diametrically opposed to these 
interpretations, Rashdall might have been less hasty in deciding as to 
which strain of thought represents Luther's "main intention / ". Many of 
the extreme statements which he quotes are taken from an early 
commentary on Romans, which Luther never published; Rashdall unwisely 
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follows Denifle in stressing this manuscript. 
Luther was chiefly concerned to deny that good works or 
moral transformation could be in any sense a ground of justification 
and acquittal; at that point there is an irreducible difference 
between his views and Rashdall's, although the latter, of course, 
does not fall into Roman Catholic ideas of merit and grace. So 
far as the subjective preconditions of justification are concerned, 
then, the Lutheran idea of faith stands over against good works in 
a sharp antithesis. But there is pervasive evidence to show that 
Luther regarded moral regeneration as a necessary result of 
justification. Therefore the contradiction underlying his 
statements about faith - (a) as mere intellectual assent, or (b) as 
involving dedication of the will to God in trust - can be at least 
partially resolved if one asks whether Luther is thinking primarily 
of the ground or of the effects of justification. 
Rashdall's failure to weigh these two aspects of Luther's 
thought fairly does not affect, however, what he says in protest 
against the idea of vicarious punishment. Undeniably Luther departs 
from Pauline thought in viewing justification, in the first instance, 
as a change in God's attitude which is brought about because His 
demand for punishment has been fulfilled in Christ, irrespective of 
any change within the sinner. Rashdall's refutation of this 
conception is one which will be accepted by most English- speaking 
____________________________________________________ - _______________ 
1. Who surely was unfair to Luther. Possibly Rashdall was 
influenced by a justifiable admiration for Denifle's work on the 
University of Paris. 
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theologians today. Advocates of "objective" theories now lay the 
stress not upon acquittal (or the remission of punishment), but upon 
forgiveness; and they do not identify the two notions as Rashdall 
sometimes tends to do. 
He seems to believe that repentance and the desire to become 
righteous make the individual no longer worthy of punishment. 
Luther too, for very different reasons, held that justification and 
the remission of punishment accompany one another. I think it is 
a radical misinterpretation of Christ's work to hold that He saves 
us from such temporal punishment as we do deserve, or to hold that we 
ever become so transformed in this life as to deserve it no longer. 
Rather, faith in Him transforms the spirit in which we bear this 
punishment. More important still, it ushers us into that filial 
relationship with God which ultimately regenerates us, and thus saves 
us from the final punishment which would have been ours if we had 
been left in the power of sin. But complete salvation from punishment, 
complete righteousness, is a condition which is ours in this earthly 
life only in anticipation and hope. 
'chat Rashdall fails to explain (as we have seen) is how sinful 
men, who are never able to be perfectly righteous and loving,and 
who are therefore never worthy of fellowship with God, nevertheless 
may be assured of reconciliation. If we abstract the question from 
penal considerations, who is right, Rashdall or Luther, when we ask 
whether fellowship with God is founded upon our present obedience, 
1. J.K. Mozley, in criticizing Rashdall's book (cf.Theology,Vol.I, 
pp. 222 ff.), suggests that the penal theory can be so 
spiritualized as to be compatible with belief in God's love. 
That divine punishment is compatible with love need not be denied; 
yet the fact remains that punishment of the sinless Christ for the 
sake of acquitting the guilty can be neither loving nor just. 
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feeble as it is in the best of men, or whether it is founded 
upon a gracious gift whereby God, in Christ, overcame the 
disaster of sin at the cost of suffering? Is there any question 
as to which conception really assures us of a never- loosening 
bond with God the Father, and thus releases us from moral impotence 
and despair? Our own attempts to be loving are faltering and 
intermittent; what Christ has done for the race is for ever 
available to the contrite as a free and gracious offer of 
redemption. To say that repentance is the sole subjective 
condition necessary for forgiveness need not mean that it is a 
ground, a reason why forgiveness is offered at all. It may well 
be the case, then, that only because the reparation made by Christ 
furnishes an adequate ground of forgiveness, is repentance seen 
to be the sole human condition necessary for the receiving of it. 
The foregoing comments have made sufficiently clear the 
fundamental respects in which Rashdall's own theory seems to me 
to be inadequate - not merely because it departs from the teaching 
of the Synoptists, St. Paul and Luther, concerning an objective 
connexion between the Atonement and forgiveness, but because the 
latter conception seems to account for God's reaction against sin 
and to acknowledge man's moral impotence in a manner more in 
keeping with our actual experience of need for and assurance of 
redemption. We must now conclude this critique with a few general 
remarks. 
Rashdall's stress upon the essential compatibility between. 
God's part and Christ's part in the Atonement is entirely acceptable 
to modern theologians, whatever their particular theory may be. 
The same holds true, I believe, concerning his insistence that the 
significance of Christ's death must not be isolated from the 
character and teaching of His entire ministry. 
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Because Rashdall recognizes the distinction between vicarious 
1 
suffering and vicarious punishment, there is less excuse for his 
wholesale rejection of the substitutionary - or better, "representative" - 
conception of Christ's death. This conception need not imply at all 
that His sufferings make ours superfluous. The real difference between 
2 
Rashdall's theory and "representative" interpretations lies elsewhere. 
He would assert that the Cross reveals God's love in a manner 
which makes it possible for men to follow this same way of sacrifice 
and thus to become righteous. As such the Cross epitomizes the truth 
that God cannot achieve His good ends without the cost of suffering. 
Thus Rashdall might have connected it more explicitly than he does with 
his philosophical solution to the problem of evil. If he had done so 
the Resurrection must inevitably have taken on a significance wider 
than any which he accords to it; our Lord's endurance of suffering 
and His victory over death possess a meaning which philosophical 
arguments about evil and immortality may confirm, but which they can 
never fully express. It may also be observed, in passing, that his 
view of the Atonement is at this point compatible with the idea (which 
"objective" theories stress) that the Cross issues from a necessity, 
arising within the nature of God, for overcoming the barrier which sin 
erects between Him and His children. 
1. Space forbids a discussion of Moberly's conception of vicarious 
penitence on the part of Christ; despite Bishop Gore's remarks 
(cf. The Reconstruction of Belief, p.593), I find certain aspects 
of the idea an illuminating interpretation of our Lordb self - 
identification with sinful men; surely His sinlessness put no 
constraint upon His sympathetic understanding of remorse on the 
part of the sinful. 
2. In what follows I have not sharply differentiated between what 
Prof. Aulén calls the "classic" and the "Latin" theories (cf. 
Christus Victor), because recent interpreters of an "objective" 
theory take over some elements from both, and leave others aside. 
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What, then, is the essential difference between this and the 
best form of the "objective" theory? In both, God is conceived as 
initiating the work of redemption, and repentance is regarded as the 
subjective condition whereby man appropriates this gracious gift. 
But in the former this repentance is held to be sufficient ground for 
the restoration of fellowship between God and man; in the latter 
repentance is regarded as necessary, but insufficient. The former, 
holding that repentance itself constitutes a moral change and contains 
the promise of further improvement, makes forgiveness dependent upon 
and proportional to the degree of righteousness which the believer has 
actually attained; the latter holds that the repentant sinner does not 
become, merely in virtue of his repentance, a worthy person whose 
goodness is such that he deserves forgiveness; he cannot deserve it; 
he can only accept it humbly, as a reconciliation brought about by God 
not by first making him righteous, but despite his sinfulness. In the 
former God brings about moral improvement within the believer in order 
that He may receive him again in fellowship; in the latter,God receives 
the contrite sinner unconditionally, and his moral improvement, his 
"satisfaction, is the fruit of this restored relationship. 
Several considerations underlie these various respects in which 
the two theories stand in contrast to each other. Rashdall's rejection 
of a corporate for a purely individualistic theory of the Atonement 
makes it necessary for him to regard the redemption of the race as a 
process, while the objective theory regards it as a finished work. Of 
course he holds that Christ's work is "finished" in the sense that it 
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has made available, for all time, the means of redemption; and, on 
the other hand, "objectivists" may agree that sanctification is a 
process. The difference between the two arises at a point where 
the latter view operates under the speculative disadvantage of having 
to express a cosmic significance in the Cross which transcends temporal 
categories. My own conviction is that the latter view meets a necessity 
of experience which yet escapes complete theoretical explanation; but 
I shall express as best I can what this view seems to imply. Whereas 
Rashdall sees in the Cross the promise that individual men can be rescued 
from sin and guilt, this latter view implies that in the Cross a work 
was accomplished which makes redemption available for the race before 
we ask it. In the one case redemption comes into being with the sinner's 
change of heart; in the other case, it is "waiting" for him before that 
change. Both theories represent God's attitude as one of changeless 
love, one of constant readiness to receive the contrite; both ground 
the experience of redemption in what God does. The real distinction 
between them arises in answer to questions concerning how this constant 
love is possible, and what it implies with regard to the specific nature 
of what God was doing in Christ. The "objectivist" argues that if God, 
who is righteous, yet receives the sinner, then this fact.must be based 
upon something other than the actual condition of the sinner; for if 
the latter were the only factor to be taken into consideration, a 
1. Dr. K.E. Kirk (in Essays Catholic and Critical,pp.254- 9,274 -6) 
has criticized Rashdall's theory as to how redemption is made 
available to the believer. Dr.Kirk contends that the "exemplarist" 
theory, if it is regarded as all- sufficing, is 'not only ... 
inadequate to human needs,but also profoundly inequitable' (22.. cit., 
p.257), because the benefits of Christ's example will be appropriated 
by the believer in direct proportion to his capacity for imaginative 
response; and this capacity for imaginative quickening, on which 
moral improvement thus depends,is not a gift for which the individual 
is responsible, but one which varies with the 'accidents of 
heredity.'. For this reason he argues that theories like Rashdall's 
are 'more unethical and arbitrary than any but the most absolute 
Predestinarianism,'.(Ibid., p.258). 
-,370 - 
righteous God would merely condemn the sinful and receive the 
obedient; in that case we should all fall under condemnation, we 
should all remain in bondage to the law. `;,Ihile if God's love prompted 
Him simply to receive the sinner unhampered, "letting by -gones be by- 
gones," then how could He be at the same time righteous - and, above 
all, why was it necessary for Him to permit His Son to be crucified? 
Rashdall has his own answer to the latter question, but his reply to 
the former contention is utterly inadequate. And this in turn reveals 
an important deficiency in his interpretation of the Cross; for he 
fails to emphasize that it is a revelation of God's reaction against 
sin, as well as a revelation of God's love. 
I have suggested that the "objective" theory implies a view of 
redemption which transcends temporal categories. In other words, 
unless one is willing to support the difficult thesis that at a point 
in time God changed His attitude toward sinners, the Cross must be 
taken as the full revelation in time of what is eternally the harmonizing 
1 
bond between love and righteousness within God's nature. Rashdall's 
own treatment of the problem of the temporal and the eternal is so 
inadequate that he never reaches the conception of redemption as a 
working out, in the sphere of created being, of what is eternally 
actual - that is, "accomplishedx ", "finishedx ",- in the divine sphere. 
1. Thus it is possible, I believe, to transcend the antinomy which 
Aulgn sets between the classic theory, which represents the Atone- 
ment as a continuous divine work, and the Anselmic or Latin theory 
which represents it as "finished, ".(Cf.Christus Victor,pp.21 f). 
In so far as the former involves a conception of God as "changing 
His own attitude "(cf.ibid., p.22), it seems to me to be unintellig- 
ible - unless this is merely a figurative expression. On the basis 
of an objective theory, only some such significance as is suggested 
above will explain how Christ could declare sins to be forgiven 
during His earthly ministry (cf.IIk.2:3 -12); the strict Anselmic 
interpretation cannot account for forgiveness prior to the 
Crucifixion. 
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Furthermore, his conception of the Incarnation does not make 
it possible for him to affirm that the personality of Christ is 
identical with the personality of God; the Atonement, for him, is 
what God does through Christ, not, strictly, in Christ. Doubtless . 
he would not regard this fact as a decisive objection, because he 
claims that God takes the initiative in redemption, working through 
Christ as Mediator. But it is an indispensable part of the objective 
theory just described that both the cost of sin and the triumph of 
love, which are manifest in the Cross, shall be understood as falling 
literally within the sphere of God's own Being. 
The corporate aspect of this theory, which is indispensable to 
any adequate account of how guilt is removed, does not necessarily 
involve a form of identification between personalities. The figure 
of the body and its members can be so employed as to do justice to the 
fact that salvation means being made perfect in Christ without losing 
personal identity; the figure is one of unity through communion,not 
1 
through fusion. Rashdall still might protest that this opposing 
theory entails an immoral conception of imputed righteousness. The 
difficulties of this conception are undeniable; yet in its best form 
it does not mean that God counts us as righteous whether or not we 
shall ever become so. Here again, the conception represents an effort 
to express a truth which transcends temporal categories: what man,in 
time, can only anticipate as future is, in the supernatural Kingdom, 
eternally actual; unless redemption be viewed as corporate, what Christ 
did cannot, of course, be regarded as actualizing for the race a perfect 
obediente which men do not fulfil in time, but which they may fulfil in he 
eternity through union with Christ. 
1. This is doubly clear in the Pauline conception of a resurrected 
spiritual body. 
.n 's 
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Finally, this supra- temporal reference seems to me to have 
good foundation in the apocalyptic aspects of Christ's conception of 
the Kingdom. His call to repentance was one which set the urgent 
necessity for establishing right relations with God while we are yet 
sinners, above any conception of the progressive moralization of the 
race. How can the "moral influence" theory really account for His 
invitation to publicans and harlots? 
Conclusion. 
It would be superfluous for me to attempt a synthesis here 
of the "conclusions" which have been emerging throughout the preceding 
pages. My remarks on Christian doctrine have been coloured by the 
conviction that a "rationalistic" theology like Rashdall's, which 
attempts merely to move logically from the sphere of the human to the 
sphere of the divine, can never do justice to unique elements in the 
Christian revelation which must be received prior to speculation. On 
the other hand, I have written with the conviction that the true 
distinction between natural and revealed theology is merely one which 
marks the difference between God's direct and His mediated self - 
expression. A theology which makes this distinction absolute, 
assigning revelation and reason to different spheres, fails to show 
the revelance of direct revelation for human life in this world; by 
renouncing natural theology, it neglects such relationships as can 
be established between revealed knowledge and our demands for 
intellectual satisfaction. Knowledge of God is wider than 
ratiocination, but it is not irrational. There is no simple formula 
for showing how the uniqueness of the Eternal and its relevance for the 
temporal can be brought into fruitful harmony; but the task which mans 
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nature as a thinking being lays upon theologians to-day, 
as in the past, cannot be shirked. We may well learn 
afresh from Barthianism some of the dangers of extreme 
rationalism; but ttashdall's system is at least a 
salutary reminder tnat revelation (although our con- 
ception of it may differ from his) can and does satisfy 
the reason and conscience. 
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